Before addressing Chris’ latest concerns, I will take a few moments to respond to a guest post that was made on ChoosingHats by ‘ZaoThanatoo’.

On Zao’s Thoughts:

I mentioned in several places throughout my posts in this series that there must be real caution taken by the theist with regard to arguments such as these, to not assume the conclusion false to show the conclusion false. Let’s quickly recap the argument in question:

Horrific Suffering (def.) = that most awe-full form of suffering that gives the victim and/or the perpetrator a prima facie reason to think that his or her life is not worth living.

(1) Necessarily, if God exists, finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God realize their deepest good.

(2) Necessarily, if God exists, the prevention of horrific suffering does not prevent there being finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God.

(3) Necessarily, if God exists, the prevention of horrific suffering does not prevent there being finite persons who realize their deepest good. (from 1, 2)

(4) Necessarily, if God exists, there is horrific suffering only if its prevention would prevent there being finite persons who realize their deepest good.

(5) Necessarily, if God exists, there is no horrific suffering. (from 3, 4)

(6) There is horrific suffering.

(7) God does not exist (from 5, 6)

Now, it should be obvious that any objection to the argument which has as a component the denial of (7) is going to be fallacious. One cannot respond to this argument solely by saying, “God exists and he has morally sufficient reasons for permitting horrific suffering.’ Zao, however, extends my cautionary point into his own further analysis when he says:

Mitch contends that one must not assume that God exists (A) in order to disprove the above conclusion that God does not exist (~A).  This, he asserts, is question-begging.  However, for anyone wishing to criticize the conclusion, the alternative is to assume that God does not exist in order to argue that he does.  This is self-contradictory.  We must either assume God exists or God does not exist (A or ~A, Excluded Middle) in presenting our reasoning.  But assuming ~A to prove A is self-contradictory and assuming A to prove ~~A Mitch asserts is question-begging.

These are some strange assertions. If it’s the case that assuming that God does not exist in order to argue that he does is self-contradictory there is a real problem for argumentation in general, as assuming the negation of some proposition to prove that proposition is simply what is meant by “proof via contradiction” or reductio ad absurdum and it would be highly controversial for Zao to claim that instances of reductio are self-contradictory, yet that seems to be his suggestion. Further, it’s not clear why one need either assume that God exists or that she does not in analyzing the argument. This seems to entail that nobody who is agnostic with regards to the existence of God could ever analyze the argument, or that agnostics are committed to the claim that God does not exist, which is false. He appears to cite the “Law of Excluded Middle” as justification for this claim, but this seems confused. It may be the case that “God exists” is either true or false but this does not entail that one has to regard it as so. For example, the “Law of Excluded Middle” tells us that the proposition “Some man named Johnathan will ride a bicycle on November 21, 2014 and crash it into an Ice Cream Stand” is either true or false,  but this in no way entails that I must assume that the proposition is true nor assume that it is false. In short, nothing about the above argument begs the question. This should be clear, but it can be made clearer by formalizing the argument, if one wishes. If such is done, it will be evident that no premise is, nor has as a premise in its justification, the conclusion.

Zao also states:

I’m attempting to elevate the conversation by recognizing the epistemic role which properly basic beliefs or ultimate presuppositions (call them what you like) play in dealing with issues such as the problem of horrific suffering.

The talk about properly basic beliefs is quite confusing as it’s not relevant to the argument at all. I can only assume that when Zao speaks of “assuming” he’s not speaking of “assuming” in the logical sense, but rather in the epistemic sense. Of course, the fallacy of begging the question is a logical fallacy and so whatever might be going on with my epistemology it does not impact the logic of the argument. That is, even if I do believe that God does not exist, that does not make my giving the above argument question begging. Also, I have noticed a general trend amongst presuppositionalists to not only assume a sort of foundationalist epistemology, but to even assume others are foundationalists! How can I have properly basic beliefs or ultimate presuppositions if I think foundationalism is false? This isn’t an immediately relevant thought, but it’s interesting enough to flag.

Zao continues:

In Premise 1 we are told “Necessarily, if God exists, finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God realize their deepest good.”  Let’s break this down quickly for definitional purposes.  We’ll take “finite persons” to be, well, finite persons.  Finite persons who “ever more fully experience the reality of God” are people living life.  Every day every finite person existing ever more fully experiences the reality of God in various ways and to varying degrees, but every aspect of life is an experience of God in one way or another.  “Realizing their deepest good” means simply that they glorify God; and one may glorify God through either salvation or judgment.

So while Mitch’s definition is good, it is incomplete, as he stated: “…Indeed such an experience of God’s reality might manifest itself in different ways to different persons.”  Indeed, some people may realize their “deepest good” (glorifying God) through horrific suffering under the judgment of God for their sins.  So, given the above definitions, Premise 2 is false since certain persons glorify God most fully by suffering horrifically under judgment for their sins; and preventing that category of people from suffering would prevent them from “realizing their deepest good.”

Here, unfortunately, Zao misconstrues the argument. The finite persons who “ever more fully experience the reality of God” are not people living life simpliciter. They are the people who believe they are in a mutually interactive relationship with God of the sort to which theists commonly attest. This is a stipulative definition and I could have perhaps made it clearer, but this is one example of why I dislike long discussions pertaining to a brief survey article of some argument, there are things which get left out or overlooked that aren’t so left out or overlooked in the primary source. But, moving on, Zao is also mistaken about what it means to “realize one’s deepest good.” If you note premise (1) it’s explicitly defining what it means to realize one’s deepest good, and it means to ever more fully experience the reality of God. The rest of Zao’s response in its current form can be overlooked since it’s simply not relevant. Zao has, perhaps unintentionally, strawmanned the argument from Horrific Suffering.

On Chris’ Thoughts:

In Chris’ recent response he begins to steer the discussion in a different direction. He states:

Mitch claims that, “In the background of the argument is the question ‘What would a perfect being do?’” However, the argument pertains to God and not necessarily a “perfect being,” thus insofar as a question like this is in the background of the argument, the question is, “What would God do?” If the Christian concept of God is in view then it is the Christian concept of God which must be evaluated in terms of what the Christian God would do. Otherwise the argument simply does not pertain to the Christian God.

The argument does take the term God to refer to a perfect personal being and insofar as Chris might propose that the Christian God is not a perfect personal being, his conception of God evades the force of the argument. I didn’t make this fact explicit in the opening post for a few reasons: the first post was never intended to be exhaustive and the position that God is not a perfect being is a minority position in the philosophy of religion, to the best of my knowledge. With that said, I do know of a recently published paper which seeks to argue against the claim that “If God exists, God is perfect” though the title escapes me at the time of writing (e-mail me if you really want to know). With that said, there are a couple of options (at least that I can foresee at this very moment) along this road of objection. One can argue against any argumentation which seeks to establish that fact, obviously. Or one can argue for the proposition, “If God exists, God is imperfect.” Also, one claim that the attributes which I’ve argued would belong to a perfect being in fact would not. We can explore Chris’ article to see which, if any, of these routes are explored.

Firstly, it’s important to note that Chris presents some citations which seek to argue against the Ontological Argument. They don’t accurately address this argument however since no appeal has been made to God being that which none greater can be conceived. For that reason, a lot of what follows will be slightly misdirected but I will respond to what I think can be redirected appropriately. Chris first cites Van Til:

[W]e should be careful when we say that God is the being than whom none higher can be thought. If we take the highest being of which we can think, in the sense of have a concept of, and attribute to it actual existence, we do not have the biblical notion of God. God is not the reality that corresponds to the highest concept that man, considered as an independent being, can think. Man cannot think an absolute self-contained being; that is, he cannot have a concept of it in the ordinary sense of the term. God is infinitely higher than the highest being of which he can form a concept…When we speak of our concept or notion of God, we should be fully aware that by that concept we have an analogical reproduction of the notion that God has of himself. (Quoted in Bahnsen, Analysis, 634)

This quotation particularly misses the mark, but it can be illustrative. Van Til is arguing against the claim that God is the greatest conceivable being on the basis that no matter how great a being human persons can conceive, God is infinitely greater. Based on this quotation, one might want to respond to Van Til by saying that God is at least the greatest conceivable being or God is no lesser than the greatest conceivable being. Both of these options satisfy the above criticisms of Van Til and allow for one to still run an Ontological Argument, albeit of a different flavor. How is this relevant to the Argument from Horrific Suffering? Well, if the objection is that no matter how many great things I think being perfect would entail my list will never be exhaustive, we can absorb the objection by simply replying that while this may be true, being perfect could not be anything less. That is, perhaps my reflections lead me to say of God that, as a perfect being, she is perfectly loving and perfectly compassionate. I should not claim to therefore have exhausted God’s attributes, but what I can claim is that any further property ascribed to God such that God’s perfection increases will add to and not take away from those about which I have managed to think. Perhaps Bahnsen is in agreement when he states:

However, God has also revealed that He is much greater than anything that we can finitely imagine. His thoughts are higher than our thoughts (without our thoughts being false or misleading). (Bahnsen, Analysis, 634, n.163)

The key thing to notice here is that it is said God is much greater than anything we imagine. Greater, not worse.

Chris continues:

Recall that [Van Til] claims, “When we speak of our concept or notion of God, we should be fully aware that by that concept we have an analogical reproduction of the notion that God has of himself.” What Van Til is saying is that our concept of God  is God’s concept of God. Now this in and of itself is rather interesting, for surely no one should expect a Christian, which I would at the moment say that I am, to accept a man’s concept of God over God’s concept of God, but that is precisely what Mitch is asking us to do.

Let us keep in mind that Chris can only non-question-beggingly assert that God has a concept of God if it is non-question-begging to assert that God exists. In order for this assertion to be non-question begging, he has to mean by God something other than what the argument means by God; something other than a perfect personal being, since he has not yet argued that any of my ascriptions are false. He has suggested that my ascriptions are inexhaustive but that is of no consequence to the argument unless there is a necessary property of God such that its existence renders the operation of some other property limited. It’s yet to be seen if a suggestion such as this is even coherent, or if coherent, can apply to the ascriptions made in the previous articles.

Chris goes on to cite a previous quote of mine, I will quote the relevant portion:

Many of my discussions with Christians have resulted in their looking at the Christian story and saying that particular conceptual analyses don’t line up with the Biblical conception of God. As I’ve said before, so long as our conceptual analyses are reasonable, so much the worse for the Biblical conception of God; if a God did exist, it would not be that one.

This follows from taking the proposition “If God exists, God is a perfect personal being” to be true. If that is indeed true (and I hope to present my argumentation for this in a future article), and if the Christian story presents a depiction of God that is not a perfect personal being, so much the worse for that depiction. I hope my statement is clearer now, in light of what’s been discussed so far.

Towards the end of his response, Chris calls into question some of the ascriptions I’ve made and while I don’t see an argument against them in what he’s written, there are some questions worth answering. Chris says:

Any problems with Mitch applying his concept of “compassion” to the Christian God are now apparent as well. He writes, “Granting that there can exist no being more compassionate than God, if she exists, this perfect compassion coupled with perfect knowledge of what it is to undergo Horrific Suffering entails that God is, as Schellenberg puts it, maximally opposed to these sufferings.” But why does Mitch grant that God is compassionate at all? Perhaps some god is the very opposite of compassionate even in Mitch’s understanding of the matter. How would the argument then apply to that god?

Taking God to be a perfect personal being, we can reason as to the properties such a being would have by analyzing out the great-making properties of human persons; the great-making properties of personhood. That is, human beings possess the properties of being loving, being compassionate and being generous. These properties differ in quality from, say, the property of being deceptive or the property of being violent such that the properties of being loving, compassionate and generous can be called great-making properties. There are a lot of ways in which we can hash out this idea, but for the purposes of this article we can say that they are the properties which are intrinsically better to have than not, the properties we regard as great-making in that the more of these a person has, the more we speak of their excellence as a person in the positive sense. Now God, if the perfect personal being, will possess all the great-making properties of human persons to their maximal (highest possible) degree and probably possess some great-making properties that human persons do not. It is because of this that we can perform a conceptual analysis of what love means, what compassion means and so on, and reason (even if inexhaustively) as to which properties a perfect personal being would have. Such reasoning in this case has led us to the conclusion that because of God’s perfect knowledge and compassion which entails a profound awareness and opposition (compassion is sympathetic opposition), she will know what it is to suffer horrifically and not permit such a state if unnecessary for the deepest good of human persons. Again, since it is unnecessary for the deepest good of human persons, the existence of horrific suffering shows us there is no God.

So, in summation, and to be precise, the argument demonstrates that there exists no perfect personal being. It may turn out that this argument does not impact Chris in any way because as a Calvinist, he already agrees that there exists no perfect personal being. If this is the case, so be it, as the argument was never addressed to Chris directly (though his responses are always welcome). Certainly many people do believe in a perfect personal being and this argument has much discussion to provide amongst them. Alternatively, Chris might argue against the properties I’ve associated with perfection; arguments which I imagine will be quite interesting given how obvious the analyses seem upon reflection. At any rate, having the discussion head in this direction (if it continues) could serve to be very beneficial in understanding not only this argument, but other important issues in the philosophy of religion.

Note: For those who may not know, the article image is a reference to the old Christian poem entitled “Footsteps” which tells the story of a person told by God that they never walk alone, when God is asked then why at times there is only one set of footprints she remarks that those are the times in which she carried the person. I think this, though a story, can help to demonstrate what perfect compassion might look like.

At this point, Chris is still challenging premise (4) of the following argument:

Horrific Suffering (def.) = that most awe-full form of suffering that gives the victim and/or the perpetrator a prima facie reason to think that his or her life is not worth living.

(1) Necessarily, if God exists, finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God realize their deepest good.

(2) Necessarily, if God exists, the prevention of horrific suffering does not prevent there being finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God.

(3) Necessarily, if God exists, the prevention of horrific suffering does not prevent there being finite persons who realize their deepest good. (from 1, 2)

(4) Necessarily, if God exists, there is horrific suffering only if its prevention would prevent there being finite persons who realize their deepest good.

(5) Necessarily, if God exists, there is no horrific suffering. (from 3, 4)

(6) There is horrific suffering.

(7) God does not exist (from 5, 6)

In my most recent article I outlined reasons for thinking (4) is true. I want to bring out some underlying strands of the debate, that will simultaneously address Chris’ concerns.

In the background of the argument is the question “What would a perfect being do?” In answering this question, one engages in conceptual analysis (not just this question, practically all of Western philosophy involves conceptual analysis). In analyzing concepts, we take something like the concept of perfect love, for example, and ask the stereotypical philosopher question of what it means to be perfectly loving. It is the hope of the philosopher that such analysis leads to deeper understandings of the concepts in question. In my last article, I presented a series of considerations for thinking that a perfect being would only permit the existence of horrific suffering if it’s prevention would prevent finite persons from realizing their deepest goods. Forgive me for quoting at length:

Let us delve further, take the state in question, that of Horrific Suffering, defined as being “that most awe-full form of suffering that gives the victim and/or the perpetrator a prima facie reason to think that his or her life is not worth living.” States such as this are often the most difficult times in people’s lives, one need only speak with someone who has gone through such turmoil to realize this fact. God, however, would not even need to speak with these persons. The perfection of God surely entails an omniscience that encompasses all kinds of knowledge. This includes a perfect knowledge of how particular states feel to her created beings and thus, complete insider knowledge of the experiences of every created being. Granting that there can exist no being more compassionate than God, if she exists, this perfect compassion coupled with perfect knowledge of what it is to undergo Horrific Suffering entails that God is, as Schellenberg puts it, maximally opposed to these sufferings. Granting that God stands in maximal opposition to the experience of Horrific Suffering it is surely the case, entailed by our aforementioned analyses, that God allows persons to suffer horrifically only if such suffering is a necessary condition of these persons realizing their deepest good; a relationship with the Creator that will unfold throughout all of eternity, the only thing that God’s perfect nature will deem enough. In fact, even if the existence of Horrific Suffering were a necessary condition of some very-good-other-goods such that they, perhaps in quantity, “outweighed” the non-good state of Horrific Suffering, our above analyses entail that permitting such suffering is still inconsistent with the divine nature!

Given the analysis of the concepts in question, the conclusion to which we are led certainly seems to be that (4) is true. That is, reasoning about what these particular things mean leads us to a conclusion about what a being with those properties would do.

Thus, when Chris suggests that God has morally sufficient reasons for causing or permitting horrific suffering, a few things are occurring. Firstly, he begs the question against the conclusion drawn from the conceptual analysis. He assumes that there can be a reason such that in light of this reason God would permit the existence of horrific suffering even in cases where the deepest good of persons does not have such suffering as a necessary condition. But, our conceptual analysis leads us to the conclusion that there is no such reason; God would not do such a thing. Chris cannot merely assume the failure of the conceptual analysis, he has to argue for it.

The most relevant portion of Chris’ response, is, I think the following:

Is the thought that one’s life is not worth living really something which God is “maximally opposed to?” Many of us have in fact had such thoughts and have subsequently gotten over it. Some people do not get over it. If it is true that Hitler committed suicide then it is likely the case that he did not get over it. But is God “maximally opposed” to Hitler’s horrific suffering or the possible result of him taking his own life? What about the well-to-do millionaire who decides after losing a few million that his life is no longer worth living by virtue of the fact of him losing those few million?

Well, if our conceptual analysis is reasonable (which I contend it is) then the affirmative is a reasonable conclusion to draw. I’m not sure if Chris has ever gone through such a period, but at the very least he probably knows of someone who has gone through such a period and even many who have “gotten over it” regard it as the worst point in their lives. The relevant portion of the analysis is the feeling involved with horrific suffering, not the antecedent conditions. We are reasoning about a being that is perfectly compassionate and because of her omniscience shares in our experience. Whether Hitler, a millionaire, or whomever, the experience of Horrific Suffering does not change in content. Chris has even admitted this to an extent, in pointing out that it may have led to Hitler taking his life. It is easy for us, I think, to scoff at people like Hitler and say that they deserve it or what not, but we should not assume that a perfect being, if she exists, shares our shortcomings in this respect; we many not be perfectly compassionate, but surely she is.

So, has Chris offered any reasons to think that the above conceptual analysis is in some way misguided? Not directly. Directly, he’s only begged the question against it by speaking of “morally sufficient reasons for God to permit horrific suffering.” There are hints of a better reply in his responses however, namely, that of “skeptical theism.” A treatment of that topic would require another article, so for now I will only flag it as a possible course of objection for Chris.

Something that I’ve mentioned before seems relevant yet again. Whereas I am asking the question, “What would a perfect being do?” Chris seems to be asking the question, “What has a perfect being done?” The difference is subtle, yet illuminating in how both of us approach this, and probably many other issues in the philosophy of religion. There is some initial question as to whether or not the being Bolt calls “God” possesses the properties of perfection I’ve ascribed to the term. There is a tendency that I have experienced in my many discussions with Christian people to assume that this world is the type of world that God would create, since God did create it. But if our conceptual analyses lead us to discover that this world is not the world that a God would create as I think is the case here, we are left with the conclusion that there is no such being. Many of my discussions with Christians have resulted in their looking at the Christian story and saying that particular conceptual analyses don’t line up with the Biblical conception of God. As I’ve said before, so long as our conceptual analyses are reasonable, so much the worse for the Biblical conception of God; if a God did exist, it would not be that one. While I think there are hints of this confusion occurring in Chris’ thought, I would like to thank him for not, as many confusedly and amateurishly have, done something like throw the book of Job at me or cite various parables from the Bible. It should be clear how to do so in this context, would only be to beg the question even further.

So, our conceptual analysis seems to lead us to the conclusion that this world, with it’s occurrences of horrific suffering, is not the world that a perfect being would create and thus, there is no God.

Chris’ most recent response chooses to set aside his initial two objections and focus in on premise (4) of the argument:

(4) Necessarily, if God exists, there is horrific suffering only if its prevention would prevent there being finite persons who realize their deepest good.

His main complaint is that no reason is given for accepting the premise. This isn’t true, in my response I provided one such justification:

Looking at an analogous instance, it seems obvious that something has gone wrong when we are saying of the parent that they are acting in accordance with anything we might remotely pick out as being “good” when they cause or permit their beloved child to suffer horrifically when the prevention of that suffering would occur at no loss to the beloved!

This is a piece of prima facie justification and whether or not Chris finds it persuasive, it is there. I will, however, take this opportunity to say much more. If there is anything that perfect goodness is not, it is the causing or permitting of non-good states to obtain for the sake of their being non-good states. What might it mean to say of some person that they are perfectly good and without repercussion can avoid the causing or permitting of some other person their experience of pain (for example), but causes or permits such pain anyhow? It is difficult to make sense of in the same way it is difficult to make sense of there being some person such that they are omniscient, and yet they do not know my name. Whatever is a property of the person in question, it surely isn’t omniscience, and in our previous example, it surely isn’t anything close to perfect goodness. We can reason then that if a perfectly good being causes or permits the obtaining of some non-good states, her doing so must in some way be necessary for some greater good state. Surely a perfectly good being, if bringing about non-good states, does so reluctantly, takes no pleasure in doing so, and would avoid doing so if at all possible without sacrificing one of the greater goods.

Good parents exemplify this in their interactions with their children. They may take their child to the dentist, permitting the obtaining of the non-good state of painful tooth extraction, taking no pleasure in the non-good state obtaining, but permitting it because it leads to the good state of having a healthy mouth. In the above example, the parents seem justified in their permitting their child to suffer because of the upcoming greater good for the child. As Chris notes, if God exists, her being our creator grants her a particular set of rights over our lives that exceeds even that of parent and child. Given such authority, however, we are not to neglect God’s perfect goodness which would ensure that the instances of non-good states are justified in some way. Let us delve further, take the state in question, that of Horrific Suffering, defined as being “that most awe-full form of suffering that gives the victim and/or the perpetrator a prima facie reason to think that his or her life is not worth living.” States such as this are often the most difficult times in people’s lives, one need only speak with someone who has gone through such turmoil to realize this fact. God, however, would not even need to speak with these persons. The perfection of God surely entails an omniscience that encompasses all kinds of knowledge. This includes a perfect knowledge of how particular states feel to her created beings and thus, complete insider knowledge of the experiences of every created being. Granting that there can exist no being more compassionate than God, if she exists, this perfect compassion coupled with perfect knowledge of what it is to undergo Horrific Suffering entails that God is, as Schellenberg puts it, maximally opposed to these sufferings. Granting that God stands in maximal opposition to the experience of Horrific Suffering it is surely the case, entailed by our aforementioned analyses, that God allows persons to suffer horrifically only if such suffering is a necessary condition of these persons realizing their deepest good; a relationship with the Creator that will unfold throughout all of eternity, the only thing that God’s perfect nature will deem enough. In fact, even if the existence of Horrific Suffering were a necessary condition of some very-good-other-goods such that they, perhaps in quantity, “outweighed” the non-good state of Horrific Suffering, our above analyses entail that permitting such suffering is still inconsistent with the divine nature!

Premise (4) is thus established and since, as argued in the earlier articles, Horrific Suffering exists and is not a necessary condition in the relevant way, it follows that God does not exist.

Horrific Suffering (def.) = that most awe-full form of suffering that gives the victim and/or the perpetrator a prima facie reason to think that his or her life is not worth living.

(1) Necessarily, if God exists, finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God realize their deepest good.

(2) Necessarily, if God exists, the prevention of horrific suffering does not prevent there being finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God.

(3) Necessarily, if God exists, the prevention of horrific suffering does not prevent there being finite persons who realize their deepest good. (from 1, 2)

(4) Necessarily, if God exists, there is horrific suffering only if its prevention would prevent there being finite persons who realize their deepest good.

(5) Necessarily, if God exists, there is no horrific suffering. (from 3, 4)

(6) There is horrific suffering.

(7) God does not exist (from 5, 6)

Chris’ first objection takes aim at premise (2) of the argument. The premise is motivated by the existence of persons in the actual world who attest to experiencing the reality of God and who, themselves, have not gone through horrific suffering. Chris mentions that we must assume that these people are not “lying, deceived, forgetful, or otherwise confused about their alleged lack of horrific suffering.” He rightly notes the extraordinary implausibility of defending such a position, and I add that it would be a most uncharitable interpretation of those in question. However, he does suggest that such a question can be asked of their experiencing the reality of God. That is, of those who attest to experiencing the reality of God and not having gone through horrific suffering, how do we know that they are not lying, deceived or confused with respect to experiencing the reality of God? Chris says:

Now we need not take so strong a position as to deny that these people have experienced the reality of God in order to plant this objection. Rather, we may point out that the subjective nature of experiencing the reality of God is sufficient to raise our suspicions about these people who claim to have had the experience of God without the experience of horrific suffering. How do we know that what one non-suffering person believes is an experience of the reality of God is anything at all like what some suffering person believes is an experience of the reality of God?

To experience the reality of God, in the context of this argument, is to be in a personal relationship with the creator of the cosmos. A relationship of the type theists mention often. It is a being as aware of the existence of God as a child is aware of his or her loving mother. That such an experience occurs in the “ever more fully” sense is to simply point out that given the infinite complexity of God, there will always be more about God for some finite human person to know. That is, if God exists and is as awesome as theists often claim, it is difficult to see how any finite human person can exhaust the things there are to know about God, or exhaust the feelings there are to be had about God, or exhaust the myriad of forms a personal relationship with her might take. It is indeed doubtful that these things can be exhausted in the context of human-to-human relationships, let alone human-to-divine relationships.  Indeed such an experience of God’s reality might manifest itself in different ways to different persons; perhaps we should even expect such a thing given God’s infinite resourcefulness, creativity, and the existence of unique individuals. Chris’ question then seems misguided. Why should we have to know that what one non-suffering person believes to be an experience of God’s reality is what a suffering person believes to be an experience of God’s reality? What is it about the subjective nature of experiencing God’s reality that should lead us to, as Chris suggests, be suspicious of those who claim to experience God, having never suffered horrifically? I fear I must have misunderstood Chris here, as I cannot bring out the objection.

Chris’ next objection is also misguided, but I fear the fault is mine for not taking the time in the initial article to outline the meaning of “ever more fully experiencing the reality of God”.  Chris says that even granting that there exists one person who has not experienced horrific suffering and has experienced the reality of God, it does not follow that the individual is in a position to “ever more fully experience” the reality of God. I hope my paragraph above clarifies what is meant by that term. I am speaking here of, in many ways, an experience of God that unfolds throughout eternity and is such that, given God’s infinite resourcefulness and creativity, the fruits of which are inexhaustible by the finite human person. Now, as Chris continues there is an important distinction to be made. Chris says that:

It could be the case that the non-suffering individual experiences the reality of God in an increasingly fuller sense but that the individual will never experience the reality of God to the degree that she could have had she of endured horrific suffering.

But this is no objection to the argument. No matter which “level of experience” the finite human person initially finds themselves at, there will be an infinite amount of unfolding left to occur. This effectively diffuses Chris’ objection as the value is placed not in the degree at which the divine experience occurs, but in its unfolding nature, the “ever more fully experiencing.” But even setting this point aside, what would be preventing the experience of the non-sufferer from reaching the heights of the sufferer? Is it God, the nature of horrific suffering, or something else? And further, why think that such prevention is necessary? Thus, assuming Chris does not want to object to (2) by taking the strong position of denying that those who claim to experience the reality of God without having suffered horrifically have actually experienced such a reality, the premise seems to survive this round of scrutiny.

Chris’ next target is (4). The denial of (4) seems quite the denial indeed. To deny the premise suggests that if God exists, there can be instances of persons who undergo horrific suffering even though their doing so is unnecessary for the realization of their deepest good. Chris, being the good Calvinist that he is, writes:

It is conceivable that a perfectly good God would “justifiably cause/permit some person A to suffer” even if that suffering were not necessary for bringing about some greater good for A. God not only owns that person, but is Himself the standard of what is just. God does no man wrong by taking his life from him immediately and without any cause known to us, and the same might just as easily be said with respect to “horrific suffering.” Herein lies a serious difficulty with reasoning through atheists’ arguments; the assumption throughout this particular argument is that humanity is the main focus of God’s dealings rather than God being the main focus of God’s dealings as Scripture describes.

It would be fruitful to understand to which particular flavor of Divine Command Theory Chris adheres, if he does possess such a view. I think Chris owes us some argumentation as to how the existence of a perfectly good God is compatible with the existence of human persons unnecessarily undergoing horrific suffering. Looking at an analogous instance, it seems obvious that something has gone wrong when we are saying of the parent that they are acting in accordance with anything we might remotely pick out as being “good” when they cause or permit their beloved child to suffer horrifically when the prevention of that suffering would occur at no loss to the beloved! Chris hints that the analysis may be too narrow, assuming that humanity is the main focus of God’s dealings. The lurking suggestion might be that God causes or permits the existence of horrific suffering for her own “deepest good.” It’s difficult to see how this might work out. This does suggest, however, that there is some good-for-God which only obtains if finite persons exist. But goods in this category seem to be, for example, instances of personal relationship between God and the created. Certainly I do not want to limit the category to those things, but I want to note the prima facie implausibility of there being, as a good in that category, that finite beings suffer horrifically. What is it about the existence of horrific suffering that makes it a necessary condition for the realization of God’s deepest good?

But these considerations aside, Chris’ objection simply begs the question. Recall, he says: “It is conceivable that a perfectly good God would justifiably cause/permit some person A to suffer even if that suffering were not necessary for bringing about some greater good for A.” Temporarily ignoring the debate of whether or not conceivability is a suitable modal epistemology, that is, whether or not it is a suitable guide to possibility, the argument from horrific suffering seeks to demonstrate that such a thing is not possible. Thus, unless Chris is just assuming from the outset that this argument is unsound, the objection does not work. Chris needs to argue (in a non question-begging way) against any justification of that premise, rather than merely assuming the premise false!

It is also important to note that when Chris says, “… the assumption throughout this particular argument is that humanity is the main focus of God’s dealings rather than God being the main focus of God’s dealings as Scripture describes,” it seems he is taking it to be the case that if God creates a world, God creates this world. That is, he is taking the data presented by the argument and attempting to make sense of how it “fits” in this “Christian-God created world.” The argument, however, has as its conclusion that there is no God, so Chris must be careful not to beg the question against the argument by reasoning in a manner that assumes the conclusion false, to show the conclusion false. An appeal to Scripture to show that the existence of horrific suffering is consistent with the Christian story may easily yield to us the conclusion that “If God creates a world, God does not create this world.” More precisely, we must be careful in looking upon the actual world as being created by God when attempting to reason about the type of world God would create and the types of worlds she would not/could not! Argumentation may lead us to say, “So, Scripture claims that God made a world with unnecessary horrific suffering… so much the worse for Scripture.“

Given these considerations, Bolt’s objections to the argument in their current form fail, and we may successfully conclude that God does not exist.

The Argument

Let us start by defining a term:

Horrific Suffering (def.) = that most awe-full form of suffering that gives the victim and/or the perpetrator a prima facie reason to think that his or her life is not worth living.

Now, the argument as Schellenberg formulates:

(1) Necessarily, if God exists, finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God realize their deepest good.

(2) Necessarily, if God exists, the prevention of horrific suffering does not prevent there being finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God.

(3) Necessarily, if God exists, the prevention of horrific suffering does not prevent there being finite persons who realize their deepest good. (from 1, 2)

(4) Necessarily, if God exists, there is horrific suffering only if its prevention would prevent there being finite persons who realize their deepest good.

(5) Necessarily, if God exists, there is no horrific suffering. (from 3, 4)

(6) There is horrific suffering.

(7) God does not exist (from 5, 6)

As you can see, the argument is pretty straightforward. Premise (1) is developed out of the idea that there can be no deepest good (where a deepest good is a greatest good for a particular individual) that is superior to the experiencing of God’s reality. What could be superior to the experience of the perfectly good, merciful, loving, just, and wise creator of everything? Premise (2) is motivated in part by the existence of persons in the actual world who attest to experiencing the reality of God in some way and who, themselves, have not gone through the horrific suffering defined at the beginning. Such suffering then cannot be a necessary condition of finite persons realizing their deepest goods and so, the prevention of such suffering would not prevent that realization from occurring. Premise (3) is a simple deduction. Premise (4) is motivated by a typical theistic response to the traditional problems of evil. That is, many theists maintain that a perfectly good God would justifiably cause/permit some person A to suffer, if that suffering were necessary for bringing about some greater good for A. Premise (4) reason then that there are instances of horrific suffering only if preventing this suffering prevents the realization of the deepest good for finite persons. We’ve already seen that it does not, however, and so from (3) and (4) we may reason (5). There obviously are cases of horrific suffering in the world, and (6) is proffered. From (5) and (6) we may deduce that God does not exist.

Free-Will Theodicy

One possible response to the argument would be to suggest that individuals need to be able to cause (or remove) this type of suffering in order to have a world that is serious enough for the virtues of soul-making and choices of destiny. But it is difficult to see how such a condition cannot be satisfied by a world where choices leading to or resulting from the horrific suffering outlined above would not suffice. Taking our actual world as an example, one is tempted to ask “How free are we really?” As we are no doubt exposed to, there exist instances where the occurrence of murder, rape or other such crimes seem to be better explained by the prior states of the world than by the free action of the individual. That is, those who are raised terribly such that their actions seem plausibly explained in sociopsychological terms properly considered an unfreedom. But more interestingly, there are a great many people who do not engage in bringing about horrific suffering who do not even seem able[1]. There seem to be good evidences that a great many people are simply incapable of performing actions which lead to horrific suffering. There are those who, no matter how hard they tried, could not bring themselves right now to rape, murder or launch nuclear bombs at some populated area. Is there really a relevant sense in which we are free?

Freedom in the actual world, thus, does not seem ‘bound up’ with the capacity to cause horrific suffering. But perhaps our reasoning is incorrect, perhaps this is not the case. At least, God could ensure that through the relevant stages, creatures are incapable of performing actions leading to horrific suffering without rendering them less free than they actually are. But even if this is misguided as well, surely we can think of a world where such horrific suffering is absent and note that this world still contains freedom and responsibility. Persons, even if unable to bring about horrific suffering, could have the ability to bring about many nonhorrific evils. This seems to satisfy the relevant concerns as in this world there is much for us to work on improving: emotional pain still exists, we are afraid of death, we have political disputes that may result in war, etc. Such instances are occasions ripe with the ability to produce, in the relevant creatures, choices moral/spiritual significance. We seem able, then, to detach horrific suffering from the development of our selves in this way.

Free-Will Defense

Schellenberg makes use of Peter Van InWagen’s outline of a defense (page 262). Schellenberg notes that the defense, which I will not produce here, makes the following assumptions (keep in mind that InWagen is a Christian):

(1) That love might essentially involve free will.

(2) That creatures gifted with the beatific vision might nonetheless rebel against God and leave Eden.

(3) That what it means to be separate from God might be to live in a world of horrors.

(4) That seeing the horror of life without God might provided the most effective motive of cooperation and return.

(5) That if a reconciliation plan involving horrors was implemented when the rebellion first occurred, many millennia ago, that plan might nonetheless not yet have proved successful.

(6) That those who experience horrors might all know of the existence and nature of God and of God’s call to return.

(7) That if God’s plan is thus, the number and distribution of horrors today might be great and wide enough.

These are assumptions which I want to flag for the purposes of introducing Schellenberg’s argument and a couple of responses, but for a full outline and criticism of InWagen’s Christian Story consult the primary source already named at the beginning of the article. Suffice for the purposes of this brief overview is to note the assumptions above as being assumptions which are anything but obviously (or perhaps even plausibly) true. A brief interesting question to note in passing, re (1), is “What really happens to what we know of love if we find out that we cannot have done otherwise?”

Lastly, one other type of defense would suggest that it is logically possible that God, when contemplating her creation of the world, saw that for each world she would create without horrific suffering in which free creatures achieve their deepest good in freely chosen relationship with her, the attempt to actualize it would be disrupted by uncooperative free agents. Thus, since it’s possible that God cannot achieve her goal of freely chosen relationship with persons without permitting horrific suffering, then any claim that God would necessarily prevent horrific suffering is, at best, unjustified. However, this, Schellenberg suggests, is the wrong conclusion to draw. That God would necessarily prevent horrific suffering becomes unjustified only if freely chosen relationship with God is entailed by possession of the deepest good for creatures. But, it seems clearly not. Taking God’s options in creation and the infinite number of modes of relationship with her, there must be many ways in which our deepest good can be achieved in the absence of freely chosen relationship. It could be the case that God’s glory is made so clear to creatures that our desires to oppose her simply fade away. That is simply one example out of an infinite number. 

Surely God would give consideration to the modes of relationship other than freely-chosen relationship. Alternatives to permitting horrific suffering that are still compatible with finite creatures realizing their deepest good. Any such alternative, since these worlds are equally (as Schellenberg says) splendid is always going to seem preferable to a world where horrific suffering occurs, even if the world in question is a world with freely chosen relationship. Simply consider, as Schellenberg invites, “…if a perfectly good, and loving, and empathetic, and wise God is able to choose between a scenario whose goodness is very great but requires the permission of horrific suffering and a scenario with goodness equally great and no need for such suffering, how does one think the divine would choose?”

_____________________________

[1] As Schellenberg notes, where capability in this context is hashed out by my rejecting the idea of perpetrating horrors at one time, and at the same time being able to choose to do otherwise.

Identity theory, as a theory of mind, is motivated by successes in scientific research. J. J. C. Smart states the following:

“There does seem to be, so far as science is concerned, nothing in the world but increasingly complex arrangements of physical constituents.  …sensations, states of consciousness, do seem to be the one sort of thing left outside the physicalist picture… I just cannot believe that this can be so.”[1]

It is also true that in the history of science we have discovered identity relations[2] between things we previously thought to be correlations. For example, instances of what we call lightning have been correlated with electrical discharge between clouds but the empirical sciences have led us to reject the correlation relationship in favour of an identity relationship. That is, it is not the case that lightning is correlated to electrical discharge between clouds, it is rather the case (or at least seems a reasonable inference) that lighting is electrical discharge between clouds. This identity relation between types entails identity between tokens: if Type A = Type B, then any token a = token b. This is just to say that if lightning is electrical discharge, then any token (or instance) of lightning will be electrical discharge.

The question arises, then, as to what observational evidence we have to move from our correlation between ‘mental states’ and brain states to a type identity. Firstly, we know that for any creature to whom we actually attribute mental life, said creature has a brain, a complex neural structure. Further, as we learn more about the nervous system, it seems we find more and more systematic correlations between ‘mental states’, brain states, and processes. These correlations, however, surely are insufficient to establish the thesis that mental states just are brain states. The arguments for the position abductively tout the theory’s unification with science, its parsimonious advantages and its ability to explain the observed causal efficacy of ‘mind’ and brain. If the arguments are granted, it follows from the position that: (IT) for any mental state M, there is a brain state B, such that M = B.

Unfortunately for the Identity Theorist, the position does not seem capable of dealing with multiple realizability objections. The multiple realizability thesis (MR) states that mental states can be realized by different physical processes or structures. In order to establish the point, one can make use of a thought experiment wherein we encounter a Martian such that we are inclined to attribute mental states to it. Perhaps this Martian gives us very good reason, prima facie, to think that it is experiencing happiness, worry, or aggression. Suppose further that the Martian does not have our neurostructure, perhaps the Martian isn’t even a carbon based life form, are we really to accept that this physical difference therefore precludes our attribution of mental states to the being? Under (IT) it simply follows that, insofar as the Martian is as described, we are not capable of any such attribution. This seems problematic since it is, as Putnam states, “overwhelmingly likely” that we will discover at least one creature with the same mental state type as us, but distinct neural structures. In fact, it might be the case that we already have with respect to the octopus. It seems reasonable to suppose that octopi experience pain, and if this is true, according to (IT) the brain state of the creature must be of the very same type as what happens in us when we experience pain. Given the unique physiology of the octopus, it does not seem very likely that we will find similarities between our own neurostructure and the octopus’. But this is precisely what is required if (IT) is to be considered a tenable position, so it seems we must embrace a theory of mind other than (IT) to account for the aforementioned possibilities[3].

Functionalism[4] does not suffer from the inadequacies discussed above. Thinking about the mind in computational terms, as a functionalist wants to do, accommodates the above possibilities and seems clearly superior to identity theory. The functionalist purports that mental states are the internal states of a system, identified with the causal-functional role they play therein. The position can be illustrated by offering a toy theory of pain[5]:

This machine table represents the input-output relations of the mental state of PAIN, (P). As such, take (P) to refer to the mental state PAIN and (R) to refer to the mental state RELIEF, defined here as the cessation or absence of (P).

We have, in the above table, three clauses represented: the input, output and internal mediation (or the state change) such that the set of rules[6] governing PAIN are as follows:

(1) If input (BB) and in state (P), then enter state (P) and output “AHHH!”

(2) If input (PK) and in state (P), then enter state (R) and output “That’s better!”

(3) If input (BB) and in state (R), then enter state (P) and output “AHHH!”

(4) If input (PK) and in state (R), then enter state (R) and output “That’s better!”

The rules can be depicted by illustration, Rule (3), for instance, can be depicted as follows:

While visiting China, Bob was feeling great until he was bitten by a ferocious giant panda. He experienced PAIN until he was given some painkillers.

The depiction allows us to see (3) in action. Bob is in a state of RELIEF when he is BITTEN and so, by (3), Bob is now in a state of PAIN and returns to his state of RELIEF when given PAINKILLERS.

With the above table, the functionalist is able to offer an analysis of PAIN. He or she can offer an answer to the question “What is pain?” (where (i) is the input clause, (ii) is the output clause, and (iii) is the internal mediation clause):

PAIN (def.) = the state (i) that is caused by input (BB) when one is in either state (P) or (R); (ii) that causes output “AHHH!” when one is in state (P) and input is (BB) and that causes output “That’s better!” when one is in (P) and input is (PK); (iii) and that causes the system to enter into state (P) when input is (BB) and enter into state (R) when input is (PK).

In treating mental states in this way, the functionalist theory of mind achieves multiple realizability. The mind, under functionalism, is analogous to computer software. The relationship of the mind to the brain, then, is one of software to hardware. That is to say, PAIN as defined above, is not dependent on any particular hardware so long as the software runs the same, the software in this case being depicted by our machine table/set of rules. For example, think about the function of a calculator. The function can be satisfied (at least if we take a very simple notion of a calculator) on a variety of hardware, we can use an abacus, counting marbles, a Texas Instruments TI-86, our cell phones, laptops, etc. In each of these cases the hardware is different, but we can achieve the same function. This is drastically different from what the Identity Theorist wants to say about mind/mental states; under (IT) we cannot have mental states without brain states and so the identity theorist does not seem to be able to successfully answer the objection from multiple realizability, whereas the functionalist has no problem whatsoever in doing so. Under functionalism, we can admit of the aforementioned Martian and octopus that they experience mental states, without committing ourselves to any claim about the hardware which they utilize to do so. In addition to this obvious advantage of the theory, it is also ontologically neutral with respect to dualism and physicalism. Since mental states are identified with functional roles, and functional roles are multiply realizable, nothing rules out the realization of mental states by immaterial substances.

The advantages of functionalism over identity theory seem evident, but there may be one relevant concern about the thought experiments which motivated the preference towards functionalism: precisely how much weight should possibilities carry in giving a philosophy of mind? There is much to be said on the nature of possibility itself, but the relevant concern for this paper is not the coherence of particular claims about possibility, but rather (granting coherence) whether or not the claims matter at all as criticisms. Philosophers of mind don’t enjoy omniscience and so there seems to be good reason to make use of thought experiments about possible scenarios. The adequacy of a particular conceptual analysis seems to depend on whether its necessary conditions are weak enough, and the sufficient conditions strong enough. With regard to identity theorists, what they propose as a necessary condition of having mental states (having a brain) is shown to be too exclusive of a condition. There are beings that we want to attribute mental states to, but who do not have a brain. Temporarily ignoring the octopus example, since that may be an actual case, the possible case of the non-carbon based Martian surely cannot be ignored on the basis that it is a possibility claim. Given our epistemic limits, for all we know there is such a being and this is of direct importance to our theorizing about mind. Should such a being exist, the identity theorist’s proposed necessary condition for mental states is simply wrong.

The identity theorist should also resist the claim that possibilities are such that they may be ignored when theorizing since one of the key motivations for identity theory is the idea that scientific discovery will lead to a complete type-physicalist understanding of the mind. But this is obviously not an actual state of affairs, otherwise we’d not be waiting for such a thing, we’d have it! Regardless of how high the identity theorist may want to rank the probability of such an outcome, we are forced to accept that for all its likelihood, the scientific picture of the mind, to which they are optimistic regarding, is still only a possibility.

[1] Smart, J. J. C. (1959). Sensations and brain processes.The Philosophical Review, 68(2), 141-156.

[2]The identity relation referred to here, and throughout the paper, is that of numerical identity.

[3]This assumes a ‘setting aside’ of two possible fixes, namely that of embracing a relativistic (IT) where we speak of ‘types-for-a-creature, or disposing of type-identity/physicalism in favour of token-identity/physicalism. These seem to be unsatisfactory as well, though space does not permit a treatment here.

[4]By which I mean to refer to ‘machine-functionalism’

[5]The table is not my own creation, but that of Prof. Stokes. I have changed the examples to keep things fresh.

[6]Numbered for easier reference, not to denote any type of succession.

Preliminary Discussion

                It is useful to begin by saying a brief bit on logic. Logic concerns itself with consequence, which has been referred to as truth-preservation. An analysis of consequence is performed by demonstrating the validity of arguments such that:

(Logical Consequence) Some conclusion C is a consequence[4] of a set of premises P iff in a case where all the premises of P are true, it is a case where C is true.

The “cases” referred to above are laid out by truth-conditions. Systems of logic provide truth-conditions for that which will be parsed through them[5], or rather, what will be a consequence of what. For example, I might provide the following condition (Where P and Q are the ‘things’[6] being parsed):

P ^ Q is true in some case iff P is true and Q is true in the same case.

In providing such a truth-condition I have enabled the system to demonstrate the validity of the following:

P ^ Q

_____

P

If P ^ Q is true then P is true, or in other words, P is a consequence of P ^ Q. The question is whether or not there are multiple ways to understand, or lay out, the aforementioned cases. Logical pluralism rejects the position[7] that there is only one way to determine whether or not some argument is formally valid, or put differently, that there is but one true logic[8].  It proposes instead that there are multiple ways of specifying cases (truth-conditions), all of which are true. If you were to ask the logical particularist whether some argument were valid he or she would maintain that there is only one answer to that question. The logical pluralist would reject that statement.

The Presuppositionalist’s Logical Laws[9]

                In much of the literature I have come across and in my discussions with presuppositionalists as they defend their thesis re logic they state that the non-believer cannot account[10] for the truth of the so-called Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC), Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM) and the Law of Identity (LI). These titles denote particular propositions found in, at least, Classical Logic (let the following ‘P’s stand for any sentence letter or compound sentence:

LNC: ~(P ^ ~P)

LEM: (P v ~P)

LI: A <-> A

These propositions are tautologies under Classical Logic and while their being named “laws” by some; they possess no special status over any other tautology under Classical Logic, such as:

((A v B) ^ (A -> C) ^ (B -> C)) -> C

Tautologies are formulae which are always true in their systems by virtue of the logical rules, regardless of the truth-value assignment of some sentence letter or compound sentence. That is to say, the mere syntax of the system is sufficient for the truth of tautologies. As an example, take the LEM: (P v ~P) is always true because the logical rules for Classical Logic state that a disjunction is only false when both disjuncts are false and whatever truth-value assignment we give to P, one of the disjuncts in the LEM will be true (Classical Logic only has two truth values: T/F) and that is sufficient for the truth of the entire disjunction.

I suspect that the presuppositionalist will want to disagree with my statement above, that the logical rules of a system are sufficient for the truth of that system’s tautologies. The presuppositionalist will claim that the existence of God stands in some truth-making relation to the tautologies (and everything other truth the system parses). It seems abundantly clear, however, that the logical rules are enough. I suspect the presuppositionalist would posit God as a necessary and sufficient condition, in some fashion, to the truth of the LEM (for example, and to remain consistent).

I have heard two common expositions of the truth-making relationship between the existence of God and the LEM (or any other logical truth). One maintains that the LEM is a reflection of God’s nature. I do not know precisely what is meant by this particular suggestion. What does it mean to be a ‘reflection’ in this context? How is the LEM a reflection? What is it about God’s nature that causes the LEM to be reflected? The questions are numerous. The other suggestion is that the LEM (or any other logical truth) is a reflection of the way God thinks. Similar questions arise to this suggestion as well. In order to move the discussion forward, we can at least concede that both suggestions suggest that there is something about God that makes (in some way) the LEM true.

Concerns

                Now, recall logical pluralism once more and consider some ternary logic (a three-valued logic) in which the LEM comes out false. The LEM essentially states “either true or false” but ternary logic introduces some third value (depending on the system that value might be: indeterminate, irrelevant, unknown, etc.) and so regards the LEM false. This system of logic will have a different logical rules than Classical Logic, in many ways it is a different language as French is different to English. The logical pluralist wants to maintain that this system is fundamentally no ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than Classical Logic (though different systems may in different contexts be more ‘useful’). This system will also have tautologies which differ from those of Classical Logic and the pluralist will maintain that they are true tautologies, given the particular ternary system.

Let us assume, though it may be difficult to do, that the logical rules of this system are not sufficient conditions for the truth of some proposition which entails the falsehood of the LEM, and that the existence of God is a necessary and sufficient condition of the truth[11]. If we take the relationship between the existence of God and the truth of the proposition to have something to do with his nature or thinking, then it seems that there is something about God’s nature or thinking that is making the LEM true in one instance and making the LEM false in the other. That is, where under Classic Logic God is making (a) (P v ~P) true, under some ternary logic he is making (b) ~(P v ~P) true.

The two propositions initially seem to be contradictions of each other, but because they are arising out of different logics, they are essentially arising out of different languages. If no translator were present, I think it obvious that “I am hungry” does not contradict “Je n’ai pas faim.” A contradiction only seems to arise when we parse one sentence from some other language into whichever one we are using. So, if I translate “Je n’ai pas faim” and I see that it is the negation of “I am hungry”, now I have some contradiction where prior to the translation/integration, I merely had foreign symbols. So where (P v ~P) and ~(P v ~P) seem to be contradictory, I suggest that this is only the case if taken into a common language where both are expressed and where the rules of that language determine them to be in contradiction. We should not be misled, in our example of (a) and (b) both instances use the same symbols but essentially arise from different languages. So, (a) as expressed in Classical Logic is only contradicted by (b) if it too is expressed in Classical Logic and so on.

Now, continuing along with our assumption that the existence of God (in some way) is a necessary and sufficient condition of the truth of the aforementioned propositions in their respective systems if they are to be non-contradictory, it seems that they must be non-translated. But, focusing on God’s thoughts, what might it mean to say that God’s thoughts (or thinking) act as the truth-maker for the truth of both statements, but that he thinks them in a manner analogous to thinking a statement in French and thinking a statement in English and not knowing the translation[12]? Surely if the statement is translatable, God knows the translation. Put in another way, God in some way makes (a) true in Classical Logic and (b) true in some ternary logic. Assume that by translating (a) into the system of (b), (a) is rendered false and by translating (b) into the system of (a), (b) is rendered false. Something about God (presumably an unchangeable something, according to the Reformed tradition) in this example makes (a) true and makes it false, and likewise with (b). How is one to make sense of this?

Perhaps it is the case that God possesses a system of logic which he translates both (a) and (b) into, and this logic is such that the contradiction yielded by the aforementioned translation “does not matter”. This would be to suggest that God-Logic[13] is dialtheist in some sense, permitting of contradictions in a non-explosive manner. This God-Logic however will of course have its own logical rules, but continuing with our assumption these are insufficient for any of the truths yielded, the truth-maker will have to be something about God. Now we also have something about God that makes the LNC, after translation into God-Logic, both true and false. If this is true then the presuppositionalist explanation regarding what logic is, or how the existence of God relates (in a necessary way) to logic, becomes quite unparsimonious, on one hand leaving being quite mysterious and barely serving as an explanation, and on the other having to invoke a God-Logic which all ‘subsidiary’ logics depend on for coherence.

It renders the position far less plausible, I think, than accepting that the logical rules of various logic systems are the necessary and sufficient conditions for their respective logical truths and that each system generating propositions which may conflict only when translated into another system where the logical rules generate the confliction is not a problem.

Though, at this point, the presuppositionalist may just want to rid themselves of logical pluralism. They may admit to the existence of these other logical systems but deny that they are the one true logic. In this case, as presuppositional logical particularists it seems that they would suggest there exists only one system of logic that is true and something about God stands in a necessary and sufficient truth-making relation to the truths of this system. They might further suggest then that all of this talk about other logics generating contradictions when translated is simply not a problem because that is what we should expect if the other systems are wrong. The problem with this route, I think, is that we do not appear to have any way of knowing which system of logic is the one true logic! From the various presuppositional writings it sounds like the consensus amongst them would be that Classical Logic is the one true logic, but why must one accept this? It would seem then that all of the talk about the “laws” of logic, which are just tautologies of a particular system, is quite possibly irrelevant and incorrect if there exists one true logic. We are in an uncomfortable epistemic position, the very thing from which presuppositionalism promised us deliverance.

                Thusly, the common presuppositionalist argumentation regarding logic and God’s necessity hitherto has, I think, some explanatory work to undertake. It is currently far from convincing that one should reject the sufficiency of a system’s logical rules regarding the truth of some proposition arising from that system in favor of adopting the presuppositionalist view on the matter.

[2] ‘Experience’ should be taken very loosely.

[3] This list is not exhaustive, but is indicative of the usual discussions as per my experience.

[4] One can also make sense of the principle by replacing ‘consequence’ with ‘follows from’.

[5] Provided that what is parsed is capable of being expressed given the system.

[6] Most commonly a claim of some type

[7] Hereby referred to as logical-particularism

[8] The particularist will not deny the existence of other systems of logic any more than the religious particularist denies other religions; he or she will merely deny their truth.

[9] I find it a source of confusion that presuppositionalists only seem to refer to three particular tautologies of a particular system. I do not understand the restriction, but perhaps sake of simplicity plays a role.

[10] I cannot find a conceptual analysis of their usage of ‘account’ though it seems to mean a type of explanation.

[11] Again, that is to say it stands in some type of truth-making relation

[12] Assuming the translation will yield a contradiction.

[13] Thought of as an overarching logical system.

In keeping with the spirit of Lao Tzu, I would like to “respond intelligently, even to unintelligent treatment”. There were some points raised that I think should be responded to, some of which are more ‘personal’ in nature. Again, I must encourage everyone to listen to the recording prior to reading this response, as to obtain the appropriate context of the statements made by both parties. Some sections that follow may feel a tad bit nit-picky, but this is done on purpose. I think this will be a fun exercise in critically examining what’s being said by Slick during this radio show, and discerning just how much substance there is to all of it.

The Persecution

At 2:55 Festivus comes early with an airing of grievances! It is indeed true that recently there has been some hostility between DC (the ‘persecuted’) and some of the other users here at UP. Chat logs demonstrate that there has been hostility of the type outlined in the audio passage on both sides of the issue, that is, performed by both DC and others. In all cases disciplinary action was taken, however, the chat logs do not (to my knowledge) show any instance in which someone called DC “stupid for believing in a mythical god”. In fact, I suspect most of the users would frown on such a statement given how “New-Atheist-ish” it sounds. This is, of course, small potatoes when contrasted with where the audio journey will take us.

It may be worth mentioning that I’ve, personally, noticed what I think to be an interesting change in DC as of late. I have noticed that DC has become quick to pronounce his persecution at the hands of non-Christians when interacting with them in discussion. Now, I am not denying that Christians are indeed persecuted at times (I think it safe to say that every human being is persecuted at some time or another, and Christians are certainly human beings, sometimes persecuted because of their beliefs) but Slick offers a trinket of encouragement at 3:46 that makes it all too easy for the Christian to think that instances of disagreement are instances of Christian persecution, saying  ”If you’re not being attacked, you’re not doing the word of god”. There is some question as to what it means to “do the word of God” but the most charitable interpretation I can think of is that it means (or at least involves, largely) defending one’s Christian commitments. Given this statement we can know (via modus tollens) that if one defends Christian commitments, they will be attacked! Slick is quick to qualify that his principle is only meant to apply to situations of argument. What seems odd here is that by restricting the usage of his principle, he hasn’t actually told us anything interesting! Should it not be entirely obvious that if a Christian is in a situation where he/she is defending their Christian commitments, they are being attacked? If there’s no attack (or at least, a perceived attack) from where comes the need for a defense? Note a couple of things about Slick’s principle; firstly, it’s applicable to absolutely anyone. No matter who you are, or what you believe, if you are in a situation of argument and you are defending your position, you are being attacked. Secondly, note how the rhetoric is constructed in such a way that makes it very easy to affirm such persecution. The principle imposes itself on instances of discourse and fuels this notion of persecution. Consider, if you are an atheist and in the context of an argument, if you are defending atheism then you are being attacked. That’s great! But why think this is an instance of persecution rather than disagreement?

There is another way to interpret Slick’s statement, and that is to take “attack” to refer to a type of person-centered (rather than argument or idea centered) criticism. Something akin to the instances of hostility referred to above. I thought to include this interpretation of Slick’s principle first, but did not do so because it is uninterestingly false. Modified, it would be roughly: “In situations of argument, if you are defending Christian commitments, you are receiving person-centered attacks.” I doubt it will take much argument to show why this is false, but one absurd conclusion from Slick’s principle is that in every dialog ever had between a Christian and a non-Christian the only times where the Christian was *actually* defending Christian commitments are the times in which the non-Christian interlocutor retaliates fallaciously. All of those civil dialogs between prominent Christian philosophers and their opponents can be discarded, unless the opponent lashes out at some point. For added absurdity, look now to Jesus’ interaction with Nicodemus (John 3:1-21). In the defense that Jesus offers in response to Nicodemus’ questions, Nicodemus does not attack Jesus. If Matt Slick is correct in what he has said here, Jesus was not doing the word of God. This seems too silly to take seriously, but again, the rhetoric is certainly useful in invoking feelings of the previously mentioned sort.

Strangely, at 5:04, Slick tells DC that these people (the ‘attackers’) are not insulting ‘him’, they are insulting a ‘figure’ (referring to his screen name, I assume). The use of language here becomes a bit confusing, if ‘DC the person’ is not being insulted, what has Slick been talking about all this time? He then concludes from this that ‘DC-the-person’ just has to “take it”… but take what? We were just told that he’s not being attacked! This appears to be the second instance of a sentence which doesn’t really say much of anything. I find sentences of this type to be particularly interesting in counselling-type conversations, they are the blank cheques of language. I find they are often thrown about and fully left to the counseled to interpret, the end result of course that they are often interpreted as favorable to the perception of the status of whatever ailment is being discussed at the time. Sylvia Browne seems to do it, and now, Matt Slick?

At 5:11 Slick graciously remarks that those who engage in the aforementioned hostility are “servants of the evil one”. As far as I know, I’ve not been hostile in this way to DC and so thankfully am excluded from being a servant of the evil one (for the time being) . Not only are these people servants of the evil one, but DC is told at 5:21 that if he lets them get to him, he will become depressed and start to doubt everything! Not only is this section a glaring instance of a special type of ad hominem we like to call ‘poisoning the well‘, the things DC is being steered away from are curious. Apparently, becoming depressed and starting to doubt things are some very bad things to go through, but I’ve heard numerous conversion stories that start out precisely like that: “Well Karl, I was really depressed and I started to doubt everything… [fast forward 5 minutes] Hallelujiah!” In fact, DC is an example of one of these folks himself (I will not repeat the story here, as I do not know if he would approve, but you can ask him yourself!), but for DC these things led to a great realization. I suppose going through depression and intense doubt is only bad, and should only be avoided, if they do not lead to Jesus. But, what if DC feeling these things indicates yet another coming great realization (surprised face)?! At any rate, what Matt Slick seems to be doing here is, in fact, poisoning the well against those would would attack DC. Of course, he is being attacked because these people are servants of the evil one who despise the lessons of righteousness he espouses, they couldn’t possibly have a point, because they seek only to persecute!

At 6:00 DC is told that “… when you ruffle the feathers of the bad guys… [inaudible]… but you have to understand that in the demonic realm that there’s going to be a certain amount of attack that comes to you… and, plus, if you just hear how bad you are in so many different ways it has an effect on you as well.” A few things, firstly… the bad guys? This well is getting awfully poisoned! Demonic realm? No comment. I did however find the last portion interesting, it’s spoken in a rather negative tone saying that “if you just hear how bad you are in so many different ways it has an effect on you as well”. The tone and the context leads me to think that the effects which Slick is referring to are negative effects. If this is what he means, I would agree with him that hearing how bad you are over and over has negative effects. Empirical verification of this fact can be obtained by sitting in the CARM chat room and listening to some Christians talk about, as they often do, what terrible, worthless, abominations of human beings they all are. Now I’m no psychiatrist, but I’m not sure that partaking in such a discussion is good for your mental health (were we not just implicitly told that we should avoid depression? If this doesn’t cause depression, what does?!). I find the differences in reactions to negative labels particularly interesting, as they seem to change in different contexts. Consider: Christian #1: “Hey, you’re a terrible human being!” Christian #2: “Thanks, you too!” vs. Non-Christian #1: “Hey, you’re a terrible human being!” Christian: “Help, I’m being persecuted!”

Slick confesses at 6:34 that “It is difficult to love the people who are in the [service] of Satan. It is difficult to try and reason with them, and they express hatred. You love them, and they are vile to you.” There are a couple of gems here, but most importantly look at how the term “hatred” is used. Remember, it’s hatred folks, not disagreement, but hatred! He continues, “How do you maintain an attitude of love for them by not being affected by their ungodly demonic attacks?” Correction on my previous sentence, it’s ungodly demonic attacks folks, not disagreement. It seems astoundingly easy to feel persecuted when instead of finding yourself in a disagreement, you find yourself in some remake of Constantine!

Moving along, 7:50: “There are times when I say to myself I’m not being loving enough, and I pray, Lord forgive me, I’m not being loving enough…” 8:48: “You’ll notice, I go in the chat room, you notice I’m very quick to hit the ban button… I am not going to put up with any crap from these idiots… I’ll tell you why, because what they do, they are spiritual vampires, they will suck you dry…”

Well no wonder DC and Matt feel persecuted, with demons and vampires already around, they are one werewolf away from being in a Twilight film! But in all seriousness, I just want to draw attention to the interesting juxtaposition between Matt’s statements. Perhaps it would be easier to love these people, if you didn’t paint them as idiotic demon spirit-suckers. But, more seriously, this is another clear instance of well poisoning.

Moving forward a bit, DC questions why, on this site, no other Christians stepped in to help him defend his position. At 12:33 Slick remarks that “…you will find Christians, for example, who will say ‘you are a bigot, you don’t know what you’re talking about, you’re in sin’ and these are the ones that are aiding and abedding the enemies of the gospel.” At this point we seem to be moving away from statements that, I contend, bring about or strengthen a persecution mindset, and we are moving towards what seems to be almost a type of paranoia. “You can’t even trust some Christians, as they are in cahoots with the demon soul-suckers. Who are these Christians that are in cahoots? Oh, well the ones who disagree with you!” What does this do to the idea of Christian edification?

Atheism

Just when you thought it couldn’t get any better, at 16:45 Slick remarks: “When you tackle atheists, because these usually are atheists and liberal wackos, they don’t believe in the Christian God… it’s an easy thing to do… it’s really easy to beat atheists.” Now, I’m not sure how we suddenly jumped from the persecution of DC to talking about atheists, but it happened.

The chat continues: Matt: “You said it was an atheist website, right?” DC: “Yup.”

Hold the phones! UP isn’t an atheist website. Sure, lots of articles are written by atheists (theists, UP wants your contributions!) but the majority of our chat users (where DC spends all of his time here on UP) are non-atheists. I don’t know why he thinks we’re an atheist website (maybe it makes the plot of the persecution story juicier?), but let me put the kibosh on that right now. We’re certainly not a Christian website, but we are not an atheist website.

At 17:12 Slick remarks, with regard to atheists, that: “… you’ve already got them beat. The way to do this is to be strategic. You’ve got to understand that what atheists like to do is gang up on you, you’ll say one thing and they will come in fifty different directions… and complain that you don’t know this and that.” At this point, Slick has appeared to have stopped consoling DC and is now gearing him for battle (Go Team Edward!), but not before he poisons the well yet again and commits the fallacy of hasty generalization. In fact, to avoid repeating myself, roughly all of his chat about “atheists” and what they do commits this fallacy. Further, Matt’s discussion about ‘atheists’ and how they respond to arguments and the like suggests to me that Matt should interact with some more philosophically minded atheists. I’ve extended an invitation to interact with him a couple of times, but as you’ve heard while listening to this radio excerpt, he does not like to engage in written format. He has invited me to phone into the radio show, but I think the issues with some of his particular thoughts far too complicated to be discussed via that format. Though, at 18:30 Matt would have you believe that the reason I’ve not called up is because I know I’m going to get my “clocks cleaned”. I’d like to know how he thinks he knows such things, but needless to say, that statement is probably based on yet another instance of fallacious reasoning. Granted, while we’re playing this game, let me join in and say that the reason Matt Slick will not engage in written dialogue with me is because he’s afraid he’ll get his “clocks cleaned”! Hey, that was kind of fun…

18:37: “Now what they’re going to do is hide, and lie, and cheat, and steal. Just consider them like that.” If you’re confused, you’re not alone! Perhaps we should thank Matt here though, since he did restrain himself from mentioning our demonic soul-sucking practices in this particular example. Not only do I not understand the relevance of this point, I find his usage of “just consider them like that” interesting as well. We’ve poisoned this well so much that the residents of the city are drinking alcohol for hydration! Is he actually telling DC to just consider atheists as those who hide, lie, cheat and steal? Do I even need to list the fallacies at play here?

At 18:50 Slick begins to draw some battle plans. “Here are some principles: use what they say against them… it’s very easy to do. You have to understand something, they do not have the proper basis of rational thought, nor do they have the basis of moral objectivity. They don’t have those things…” He continues on recounting a dialog between him and some atheist wherein he “stumps” them by asking, “how do you know?” I think the same question needs to be extended to Slick based on the statements he’s just made. 19:52: “She has now hung herself [by making an assertion]… when they make assertions, ask them to verify their assertions.” I feel just eerie listening to this, it really is some sort of battle plan (though it kindly left out the bit about how you can defeat us by driving stakes through our hearts!).

Aside from DC’s monumental misunderstanding of moral nihilism espoused in the latter portion of minute 21 (how can things be morally permissible if there exists no morality?) Matt continues with his instruction, at 21:48 he states “…in order to [use the atheists statements against them] you’re going to have to study logic… you should learn [list of fallacies]…” I will politely recommend that this instruction be adjusted inward. What Matt seems to take to be the goal of logic, I doubt is actually the goal of logic. But, further, he tells us about a girl who said she enjoyed the content on his website, but could not trust it because Matt is a Calvinist. Matt identifies this as an instance of the genetic fallacy. At 22:32 he says, “… the information on the website needs to be studied on its own merits and not judged by the source, but by what it is.” Well let’s hold the phones again, Matt seems to tread awfully close to committing this fallacy throughout the discussion. I find it curious that he acknowledges that arguments need to be considered on their own merits, but spends a considerable amount of time teaching DC how to argue against atheists and not particular atheistic arguments. Interesting, yes?

The reason I feel so uncomfortable about discussions like this is that its all too similar to putting guns on children and sending them out to shoot people. Matt Slick has given DC a particular rhetorical technique to use, but he’s not given him any explanation as to why his analysis is correct. I find that to be some scary stuff indeed.

At 24:11 he goes on to suggest that in arguing with atheists DC should think about where their argument leads. Just a minor point of clarification, if Slick is suggesting a proof by contradiction, hooray. If he’s not, he’s implicitly utilizing another fallacious method of reasoning, namely, the fallacy of the slippery slope! If he does that, he’ll just commit a whole bunch of other fallacies! (There’s an example of it, just for fun!)

Oh, another added bonus, at 25:31 Matt actually utilizes the fallacy of the slippery slope. Doesn’t he offer a course on logic on his website? Oh well, at least he doesn’t soul-suck.

The next portion is largely uninteresting, as I find it to be the usual confused chatter about morality. I strongly suggest a course in ethics for Mr. Slick, however.

At 28:20 something really strange happens. Earlier, DC identified with Matt an instance of fallacious reasoning known as the genetic fallacy, but now DC actually commits the fallacy! He says: “Even if an atheist gives you a formal argument, and you don’t understand it at the time, if you put enough time into it, you start to look at where the worldview is coming from, you can tear it to pieces.” What?! Why didn’t Matt Slick, our resident logician for the day, call DC out on this fallacy? Maybe fallacies are only fallacies when used by vampires!

Conclusion

I could go for quite awhile, I think, but I don’t want to make this too long to read. Admittedly, I have been facetious in places but I hope at the very least I’ve drawn out some issues that are interesting to think about. The encouragement or provocation of “Christian Persecution-(ism?)” from fellow Christians, the vilification of non-Christians, and the arming of ill-prepared Christians with quick-draw tactics forgoing teaching with any real rigor. When all is said and done, this conversation at least gives the non-theist a basis for claiming persecution. I’ve never felt more vilified in my life!

Before I begin, I would like to make the point that the claims in my paper do not need to be true for the TAG to be defeated (with regard to logic, in this circumstance). The TAG fails due to the fact that logical conventionalism is coherent. Zao briefly touches upon this point, which I will address later, but I want to make it clear that my paper attempts to go beyond the mere claim that “logic does not presuppose God” and suggest something closer to the idea that it cannot.

The Criticisms

In my paper, I remark:

It seems to me that some hybridization of any of the mentioned means of justification may bring about a new means of justification. For example, a hybridization of an a priori and conventionalist system may succeed in providing the justification of logic sought by Bahnsen, but in a manner wherein the new system may be thought of as unique to both previous a priori systems, and forms of conventionalism.

Zao takes issue with this, stating:

Mitch starts off on the wrong foot immediately by proposing a hypothetical “hybridization” of two positions which is also “unique” to those other positions. So, is it a “hybrid” or is it “unique”?

I don’t think that one needs to choose between something being a hybrid, or unique. It’s doesn’t seem to be an either/or situation. For example, take gas-powered automobiles  and electric automobiles and combine the two concepts so that we create a gas-electric hybrid. In this circumstance we have a car that is unique in that there is a property that members of the previous categories do not have, namely, the property of being both gas and electric powered. Must we agree with Zao’s criteria that because this car is a hybrid, it cannot be unique or vice versa? I don’t think so, in fact it seems to me that it may be unique by being a hybrid!

Zao suggests that if there is such a system, I should present it rather than bringing it up as a hypothetical because it isn’t an objection. I think, however, if Zao understood me correctly he(?) would see that I merely rely on the possibility of a system and that this possibility is enough to make the point I wanted to make.

He also takes issue with the formal presentation of the TAG I’ve included in my paper which I’ve borrowed from Sean Choi. Zao states:

…advances have been made in presuppositionalism which have shown Choi’s position to be mistaken. Don Collett has argued effectively (in Revelation and Reason edited by K. Scott Oliphint) that Van Til’s conception of presuppositional semantics is identical to the Strawson/Van Fraasen semantics, which makes a clear distinction between “presupposition” and “implication.” (Even John Frame has accepted Collett’s argumentation in this respect.)

Choi presents his formulation of the TAG as a traditional transcendental argument (a la Kant) which would suggest (in this context) that the existence of logic implies the existence of God. Strawson in attempting to formalize a sufficient theory of presupposition proposes something similar to the following:

P presupposes Q if and only if Q is true provided P is true or P is false.

Where P is logic and Q is God, if one is to use this formulation instead of the previous, we would not say that the existence of logic implies God but that even the denial of the existence of logic also presupposes God. But what real difference does this make to our discussion? If I’m missing something then I wait to be informed, but it seems to me that even under this view the claim that “Both the truth of P or falisity of P presupposes Q” will reduce, in our discussion, to the claim that “logic presupposes the existence of God” since I am not denying the existence of logic. In other words, what difference does this make to any of my subsequent criticisms insofar as they pertain to the presuppositionalist ideas I mention?

This much can be said about the entire section of my paper where I introduce Choi’s formalism. It is of course nice to have something with which to work, but I am not dependent on this formulation. The arguments in my paper can be extended and applied to any (as I can conceive) assertion that amounts to “logic presupposes God.”

I go on to criticize Bahnsen’s idea of the “impossibility of the contrary” stating:

But what might this mean for our discussion? If Bahnsen is permitted to carry on with his criteria, then if any a priori, a posteriori or conventionalist justifications of logic are shown to be false (and subsequently, the worldviews that house and depend on them) all other formulations which properly fall under those headings will also be false (worldviews included) since they employ the same proposition, namely, ‘Christianity is false’. Of course, this is not sound reasoning unless the shared proposition is what is causing the justification to be false. Bahnsen needs to show that ‘Christianity is false’ is the ‘false-making’ proposition of all non-Christian worldviews, and it doesn’t seem that this is possible by any means other than (i) showing that all possible non-Christian justifications will have ‘Christianity is false’ as the onlyproposition in common (for if there is even one other proposition shared by these worldviews, how might one disqualify that proposition as possibly being the ‘false-maker’?), and (ii) showing that Christianity is not false. The obvious problem is that if (ii) is shown, the TAG becomes superfluous as it is no longer needed; one has already arrived at the truth of Christian theism, and for (i) to be shown, one still has to have an awareness of “every single variation of unbelieving philosophy.”

Zao replies that the false-maker of the proposition is its axiomatic nature. But I cannot see any reason to accept the claim that every worldview which has the proposition “Christianity is false” has that proposition as an axiom.

He states:

If the most basic presupposition of a non-Christian worldview is “not Christianity” (which appears to be definitional, given the above framework), then it is the basic nature of the presupposition which exerts a rational controlling influence on all other worldview content. It is not merely one proposition among many, floating loose and free in a certain worldview, but is rather foundational.

Again, why is this true? It seems to me that the only reason for claiming that “Christianity is false” is the most basic presupposition of non-Christian worldviews lies simply in identifying them as non-Christian worldviews. That is to say, I might identify some worldview as being non-Mitchist because I see that their worldview does not utilize what I utilize as my axiomatic foundation but I cannot see how this entails that “Mitchism is false” becomes their foundational axiom. It also seems that depending on who is looking at Bob’s worldview, he has several other axioms! For instance, what if a Muslim is looking at Bob’s worldview, does he now have as a foundational axiom that “Islam is false?” If a Hindu is looking at his worldview, does he now have as foundational the axiom that “Hinduism is false?” It even seems that atheists can analyze Zao’s worldview under his own criteria and suggest that he has as a foundational axiom that “Atheism is false” as his most basic presupposition.

Further, imagine Bob the Buddhist who has as his foundational axiom “Buddhism is true.” If we take Zao’s criteria, then since Bob the Buddhist can be identified as possessing a non-Christian worldview it follows that he has, also as a foundational axiom that “Christianity is false.” We can say that he’d also have as foundational axioms, under Zao’s criteria, propositions such as “Islam is false,” “Confucianism is false,” and “Scientology is false.” It seems more proper to say that Bob merely has the axiom “Buddhism is true” (if even this), and that he deduces from this postulate all of the other aforementioned propositions. That is to say, “Christianity is false” is not an axiom for Bob, it’s a deduction and so like other deductions it is “floating loose and free”. If we are to follow Zao’s criteria, it seems we render the term “axiom” meaningless. In fact Bob would have possibly an infinite number of axioms about religions of which he has not even heard! I see no reason to accept such absurdity.

In further response to my mention of Fristianity, Zao responds:

Being quite thoroughly familiar with various Fristianity objections, I had to chuckle at this one. I apologize for it, but I did. Let’s be perfectly clear here: an atheist can get zero cash value out of the Fristianity objection in debate with a Christian. Are you planning on being baptized in the name of the Father, Son, Holy Spirit and “Fred” anytime soon, Mitch?

The Fristianity objection, if sound, merely shows that the central claim of presuppositionalism is false. That is, if the Fristianity objection holds then it is false that no non-Christian theistic methods can possibly justify X, Y, Z. This is all I was intending to show.

Moving right along we come to my application of a Euthyphro-like dilemma to the laws of logic. Similar to many Christians with regard to the actual Euthyphro dilemma, Zao takes the route of stating:

The Christian’s argument is that logical laws are a reflection of God’s thought which is in accordance with God’s nature, which are all necessary.

But analyze what I said in the section, as Zao even quoted himself:

Frame essentially makes the claim that it is logically impossible for the nature of God to change. But the standard Frame is using to identify logical possibility is allegedly the nature of God. As such, his claim appears to be represented more accurately as:

(C)  Based on God’s nature it is logically impossible for God’s nature to be different because God is necessarily a rational God

This does not seem to assist in any regard as what is rational is allegedly determined by God’s nature. So to argue that God’s nature must be the way it is because God is necessarily rational seems to only appeal to a standard of rationality that is separate from God, otherwise it is clearly circular.

In what manner would it be the case that God’s nature was not rational? It does not seem that a God who forms the basis of logical principles and thereby is the standard of rationality can ever be irrational (though he may certainly appear irrational when judged by a foreign standard). That is to say, if one wants to state that the Christian God forms the basis of rationality and the logical principles thereby in effect cannot be anything other than what they are, they must be appealing to a standard of logic that is separate from God’s nature as to appeal solely to God’s nature does not sufficiently answer the question; it is a non-answer.

If Zao does not think that (C) is circular, I suggest he read a bit closer. He says that my dilemma is circular in itself because the first horn “…asserts that there is a meaningful sense in which logic is independent of the thought of God.” What is the implication of the aforementioned circularity in basing them on God? It seems to me that, as a direct implication, we must conclude that the necessary principles of logic indeed are external to God just as is the case with necessary moral principles and the original Euthyphro dilemma. I have not, as Zao has suggested, assumed that they are independent to show they are independent, I’ve formulated a dilemma and shown that given the alternatives are incoherent we have no choice but to accept that logical principles exist independently of God.

We might even supplement this by raising a point that was conveyed to me by a fellow UP.net member. Zao stated that the logical laws are a reflection of God’s thought and that God thinks logically. Moving over the seemingly obvious incoherence in such a statement, one might want to ask what it even means to say that God thinks logically? Logic permits us to deduce from premises, distinguish conclusions and so on. But God, if he is omniscient, surely does not have to do any of these things to have knowledge. God does not “reason” to his conclusions, he simply knows them. To say that the logical laws are reflections of God’s logical thinking stands in opposition to the idea that God knows all there is to know. Truly omniscient beings do not require logic, because they do not require a means to apprehend knowledge. This, I think, just adds to the incoherence of stating that logical principles reflect God’s rational thought.

In my section entitled “God and the Abstract” I offered an argument which is basically as follows:

The dependence relationship between “God exists” and “logical principles exist” seems problematic. If God is the source of all things other than himself, and he depends on nothing for his existence, surely the relationship must be asymmetrical (with primacy granted to God), but it appears not to be. It can be shown, in fact, that God depends on logical principles for his existence.

Lewis’ counterfactual semantics tell us that ‘any proposition is counterfactually implied by a necessarily false proposition’. Since “logical principles do not exist” is a necessarily false proposition, it counterfactually implies any proposition whatsoever.[21] So it is also true that if logical principles did not exist, neither would God. Thus, God depends on logical principles for his existence.

The relationship between the existence of logical principles and the existence of God would be asymmetrical iff God depended on nothing for his being and logical principles depended wholly on him. In this regard, the relationship of dependence is one-way; logical principles depend on God but not vice versa. If dependence is asymmetrical, then logic cannot depend on God as it has been shown that God depends on logic.

The asymmetrical relationship can be depicted further: where P refers to logical principles and Q refers to God. If P depends on Q asymmetrically, then the worlds in which P is true must be a proper subset of the worlds in which Q is true. Since it is the case that the principles of logic hold in every world, and the set of all worlds is not a proper subset of any other set of worlds, the laws of logic cannot depend on anything, including God.

Zao responds:

Given the nature of the points under contention (the existence of God and the relationship between God and logic), to argue that “logical principles do not exist” counterfactually implies that God depends on logical principles for his existence is to beg the question in a rather bald and obvious sort of way. How about, “God does not exist” is a necessarily false statement? Given that TAG is intended to argue for the necessary existence of God, to assume the contingency of God’s existence upon logic in order to prove God is contingent upon logic is, well, unpersuasive (to put it mildly).

I might be mistaken, but it seems to me that Zao interprets my argument as an argument against the existence of God. This is not the case, however. I can accept both the necessary existence of God and the necessary existence of logical principles, and still deny the type of relationship that the presuppositionalist is proposing. It’s not the necessary existence of either of these things that is the issue, it’s the proposed asymmetrical relationship between God and logic. I think Zao has really misunderstood the thrust of my argument here.

After a point about my brief treatment of divine simplicity and Trinitarianism (I agree, that could be a paper unto itself!) Zao closes with a very brief criticism of logical conventionalism. Zao states:

Finally, we have a section where logic is said to be both conventional while necessary and universal. This is rather fun. It’s like something from Alice in Wonderland. “Sentence first – verdict afterwards!

This is a claim that is thrown around a lot, and it is a claim that is just simply false. There simply is no problem with logic being conventional, while having its principles be necessarily true. Zao is welcome to either read the literature cited in my paper, the brief treatment here or wait for an upcoming article I’m expecting authored by a logician.

Conclusion

Again, the arguments in my paper are not needed to show that the TAG fails, the mere coherence of Conventionalism serves as a defeater for the endeavor. What my arguments seek to show is that logic cannot be based on God in any such implied way. I can only say that Zao’s brief treatment of Conventionalism towards the end of his post seems to violate his own suggestion of “… [understanding] the matter for [one's self] before attempting to criticize…”

P.S: I’d like to politely ask that in the future Zao link to my articles rather than pasting them in full. I’d also like to ask that he adds a hyperlink to the specific post he’s writing about. Thanks!

What follows are some thoughts on the subject. I am not well read on this topic and so I do not presume to raise points that have not been raised prior. I only wish to outline some of my ideas on this very elusive topic. While I use the term love in the paper, it may identify love in different circumstances, romantic, friendly or common (societal). I do not seek to resolve these differences here, but I think the definition I introduce can form the basis of all types.

The Definition

I think that we can capture a piece of what love is by defining it with relation to human interaction. The definition of love I have arrived at is as follows: love is the desire of some being x that some other being y fare better, or at least as good, in some area, or at some task than x for no benefit of x coupled with, where possible, the assistance of x in y‘s attainment of betterment.

Let’s consider a couple of examples where we have four people, Bob, Jim, Mary, and Suzie. In our first example, let us assume that Mary has a philosophy exam coming up and she happens to be in the same class as Bob and Jim who are both doing very well. Bob and Jim both offer to help Mary prepare for the exam. Bob is offering his help because he thinks that Mary is very beautiful and thinks that helping her study will be an easy way to get her alone. Jim is offering his help because he wants to see Mary do well on the exam, at least as good as he performs. We might be tempted, thus far, to remark that of the two if we had to choose, we’d identify Jim as being the one who loves Mary. That may be true thus far, but imagine that Jim is being paid by Mary’s parents to help her achieve a certain grade on the exam that is at least as high as Jim’s – that is, he will receive a payment for helping her study but more money the better she does. It would seem odd in this situation to say that either Bob or Jim actually love Mary. Now consider Suzie, another classmate of Mary’s who desires that Mary does at least as good as she will on the upcoming examination, and who has nothing to gain from Mary’s success, and vows to help Mary achieve that goal. It seems to me that under normal circumstances there is no better explanation of this fact, than that Suzie loves Mary.

In another, unrelated circumstance, let us assume that Suzie is crossing the street and a car is barreling down, not paying attention and will hit Suzie if she is not moved. Bob, Jim and Mary are outside and see the situation about to unfold. Of the three, only Bob dives to push Suzie out of the way of the vehicle. We might say, then, that out of the three he is the only real candidate to be properly labeled as loving Suzie. Bob desired that Suzie fare better in the circumstance than being hit by a car, and out of no benefit to himself, assisted in bringing this about. Might we identify Bob as loving Suzie in this instant? Generally, I don’t see a problem in doing so. Though one might respond that Bob acted out of instinct and that this nullifies his claim to love. The reason why I reject this line of thinking is because it seems to me if we rule out all instinctual aspects of love, we are reduced to the matter of love being a voluntary choice. But it seems to me that often times we don’t choose the people we love, and sometimes we may be helpless to stop loving the people we do!

Conclusion

Unfortunately, I do not yet have any objections to address but I imagine that they will arrive in due time. I, of course, hope that my analysis of love here is unique so that I haven’t just muttered some variation of an idea from some great thinker, but if it such an idea from such a thinker I am personally unaware. I also think there are a lot more relevant issues to approach here, since we should speak of when one is justified in loving another, how we might judge whether one loves another and so on. At the very least, I hope that I’ve successfully shown what I think the elusive phenomena of love to be.