First, I would like to respond to a “general” criticism regarding the last section of my previous article. Recall that I granted all the assumptions that a Christian objecting to the permissibility of homosexual sex generally holds, and proceeded to offer this argument:

1. God’s commands hold if and only if those commands benefit us in some way.
2. God’s commands prohibiting all homosexual acts no longer benefit us.
3. God’s commands prohibiting all homosexual acts no longer hold.

This last argument seems to me to have been largely misunderstood; perhaps this is my fault. I admit that this section was added in haste near the end of writing my article. However, I would like to clear up a few things about it.

What I was trying to do here was twofold. I made this assumption(which I think most Christians will readily accept): Everything (even God’s commands) happen for a reason, or more simply, God’s commands are not arbitrary. I asked myself “what would be God’s motivation for issuing a command?” The most plausible answer seems to be simply that for each and every command he issues, God has us in mind; that he is giving us these moral prescriptions because following them makes a positive tangible or pragmatic difference in our lives.

But what about modern conceptions of divine command theory? Don’t they say that God’s commands flow from his very nature? Yes, they do – however, it is important to note that not every command can flow directly from God’s nature. Rather, some are contingent upon other things about God’s nature; and all of them depend on the nature of the action commanded for or against. Take killing as an example; we can say that God commands us not to kill because killing causes suffering of others, and causing the suffering of others is contrary to his nature. In a world where killing did not cause suffering(imagine that we all came back to life immediately after being killed, and experienced no pain or inconvenience), God would have no reason to issue a command against killing. In such a world, killing would merely be a pat on the back.

So, what about the commands against “modern-style” homosexual acts? What part of God’s nature do they flow from? Keep in mind that, as per the secular part of my previous article, some homosexual acts, in some contexts, result in great goods, with no obvious harms coming from them. I can’t think of anything. You’re welcome to try.

Closing the Ryft

Given the strong opinions people often have on this topic, it came as quite a surprise that there was only one response to my article as a whole. That response is here. He first offers some criticisms of my opening argument.

Ryft starts by pointing out that I offer no moral theory in making my argument, and that “an argument that involves moral permissibility presupposes some moral theory X. An act is immoral only under moral theory X insofar as it violates some precept thereof.” While he is right about this, he is wrong that I offer no moral theory. In fact, the moral theory is implicit in the argument itself! Consider the argument again:

Premise 1: In cases where the good-making properties of a behaviour are much greater than the bad-making properties, then that behaviour is prima facie morally permissible.
Premise 2: There is a subset of homosexual sexual relationships where the good-making properties are much greater than the bad-making properties.
Premise 3: There is a subset of homosexual sexual relationships that are prima facie morally permissible.
Premise 4: If there is a prima facie support for the permissibility of some-thing, and there are no good reasons to support its impermissibility, then it should be deemed permissible.
Premise 5: There are no good reasons to suppose this subset of homosexual sexual relationships are impermissible.
Conclusion: This subset of homosexual sexual relationships is permissible.

Notice premises 1 and 4; they are ‘rules’ for how to determine whether something is morally permissible. In fact, premise 4 could perhaps be considered a rule of ‘meta-normative ethics’ – surely Ryft would agree (if he agrees with premise 1) that if there are no good reasons to disregard the prima facie support of something, then we should indeed conclude that it is permissible.

However, he goes on to comment on my use of the term ‘good-making property’. He writes: “So for example, the term “good-making” is rather meaningless because there is nothing to inform its meaning. We do not even know what ‘good’ itself means in his argument.”

Perhaps this is a failure of clarity on my part, but considering the good-making properties I go on to list, it seemed rather obvious, at least to me. When I say ‘good-making’ here, I do not mean ‘a property which makes something right’; I mean those things which we all generally agree are good and/or preferable – regardless of our stance on ethics. Things like love, happiness, kindness, and respect; all the positive things we value are good-making properties. Of course, some might disagree on certain good-making properties (such as wealth), however the ones I point to in my argument seem uncontroversial.

Finally, he addresses my argument regarding Christianity. He writes: “God’s commands against homosexuality have not changed. It was proscribed and condemned not only in the old covenant but also the new.” and “…but when something is declared in the Old Testament and reaffirmed in the New Testament, the question finds itself answered. “

While Ryft agrees that God’s commands can change, he seems to think that they can change only once, and that none of them could have changed in the past two thousand years. But why think this? Perhaps he thinks that God would inform us via special revelation if his commands change. However, I see no reason to think we cannot use something like general revelation (for example, by looking at all the benefits of some homosexual sex, and seeing no harms) to infer a change in a command.

In addition, he writes: “The second premise asserts that “God’s commands prohibiting all homosexual acts no longer benefit us.” But according to Scriptures, it actually does: it alerts us to the sinful nature of sexual immorality and our need for repentance and faith in Christ our salvation, in whom we are redeemed from the wrath to come at God’s judgment.” It seems here that Ryft has forgotten or misunderstood what sin is – acting contrary to the will of God. But, if it is no longer the will of God that no one ever partake in any homosexual acts, then the command no longer alerts us to the sinful nature of such acts. Ryft’s criticism here is just begging the question.

Near the end of Ryft’s response, we see this:

“Perhaps in his follow-up article (assuming he decides to write one) he could return his attention to the Christian objections as defended above but also visit the one objection he anticipated in his introduction but never addressed in the body of his article: that all homosexual activity qualifies as sexual immorality (as does adultery, fornication, prostitution, etc.) because it occurs outside the covenant of marriage. However, he must contend with what biblical Christianity actually holds regarding marriage.”

I’ll do that now – and quite simply, just by running the same argument with regard to marriage instead of homosexuality:

1. God’s commands hold if and only if those commands benefit us in some way.
2. God’s commands defining marriage as only between a man and woman no longer benefit us.
3. God’s commands defining marriage as only between a man and woman no longer hold.

Finally, I will briefly address the issue of Calvinism once more. Ryft writes:

“Nocterro says something else that is rather weird. “Since Calvinism does not admit libertarian free will,” he said, “[then] (pending other theodicies) either Calvinism is false or Christianity as a whole is false.” Does he not recognize the bifurcation fallacy here (false dilemma)? Let me suggest a third alternative which did not occur to him: “or libertarian free will is false.””

I’ve committed no fallacy here – he’s simply misunderstood my point. I was pointing to an apparent inconsistency between what God desires (that all men be saved) and what actually obtains. I then commented that a non-calvinist can say that libertarian free will accounts for this inconsistency – one might say that libertarian free will is a great good, and that God also desires us to have it, and us having it results in other great goods. A calvinist, however, cannot give this answer – he must offer another, and Ryft has not done so. He also says “Man’s libertarian free will is an answer only if we deny some attribute or character of God (e.g., if God does not have power over man’s will then he is not omnipotent).” If what he says here is true, and if he has no other answer to the apparent inconsistency, then so much the worse for God.

Assumption Redux

So, while I am not dropping my last argument (which grants all of the assumptions required for homosexuality to be immoral), I would like to come back to the issue of which assumptions we are justified in granting. Recall that one of the assumptions was “the Bible is infallible”. What should we make of this assumption? Well, I think we should reject it – even if Yahweh exists, and even if Jesus Christ was divine. Why? Simply because it’s likely not infallible.

First, it bears a striking resemblance (both in content and in style) to other holy books which are obviously not divinely inspired. Second, it states things which can be empirically verified to be false (hares chew cud, global flood, etc). While some parts of it may be able to be verified as true, this does not mean that we should accept every claim in it as true. That is, if one part is true, we are not therefore justified in rejecting all empirical evidence and observations to the contrary of another part.

Furthermore, consider two other assumptions that are required: “that deity is a ‘personal God’” and “that deity is Yahweh”. We can be justified in rejecting these on the basis of arguments such as the argument from divine hiddenness, popularized by J.L. Schellenberg. While I won’t go into detail on the argument here, suffice to say that it seems none of the responses so far offer plausible criticisms of the argument.

Finally, we can plausibly reject the assumption “Divine Command Theory is true”. Many criticisms have been offered against DCT, including Erik J. Wielenberg’s recent account of a non-natural, non-theistic moral realism. If this view is correct (some Christian philosophers even espouse it, or something similar, including Richard Swinburne) then any commands issued by God would necessarily reflect some necessarily true moral proposition. But what sort of proposition like this would lead to “all homosexual acts are immoral”? It would have to be something like “causing suffering is immoral” (just as an example). In this case, the person defending such a claim would have to point to some natural characteristic of homosexual sex that would be supervened on by the moral property – and this would lead back into my secular case.

I have not discussed all of the assumptions needed to conclude that homosexual sex is immoral, nor have I discussed any in great detail. Rather, I’m hoping to open up further discussion on these assumptions. Feel free to start a ‘sub-discussion’ regarding any one of the assumptions I listed.

Final Thoughts

While I thank Ryft for writing a full response, I am a bit disappointed that his was the only one offered (all other responses were either via much shorter comments, or via chat). However, as he stated at the beginning of his response, “I will leave it to Mathew Hamilton to address the sociological arguments when he returns from his sabbatical.” While Matthew may or may not have the time to ever respond, I hope he eventually does so. I have also been informed that one other person will have a response ready somewhere around mid-october. I look forward to this as well.

I’m also a bit disappointed that so much focus has been placed on the last section of my article – while I realize it is perhaps the most original and interesting part, I don’t think it’s really essential to my argument as a whole. Attacking this section is like a sniper aiming for the left hand rather than the head. So, if you or anyone you know is interested in critiquing other sections of my article, please do so.

The position I will be defending is this: Homosexual behaviour is morally permissible in the same situations in which heterosexual behaviour is morally permissible; i.e., there is no qualitative difference between homosexual and heterosexual sex. I will be critiquing the position “all homosexual sex is immoral”.

First, a brief word on marriage. One might be inclined to object to my argument on the grounds that any sort of sex is only permissible within marriage, and since homosexuals cannot by definition get married, then homosexual sex is never morally permissible. This, however, must be defended. Why think homosexuals cannot marry? Perhaps because of religious reasons – I will address religious concerns in the second section of this essay.

That being said, I will begin my case by offering an argument for the moral permissibility of some instances of homosexual behaviour. I will then defend the premises of my argument; first by discussing the beneficial results of homosexual behaviour, then by refuting common objections to such practices.

Argument

Premise 1: In cases where the good-making properties of a behaviour are much greater than the bad-making properties, then that behaviour is prima facie morally permissible.

Premise 2: There is a subset of homosexual sexual relationships where the good-making properties are much greater than the bad-making properties.

Premise 3: There is a subset of homosexual sexual relationships that are prima facie morally permissible.

Premise 4: If there is a prima facie support for the permissibility of something, and there are no good reasons to support its impermissibility, then it should be deemed permissible.

Premise 5: There are no good reasons to suppose this subset of homosexual sexual relationships are impermissible.

Conclusion: This subset of homosexual sexual relationships is permissible.

The “set” referred to in premise 2 is all homosexual sexual relationships in which the participants are similarly situated to a heterosexual couple participating in morally permissible sexual acts.. For the purposes of this essay, I will take this to mean only those homosexual sexual relationships which can be considered committed, monogamous, and healthy/disease-free. I will exclude acts of rape, acts of infidelity, acts which may result in contraction of an STD, and other such behaviours. In other words, there is nothing about homosexual behaviour that renders it intrinsically immoral; that is, there is nothing that makes homosexual behaviour immoral just because it is homosexual.

In defense of 1, consider an analogy. Imagine you walk past a restaurant, and you see through the window that someone is eating a stick of celery. The man eating the celery has a smile on his face – it is obvious that he is enjoying it. Furthermore, you know that celery is fairly healthy for the body; it’s low in fat and calories. Now imagine that you enter the restaurant and speak with the man to find out more information. He tells you, “Oh, I absolutely love to eat celery. Not only is it delicious, but it’s good for you. And I eat only the finest – fresh, clean celery; only from this restaurant.”

It becomes clear that, at least on the surface, eating celery is innocuous, and should be considered morally permissible. Barring some not-so-obvious reasons, we can safely conclude that there is nothing immoral about the man eating the celery. In such a situation, given what we know about the circumstances, we would lack justification to conclude that eating celery is immoral – we cannot say things are immoral “just because”.

Love is All You Need

So, what are the great goods which homosexual behaviour results in?

The first good-making property is intimacy. Sex between partners (at least within the context of a committed relationship) fosters feelings of closeness and love toward one’s partner. It is also the case that when homosexuals in committed, monogamous relationships have children (either by adoption, artificial insemination, or other means), the benefits of the intimacy created by sex are passed on to the child in the form of a more loving, caring environment for child-rearing.

This also solves another current problem we have – children without parents. Currently, there are many children in orphanages and foster homes. As homosexuals cannot reproduce with each other naturally, they are good candidates for adoption. This gives these children a loving, caring home to grow up in. Research shows that children raised by homosexual parents do just as well as their peers raised by heterosexual parents. Professor of pediatrics Ellen C. Perrin testifies, “The vast consensus of all the studies shows that children of same-sex parents do as well as children whose parents are heterosexual in every way…”In some ways children of same-sex parents actually may have advantages over other family structures.”[1]

Sandra B. Stier testifies that “marriage would be a way to tell ‘our friends, our family, our society, our community, our parents…and each other that this is a lifetime commitment…we are not girlfriends. We are not partners. We are married.’”; and Kristin M. Perry that “marriage would provide her with what she wants most in life: a stable relationship with Stier, the woman she loves and with whom she has built a life and family.”[2] When individuals provide testimony about their own mental and emotional states, we generally take them at their word (assuming they are not mentally ill). Richard Swinburne’s Principle of Testimony can be applied to such a situation – “with the absence of any reason to disbelieve them, one should accept that eye-witnesses or believers are telling the truth when they testify about religious experiences.”

We should certainly take the testimony of the above individuals to be true; they are not mentally ill, and there is no reason to suppose they are lying. It seems true that these two individuals at least, and likely many similar homosexual couples, view their relationships as ones based on trust, intimacy, and love. Indeed, their relationship is likely stronger, more beneficial to them, and more conducive to child-rearing than some heterosexual relationships.

Another good-making property is marriage. Keeping in mind that the topic of this essay is “Homosexual behaviour is immoral”, one can count not just sexual activities, but also homosexual marriages as “behaviour” (and of course marriages routinely include sex). It is certainly the case that allowing homosexuals to marry provides economic benefits to society – weddings are often expensive, and provide a good amount of cash flow into the economy; both from the marriage itself and from subsequent marriage-related purchases (wedding gifts, larger homes, etc.) To give a real world example, economist Lee Badget(A) is of the opinion that “Proposition 8 has inflicted substantial economic harm on same-sex couples and their children”, and that “Proposition 8 has imposed economic losses on the state of California”.[2]

I Am What I Am

However, perhaps the most important good-making property has to do with one’s very identity. It is agreed upon by almost all psychologists that sexual orientation is in fact not a choice – the causes of homosexuality are complex, and changing orientation is difficult if not impossible.

Despite claims from individuals with personal interests in showing that one’s orientation can be changed, it is the consensus that even attempting to change one’s sexuality can be quite damaging to mental health, and as such it is advised against – rather, homosexuals are encouraged to accept themselves. Actor David Yost, for example, spent two years in an ex-gay ministry; after which time he suffered a “nervous breakdown” resulting in a five-week hospital stay.[3] The official stance of the American Psychiatric Association is that “…some homosexual or bisexual people may seek to change their sexual orientation through therapy, often coerced by family members or religious groups to try and do so. The reality is that homosexuality is not an illness. It does not require treatment and is not changeable”.[4] This is a very important good-making property – accepting one’s orientation involves pursuing relationships which (usually) include sex. Of course, we could say that exactly when such an individual should or should not have sex is up for debate – but not that sex should remain unavailable to the homosexual in all situations.

There are also other (less important) good-making properties. Pleasure is one. Homosexuals derive pleasure from having sex with their partners. Some other minor good-making properties include stress relief and cardiovascular exercise. As these can be obtained in other ways, I mention them only in passing.

Rectifying Rectal Misinformation

One of the more common criticisms of homosexual behaviour is that it has negative health effects, both physical and mental. However, research into modern medicine and psychology show that this is simply not the case.

The first form of this criticism involves anal sex. It is a common misconception that most homosexuals regularly engage in anal sex. In fact, many do not – and many heterosexuals do. A poll from the Center For Disease Control shows that while only 6 percent of males age 15-44 have had “any same-sex sexual contact”, 34 percent have had anal sex. Furthermore, 30 percent of females age 15-44 have had anal sex.[5] It is a simple fact that anal sex is not exclusively homosexual.

It is another misconception that anal sex is often physically damaging. For example, anal sex is not a recognized cause of fecal incontinence (inability to control bowel movements)[6][7][8]; while childbirth is. While it is true that anal sex is riskier than oral or vaginal sex, it is not nearly as risky as some would like to say. When performed correctly (with an STD-free partner, slowly, and with a condom), the risks fall well within the “acceptable” range. In any case, even if it can be shown that anal sex leads to physical damage of the body 100 percent of the time, this is at best a case against anal sex itself, not homosexual sex – homosexuals have other types of sex available to them.

Hit Me, Beat Me, Make Me Do My Taxes

Some individuals and organizations[9] claim that there is a higher rate of domestic abuse among homosexuals. While this may or may not be true (statistics on this are ambiguous, as most cases are never reported[10][11]), this is merely a correlation – it needs to be shown that there is something about being gay that makes one intrinsically more prone to abuse. Furthermore, here are some interesting statistics for abuse rates in various groups:

heterosexual – 17 percent, gay/lesbian – 28 percent, bisexual – 41 percent, married – 13 percent, single – 13 percent, single no children – 19 percent, separated divorced or widowed – 41 percent. [12]

gay men – 15 percent, lesbians – 11 percent [13]

gay and lesbian couples – 25-33 percent [14]

As one can see, different studies have concluded very different abuse rates. However, here’s a reductio for this argument:

1) If a population has a significantly higher abuse rate than the heterosexual population, being a practicing member of that population is always immoral.
2) The population “homosexuals” has a significantly higher abuse rate than the heterosexual population.
3) Being a practicing member of the population “homosexuals” is always immoral.
4) The population “separated, divorced, or widowed” has a significantly higher abuse rate then the heterosexual population.
5) Being a practicing member of the population “separated, divorced, or widowed” is always immoral.

The group in premise 4 can be replaced with any group that a study shows has high rates of abuse/violence. We should be wary when one cites statistics to support such an argument – remember, correlation does not equal causation, and statistics can vary. Of course I agree that domestic abuse of any kind is immoral, however statistics regarding domestic abuse cannot show that a certain lifestyle is always immoral. the 72 percent of gay/lesbian individuals in this study should not be deemed immoral just because 28 percent of their population experiences domestic abuse. It’s also easy to just say “Homosexual sex which occurs in abusive relationships is immoral, while homosexual sex in stable, loving relationships is not”.

You’re My Favorite Damn Disease

Another common criticism of homosexual sex involves STD rates. It is claimed that homosexuals have a much higher risk of contracting an STD. This is highly misinformed. The average prevalance of STDs (gonorrhea, chlamydia, syphilis, and HIV) among men who have sex with men is about 9%[15]. While it is true that the prevalence of STDs is higher here than in heterosexual males, three things must be noted.

First, the difference is actually only a few percent. While 9 percent is twice as high as 4.5 percent, it’s still only a small difference; the risk is still low. Second, in 2008, chlamydia, gonorrhea, and syphilis rates were highest among african-americans, representing 49, 71, and 49 percent of total cases, respectively.[16] If an argument against homosexual sex from STD rates works, then an argument against sex with african-americans from STD rates works as well. The implied syllogism in the argument from STDs seems to be this:

1. If an action is likely to result in contracting an STD, that action is immoral.
2. Homosexual sex is likely to result in contracting an STD.
3. Homosexual sex is immoral.

However, considering the STD rates in african-americans cited above, we may replace premise 2:

2’. Sex with an african-american is likely to result in contracting an STD.

thus leaving us with a morally repugnant conclusion: that it is immoral to have sex with an african-americans. Third, there are actually (as of 2005), no confirmed cases of female-to-female sexual transmission of HIV.[17]

This is also irrelevant. It is important to note (although this should not even need to be stated) that homosexual acts do not create the pathogens which infect one with HIV and other STDs. Rather, one contracts an STD by having sex with someone who has that STD already. So, this is at best an argument for safe sex, not an argument against homosexual sex – as well as an argument I completely agree with.

So, if we restrict our moral scope to the question “Is it immoral for a committed, monogamous, disease-free homosexual couple to have sex?”, objections based on perceived dangers of anal sex, domestic abuse, and risk of contracting an STD fall flat. What other objection to such acts might one give?

Breaking the Natural Law

Another criticism of homosexual sex is the so-called “natural law” objection. This objection, in essence, says two things:

1) We should only use our faculties and abilities for their intended, primary, or natural purpose.
2) The intended, primary, or natural purpose of sex is for procreation.

The issue here is what is meant by language such as intended, primary, and natural.

First, ‘intended’. To assign intent to something requires personhood. When we say “a corkscrew is intended to open wine bottles”, what we mean is that a corkscrew is for opening wine bottles. This is its purpose. If no persons existed (and yet somehow a corkscrew still did), then the object would not be intended for anything – it would just be.

So, who decides what sex is intended for? Perhaps God – but I’ll get to that later. If not God, then it is surely us, ourselves. Thus, if homosexuals decide that sex is intended for something other than procreation, then it is. It cannot be nature – there is no “ought” in nature, there is only “is”. So, this line of reasoning can only possibly work if God is the one deciding the intent.

What about primary purpose? We use other faculties and abilities for non-primary purposes all the time, and no one ever questions it. We use our legs and feet for leg presses in addition to walking, for example. So, what’s wrong with “hijacking” sex for non-procreative purposes?

There are also purposes to sex other than procreation. These can be referred to as “natural purposes”, or more simply, “effects”. Surely we would not say a situation in which a heterosexual couple has sex only for procreative purposes is equal to or better than a situation in which the couple uses sex for procreative purposes, and also experiences pleasure and intimacy. So, even if it is the case that it is better for one to use sex for all of its functions (procreation + everything else), what’s the problem with dropping the procreation function? Dropping procreation might be less good (just as donating a thousand dollars to charity is less good than donating two thousand), but I fail to see why it would be bad.

Through a Glass, Ignorantly

Despite the supposed “secular arguments” against homosexual acts, we notice one very telling fact: these secular arguments are posited almost exclusively by people with prior religious motivations.

What would we expect to see if the secular case against homosexuality worked? Let’s use another issue as a case study: the issue of the death penalty. There are people from all walks of life against the death penalty – Christian, Buddhist, Muslim, Hindu, and atheist; and they generally all use similar arguments. This is not the case with regard to homosexuality. The arguments against it are all but quarantined to religious fundamentalism. Why is it that so very few liberal Christians, Buddhists, agnostics, and atheists are convinced by these arguments? Probably because they just don’t work. There seems to be no working secular case against homosexual acts.

When You Assume…

Other than natural law, the most common objection to homosexual behaviour has to do with one’s religion. As the religious portion of the people reading this will be mostly Christian, I will focus on Christian objections exclusively; although some of these objections might also work for adherents of other religions.

The objection consists of citing verses from the Bible which (implicity or explicity) point to divine commands from God prohibiting homosexual behaviour.

While such a case against homosexuality may seem convincing to the believer, there are a number of hidden assumptions that not everyone is going to accept. Here is a list, in order of logical progression (from general to specific):

persons exist -> some sort of deity exists -> that deity is a “personal God” -> Divine Command Theory is true -> that deity is Yahweh -> Jesus Christ is divine -> the Bible is the inspired word of God -> the Bible is infallible -> the correct interpretation of certain verses in the Bible is that all homosexual acts are immoral

There are a great many assumptions here – and all of them must be adequately defended before a Christian can make a convincing case for the immorality of all homosexual behaviour. Such a case will not convince a Buddhist, as Buddhists deny actual personhood. Such a case will not convince a Deist, as deists deny that a “personal God” exists. Such a case will not even convince a liberal Christian, as liberal Christians deny either the interpretation assumption, or the infallible Bible assumption.

Now, I could critique any of these assumptions in order to defeat the Christian case against homosexuality. However, I will be extremely generous here. I will assume, for the sake of argument, that every single one of the above propositions is true.

Past, Present, and Future

1. God’s commands hold if and only if those commands benefit us in some way.
2. God’s commands prohibiting all homosexual acts no longer benefit us.
3. God’s commands prohibiting all homosexual acts no longer hold.

First, some clarification. By “command”, I mean any rule, law, prohibition, obligation, or moral statement that can be evidenced via scripture as being declared, either implicitly or explicitly, by God. By “benefit”, I mean to say that such a command has some positive influence or result such that we are better off following it than not.

There is biblical evidence that God’s commands can, and have, changed. For example, in Genesis 4:3-4, Cain and Abel offer sacrifices to God – No one nowadays would even think of arguing that this is permissible. Furthermore, we were not required to have faith in Christ before (roughly) 5 B.C., while we are now. Other commands only apply to certain groups of people at certain times, in certain situations (see Hebrew ritual laws). So, we can establish that at least possibly, commands against homosexuality no longer apply. We can also run this argument with any of God’s other commands – as a thought experiment, replace “prohibiting all homosexual acts” with “prohibiting the eating of pork”, and the argument still works.

How are we to tell whether they still apply? Simple – look at whether such commands still benefit us, either individually or as a society. Let’s look at some facts (see previous section):

A) Homosexuals can love each other.
B) Homosexuals can have safe sex.
C) Homosexuals can raise children.

Looking at these, and other related facts, one is now rather hard-pressed to think of a benefit that a command against all homosexual behaviour might have today. One might say that the command still holds in order for humanity to continue to procreate and thus keep the species going, however this objection simply does not work. Only about 8-10 percent of the population is homosexual – it’s not as if removing/voiding this command would cause a huge chunk of the population to become exclusively homosexual. This percentage has, as far as we can tell, remained roughly constant in most societies throughout recorded history.

Furthermore, even if the entire human population (for whatever reason) suddenly became homosexual, humanity would not even then die out. Homosexuals, despite their attraction to the same sex, still desire to raise children. Just like a sterile couple who relies on sperm donation and/or a surrogate mother to reproduce, so too can homosexual couples reproduce (and, just like the sterile couple, will not love or care for their children any less due to the method of procreation). It seems that, today, the procreation rate would be wholly unaffected by lifting a command contra-homosexuality.

Now, one might object to premise 1 on the grounds that the purpose of God’s commands is not to benefit us. One might say that, as Calvinism states, God’s commands serve the purpose of bringing him glory. To this I can only say that there are good reasons for thinking, even if one is a Christian, that Calvinism is false. Here’s a brief sketch of how one might go about showing this:

1 Timothy 2:4 says that God “desires all people to be saved and to come to knowledge of the truth”. Now, obviously not all people are saved – this fact must be accounted for. Under non-Calvinistic theologies, this is accounted for via libertarian free will. Since Calvinism does not admit libertarian free will, (pending other theodicies) either Calvinism is false, or Christianity as a whole is false.

While much more can be said on whether Calvinism is true and/or correct interpretation of scripture, such a discussion is beyond the scope of this essay. Furhermore, one could also simply argue that Christianity itself is false (perhaps via Schellenberg’s divine hiddenness argument), or that God does not exist, or attack any of the above assumptions. However, these are topics for another time. My argument above will hopefully convince at least some of my readers that some instances of homosexual behaviour are permissible even within Christianity.

Conclusion: All Good Things…

To summarize: if there are many good things about homosexual behaviour, and no good reasons to think it is immoral, then we should conclude that homosexual behaviour is indeed permissible, at least in certain circumstances. I have shown that there are some very good things that result from homosexual behaviour; among these are intimacy, identity, child-rearing environments, economic benefits, and pleasure. I have also attempted to refute some of the more common arguments for thinking it is immoral; such as health concerns about anal sex, STD and abuse rates, natural law/proper fuction objections, and religious objections.

Enjoy your celery.

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(A) Badgett received her PhD in economics from UC Berkeley in 1990; and has co-authored two reports analyzing the fiscal impact of allowing same-sex couples to marry in California.

[1] http://www.webmd.com/mental-health/news/20051012/study-same-sex-parents-raise-well-adjusted-kids
[2] https://ecf.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/09cv2292/files/09cv2292-ORDER.pdf
[3] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TmlcuY8bOUk
[4] http://www.apa.org/helpcenter/sexual-orientation.aspx
[5] http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad362.pdf
[6] http://familydoctor.org/online/famdocen/home/seniors/common-older/067.html
[7] http://www.umm.edu/ency/article/003135.htm
[8] http://www.mayoclinic.org/fecal-incontinence/causes.html
[9] http://afaofpa.org/archives/news-release-same-sex-domestic-abuse-greater-threat/
[10] Frieze, I.H., Browne, A. (1989) Violence in Marriage. In L.E. Ohlin & M. H. Tonry (eds.) Family Violence. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
[11] U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Criminal Victimization,” 2003.
[12] http://www.healthpolicy.ucla.edu/pubs/files/IPV_PB_031810.pdf
[13] http://new.abanet.org/domesticviolence/Pages/Statistics.aspx#same-sex
[14] http://www3.uwstout.edu/cvpp/same_gender_stats.cfm
[15] http://www.cdc.gov/STD/stats08/msm.htm
[16] http://www.cdc.gov/STD/stats08/minorities.htm
[17] http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/women/resources/factsheets/wsw.htm

Now, one may attempt to answer this argument by objecting to (15) and arguing that there are rightmaking properties that override, or at least balance, the wrongmaking properties. One Swinburnean answer is that instances of natural evil give us an opportunity to exemplify goodness. One may object to this and claim that if this is the case, God would be justified in causing an earthquake that kills all but one person. However, if this opportunity is given to, say, 4 billion people, this would most likely balance the pain and suffering felt by the 200,000 or so; as well as be a better state of affairs than granting such an opportunity to only one individual.

Consider as well that this pain and suffering is not nearly as prolonged as one might be inclined to think at first glance; many people’s pain and suffering would be ended rather quickly by their death, and very few people normally suffer for days or weeks. So, the wrongmaking property of pain and suffering caused by the haiti earthquake is balanced by both the opportunity of 4 billion people to exemplify goodness, and the rather quick cessation via death of many of the victims.

Another issue is that perhaps God does not know with certainty how many people will die in any given natural disaster. Assuming Molinism (or something like it) is true, then the number of deaths may vary one way or the other. Consider that when the earthquake begins, many will panic. They may make rash decisions, such as a decision to run into a building for cover or dive into the water. God, in his omniscience, would know which buildings would collapse, where certain pieces of rubble would fall; however he may not know if someone will be inside a building or under a piece of rubble at time t. We could of course say that God knows the probabilities concerning what any given being X will do during the earthquake; however it seems rather obviously true that if one makes a snap decision during such an event, the probabilities of any possible actions will tend to even out, rather than be high for one possibility and low for another, as they most likely are when one makes a careful, considered decision.

But what of death itself? Surely death has wrongmaking properties as well, in that once one begins to exist, it is better to continue existing than to stop existing. Furthermore, one’s death carries a wrongmaking property in that it causes further pain and suffering for the family and friends of he who died. What rightmaking property could balance this? If we hold to the proposition:

(A) Once one begins to exist, it is a rightmaking property to continue existing rather than to cease existing, provided that existence does not become torturous or otherwise unbearable.

and also reason that God is perfectly good (via other arguments); then we may conclude that it is likely that there is some sort of afterlife.

This, I think, gives us a rather strong case for some sort of afterlife, provided we believe in a God who is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. We can also safely assume that existing in any sort of afterlife created by God would be quite a pleasant state of affairs. This would then balance out the wrongmaking properties of the death caused by the Haiti earthquake, both because the individual who died would continue to exist, and do so in a pleasant state of affairs, and because the family and friends of the victim would be comforted in knowing he is in a “better place”.

One may object to this as well by saying that perhaps the family and friends do not know that their dearly departed loved one is in a better place; by applying an argument from divine hiddenness. A response to this however is beyond the scope of this article, and must be dealt with separately.

So, why is it morally better for us to exist here from time {t1…tn} than in heaven? I have not developed a solid answer to that question as of yet (and it is certainly an important one); however this argument from evil is inductive, and so I think that the theodicy offered above weakens the argument a bit – certainly enough to swing the probability of theism back towards the positive quite a bit. I will say however that I suspect the answer lies in some sort of personal growth we must undertake, or some lesson we need to learn in order to become better moral agents.

My final thought applies Rawls’ veil of ignorance to the problem of evil. Suppose that we are behind a “moral-societal” veil of ignorance; that is, we live in an ideal society which, due to social and technological advancement, always(or almost always) works together in an effective manner in order to produce a state of living that is the best possible state of living that we could achieve, for every member of society. What might such a society look like?

I strongly suppose that if society were to be in such a state for any extended period of time(perhaps even as little as 50 years), we would have nearly unlimited resources to fuel any sort of thing we might want to do. Fuel for transportation would not be much of a problem; it would be cheap(or even free), and abundant. Furthermore, we would have some sort of ideal global government, which always carries out its action fairly and without bias. If it were the case that we were to develop such a society, it seems that the problem of both moral and natural evil would be almost entirely eliminated. If there were a hurricane, we would know about it quite far in advance, and would be able to quickly remove people to a safe location. If an earthquake were to occur, it would not be very much of a problem for us, as our structures would be incredibly well-built.

Such a society seems, at least, logically, perfectly within our power to actualize; and it also appears to be the case that the only reason it is not is because of moral evils in the world. So, it seems that another way of answering the natural problem of evil is to reduce it to the moral problem of evil. The moral problem, historically, has had far more, and stronger, responses than the natural problem (such as Plantinga’s free will defense). I will, therefore, leave discussion of the moral problem for another time.

First I will examine this argument from Joshua Rasmussen[1]:

(1) Intrinsic properties that can be exemplified by something that has a cause are such that if any one were to begin to be exemplified, that beginning could have a cause.
(2) There can begin to be contingent (non-necessary) things.
(3) Being contingent is an intrinsic property.
(4) Some contingent things can have a cause.
(5) Therefore, there can be a cause of a beginning to the existence of contingent things [from (1) – (4)].
(6) If (5), then there is a Necessary Being.
(7) Therefore, there is a Necessary Being.

It should be noted here that this is not necessarily an argument for God, rather it is an argument for something which has causal power and cannot fail to exist. This argument employs a very weak causal principle – even weaker than the W-PSR. Rasmussen gives the following analogy to explain intrinsic properties being caused to begin to be exemplified:

Consider first the property of being an armchair. That property began to be exemplified when the first armchair was constructed, and of course, that beginning had a cause. Consider next an intrinsic property that has never been exemplified, but could be: being a fifteen-legged animal, say. It is plausible that if that property were to begin to be exemplified, that beginning could be caused: imagine an evolutionary process leading to the birth of the first fifteen-legged animal.

So considering this, (1) seems to work, at least for things such as “being blue” and “being rectangular”.

(2) and (4) seem so obvious, I do not feel that they need a defense. However, I will defend them if an objection arises. But what of (3)? Rasmussen explains intrinsic properties thus:

(I) p is intrinsic if there is no external relation r, such that (anyone who fully grasps p, thereby grasps r, and it is not necessary that if p is exemplified by an x, then x bears r to x or one of x’s parts).

An example of an intrinsic property would be mass; physical objects have mass no matter where they are, and no matter what conditions they are under. An objects’ mass always = x. Weight, however, is an extrinsic property. An objects’ weight will be X on earth, but may be Y somewhere else. So, it seems apparent that contingency is an intrinsic property. We are not contingent because of anything, we just are.

(5) of course follows from (1) – (4). (6) Follows from (5) because things can only be necessary or contingent, and something contingent cannot cause the beginning of the existence of contingent things; this thing would have to cause itself to do that. So we arrive at (7) There is a necessary Being. It should be noted here that this argument is very modest – the “Being” in the conclusion does not need to be God, or even something supernatural; this being could very well be entirely natural, as long as it is necessary.

Is God Coherent?

Given that the previous argument does not necessarily show there is a God, why do I think there is? The first step is to show that God is a coherent idea; that is, I must show that this being could possibly exist. I will start by explaining what I mean by “God”, and define His attributes:

God:

There exists a necessary being with properties including, but not necessarily limited to, perfect freedom, omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness, who caused the beginning of the existence of contingent things, and who may or may not have created the universe.

Perfect Freedom:

If P does A freely, then no cause makes him do A. He is ultimately responsible for A being done; for nothing makes him make A be done. [...] An action, I suggest, is a free action if and only if the agent’s choosing to do that action, that is having the intention to produce the result of that action, has no full explanation—of any kind, whether of the kind described by scientific explanation or of the kind described by personal explanation. [...] But the suggestion that a man might see refraining from A as over all better than doing A, be subject to no non-rational influences inclining him in the direction of doing A and nevertheless do A, is incoherent. [...] it follows that a perfectly free agent will never do an action if he judges that over all it would be worse to do the action than to refrain from it; he will never do an action if he acknowledges overriding reasons for refraining from doing it. Similarly, he will always do an action if he acknowledges overriding reasons for doing it rather than for refraining from doing it, if he judges that doing it would be over all better than refraining from doing it.[2]

Omnipotence:

A person P is omnipotent at a time t if and only if he is able to bring about the existence of any logically contingent state of affairs x after t, the description of the occurrence of which does not entail that P did not bring it about at t, given that he does not believe that he has overriding reason for refraining from bringing about x.[2]

Omniscience:

A person P is omniscient at time t if and only if he knows every true proposition about t or an earlier time and every true proposition about a time later than t which is true of logical necessity or which he has overriding reason to make true, which it is logically possible that he entertains then.[2]

Perfect Goodness:

A person P is perfectly good if P is so constituted that he always does what there is overriding reason to do, and always refrains from doing what there is overriding reason for not doing.[2]

Given that moral judgements have truth values, an omniscient person will know them. His judgements about which actions are morally bad and which actions are morally good will be true judgements. Hence a perfectly free and omniscient being can never do actions that are morally bad, and will always do the best action, or an equal best action, or a best kind or an equal best kind of action (if there are these) [3]

Swinburne’s view is that God’s perfect freedom, omnipotence and omniscience entail his perfect goodness. That is, if X is omniscient and omnipotent, X will always know what the best action is to take, and will be able to take that action. Furthermore, X will know “I ought to take the best action”. So, as per his freedom, this will be an overriding reason to take that action, and thus He will.

First Cause:
It has already been shown that this being is the cause of the beginning of the existence of contingent things (see section I). But what of the universe; is this being the direct cause of the universe, or only indirectly, by virtue of causing contingent things? Well, I think that remains to be seen. This issue still seems to me to be explored further, as there are good arguments as to whether God is the direct cause of the universe on both sides.

Granting that all these properties are coherent, it follows that God is coherent; that is, He could exist.

Moving from A to B

So, two things have been established:
1) There exists some sort of necessary being.
2) The concept of God is coherent.

But are there reasons to think that the necessary being is God (that this being has the properties of God)? I again cite Rasmussen in support that God is the necessary being. He first introduces the concept of a gridscape[4]:

(1) Gridscape S =(def) For some concrete objects, the x’s, and some intrinsic properties and/or relations, the y’s, S is the state of affairs of the x’s instantiating the y’s.

That is, imagine four concrete objects represented as dots. These dots have circles attached to them, representing properties; and lines connecting them, representing relations. He then introduces a related concept:

(2) Wholly contingent gridscape S =(def) A gridscape all of whose properties and/or relations are contingently (not necessarily) instantiated by concrete objects in the gridscape.

He then introduces a causal principle:

Causal “x ((x is a wholly contingent gridscape) → ◊(x’s obtaining is causally explained)). {or} for any bunch of contingent, intrinsic properties or relations, their joint instantiation can be causally explained. For example, John’s jellybean being red can be causally explained.

Further on, he offers an argument for the omnipotence of the necessary being (N):

For any measurable [finite] attribute A, where A consists in having determinable D to degree µ, and any concrete object x that has A, there is some degree such that it is possible for x to have D to degree µ – e or µ + e.

That is, if we say a being has a finite amount of power, that being could have a little more or a little less power. This implies that having an attribute to a certain degree is contingent, because it could have been a slightly higher or slightly lower degree. Let us assume this is the case, and we have a gridscape containing some number of contingent objects, and the necessary being from section I. Let us also assume this being has finite power. If this is the case, then this property would be contingent, and we no longer have the necessary being we need to explain contingent things. So, N must be infinitely powerful.

Next he discusses free agency:

If N is not a personal agent, then if N brings about a state of affairs, N does so in virtue of exemplifying some property or properties, perhaps in combination with some law obtaining.

The idea behind this is that if N causes X, it did so either through free choice, or because it was a certain way/had certain properties. So, let’s imagine a gridscape again, this time one in which N is not a free agent. If this is the case, then N has “probability-fixing properties”; properties which will entail that there is a certain degree of probability that a wholly contingent gridscape G obtains. But let’s say that N has a property such that it creates a 0.2 probability of G obtaining. We again run into the same problem; it could be slightly higher or lower, and this leads to a wholly contingent gridscape.

Now, what of omniscience? Again, we run into the same problem:

If N is a personal agent, then N is capable of knowing at least something.

Let’s suppose that N has a finite degree of knowledge. Once again, N could have slightly more or slightly less knowledge, which leads to a wholly contingent gridscape.

Finally, what of perfect goodness? We have previously seen Swinburne’s view; that perfect goodness is entailed by God’s other attributes. However Rasmussen gives another argument:

Now suppose that N is finitely good (has finite degree of positive moral status) or finitely bad (has finite degree of negative moral status) or both. Suppose also that: There can be no causal explanation for N’s having the degree of positive or negative moral status that it has (had and will have).

Just as with the other attributes, we see that N could be slightly more or less morally praiseworthy. This leads to the conclusion that N must be either infinitely good, or infinitely bad. Rasmussen offers this in support of N being infinitely good:

N has at least some positive moral status: there is a situation in which N would freely bring about a good state of affairs.

This, combined with Swinburne’s thoughts on moral goodness, lays out a strong case for N being perfectly good.

Conclusion

So finally, we come to this:

1) There exists a necessary being.
2) This necessary being is, given its attributes, likely to be a being we may consider “God”.

Of course, much more may be said on this line of reasoning; it is quite complex and I have not even begun to explain all the details. I have not included any possible objections, or addressed the various atheistic arguments. However, I hope this brief summary will inspire further inquiry into my new-found belief in God.

_________

[1]Rasmussen, Joshua. “A New Argument For A Necessary Being.” Yale & UConn Graduate Conference (Feb 2009).

[2]Swinburne, Richard. The Coherence of Theism. 2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 1993. Print.

[3]Swinburne, Richard. The Existence of God. 2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2004. Print.

[4]Rasmussen, Joshua. “From A Necessary Being to God.” International Journal of Philosophy of Religion. 66.1 (2009): 1-13. Print.

In response to Bolt’s opening post, I replied and Bolt has since authored his rebuttal. What follows will be a response to the issues he raises therein.

Liangzhi, Proper Function, and Selflessness

First, I will explain some more about li, qi, and liangzhi. To quote directly from Tien’s paper:

For most Neo-Confucians, li describes the way a thing or state of affairs ought to be. So when things or states of affairs are in accord with li, they are deemed “natural,” and when they are not, they are deemed “deviant.” All things possess all the li of the universe within them. In human beings, the li exist complete in the mind (xin). For Wang, though, the mind not only contains li, the mind is itself li.

The liangzhi is the mechanism by which one can come to know the li or the principle of all things. Liangzhi is both a cognitive and affective (thinking and feeling) faculty. The li serves as the principle which describes the way things ought to be. Every existing thing contains all of the li within and so li is completely existent within the mind and while the mind contains li it is also, itself, li. Birth endows all human beings with a perfect mind or xinzhibenti. The perfect mind does not come to knowing by thinking, but simply knows. Liangzhi is a faculty of this mind which discerns “flawlessly, naturally and spontaneously between right and wrong,” thus forming correct beliefs and correct affective responses. However, there is a problem of qi:

All things in the universe are a combination of li and qi. Qi is the stuff of which the universe is made. It exists in various grades of purity. Although all things possess all the li of the universe within them, because of the impurity of the qi of which they are composed, some li are obstructed, thereby accounting for the differences between things.

Just as all things possess all of the li of the universe, because of the qi that forms their composition some li are obstructed. However, human beings have the ability to purify the levels of qi within and in turn allow the li to “shine forth”. Internal manifestations of qi within human beings are self-centered desires. It is these desires, or subsequent states of mind that cause us to lose touch with our pure mind and liangzhi. That liangzhi is to operate effectively requires that the self-centered desires are eliminated. Thus, our minds while li, are corrupted by qi. But how then can we come to know things? Regarding proper function, one can be said to be able to discern knowledge when one is employing liangzhi at some time; that is, our beliefs are warranted when we come to them while employing liangzhi. But how may we do this when qi “blocks” the liangzhi?

The proper functioning of the mind is acquired through selflessness or the absence of self-centered desires. Self-centered in this context does not mean selfish, but is translated from si meaning “to make oneself the center of one’s world.” It can be said that being in a state of selflessness in order to employ liangzhi equates to being unselfconscious of personal agency. To form an analogy, we can say that in order for our beliefs to be warranted, we must polish (liangzhi) the dust (qi) off of a mirror, in order to see the reflection (li) clearly. This “polishing of the dust” is a cumulative process, we must first rid ourselves of self-centered thoughts one at a time; and each time we do, we become better equipped to do so with other self-centered thoughts in the future. Second, we must extend liangzhi to our everyday lives.

The means by which one achieves a state of selflessness is firstly through the rectification of thoughts. This is simply to purge one of the impurities of self-centeredness to permit the second stage of the extension of knowledge, which results in the attainment of warranted belief.  The rectification of thoughts or gewu explains that the mind is li and the proper place to discover li is in the mind and not in any outside world. In eliminating incorrect thoughts, one’s mind can function freely and being to operate properly. Gewu entails that once a single self-centered thought begins to stir, it must be cast out. As it is a continual effort, each individual success allows the liangzhi to operate more freely and the more freely the liangzhi is the more easily it can identify incorrect thoughts and eliminate them. As such, when one eliminates some self-centered desire relevant to a particular belief, one attains an affective state of selflessness in relation to that belief and the liangzhi constitutes a properly functioning cognitive-affective faculty relative to that belief. This is, in effect, polishing the mirror to reflect the images before it.

Further, there is the additional criterion of the extension of knowledge. Succinctly, this is to extend the liangzhi to matters of everyday life. It is the difference between knowing “how” and knowing “that.” One cannot extend the liangzhi if they are not in an affective state of selflessness to some specific belief which would prevent one from attaining an affective state of action which stands as a necessary condition for true belief to constitute warranted knowledge. In some instances self-centered desires hinder the liangzhi from extending and the effective way of unearthing one’s incorrect thoughts are by attempts at such extension. “When the attempted extension fails, the subject will then be in a much better position to identify the relevant self-centered desires, and when they are identifies, she will be forced to confront them.” Upon doing so, extension of the liangzhi will be possible. That is, failure to extend one’s liangzhi reveals the relevant self-centered desires that need overcoming. As such, the rectification of thoughts and the extension of knowledge is a cyclical process. “The rectification of thoughts is the effort to extend knowledge. As one knows how to extend his knowledge, he also knows how to rectify thoughts. If he does not know how to rectify thoughts, it means he does not yet know how to extend his knowledge.” For those who have already eliminated all the self-centered desires and still cannot extend the liangzhi the issue of unity between knowledge and action arises. That is to say, the extension of liangzhi is merely acting upon the deliverances of the properly functioning liangzhi. Is it possible to know that filial piety involves caring for one’s parents in both winter and summer without actually doing so? One might have right beliefs about such but until one extends this otherwise lesser kind of knowledge, one will never truly “know.” Knowledge is the beginning of action, and action is the completion of knowledge.

And so, we can identify the Neo-Confucian theory of warrant as:

A belief p will have real warrant for a person S if and only if S is in an affective state appropriate to belief p, and p is produced in S by properly functioning cognitive-affective faculties in an appropriate cognitive affective environment for S’s kind of cognitive-affective faculties, according to a function successfully aimed at truth, and the degree of warrant p enjoys for S is directly proportional to the firmness with which S holds p.

Bolt’s Lack of Clarity

Bolt writes:

Recall that the reason atheistic epistemic justifications fail is because atheism does not provide for objective epistemic normativity which is required for propositional knowledge.

As evidenced by the italics in the above quote, Bolt clearly considers justification and normativity to be two different things. This statement seems counter to some things Bolt has said in his opening statement:

“Something like justification or warrant is required in order for someone to have propositional knowledge.”

“What is required for propositional knowledge is some sort of objective epistemic normativity.”

“Some type of epistemic warrant must be accounted for in Nocterro’s view of the world because of the need for warrant in knowledge.”

“The character and command of God and His having created us in His image and obligated us toward Him provides for the epistemic normativity necessary to right belief.”

“Epistemic warrant is in some sense necessary for human intelligibility yet it is foreign to an atheistic worldview while the Christian worldview provides for epistemic warrant. “

Bolt, in his most recent response, claims that atheistic epistemic justifications fail because atheism does not provide for objective epistemic normativity. However, as evidenced by the quotes above from his opening post, he uses the terms “justification”, “warrant”, and “normativity” interchangeably. So I must wonder, what is he asking the atheist to provide? In fact, I must wonder this same thing overall. I do not think Chris has been at all detailed enough in describing his worldview and how it provides warrant/normativity, or in stating what it is the atheist needs to do in order to effectively argue against his position. Furthermore, Bolt states in his response that:

Nocterro allegedly provides a brief summary of Plantinga’s position on epistemic justification which I do not adhere to and did not bring up in my opening statement.

Firstly, I am not sure what Bolt means here by “allegedly”; I must ask him to clarify his choice of words. Bolt thinks I am assuming that Plantinga’s position is his position as well. However, this is not the case. There are two reasons why I chose to discuss Plantinga’s view on warrant. The first is that Bolt, in his opening statement, never went into detail on what the concept of warrant entailed. I was thus forced to go with the leading view in order to discuss the topic:

Perhaps the most prevalent view of warrant in contemporary philosophy is that of proper function, as employed comprehensively and famously by Alvin Plantinga.

The second reason has nothing to do with Bolt’s (as yet explained) account for warrant, but a possible atheistic account for warrant. I merely presented Plantinga’s view as background information, going on to quote Plantinga himself in defense of atheistic warrant:

Even if [the atheist] doesn’t think we human beings have been designed and created by a powerful and highly competent being who proposed to endow us with the ability to achieve true beliefs, he may nonetheless think of this idea as a convenient and useful fiction [...] he may say that our cognitive faculties are working properly when they are working in the way they would work if the theistic story were true. He may therefore treat this story the way corresponding stories are treated by some who accept ideal observer theories in ethics…

Perhaps in response to this, he writes, in the section previous to his quote above:

Finally, Nocterro believes that he can presuppose God in his reasoning without believing that God exists. Not only does the argument presented show that epistemic normativity is impossible on a view where God does not exist, but it is impossible to “presuppose God” without believing that God exists, so Nocterro fails in his attempt to escape the conclusion of the argument given the soundness of the argument.

I agree that it is impossible to presuppose God without believing that God exists. Plantinga’s quote above states that the atheist does *not* presuppose God (which would entail belief that He exists), but rather that he may take the idea to be “a convenient and useful fiction”. That is, the atheist may use the concept of God as a thought experiment, and nothing more. To conclude, I must ask Chris to clarify his views on a few things before this discussion can proceed any further:

1) What is warrant?

2) What is justification?

3) What is epistemic normativity?

Bolt’s Objections to Neo-Confucian Warrant

Bolt states:

Nocterro has not provided any explanation of how the liangzhi may have been designed to function as it is held to function as opposed to any other way.

This, however, strikes me as similar to asking why God is the way he is rather than other way. Do questions such as these really have answers? Surely they are brute facts that are unexplained by any external states of affairs.

Bolt further states:

The liangzhi must be the result of unintentional, undirected, non-human, non-divine, non-intelligent processes by which the liangzhi came to be or comes to be.

Or simply not a result of anything at all, similar to how God is not a result of any non-God thing. If what Bolt is hinting at here is a sort of evolutionary objection in that it seems odd that evolution would develop liangzhi, I think we can agree with him. Of course, under Neo-Confucianism the existence of a mind necessarily entails the existence of liangzhi so that insofar as we have an explanation as for why evolution would bring about a mind, we have thereby explained why there is liangzhi. That liangzhi is the type of faculty that it is seems to be merely a brute fact.

Bolt states:

Further, he implies through his use of terms like “ought” that li, while only a descriptive concept, is somehow normative. Indeed he states this outright but without any reason for doing so.

But the li is not only a descriptive concept, it is both descriptive and normative as outlined above: “…when things or states of affairs are in accord with li, they are deemed ‘natural,’ and when they are not, they are deemed ‘deviant.’” Bolt states:

… the question remains as to why the li should be preferred over qi anyway. Again, epistemic normativity is lacking in this view and there is no apparent reason why one is obligated to conform one’s thoughts to li to begin with.

This seems no different than asking why one would prefer or adjust their lives towards God over Satan? Bolt might answer that we should do so because God created us, but where is the principle that says if one creates another, we should adjust our lives towards them? Even if there were such a principle, why should one follow it rather than not? Perhaps Bolt would state that because God commands us to do so, but why should we listen to his commands rather than not? Bolt might state that we’ll be punished if we don’t, but why should we prefer non-punishment over punishment?  Of course, perhaps there is no obligation under Neo-Confucianism to conform to the li, or perhaps one should prefer the li because of the better lives that result in ridding one’s self of self-centered desires. The question seems to be importing standards from Bolt’s own view in examining Neo-Confucianism but he must not judge this system by his presuppositions to determine internal incoherence he must examine my system from within and there does not seem to be any necessity for this idea of “preference” that Bolt is introducing. Bolt states:

Some may think that I have already given Nocterro too much, for while Christianity is a revelatory worldview, Neo-Confucianism is not. There are questions concerning how anyone comes to know these sort of claims concerning liangzhi and li and qi to begin with. Has Nocterro ‘discovered’ and ‘reached’ the liangzhi? If he has not, then he cannot claim to have come to know the liangzhi apart from the ‘authority’ of Wang (given that Wang reached it himself), but this is not bringing even one’s most basic thoughts into conformity with li because Wang was just another human being.

Given the discussion on the role of action, it would actually be impossible to count claims based on authority as knowledge. There must be that role of personal experience and affective states. This doesn’t, then, seem to be a problem. He further states:

The world of li and qi is not an appropriate cognitive environment for the operation of liangzhi since qi obstructs the operation of the liangzhi so that it does not function properly.

Of course the same might be said for his worldview as well, that the noetic influence of sin prevents any knowledge whatsoever. However, Bolt has the faculties of the so-called sensus divinatus as an alleged “way-out” of this problem, and so too has the Neo-Confucian a “way out” in the criteria previously outlined.

Conclusion

It does seem that Neo-Confucianism epistemology permits the ideas of warrant, proper function and normativity (as understood by traditional definitions, I now assume that Bolt is using them as such). Indeed, since this is true Bolt’s claim that only Christianity could do so is clearly false. Since this also forms the basis of his argument for the truth of Christianity, one is not required to accept his conclusion that Christianity is true and one need not accept on this basis that scripture is true, or that I presuppose God. If Bolt’s key argument for the Christian position has indeed failed, one must wonder by which means is he now establishing the truth of Christianity.

1) The reliability of scripture
2) The self-deception of atheists
3) The presupposition of God in my reasoning

¹Response to the “Reliability of Scripture”

Bolt writes:

Scripture is reliable and is the source of my claim that Nocterro believes both ‘God exists’ and ‘Nocterro does not believe that God exists’. Scripture is also the source of my claim that Nocterro presupposes God in order to reason at all.

Bolt bases his other claims on the claim that scripture is reliable. But how does he know scripture is reliable? He writes:

From the providence of God and the results of textual critical science it can be known that we currently posses substantially correct transcriptions of the autographa of Scripture. Nocterro must assume from the outset of the discussion that God has not spoken clearly and that He has not provided us with an adequate means of learning what He has said if Nocterro is to call into question the reliability of Scripture.

It is interesting here that Bolt is not defending the claim that scripture is true, rather he is defending the claim that our current texts match the originals. Also interesting is that one of his justifications for this claim is “the providence of God” – going on to state that:

Nocterro must assume from the outset of the discussion that God has not spoken clearly.

He claims that scripture is the source of his claim that I (and presumably everyone else) must presuppose God in order to reason. He is presupposing God in order to show that scripture is true. But surely scripture is correct only if both the Christian God exists and one must presuppose the existence of God to account for reason.

Bolt must show both that the Christian God exists and that we must presuppose the existence of him to account for reason but cannot use Scripture alone to do so. To do so would be to assume the very thing in question. Bolt can’t use that which necessarily depends on the existence of the divine to argue for the existence of the divine using its proposed divinity as a reliability-maker.

Response to “Self-deception”

He also writes:

It is worth noting that the second-order belief mentioned influences the way that Nocterro interprets evidence. Nocterro suppresses the truth in unrighteousness. This feat is accomplished through rationalizing away evidence of the existence of God, ignoring obvious points, dodging anything which might challenge his anti-Christ presuppositions, etc.

There are a few things to say about this:

a) Can Chris point to anything I have ever written that is an example of me rationalizing away evidence of the existence of God?
b) What “obvious” point or points does he feel I have ignored?
c) What have I ever dodged?

Apparently Bolt feels that I have been intellectually dishonest in this discussion by not addressing the issue directly.

Scripture, according to Bolt, states that I am self-deceived. But why believe Scripture? If Scripture is false, then it seems Bolt has no reason whatsoever to claim that I am self deceived, but as we have seen above, we may not simply assume that Scripture is true since it is obviously false if God does not exist, and if I do not have to presuppose him.

Further, if there are good arguments which reduce the probability of God’s existence then so too is the likelihood of Scripture’s being true reduced and by proxy this reduction extends to my being self-deceived. Granting that there are such arguments and coupled with the fact that I have a privileged access to the contents of my own mind, in that I experience them directly, it seems even more unlikely that I am so deceived.

To quote Richard Swinburne:

The adequacy of grounds is often expressed in terms of probability—both by the externalist and by the internalist. The grounds for a belief are adequate to the extent to which they render the belief probable. (And if the grounds for one belief B consist of another belief C, then, for B to have adequate grounds, Cs grounds must make B probable. (Epistemic Justification, pg. 56)

In other words, a belief on a certain matter is justified if it is more probable than other mutually exclusive beliefs on the matter. So, if this argument is sound, then I am justified in my belief that I am not self-deceived.

Response to “Presupposing God”

This is quite clearly the most important portion since Bolt’s justification for all the previous sections is based on the success of his argument here. That is to say, if Bolt does not succeed in showing that God exists and that I must presuppose him in order to reason he has, by proxy, not succeeded in showing that scripture is reliable, and that I am self-deceived.

Bolt writes:

Given his anti-theistic worldview, Nocterro cannot posit the notion of right or wrong ways that beliefs should either come about or be held and hence his position is reducible to absurdity.

Bolt assumes here either that (1) no atheistic epistemic justifications have ever been offered; or (2) all such justifications offered fail. As for (1), even a simple Google or Wikipedia search will show this is blatantly false. Regarding (2), Bolt has a grand task indeed if he must offer objections to ALL forms of non-theistic theories of justification.

He states:

There is no absolute person or persons on an atheistic view which provides an account for epistemic normativity.

This assumes that any justification must necessarily be based on an absolute person or persons (by which I assume he means a deity) – it begs the question against atheism.

He continues:

The character and command of God and His having created us in His image and obligated us toward Him provides for the epistemic normativity necessary to right belief.

It seems quite odd to me that while several philosophers have written entire books on epistemic justification, Bolt’s justification consists of merely a single sentence – a sentence which, all things considered, doesn’t really tell us much at all. All Bolt does here is state that his theory of justification is based on God; he does not explain how or why, he gives no details. How exactly is it that belief in Yahweh leads to correct beliefs? Is it Bolt’s claim that if one is a believer, then Yahweh will prevent that person from ever believing something which is false? I’m also not sure what Bolt means by “right belief”. Is a right belief a belief with is justified? Is it a belief which is true?

Truth be told, this conversation seems eerily similar to Bolt’s conversation with Mitch LeBlanc regarding another formulation of TAG (Transcendental Argument for the existence of God), the laws of logic, and conventionalism in which LeBlanc states:

[The TAG] is no better than a God of the Gaps argument, applied to logical justifications. Why can’t epistemology rely on the possibility of there being justifications? If you’re saying that the case is such that these three justifications have been shown to be false, and Christianity has not, therefore we must choose Christianity, I think you’ve just begged the question in favor of Christianity. If the arguments in the bulk of my paper hold up, it is an incoherent notion to state that logical principles can be grounded in the existence of God.

To which Bolt replies:

I can deny that lightning is caused by Zeus and even come up with other explanations for it, even other unscientific explanations, and not be concerned about my entire epistemology crashing down. You actually cannot, however, deny that Christianity is the precondition for logic and come up with other “explanations” for it and not be concerned about your entire epistemology crashing down. If you are actually unable to account for logic then you are reduced to absurdity and unable to even entertain allegedly possible justifications for logic. You have no place to stand.

All this ties in closely with the notion of the ”impossibility of the contrary”. Bolt’s overall argument here (modified to reflect our current discussion) is:

1) Christianity gives a sound epistemic justification.
2) Nocterro cannot give a sound non-Christian epistemic justification.
3) Therefore, Nocterro must borrow from Christianity for epistemic justification.

However, Bolt has merely asserted (1). He has offered no real defense of this, or even explained how Christianity does so. Until he can do that, (3) does not follow from (1) and (2). Furthermore, even if he successfully defends (1), he must still defeat any epistemic justification I could possibly offer in order to show that (2) is true.

Leblanc touches upon this notion in a paper by referencing presuppositionalist Greg Bahnsen’s attempt at avoiding having to show all possible justifications false:

As such, in an attempt to avoid the arduous task of showing that all flavours of the aforementioned possible justifications are false (and thereby that any worldviews that employ them are false), he seeks only to show that they all depend upon a particular claim, that ‘Christianity is false’, and that this claim renders everything unintelligible….

To paraphrase this section of LeBlanc’s paper:

i) One must have knowledge of all possible non-Christian justifications in order to show that they all share this claim in common.
ii) If one shows that this claim “Christianity is false” is false, then the TAG is no longer needed.

On Warrant

Perhaps the most prevalent view of warrant in contemporary philosophy is that of proper function, as employed comprehensively and famously by Alvin Plantinga. To say that warrant is proper function is to say that some persons true beliefs are justified in counting as knowledge if they have arisen by virtue of the proper functioning of some cognitive faculties.

Plantinga outlines some criteria in his paper “Epistemic Justification” (Nous, 1986):

A) Your faculties must be in good working order.

This is of course not a problem for the theist, since he will believe that he was designed with faculties in good working order. However, I think two points need to be brought up:

1) Many theists can believe this, not just Christians.
2) Even an atheist may employ an “epistemic veil of ignorance”; that is, he may use God merely as a hypothetical, just as Rawls did in discussing how we may decide what is moral.

In regard to (2), Plantinga writes:

Even if [the atheist] doesn’t think we human beings have been designed and created by a powerful and highly competent being who proposed to endow us with the ability to achieve true beliefs, he may nonetheless think of this idea as a convenient and useful fiction [...] he may say that our cognitive faculties are working properly when they are working in the way they would work if the theistic story were true. He may therefore treat this story the way corresponding stories are treated by some who accept ideal observer theories in ethics…

B) You must be epistemically dutiful.

This merely means that you make real, honest efforts to come to hold true beliefs.

C) Your environment must be appropriate for your particular repertoire of epistemic powers.

Plantinga asks us to imagine:

You awake on a planet near Alpha Centauri. There, conditions are quite different; elephants (or their counterparts) are invisible to human beings but emit a sort of radiation that causes human beings to form the belief that a trumpet is sounding…

…The problem is that your cognitive faculties and the environment in which you find yourself are not properly attuned. The problem is not with your cognitive faculties; they are in good working order; the problem is with the environment.

So basically, it must be the case that our faculties are “suited” to our environment.

Warranted Neo-Confucian Belief

Bolt states:

Given his anti-theistic worldview, Nocterro cannot posit the notion of right or wrong ways that beliefs should either come about or be held and hence his position is reducible to absurdity.

Based on this statement, and drawing from other conversations that Bolt has had, it seems that he is making the claim that only the Christian God can provide the type of warrant required for knowledge. That is to say, he is attempting to prove the truth of Christianity by showing that a denial of Christianity necessarily leads to a denial of warrant, and thereby a denial of knowledge. This, however, is dubious for it is certainly not clear that only the Christian worldview can account for warrant. As one example, David Tien shows that Neo-Confucianism meets the criteria for warrant² (should Bolt also want to claim that his belief is properly basic, Tien’s discussion attempts to show that warranted Neo-Confucian belief provides a defeater for Christian theism).

Briefly, in Neo-Confucian belief, the liangzhi is the “perfect state of mind”. The li (or principle) is the way things ideally ought to be. So, if it can be said that one has a liangzhi state of mind, one’s state of mind is ideal, natural, or perfect. A Christian may consider the mind of God to be liangzhi.

Tien states:

The liangzhi operates as a faculty of the mind that discerns flawlessly, naturally, and spontaneously between right and wrong. It not only forms correct beliefs, it also produces correct affective responses.

I will not delve too much into affective responses here, as I do not think it is important to the discussion. However, the Chinese scholar Wang Yangming states that all humans innately possess liangzhi.

In response to one seeming problem with such an account of the mind,  how does Wang account for our poor moral choices? He offers this explanation:

All things in the universe are a combination of li and qi. Qi is the stuff of which the universe is made. It exists in various grades of purity. Although all things possess all the li of the universe within them, because of the impurity of the qi of which they are composed, some li are obstructed, thereby accounting for the differences between things.

Wang’s view is that while humans possess both li and qi, we are able to purify our minds and eliminate qi. He says that qi is manifested mainly as self-centered desires. Qi can thus be compared to the Buddhist concept of negative karma, or the Christian concept of sin.

In Plantinga’s Warranted Christian Belief, he states that, according to the sensus divinitatus, Christians have warrant for belief because they have a faculty that produces true beliefs. Thus, Christian belief is warranted (the SD being created by God). However, Wang’s Neo-Confucian beliefs also meet Plantinga’s criteria for warrant.

Tien writes:

First, the liangzhi, once it is discovered and utilized, is a properly functioning (and affective) faculty. Second, the world of li and qi is an appropriate cognitive environment for the operation of liangzhi. Third, the liangzhi faculty of our original minds is simply the conscious aspect of li, which is itself descriptive and normative truth; li conveys the truth about the way things are when they are the way they should be.

Plantinga defends his warrant by stating that if his model is true, then Christians and non-Christians are in different epistemic situations. He also states that one who holds to a non-Christian worldview is necessarily assuming the Christian worldview is false. If this is the case, then it is also the case that the Christian is assuming all non-Christian worldviews are false. Plantinga holds that the claim of arbitrariness only works if the Christian and non-Christian are in similar epistemic situations. If, however, the Christian account is epistemically superior, then the objection is not sound. Since the Neo-Confucian account for warrant is at least internally consistent, and the Neo-Confucian account is epistemically similar to the Christian account, then the Neo-Confucian may accuse the Christian of arbitrarily assuming the falsity of non-Christian belief, just as the Christian may likewise accuse the Neo-Confucian. Thus, Plantinga’s response is self-defeating.

Later on in his paper, Tien examines the overall issue:

And all along, I have claimed that Neo-Confucian belief is probably warranted only if Neo-Confucian belief is true, and Plantinga has claimed the same for Christian belief. The de jure objection is dependent on the de facto objection. If Wang’s description of ultimate reality is true, then Wang’s Neo-Confucian beliefs probably are warranted. If it is false, then they are probably not warranted.

To conclude:
1) If Christian beliefs are possibly warranted (by Plantinga’s method), then Neo-Confucian beliefs are also possibly warranted.
2) If Christian beliefs are true, then they are probably warranted; and likewise for Neo-Confucian beliefs.

As such, if Bolt intends to make the claim that only Christian theism can account for epistemic warrant, it seems that he is simply wrong. Further, it is also an open issue as to whether or not Neo-Confucianism is overall a preferable system to Christian Theism, as well as whether or not Bolt’s system succeeds in providing what he hopes it does. One might discover that I am not presupposing God to reason, but rather, that Bolt is presupposing Neo-Confucianism (and further, possibly deceived about his doing so!) It seems to follow that Bolt should make a case not that Christian belief (and only Christian belief) is warranted, but that it is in fact true.

Assumption vs. Existence

Further, even if Bolt is correct in saying that I must presuppose God, it obviously does not follow that God exists. Bolt seems to be operating with a principle similar to: If I can do Q by assuming P and P only, then my assumption is true where Q is account for reason, or having warranted beliefs and P is that God exists. However, would it not be more accurate to say: If I can do Q by assuming P and P only, then I must assume P? Does the necessity of assuming P entail that P is true? I think not. So, even if Bolt is correct in that I must presuppose that God exists (and I do not think he is), that would mean only that Bolt’s belief in God is possibly justified, not that God actually does exist.

Conclusion

As such, our three topics are really one topic. Of that one topic, it does not appear to me that Bolt has presented any sufficient case or convincing reason to accept that (i) his Christian theism provides warrant, (ii) no non-Christian system can possibly provide warrant. Indeed, the internal consistency of Neo-Confucianism and that it meets the criteria for warrant seems to render at least (ii) obviously false. Given that one does not need to presuppose the Christian God in order to satisfy the requirement of warrant in knowledge, one does not need to accept the authority of scripture and given that, one need not to accept that they are self-deluded if they think differently than Bolt does.

___________________________

¹Any time the word “God” is used, it refers to specifically the Christian God, unless stated otherwise.

²Tien, David W. “Warranted Neo-Confucian Belief: Religious Pluralism and the Affections in the Epistemologies of Wang Yangming [1472-1529] and Alvin Plantinga” in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 55:1 (2004).

1. If any being is God, he must be a fitting object of worship.
2. No being could possibly be a fitting object of worship, since worship requires the abandonment of one’s role as an autonomous moral agent.
3. Therefore, there cannot be any being who is God.

It very strongly seems the case that no one will dispute (1), so I will move on to Rachels’ defense of (2).

He describes worship thus:

We can very well comprehend people loving one another or respecting one another, but not (unless they are misguided) worshiping one another. This is because the worshiper necessarily assumes his own inferiority; and since inferiority is an asymmetrical relation, so is worship.

Rachels argues that whether or not God exists, we are moral agents; that is, we are autonomous and make moral decisions. However, this seems to conflict with being a worshiper:

To say “I will follow so-and-so’s directions no matter what they are and no matter what my own conscience would otherwise direct me to do” is to opt out of moral thinking altogether; it is to abandon one’s role as a moral agent. And it does not matter whether “so-and-so” is the law, the customs of one’s society, or Jehovah. This does not, of course, preclude one from seeking advice on moral matters and even on occasion following that advice blindly, trusting in the good judgment, of the adviser.

The conflict between being a worshiper and a moral agent is this: While a worshiper must always defer to God on moral decisions without question, a moral agent must make his or her own moral decisions.

Objections

1) God’s only command regarding morality is that we make our own moral decisions.

This is in fact the complete opposite of what most major theistic religions claim. Judaism, Islam, and Christianity all have God giving many specific moral commands to humanity. This objection may work if one is a deist, however it fails if one is a member of the Abrahamic religions.

2) Our responsibility as a moral agent is to do right, and God only ever commands us to do what is right.

The problem here is this: a being worthy of being called “God” will always command what is right, however, how can we know whether what he commands is right without using our own moral judgment? It seems that our own moral judgment is logically prior to deciding if some being is worthy of the title “God”.

3) We cannot trust our own judgment to determine what is right and wrong, we must trust God’s judgment, as only He is morally perfect.

Rachels gives two responses to this objection; for the sake of brevity I will only discuss the second. He argues that if we determine that God requires us to take some action, and we state that this action is morally right because God requires it, we have still made a moral judgment – that whatever God requires is morally right.

4) The conscience is God speaking to the individual.

This objection seems to lead to the conclusion that God is “tricking” us; that we think we have moral autonomy but in reality we do not. Rachels applies the famous Euthyphro dilemna here:

If in speaking to us through the voice of conscience, God is informing us of what is right, then there is no reason to think that we could not discover this for ourselves–the notion of “God informing us” is eliminable. On the other hand, if God is only giving us arbitrary commands, which cannot be thought of as right independent of his promulgating them, then the whole idea of conscience, as it is normally understood, is a sham.

5) “Finally, it might be objected that the question of whether any being is worthy of worship is different from the question of whether we should worship him.”

Rachels writes:

Mrs. Brown, being a fine woman, may be worthy of a marriage proposal, but we ought not to propose to her, since she is already married. Or, Seaman Jones may be worthy of a medal for heroism, but still there could be reasons why we should not award it. Similarly, it may be that there is a being who is worthy of worship and yet we should not worship him since it would interfere with our lives as moral agents.

The response to this objection deals with circumstances. Under circumstances X, Mrs. Brown would be worthy of marriage, while under circumstances Y, she is not. However, according to the argument, there are no cases in which moral agents should, or even can, worship God. One could say that an example would be beings which are not moral agents should worship God, however how could a non-moral agent, such as a spider, or even a rock, possibly worship?

The argument, if sound, forces the theist to one of two possible conclusions:

1) God does not exist.
2) We are not moral agents.

The problems for the theist if he chooses to accept 1 are apparent. However, if the theist instead goes with 2, then he must conclude that we are merely moral robots, devoid of any accountability for our actions.

________________________

¹See: Can Ethics Provide Answers? : And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy by James Rachels

(A) If the God of evangelical Christianity were to exist, then:

1. He would love all Christians and want a personal relationship with them.
2. People would need to have G-beliefs (among other things) in order to have the sort of relationship with God that he would want them to have.

(B) Therefore, if the God of evangelical Christianity were to exist, then he would want all Christians to have G-beliefs.

(C) Thus, if the God of evangelical Christianity were to exist, then he would probably prevent Christians from becoming confused or conflicted about matters that are the subject of G-beliefs.

(D) But some Christians are confused about such matters.

(E) And many Christians disagree with one another about such matters.

(F) Therefore [from D & E], Christians have not been prevented from becoming confused or conflicted about matters that are the subject of G-beliefs.

(G) Hence [from C & F], probably the God of evangelical Christianity does not exist.

He writes:

According to evangelical Christianity, there are matters about which it would be very beneficial for people on earth to be knowledgeable. Included among them would be God’s nature, God’s laws, the nature of the afterlife, the requirements for salvation, God’s church and sacraments, and the status of the Bible. Let us call true beliefs about such matters “G-beliefs.”

Examples of G-beliefs would include:

“I believe with a reasonable degree of certainty that faith alone is required to enter heaven.”

“I believe with a reasonable degree of certainty that I will retain my free will in heaven.”

“I believe with a reasonable degree of certainty that God is omnipotent, with the definition of omnipotence being X”

The “reasonable degree of certainty” in question would be a level of certainty which Christians have about other theological matters, such as “Jesus Christ was the Son of God”.
However, there is a high degree of confusion among Christians about theological details – details which seem quite important to salvation. For example, the debate regarding Calvinism/Molinism/Arminianism is quite complex, with adherents of all three seemingly able to make a strong biblical case for each. This points to the apparent fact that the bible is not nearly as clear on such matters as it could be. Drange defines two types of confusion regarding doctrine:

1) Individual confusion – confusion within one’s own mind about which view of a theological matter is biblically correct.

2) Group confusion – there are two or more groups who hold different stances on a theological matter; while each member of group A may not be individually confused, if group B is correct, then group A as a whole is confused.

This argument is similar to the divine hiddenness argument in that God has not made it clear which view of a theological matter is correct. Furthermore, it is important to note that confusion regarding some of these matters may have grave consequences, such as whether God hate homosexuals or abortion doctors. So, confusion on at least some of these issues is not trivial.

Drage then goes on to discuss three possible objections to this argument:

The Free Will Defense

Drange writes,

God permits Christians to be confused about important doctrinal issues because if he were to clarify matters for them and thereby cause them all to have G-beliefs, it would interfere with their free will, which he does not want to do. It is more important to him that they retain their free will than that they have G-beliefs.

He then points out that enhancing humanity’s knowledge would enhance their free will, not restrict it. Even the bible agrees, in John 8:32, “…and the truth shall set you free”. Another objection can be made in that God has already provided some G-beliefs, such as the belief that Jesus is Lord. So it is apparent that God would not think that causing G-beliefs would interfere with free will.

The Afterlife Defense

This defense admits that while there is confusion here, in this life; it will be rectified in the afterlife. One problem with this defense is that it tends to make light of confusion in this life, and thus make light of this life itself. Another objection would be that this view itself, that confusion will be rectified in the afterlife, is itself a source of confusion which should be a G-belief.

The Unknown-Purpose Defense

This defense states that while God may desire for humans to have G-beliefs in this life, He has another desire which conflicts with this desire – similar to God not being able to eliminate evil, even though He desires to, because He also desires us to have free will. However, what would this desire possibly be? This defense seems to have little, if any, explanatory power. In addition, there seem to be many verses in the Bible which conflict with this defense, including John 18:37, Matthew 28:19-20, and 2 Timothy 3:16. Drange states that this defense would “make much of the Bible incomprehensible” and that the Bible seems to indicate that “acquisition of the truth is a top priority with [God]“. In fact, he postulates that this defense clashes with the Bible so greatly, that anyone espousing this objection would be forced to retreat to a type of deism!

Drange concludes:

Any Christian who is not willing to give up the idea of God as omnipotent, all-loving, and greatly concerned about humanity and desiring some close personal relationship with it, would have great difficulty in overcoming the Argument from Confusion.

This argument is coupled with another argument entitled “The Argument from Biblical Defects”, which may be discussed in a later article.

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¹http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/confusion.html

“You have just as much faith in science/atheism as I do in God/religion/the bible”

When this argument is presented, the typical atheist response is to explain that their position is NOT faith based. However, it seems as this gives undue credence to the argument. The fact is, the “argument from equal faith” is hypocritical. For the theist to say that the atheist has an equal amount of faith is to say two things:

1) It is an admission that the theist has faith concerning the existence of God
2) It is an admission that since faith justifies the theist position – and is therefore a good way of knowing something – and therefore gives just as much credence to the atheists’ position as to the theists’ own.

The overall goal for this argument, at least among the theists who are actually concerned with real discussion of ideas, is to say that the atheist cannot criticize a position which is based on faith, since they themselves have faith. Such intellectual theists, when they make this argument, seem to really mean something akin to Warranted Belief/Properly Basic Belief/Justified True Belief, and not the traditional “Belief without evidence”. However, when this argument is made by the theist, the discussion turns from the validity of the theist/atheist positions to which “ways of knowing” are valid and which are not.

“This person who shares your worldview was/is a bad person.”

I see this on both sides. Examples include “Hitler was a Christian” and “Stalin was an atheist”. Well, so what? This says nothing about the truth of an idea. Many true ideas are unpleasant. My uncle passed away some years back; this does not mean that I will reject the idea merely because it is unpleasant. Yes, Hitler was probably a Christian. Yes, Stalin was probably an atheist. It simply does not matter.

“You can’t disprove God.”

I often see this on the atheist side, and it is simply not true. Consider this:

If X, then not Y.
X.
Therefore, not Y.

The way to disprove God is simple. First, make your opponent give a critically robust definition of the sort of God he or she is arguing for. Then, show that something exists which is contradictory to some attribute of your opponent’s definition of God. For example, if your opponent claims that God gives everyone who believes he exists $10 weekly, simply point to a believer who does not receive $10 weekly, and your opponent’s God is disproved. This is also how the “problem of evil” argument works. It claims that the existence of evil is contradictory to the proposition “God exists”. Therefore, such a proposition is false. Of course, if no definition of God is given before an attempt to disprove God is made, then the theist may simply shift the goalposts. At the same time, an atheist who makes this argument after a definition of God has been presented is merely trying to shift the burden of proof.

“Without a presupposition that God exists, you cannot explain anything.”

Yes, I can.

I am hungry.
I feel hunger because the trait for feeling hunger when the body needs food has been selected for.

Of course, my opponent may then say that I have not explained why/how that trait has been selected for, however, that is shifting the goalposts and asking me to explain something other than my original statement. I have already given an explanation for “I am hungry”, without invoking God. What the theist means by this argument is “Without a presupposition that God exists, you cannot explain X”, where X is not everything, but one specific thing, most often morality, or logic. This more refined form of the argument is known as the Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God, or TAG. These arguments are better, and there are several strong responses to them, including: http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/the-transcendental-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/

“Historical Jesus”

This one is not so obvious. At first glance, it may seem that showing there was a historical Jesus validates Christianity. But it does not. All it shows is that there was a historical Jesus. It does not show that he was divine in any way. Showing that the Bible is correct in its historical claims does not show it is correct in its theological claims.

Let’s go one step further, though. Imagine for the sake of argument that someone showed that Jesus did indeed resurrect. Would that validate Christianity? Surprisingly, no. All it would show is that a man resurrected, not that Yahweh exists and that such a being was the cause of such an event. It could have been that it was the doing of some other sort of god, or even something else supernatural.

But let’s go even one more step further. Evidence of an actual resurrection does nothing to show that ANY supernatural event took place. All it would really show, at its core, is that we are incorrect in our belief that resurrection after death is not naturally possible.

To show that Jesus is lord, you have to first show that the God of the bible exists via another method. If you don’t, that means you’re presupposing that such a god exists.

“Believing in God is like believing in Santa Claus/believing in God means you are delusional”

True, some people may believe in a god because they were brought up that way. But there are certainly good arguments for the existence of a god. These arguments must be carefully examined; they cannot be dismissed as mere belief in a myth for no reason at all. There is an obvious difference, for example, between Plantinga’s concept of God and Zeus. Some atheists have just as much trouble justifying their position as some theists. They may claim that the theist is delusional, or even schizophrenic. But perhaps they should look at their own defenses of their position. Here are the criteria for delusion:

• certainty (held with absolute conviction)
• incorrigibility (not changeable by compelling counterargument or proof to the contrary)
• impossibility or falsity of content (implausible, bizarre or patently untrue)

Some theists may meet the first criteria, however certainty alone does not mean one is delusional. Many people are certain about many things. Remember: delusion should only be diagnosed by a psychological professional.

Thimerosal

The first claim I will address is that vaccines contain poisonous mercury in the form of thimerosal, that can cause severe brain damage, particularly in infants. First, it must be noted that we are not really talking about pure mercury. Rather, there are two types of mercury – ethylmercury(referred to from now on as EM), and methylmercury(referred to as MM). EMs are “organic mercury compounds in which the mercury is attached to an ethyl group”, and MMs are the same, but attached to a methyl group.  EMs and MMs have the chemical formulas C2H5Hg+ and CH3Hg+, respectively.[¹] To show why this is important, look at the formulas for water, H20, and hydrogen peroxide, H2o2. Both have the same elements, but in different amounts. So, we can see that ethylmercury and methylmercury will have different effects on the body, just as water and hydrogen peroxide do.

Why is this important? It shows that one just cannot say “mercury in vaccines is bad”. Any harmful effects that MMs have cannot be applied to EMs. Of course it is still possible at this point for EMs to be harmful. But is it? No. Let’s look at some numbers.

The half life of EM in the human body is less than a week, compare this to the half-life of MM, 1.5 months.[2] This means that within a week, half the mercury will no longer be in your body.

The lethal dose of thimerosal for 50% of the population (this study was done in rats) is 98 mg per kilogram.[3](thanks to RoaringAtheist for finding this!)

Each 0.5 mL dose of the H1N1 vaccine contains 24.5mcg of ethylmercury. That’s 0.0245 mg.[4]

What does this mean? It means that a lethal dose for 50% of the adult population is ~4,000 H1N1 vaccinations per kg. I weigh ~90 kg. So, for me to die from mercury poisoning, I would have to get 360,000 doses of the vaccine in less than a week.

Of course, none of this matters at all, because there is also a thimerosal-free version of the vaccine.

The vaccine makes you sick/Live virus

Here is another ridiculous claim I have often seen about the vaccine – it will in fact give you the very illness it is supposed to protect against! Of course this is absurd.

There are two types of the flu vaccine: Inactivated vaccine, and Live attenuated vaccine. The inactivated vaccine is also known as the “killed” vaccine, with good reason. The viruses in the vaccine are dead![5] The live attenuated vaccine, on the other hand, contains a version of the virus that is alive, although weakened to the point that it is not pathogenic. Such viruses will cause an immune response while not causing illness.[6]

It’s My Choice

So, it is now apparent that the vaccine is not dangerous, and that there is no harm in getting one. But even so, why should you bother? The obvious answer is that so you don’t get the flu. But there is a second reason – herd immunity. This is the resistance of a group to attack by disease to which a large proportion of the members are immune.[7] To put it simply, the higher the percentage of people in a community who have gotten the vaccine, the less vulnerable the community is to suffering a pandemic. Every individual who gets the vaccine slightly lowers the chances of a pandemic. By getting the vaccine, you slightly lower the odds of other people getting sick or even dying.

These are the main reasons for not getting the vaccine that I have seen. If you have any further objections, please explain and I will attempt to answer.

[1] http://www.reference.md/files/D005/mD005035.html

[2] http://www.who.int/vaccine_safety/topics/thiomersal/statement_jul2006/en/index.html

[3] http://infao5501.ag5.mpi-sb.mpg.de:8080/topx/archive?link=Wikipedia-Lip6-2/221998.xml&style#1.4.

[4] www.fda.gov/downloads/BiologicsBloodVaccines/…/UCM182401.pdf

[5] www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/vis/downloads/vis-flu.pdf

[6] http://virology-online.com/general/typesofvaccines.htm

[7] http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/herd+immunity