The position I will be defending is this: Homosexual behaviour is morally permissible in the same situations in which heterosexual behaviour is morally permissible; i.e., there is no qualitative difference between homosexual and heterosexual sex. I will be critiquing the position “all homosexual sex is immoral”.

First, a brief word on marriage. One might be inclined to object to my argument on the grounds that any sort of sex is only permissible within marriage, and since homosexuals cannot by definition get married, then homosexual sex is never morally permissible. This, however, must be defended. Why think homosexuals cannot marry? Perhaps because of religious reasons – I will address religious concerns in the second section of this essay.

That being said, I will begin my case by offering an argument for the moral permissibility of some instances of homosexual behaviour. I will then defend the premises of my argument; first by discussing the beneficial results of homosexual behaviour, then by refuting common objections to such practices.

Argument

Premise 1: In cases where the good-making properties of a behaviour are much greater than the bad-making properties, then that behaviour is prima facie morally permissible.

Premise 2: There is a subset of homosexual sexual relationships where the good-making properties are much greater than the bad-making properties.

Premise 3: There is a subset of homosexual sexual relationships that are prima facie morally permissible.

Premise 4: If there is a prima facie support for the permissibility of something, and there are no good reasons to support its impermissibility, then it should be deemed permissible.

Premise 5: There are no good reasons to suppose this subset of homosexual sexual relationships are impermissible.

Conclusion: This subset of homosexual sexual relationships is permissible.

The “set” referred to in premise 2 is all homosexual sexual relationships in which the participants are similarly situated to a heterosexual couple participating in morally permissible sexual acts.. For the purposes of this essay, I will take this to mean only those homosexual sexual relationships which can be considered committed, monogamous, and healthy/disease-free. I will exclude acts of rape, acts of infidelity, acts which may result in contraction of an STD, and other such behaviours. In other words, there is nothing about homosexual behaviour that renders it intrinsically immoral; that is, there is nothing that makes homosexual behaviour immoral just because it is homosexual.

In defense of 1, consider an analogy. Imagine you walk past a restaurant, and you see through the window that someone is eating a stick of celery. The man eating the celery has a smile on his face – it is obvious that he is enjoying it. Furthermore, you know that celery is fairly healthy for the body; it’s low in fat and calories. Now imagine that you enter the restaurant and speak with the man to find out more information. He tells you, “Oh, I absolutely love to eat celery. Not only is it delicious, but it’s good for you. And I eat only the finest – fresh, clean celery; only from this restaurant.”

It becomes clear that, at least on the surface, eating celery is innocuous, and should be considered morally permissible. Barring some not-so-obvious reasons, we can safely conclude that there is nothing immoral about the man eating the celery. In such a situation, given what we know about the circumstances, we would lack justification to conclude that eating celery is immoral – we cannot say things are immoral “just because”.

Love is All You Need

So, what are the great goods which homosexual behaviour results in?

The first good-making property is intimacy. Sex between partners (at least within the context of a committed relationship) fosters feelings of closeness and love toward one’s partner. It is also the case that when homosexuals in committed, monogamous relationships have children (either by adoption, artificial insemination, or other means), the benefits of the intimacy created by sex are passed on to the child in the form of a more loving, caring environment for child-rearing.

This also solves another current problem we have – children without parents. Currently, there are many children in orphanages and foster homes. As homosexuals cannot reproduce with each other naturally, they are good candidates for adoption. This gives these children a loving, caring home to grow up in. Research shows that children raised by homosexual parents do just as well as their peers raised by heterosexual parents. Professor of pediatrics Ellen C. Perrin testifies, “The vast consensus of all the studies shows that children of same-sex parents do as well as children whose parents are heterosexual in every way…”In some ways children of same-sex parents actually may have advantages over other family structures.”[1]

Sandra B. Stier testifies that “marriage would be a way to tell ‘our friends, our family, our society, our community, our parents…and each other that this is a lifetime commitment…we are not girlfriends. We are not partners. We are married.’”; and Kristin M. Perry that “marriage would provide her with what she wants most in life: a stable relationship with Stier, the woman she loves and with whom she has built a life and family.”[2] When individuals provide testimony about their own mental and emotional states, we generally take them at their word (assuming they are not mentally ill). Richard Swinburne’s Principle of Testimony can be applied to such a situation – “with the absence of any reason to disbelieve them, one should accept that eye-witnesses or believers are telling the truth when they testify about religious experiences.”

We should certainly take the testimony of the above individuals to be true; they are not mentally ill, and there is no reason to suppose they are lying. It seems true that these two individuals at least, and likely many similar homosexual couples, view their relationships as ones based on trust, intimacy, and love. Indeed, their relationship is likely stronger, more beneficial to them, and more conducive to child-rearing than some heterosexual relationships.

Another good-making property is marriage. Keeping in mind that the topic of this essay is “Homosexual behaviour is immoral”, one can count not just sexual activities, but also homosexual marriages as “behaviour” (and of course marriages routinely include sex). It is certainly the case that allowing homosexuals to marry provides economic benefits to society – weddings are often expensive, and provide a good amount of cash flow into the economy; both from the marriage itself and from subsequent marriage-related purchases (wedding gifts, larger homes, etc.) To give a real world example, economist Lee Badget(A) is of the opinion that “Proposition 8 has inflicted substantial economic harm on same-sex couples and their children”, and that “Proposition 8 has imposed economic losses on the state of California”.[2]

I Am What I Am

However, perhaps the most important good-making property has to do with one’s very identity. It is agreed upon by almost all psychologists that sexual orientation is in fact not a choice – the causes of homosexuality are complex, and changing orientation is difficult if not impossible.

Despite claims from individuals with personal interests in showing that one’s orientation can be changed, it is the consensus that even attempting to change one’s sexuality can be quite damaging to mental health, and as such it is advised against – rather, homosexuals are encouraged to accept themselves. Actor David Yost, for example, spent two years in an ex-gay ministry; after which time he suffered a “nervous breakdown” resulting in a five-week hospital stay.[3] The official stance of the American Psychiatric Association is that “…some homosexual or bisexual people may seek to change their sexual orientation through therapy, often coerced by family members or religious groups to try and do so. The reality is that homosexuality is not an illness. It does not require treatment and is not changeable”.[4] This is a very important good-making property – accepting one’s orientation involves pursuing relationships which (usually) include sex. Of course, we could say that exactly when such an individual should or should not have sex is up for debate – but not that sex should remain unavailable to the homosexual in all situations.

There are also other (less important) good-making properties. Pleasure is one. Homosexuals derive pleasure from having sex with their partners. Some other minor good-making properties include stress relief and cardiovascular exercise. As these can be obtained in other ways, I mention them only in passing.

Rectifying Rectal Misinformation

One of the more common criticisms of homosexual behaviour is that it has negative health effects, both physical and mental. However, research into modern medicine and psychology show that this is simply not the case.

The first form of this criticism involves anal sex. It is a common misconception that most homosexuals regularly engage in anal sex. In fact, many do not – and many heterosexuals do. A poll from the Center For Disease Control shows that while only 6 percent of males age 15-44 have had “any same-sex sexual contact”, 34 percent have had anal sex. Furthermore, 30 percent of females age 15-44 have had anal sex.[5] It is a simple fact that anal sex is not exclusively homosexual.

It is another misconception that anal sex is often physically damaging. For example, anal sex is not a recognized cause of fecal incontinence (inability to control bowel movements)[6][7][8]; while childbirth is. While it is true that anal sex is riskier than oral or vaginal sex, it is not nearly as risky as some would like to say. When performed correctly (with an STD-free partner, slowly, and with a condom), the risks fall well within the “acceptable” range. In any case, even if it can be shown that anal sex leads to physical damage of the body 100 percent of the time, this is at best a case against anal sex itself, not homosexual sex – homosexuals have other types of sex available to them.

Hit Me, Beat Me, Make Me Do My Taxes

Some individuals and organizations[9] claim that there is a higher rate of domestic abuse among homosexuals. While this may or may not be true (statistics on this are ambiguous, as most cases are never reported[10][11]), this is merely a correlation – it needs to be shown that there is something about being gay that makes one intrinsically more prone to abuse. Furthermore, here are some interesting statistics for abuse rates in various groups:

heterosexual – 17 percent, gay/lesbian – 28 percent, bisexual – 41 percent, married – 13 percent, single – 13 percent, single no children – 19 percent, separated divorced or widowed – 41 percent. [12]

gay men – 15 percent, lesbians – 11 percent [13]

gay and lesbian couples – 25-33 percent [14]

As one can see, different studies have concluded very different abuse rates. However, here’s a reductio for this argument:

1) If a population has a significantly higher abuse rate than the heterosexual population, being a practicing member of that population is always immoral.
2) The population “homosexuals” has a significantly higher abuse rate than the heterosexual population.
3) Being a practicing member of the population “homosexuals” is always immoral.
4) The population “separated, divorced, or widowed” has a significantly higher abuse rate then the heterosexual population.
5) Being a practicing member of the population “separated, divorced, or widowed” is always immoral.

The group in premise 4 can be replaced with any group that a study shows has high rates of abuse/violence. We should be wary when one cites statistics to support such an argument – remember, correlation does not equal causation, and statistics can vary. Of course I agree that domestic abuse of any kind is immoral, however statistics regarding domestic abuse cannot show that a certain lifestyle is always immoral. the 72 percent of gay/lesbian individuals in this study should not be deemed immoral just because 28 percent of their population experiences domestic abuse. It’s also easy to just say “Homosexual sex which occurs in abusive relationships is immoral, while homosexual sex in stable, loving relationships is not”.

You’re My Favorite Damn Disease

Another common criticism of homosexual sex involves STD rates. It is claimed that homosexuals have a much higher risk of contracting an STD. This is highly misinformed. The average prevalance of STDs (gonorrhea, chlamydia, syphilis, and HIV) among men who have sex with men is about 9%[15]. While it is true that the prevalence of STDs is higher here than in heterosexual males, three things must be noted.

First, the difference is actually only a few percent. While 9 percent is twice as high as 4.5 percent, it’s still only a small difference; the risk is still low. Second, in 2008, chlamydia, gonorrhea, and syphilis rates were highest among african-americans, representing 49, 71, and 49 percent of total cases, respectively.[16] If an argument against homosexual sex from STD rates works, then an argument against sex with african-americans from STD rates works as well. The implied syllogism in the argument from STDs seems to be this:

1. If an action is likely to result in contracting an STD, that action is immoral.
2. Homosexual sex is likely to result in contracting an STD.
3. Homosexual sex is immoral.

However, considering the STD rates in african-americans cited above, we may replace premise 2:

2’. Sex with an african-american is likely to result in contracting an STD.

thus leaving us with a morally repugnant conclusion: that it is immoral to have sex with an african-americans. Third, there are actually (as of 2005), no confirmed cases of female-to-female sexual transmission of HIV.[17]

This is also irrelevant. It is important to note (although this should not even need to be stated) that homosexual acts do not create the pathogens which infect one with HIV and other STDs. Rather, one contracts an STD by having sex with someone who has that STD already. So, this is at best an argument for safe sex, not an argument against homosexual sex – as well as an argument I completely agree with.

So, if we restrict our moral scope to the question “Is it immoral for a committed, monogamous, disease-free homosexual couple to have sex?”, objections based on perceived dangers of anal sex, domestic abuse, and risk of contracting an STD fall flat. What other objection to such acts might one give?

Breaking the Natural Law

Another criticism of homosexual sex is the so-called “natural law” objection. This objection, in essence, says two things:

1) We should only use our faculties and abilities for their intended, primary, or natural purpose.
2) The intended, primary, or natural purpose of sex is for procreation.

The issue here is what is meant by language such as intended, primary, and natural.

First, ‘intended’. To assign intent to something requires personhood. When we say “a corkscrew is intended to open wine bottles”, what we mean is that a corkscrew is for opening wine bottles. This is its purpose. If no persons existed (and yet somehow a corkscrew still did), then the object would not be intended for anything – it would just be.

So, who decides what sex is intended for? Perhaps God – but I’ll get to that later. If not God, then it is surely us, ourselves. Thus, if homosexuals decide that sex is intended for something other than procreation, then it is. It cannot be nature – there is no “ought” in nature, there is only “is”. So, this line of reasoning can only possibly work if God is the one deciding the intent.

What about primary purpose? We use other faculties and abilities for non-primary purposes all the time, and no one ever questions it. We use our legs and feet for leg presses in addition to walking, for example. So, what’s wrong with “hijacking” sex for non-procreative purposes?

There are also purposes to sex other than procreation. These can be referred to as “natural purposes”, or more simply, “effects”. Surely we would not say a situation in which a heterosexual couple has sex only for procreative purposes is equal to or better than a situation in which the couple uses sex for procreative purposes, and also experiences pleasure and intimacy. So, even if it is the case that it is better for one to use sex for all of its functions (procreation + everything else), what’s the problem with dropping the procreation function? Dropping procreation might be less good (just as donating a thousand dollars to charity is less good than donating two thousand), but I fail to see why it would be bad.

Through a Glass, Ignorantly

Despite the supposed “secular arguments” against homosexual acts, we notice one very telling fact: these secular arguments are posited almost exclusively by people with prior religious motivations.

What would we expect to see if the secular case against homosexuality worked? Let’s use another issue as a case study: the issue of the death penalty. There are people from all walks of life against the death penalty – Christian, Buddhist, Muslim, Hindu, and atheist; and they generally all use similar arguments. This is not the case with regard to homosexuality. The arguments against it are all but quarantined to religious fundamentalism. Why is it that so very few liberal Christians, Buddhists, agnostics, and atheists are convinced by these arguments? Probably because they just don’t work. There seems to be no working secular case against homosexual acts.

When You Assume…

Other than natural law, the most common objection to homosexual behaviour has to do with one’s religion. As the religious portion of the people reading this will be mostly Christian, I will focus on Christian objections exclusively; although some of these objections might also work for adherents of other religions.

The objection consists of citing verses from the Bible which (implicity or explicity) point to divine commands from God prohibiting homosexual behaviour.

While such a case against homosexuality may seem convincing to the believer, there are a number of hidden assumptions that not everyone is going to accept. Here is a list, in order of logical progression (from general to specific):

persons exist -> some sort of deity exists -> that deity is a “personal God” -> Divine Command Theory is true -> that deity is Yahweh -> Jesus Christ is divine -> the Bible is the inspired word of God -> the Bible is infallible -> the correct interpretation of certain verses in the Bible is that all homosexual acts are immoral

There are a great many assumptions here – and all of them must be adequately defended before a Christian can make a convincing case for the immorality of all homosexual behaviour. Such a case will not convince a Buddhist, as Buddhists deny actual personhood. Such a case will not convince a Deist, as deists deny that a “personal God” exists. Such a case will not even convince a liberal Christian, as liberal Christians deny either the interpretation assumption, or the infallible Bible assumption.

Now, I could critique any of these assumptions in order to defeat the Christian case against homosexuality. However, I will be extremely generous here. I will assume, for the sake of argument, that every single one of the above propositions is true.

Past, Present, and Future

1. God’s commands hold if and only if those commands benefit us in some way.
2. God’s commands prohibiting all homosexual acts no longer benefit us.
3. God’s commands prohibiting all homosexual acts no longer hold.

First, some clarification. By “command”, I mean any rule, law, prohibition, obligation, or moral statement that can be evidenced via scripture as being declared, either implicitly or explicitly, by God. By “benefit”, I mean to say that such a command has some positive influence or result such that we are better off following it than not.

There is biblical evidence that God’s commands can, and have, changed. For example, in Genesis 4:3-4, Cain and Abel offer sacrifices to God – No one nowadays would even think of arguing that this is permissible. Furthermore, we were not required to have faith in Christ before (roughly) 5 B.C., while we are now. Other commands only apply to certain groups of people at certain times, in certain situations (see Hebrew ritual laws). So, we can establish that at least possibly, commands against homosexuality no longer apply. We can also run this argument with any of God’s other commands – as a thought experiment, replace “prohibiting all homosexual acts” with “prohibiting the eating of pork”, and the argument still works.

How are we to tell whether they still apply? Simple – look at whether such commands still benefit us, either individually or as a society. Let’s look at some facts (see previous section):

A) Homosexuals can love each other.
B) Homosexuals can have safe sex.
C) Homosexuals can raise children.

Looking at these, and other related facts, one is now rather hard-pressed to think of a benefit that a command against all homosexual behaviour might have today. One might say that the command still holds in order for humanity to continue to procreate and thus keep the species going, however this objection simply does not work. Only about 8-10 percent of the population is homosexual – it’s not as if removing/voiding this command would cause a huge chunk of the population to become exclusively homosexual. This percentage has, as far as we can tell, remained roughly constant in most societies throughout recorded history.

Furthermore, even if the entire human population (for whatever reason) suddenly became homosexual, humanity would not even then die out. Homosexuals, despite their attraction to the same sex, still desire to raise children. Just like a sterile couple who relies on sperm donation and/or a surrogate mother to reproduce, so too can homosexual couples reproduce (and, just like the sterile couple, will not love or care for their children any less due to the method of procreation). It seems that, today, the procreation rate would be wholly unaffected by lifting a command contra-homosexuality.

Now, one might object to premise 1 on the grounds that the purpose of God’s commands is not to benefit us. One might say that, as Calvinism states, God’s commands serve the purpose of bringing him glory. To this I can only say that there are good reasons for thinking, even if one is a Christian, that Calvinism is false. Here’s a brief sketch of how one might go about showing this:

1 Timothy 2:4 says that God “desires all people to be saved and to come to knowledge of the truth”. Now, obviously not all people are saved – this fact must be accounted for. Under non-Calvinistic theologies, this is accounted for via libertarian free will. Since Calvinism does not admit libertarian free will, (pending other theodicies) either Calvinism is false, or Christianity as a whole is false.

While much more can be said on whether Calvinism is true and/or correct interpretation of scripture, such a discussion is beyond the scope of this essay. Furhermore, one could also simply argue that Christianity itself is false (perhaps via Schellenberg’s divine hiddenness argument), or that God does not exist, or attack any of the above assumptions. However, these are topics for another time. My argument above will hopefully convince at least some of my readers that some instances of homosexual behaviour are permissible even within Christianity.

Conclusion: All Good Things…

To summarize: if there are many good things about homosexual behaviour, and no good reasons to think it is immoral, then we should conclude that homosexual behaviour is indeed permissible, at least in certain circumstances. I have shown that there are some very good things that result from homosexual behaviour; among these are intimacy, identity, child-rearing environments, economic benefits, and pleasure. I have also attempted to refute some of the more common arguments for thinking it is immoral; such as health concerns about anal sex, STD and abuse rates, natural law/proper fuction objections, and religious objections.

Enjoy your celery.

————————————————–
(A) Badgett received her PhD in economics from UC Berkeley in 1990; and has co-authored two reports analyzing the fiscal impact of allowing same-sex couples to marry in California.

[1] http://www.webmd.com/mental-health/news/20051012/study-same-sex-parents-raise-well-adjusted-kids
[2] https://ecf.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/09cv2292/files/09cv2292-ORDER.pdf
[3] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TmlcuY8bOUk
[4] http://www.apa.org/helpcenter/sexual-orientation.aspx
[5] http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad362.pdf
[6] http://familydoctor.org/online/famdocen/home/seniors/common-older/067.html
[7] http://www.umm.edu/ency/article/003135.htm
[8] http://www.mayoclinic.org/fecal-incontinence/causes.html
[9] http://afaofpa.org/archives/news-release-same-sex-domestic-abuse-greater-threat/
[10] Frieze, I.H., Browne, A. (1989) Violence in Marriage. In L.E. Ohlin & M. H. Tonry (eds.) Family Violence. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
[11] U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Criminal Victimization,” 2003.
[12] http://www.healthpolicy.ucla.edu/pubs/files/IPV_PB_031810.pdf
[13] http://new.abanet.org/domesticviolence/Pages/Statistics.aspx#same-sex
[14] http://www3.uwstout.edu/cvpp/same_gender_stats.cfm
[15] http://www.cdc.gov/STD/stats08/msm.htm
[16] http://www.cdc.gov/STD/stats08/minorities.htm
[17] http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/women/resources/factsheets/wsw.htm

What is the nature of the relationship between the body and soul of a human being, and is this nature analogous to the nature and form of a population of humans?

In order to give an accurate account of the individual consciousness (or the soul), certain key principles need to be established.  First of all, the very concept of a system in itself must be understood before we can begin to understand the concept of a conscious system.  Second, in order to move closer to a complete understanding of systems and conscious systems, it must be known whether or not systems exist in varying degrees of complexity.  A conscious system cannot be adequately understood apart from knowing what degree of system it is.  Third, an adequate theory or account must be given for the nature of the soul in the fundamental sense, specifically regarding the relationship between the soul and the body of a system.  Finally, after giving an account of the individual human soul, the investigation can be extended by exactly the same pattern to give a hylomorphic account of the nation-state.

The Concept of a System

To illustrate the concept of a system, imagine a flock of birds.  To an outside observer, the birds appear directed from a ‘centre’ in the system, but this is not the case.  Each bird minds its distance from the birds immediately next to them so as not to bump into them or stray too far from them.  Because each individual plays the same function and guides itself by this one rule, the birds as a whole fly in a formation.  This arrangement of interacting functions is what I mean by ‘system’. [1] This cannot be explained in terms of individual birds, because an individual bird does not fly through the air in a way which suggests how it would behave in a group.  Thus the behaviour and nature of the whole cannot be deduced from the nature of its parts.

However, the concept of a system of interacting functions is not limited to groups of individual bodies.  A tree is another example of a system. Each branch or stem grows in the direction of sunlight so as to produce more food through photosynthesis.  With every individual branch behaving in this way, certain interesting properties of the whole tree arise which are not explicable in terms of individual parts.   Consider the distribution of leaves on a tree. The tree as a whole appears directed.  At first glance it seems almost as if each branch has been ordered by a leader to grow leaves only on a certain side so as to maximize the absorption of sunlight.  However, as with the flock of birds, this is not the case with the tree either.  Similar to the behaviour of each bird in tending towards flying a certain distance from its neighbours, one branch which takes up sunlight in one area and casts shadows beneath is effectively ‘telling’ the other branches not to grow beneath it.  This simple communication between each branch is what guides the tree to grow the way it does.

In this way, we can see that the system is what makes an organism the way it is; what defines the nature of the organism.

Degrees of Systems

Now, trees and flocks of birds are examples of systems which are not very centralized.  Trees are significantly more centralized than a flock of birds, because a tree has a hierarchy of parts defined by interacting functions as described above.  This hierarchy of interacting functions extends from the leaves to the trunk, comprising the entire system.  You might cut a leaf off from a tree, and there would be little or no damage done to the tree.  But if you were to cut the trunk of the tree, the tree would very likely die.  Therefore, it can be understood that different parts of the tree are more important than others, due entirely to the centrality of their functions.  Such a hierarchy cannot be seen in a flock of birds.  There is no ‘trunk bird’ whose function supports all the other birds in the flock.  A tree exhibits a greater degree of centralization than a flock of birds.  I would then call the system of a tree a ‘higher degree’ of system than the flock.[2]

There are many different degrees of systems.  A cat is a system more centralized than a tree or a flock of birds.  There are many ‘trunk parts’ of a cat, those without which it could not survive.  The head of a cat is one of these.  If you were to cut off the head of a cat, it would die.  Now, within the brain of a cat, which I have shown to be a centre of the cat’s body, so to speak, there are many billions of neurons that govern the vital functions of the cat’s body.  Specifically, the brain and body of the cat constitute a vast system of interacting functions which make the cat what it is (i.e., defines the nature of the cat).

It is of value to note that the matter of the cat does not produce the life of the cat.  Every atom in the cat’s body is switched out and replaced by another many times throughout its life due to its biological functions.  So it is not a matter of which specific atoms or electrons materially constitute the cat, but what arrangement thereof formally constitutes it.  The form of the body does not change over time, (as the bodily system of interacting functions remains the same), while the atoms are switched out into different functions and roles.

Hylomorphic Aspect of the Conscious Human System

According to the above, the form of the body makes the body what it is, not necessarily the matter.  It must be noted, however, that the form cannot be separated from the matter, as a wave cannot be separated from its own water.

To understand how this concept can be related to the soul, look to the United States of America, as nation-states are properly analogous to conscious human systems.  It can be said that America ‘moves through’ people.  Some people die and new ones are born every minute, yet America remains.  Now, at any given moment could someone answer the question, “What is America?”, by ‘freezing’ this movement and saying, “These people are America “?  There seems to be nothing of importance to the nature of America about these people[3], but rather their system of interacting functions (i.e., that one remaining bit which is more or less constant over time, as people are continually replaced).  This could be interpreted variously as their economy, their government, their media, their culture, their society, and their very families and relationships, to name a few.  This is to be called the State.[4]

Now, the conscious human system bears meaningful similarities to America.  Much the same as America, the conscious human moves through matter.  Yet, as with America, while the matter is changed out, the soul (or consciousness) remains the same.  Yet again, as with America, the form of the body remains the same.  When the matter of the body is switched out, the consciousness remains the same, yet when the form of the body is changed, the consciousness is affected.  For example, if the matter of the body is switched out, as it is known to do over time as part of the natural biological processes of the body, the consciousness is present throughout.  For example, you have vivid recollections of your life as a child, yet now none of the molecules which then constituted you remain. However, if the form of the body is changed, as it is when a part of the heart or brain is ripped apart (it is of some interest to note that the matter remains the same in these cases), the consciousness is destroyed in death.  From this seemingly non-coincidental association, it can be assumed that the soul is the form of the body.

This, I believe, is similar to what was meant by ‘hylomorphism’ in ancient times[5], from the Greek hylo-, meaning ‘matter’, and –’morpha’, meaning ‘form’.  I maintain that hylomorphism accurately gives an account of the nature of consciousness.

It is of interest to note that the human soul, being capable of introspection and knowledge of the self, exhibits the highest degree of centralization to be found in nature.  Therefore, the human soul is to be ranked above the souls of bird flocks, trees, and cats as the highest degree of soul.

Hylomorphic Aspect of the State

Earlier, the similarities between the conscious human system and America were discussed with attention paid to the idea that the form of a nation is properly analogical to the form of an organism (i.e. the conscious human).  Over the span of its history, America has persisted, which is to say that it has continued to be what it is.  This is not true of its population (i.e. its ‘nation’), which has not persisted, as it were.  It has grown, shrunk, died, and been entirely and completely replaced since its creation.  However, its form has more or less persisted, which is to say that the system of interacting functions in America, in its government, and to a much lesser extent its economy and society, has persisted, thus leading to the conclusion that it is the form of a nation which is what makes it what it is.

Now, the form of a nation is actually the same as the form of an organism.  A nation is defined as a population of humans[6]; a vast collection of individual conscious systems.  I might object then, that surely the form of a nation, this form of many bodies, must be a different sort of form than the form of one body?  But this cannot be the case.  The line between an individual and a population is blurry, and therein lies the solution.  One can just as easily object that the form of the body must be different, as it is also a form of many bodies.  This is because the human body, while commonly thought of as being individual, is actually quite ‘dividual’.  The human body can be thought of as a population of cells.  Yet, what can this objection bring against the hylomorphism of the body?  Similarly, it can bring nothing against the hylomorphism of the nation.  We mustn’t be too hasty, then, to draw a line between the “collective” soul and “normal” souls.

Now, the form of the nation, which is its government, economy, society, etc, is what is meant by “the state”[7].  What is meant by the nation is the physical population of humans in community. This hylomorphic conception of the nation-state is properly analogous to the dual nature of the human being as body and soul.  (Body -> nation, soul -> state.  Nation-state -> hylo-morpha).

Relationship between Citizen and State

To understand the relationship between the citizen and the State, imagine that a human is a microcosm of the universe, as past philosophers have suggested.[8] There is contained within the soul of a human, and the state of a nation, analogous systems of interacting functions.

Indeed, the king is to the city, or the government is to the State, what the head is to the body, to use the classical analogy.  The head (the brain, really) holds the executive office and function of the body, and rules it.  Plato makes this analogy in the Republic, with reference to the State[9], and by St. Paul with reference to the Church, in the theology of Christianity, which is heavily hylomorphic.[10] Christ is the head of the Church[11], in that case.

So ingrained is this analogy between the parts of the body and the parts of nation-states in human thought that it is embedded in the English language in the form of metonymic expressions.[12] To refer to the leader of a nation as its “head”, or to its language as its “tongue”, is a classic example of English “metonymy”.

My next point in laying the framework for a theory of the relationship between the citizen and the State takes the form of a thought experiment called the Chinese Nation Argument (CNA).  It was devised at least in part by Ned Block.[13] (The experiment assumes that if consciousness is concomitant with matter, [specifically, the nervous system], then only the function of a neuron or any other constituent piece of matter involved is relevant to the concomitance of consciousness, as opposed to the substance of the neuron). In this thought experiment, the concept of the conscious self is explored with relation to neural interactions.  It is as follows:

Suppose a man named Jeff is kidnapped by a bunch of evil futuristic scientists who have extremely advanced neurosurgical technologies at their disposal.  Suppose they carry Jeff off to their stadium sized lab and remove his skull, thereby exposing his brain.  The scientists, being very advanced and futuristic, are then able to disentangle the billions of tiny nerve fibres constituting Jeff’s brain in such a way that their functioning is not affected.  A neuron has a very simple job of either sending or refraining to send an impulse to another neuron.  The scientists then proceed to slowly and carefully suspend each and every individual nerve fibre of Jeff’s brain and nervous system on hooks throughout the giant lab, in such a way as to have them suspended a reasonable distance apart, and also so their functioning is still not affected.  Throughout this procedure, Jeff continues to have thoughts, experiences, and a generally normal mental life, since the function of his nervous system has not been affected.

Now suppose that the scientists begin to replace some of Jeff’s stretched out neurons with Chinese men in cubicles.  These Chinese men perform the exact same function of sending and directing simple impulses as the neurons they replace.  These Chinese men, when they see a light come on in their cubicle, are directed to press a button to send an impulse to another neuron or another Chinese man in a box who is acting like a neuron.  It does not matter.  They perform in a manner identical in speed and reflex to actual neurons, and do so reliably.

Now suppose all the rest of Jeff’s neurons are replaced by Chinese men in boxes such that the entire population of China goes to work in this way; sitting in boxes in their homes, pushing buttons when directed.  It is conceivable that Jeff’s mental functioning would not be affected, since nothing of his China-Mind is qualitatively different from his neural one.  Yet the significant question remains:  At what time, if at all, during his transformation can Jeff honestly proclaim, “I am China”? How has Jeff’s identity been affected by all of this?

(It is valuable to note that Chinese men are not necessarily required to form a mind for Jeff.  As stated before, the substance of the system seems not to be relevant.)

I argue that if the soul is the form of the body, if the soul is the form of the system, then Jeff will not necessarily be able to say that he is China, because all that has been changed is matter (recall the cat example).  As was discussed before, matter is changed out all the time, while the organism remains alive.  Instead, each Chinese man would cease being Chinese, and would instead become “Jeff-ese”, as they would then constitute the form of Jeff, and not the form of China.

Degrees of States

Remember that a more centralized system is a better system.  Now that we have made this connection, we can judge human systems of government by assessing what degree of centralization they have.  This is not the most perfect connection, as there is more to the form of a nation than its government (the government is not the whole State. There is also the economy, society, culture etc, as was discussed before).

At the very bottom of the scale is anarchy, which is the lack of government.  It is like the flock of birds, and similarly, anarchists will act like birds.  The birds mind their distance from each other in order to reduce drag, or not bump in to each other, as discussed before.  Naturally, humans will be similar.  But by their nature, they will have a whole panoply of rules and ideals[14], making them distinct from birds in flight, which have that one rule about not crashing into each other.  They will say, “Thou shalt not murder”, “thou shalt not steal”, etc, and this will decide the shape of their “flock”.  In this way, by their nature, they will assume a certain form that is unique to humans[15] (as the flock is unique to birds).

At the very top of this scale should be the government described in the CNA.[16] When the nation is organized into the form of a human (i.e. “Jeff”), it is very centralized.  As was discussed before, the human soul is the most centralized form in nature, as it produces the self; it is the highest degree of soul.  Likewise, the government (the brain is the government of the body, and as the CNA involves only Jeff’s brain[17], only the government, and not the whole State is described) described in the CNA (i.e., Jeff’s brain) is the highest degree of government.

Furthermore, a system ruled from within is better than one ruled from without.  If you disturb one bird in a flock, it goes crazy, causing the birds next to it to be disturbed.  This action produces a dramatic effect in the whole flock, and it is reduced to chaos, with birds flying every which way.  In this way, being reactive, the flock of birds is ruled from the outside.  Indeed, the same goes for anarchy.

On the contrary, a CNA-style government, being proactive, is ruled from within, like a human.  It has a will, and is a free entity that does as it pleases.  If a person wishes to go somewhere, they may do so.  Most of its actions originate from within, although there are some cases in which it can be disturbed like a flock of birds.  The flock of birds is just as disturbed by a hungry frog as it is by a hungry cat, though it obviously needn’t be as disturbed by the frog.  However, the CNA-style government is more sensible, and applies reason both to itself and to the external world[18].  It will be ruled from without in the presence of mortal dangers only insofar as it is forced to by reason[19].  It will not react unreasonably, and so is far higher on the scale than the flock of birds.

Now, what makes a system centralized is the number of connections between the centre and periphery[20].  If every individual or organ of the State (or organism) is connected to the ones next to it, and also to one other to which every other organ is attached, then we say that this other organ to which they are all attached is the centre.  Now, this needn’t be a kind of mob-rule where every organ connected to the centre rules it, or the other way around where the centre dominates its organs.  Indeed, there is a whole scale between these two extremes of power, and every one is just as centralized as the others.  Every one has the same degree of connection between the centre and the periphery, but the interaction between them can be more or less asymmetric.

Now in this scale of power distribution in centralized systems we can place several types of modern government.  At the one end is a kind of fascism,[21] where the centre dominates the whole system.  At this end there is a kind of one-way interaction; from the government to the nation (centre to periphery).  At the other end is a kind of libertarianism.[22] Here there is a kind of one-way interaction from the nation to the government (periphery to centre); individuals or groups dominate the centre of the system, and their interests come before those of the government.

Now, to determine which point along this scale is the best government, we must turn again to the human individual, which is analogous to the nation-state.  We must determine what kind of interactions exist between the centre and periphery of the human system, which is to say, between the head and the body, and apply this to our assessment of nation-states.  Consider the human system when there is no interaction from the head to the body.  If the brain ceases to command a muscle to move, if it ceases to interact with it, then the muscle will shrink and atrophy.[23] This is indicative of the fact that interaction from the centre to the periphery is necessary, and likewise, that the government must interact with the nation.

On the contrary, in recent studies in sensory deprivation, where the hand is immobilized or anesthetized for an extended period of time, so that there is no sensory inflow from the nerves in the hand to the brain, then the part of the brain responsible for sensing and moving the hand becomes atrophied and weak[24].  Indeed, during a scientific experiment in which a group of mice’s whiskers were trimmed, certain effects were observed in the brain.[25] We see that without sensation coming in from the whiskers, there was an increase in non-specific neural connectivity in the mice’s brains, meaning their brains became less centralized (more like the flock of birds) and began to appear juvenile.  This is indicative of the fact that interaction from the body to the mind (periphery to centre) is necessary in order to have a functional brain, and likewise, that the nation must interact with the government in order to keep it practical.[26]

Evidently, there must be two-way (symmetric) interaction between the government and the nation in the ideal nation-state.  Indeed, the best government is one that interacts with the nation and also facilitates the interaction of the nation with the government itself.  This kind of interaction takes many forms in the whole organism, or the whole nation-state.  As in the nervous system of the human body, which was the case of two-way interaction discussed above, this interaction must take the form of a flow of information in the nation-state.  Interaction from the nation to the government must consist of resource, information, control (as in voting and democracy), and sustenance (as in taxes). Furthermore, the interaction from the centre to the periphery consists of leadership and service[27] (governance).

We see an important example of this in the government subsidization of media.  In the case of the British Broadcasting Corporation, the UK Government sustains it through subsidies, and it performs the task of exposing Government inefficiencies and abuses publicly, so that they can be corrected by the nation through the processes of democracy[28].  They also provide public service radio, television and Internet broadcasting within the United Kingdom[29].  In this way we see a two-way interactive relation in which the government provides for the existence of an organ of the nation (the BBC), and it keeps the government “in shape”, so to speak.[30]

By the same token, things like free speech must be taken not as rights, but as necessities.  For without them, the connectivity that is the key to the centralization of the system does not exist.  It is then only a one-way interaction from the government to the nation, which may take the form of despotism.  Then this government, like the sensory deprived brain, will atrophy and dissolve, and the nation-state will cease to exist.

Conclusion

I conclude that an accurate account of the nature of the soul and the nation-state has been given by establishing a number of necessary principles.  First of all, a system must be understood as a network of interacting functions or parts before any significant progress can be made towards understanding what a conscious or living system really is.  Second, systems of interacting functions tend towards varying degrees of complexity, and these degrees can be understood in terms of the centralization of a system.  From this understanding of the varying degrees of systems present in nature and the world of man, it is clear that the conscious system of a normal human being is the highest degree of system known.  Third, an investigation of the soul yields an understanding of the fundamental relationship between the form and body of a system.  The soul is the form of the body.  Additionally, the relationship between the system and the individual can be understood in terms of the whole being equal to more than the sum of its parts, whereby the conscious system (the soul) is greater than the sum interaction of its parts.

Furthermore, under a hylomorphic understanding of the human being, a proper analogy can be established that relates human beings to nation-states, as they are both bodies with souls.  The State is the form of the nation, as the soul is the form of the body.  In this way, souls and States are properly analogous.  Following this conclusion is an examination of the relationship between the citizen and the State in which the Chinese Nation Argument of Ned Block is considered.  It is determined that it is the form of a nation which makes it what it is, and constitutes the nature of the nation-state.  Man is a microcosm of the ideal nation-state.

In conclusion, it is recalled that the brain/head is the government of the body, and then various systems of government are categorized according to higher and lower degrees of centralization, as souls were previously.  The ideal governmental system is the most centralized, which is to say, the one that has the most centre-peripheral connectivity.  The CNA-style government is a part of the highest order of state, as it will produce introspection and consciousness.  It is the conscious State, and has an “I”, or self.  This concept is further expanded to analyze the nature of this connectivity in this ideal State, which is a kind of two-way interaction.  The BBC is an excellent example of this interaction.  Indeed, this kind of interaction must be safeguarded and facilitated by the ideal government in the form of things like free speech and the BBC.

However, that is the extent of this investigation.  As to whether a CNA-style government is possible, or indeed, if it is even the best government, we cannot say within the scope of this study.  There also exists the question of what steps can be taken to centralize a system, or what can be done to make it of a higher degree.  It could be that the ideal governmental system possesses the same degree of centralization and general framework of the individual human, as would be the case with the CNA, but is in an entirely different (more mundane or realistic), but equivalent form.  Or it could be an altogether different kind of system; we do not know.  Could it be that humanity naturally arranges itself into systems of governance in a way similar to how birds fly in formation?  This is a worthwhile question.  However, this particular investigation is complete within the context of this essay, and an accurate account of the embodied soul and the nation-state has been given.[31]

Bibliography

“British Broadcasting Corporation.” BBC – Homepage. BBC, n.d. Web. 7 Mar. 2010. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/>.

“Hylomorphism.” MSN Encarta, Dictionary. Microsoft, 2009. Web. 17 Dec. 2009. <http://encarta.msn.com/‌dictionary_1861619520/‌hylomorphism.html>.

Kimball, J. “Neurons.” Biology Pages. RCN, 13 Feb. 2010. Web. 21 Feb. 2010. <http://users.rcn.com/‌jkimball.ma.ultranet/‌BiologyPages/‌N/‌Neurons.html>.

Kukathas, Chandran. “A Definition of the State.” Madison Philosophy Department. University of Wisconsin, 29 Mar. 2008. Web. 7 Mar. 2010. <http://philosophy.wisc.edu/‌hunt/‌A%20Definition%20of%20the%20State.htm>.

Metzger, Perry E. “What is the Role of the State?” Piermont. Metzger, Dowdeswell & Co. LLC,, 10 Sept. 2004. Web. 28 Feb. 2010. <http://www.piermont.com/‌blog/‌archives/‌permalinks/‌2004-08-28T12_54_13.html>.

“Muscle Atrophy.” Medline Plus Medical Encyclopedia. Medline Plus, 13 Nov. 2008. Web. 7 Mar. 2010. <http://www.nlm.nih.gov/‌medlineplus/‌ency/‌article/‌003188.htm>.

Mussolini, Benito. “What is Fascism?” Fordham Modern History Sourcebook. Fordham University, 8 Feb. 2001. Web. 14 Dec. 2009. <http://www.fordham.edu/‌halsall/‌mod/‌mussolini-fascism.html>.

“Nation.” WordNet Search. Princeton University, Fall 2004. Web. 14 Dec. 2009. <http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/‌perl/‌webwn?s=nation>.

Nordquist, Richard. “Metonymy.” About. The New York Times Company, 10 Feb. 2009. Web. 21 Feb. 2010. <http://grammar.about.com/‌od/‌mo/‌g/‌metonymy.htm>.

Rodrigue, Jean-Paul. “Centrality and Intermediacy.” The Geography of Transport Systems. Hofstra University, 2010. Web. 28 Feb. 2010. <http://people.hofstra.edu/‌geotrans/‌eng/‌ch4en/‌conc4en/‌centralityintermediacy.html>.

Sandeep. “Man the microcosm, Universe the macrocosm.” Auromere. WordPress, 18 Aug. 2009. Web. 21 Feb. 2010. <http://auromere.wordpress.com/‌2009/‌08/‌18/‌man-the-microcosm-universe-the-macrocosm/>.

Shaffer, Marjorie. “Sensory Deprivation Affects Brain’s Nerve Connections.” NYU Langone Medical Center. New York University, 18 July 2005. Web. 7 Mar. 2010. <http://communications.med.nyu.edu/‌news/‌2005/‌sensory-deprivation-affects-brains-nerve-connections>.

Van der Hart, Rob. “Hylomorphism and Politics.” Message to Payton Alexander. 22 Sept. 2009. E-mail.

Van der Hart, Rob. “Hylomorphism and Politics.” Message to Payton Alexander. 24 Sept. 2009. E-mail.

- – -. Personal interview. 27 July 2009. University of Oxford, England

- – -. Personal interview. 20 July 2009. University of Oxford, England

- – -. Personal interview. 13 July 2009. University of Oxford, England

[2] Van der Hart, Rob. Personal interview. 20 July 2009. University of Oxford, England

[3] Van der Hart, Rob

[4] Kukathas, Chandran. “A Definition of the State.” Madison Philosophy Department.
University of Wisconsin, 29 Mar. 2008. Web. 7 Mar. 2010.
<http://philosophy.wisc.edu/hunt/A%20Definition%20of%20the%20State.htm>.

[5] “Hylomorphism.” MSN Encarta, Dictionary. Microsoft, 2009. Web. 17 Dec. 2009.
<http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_1861619520/hylomorphism.html>.

[6] “‘Nation.’” WordNet Search. Princeton University, Fall 2004. Web. 14 Dec. 2009.

<http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=nation>.

[7] Mussolini, Benito. “What is Fascism?” Fordham Modern History Sourcebook. Fordham

University, 8 Feb. 2001. Web. 14 Dec. 2009. <http://www.fordham.edu/

halsall/mod/mussolini-fascism.html>.

[8] Sandeep. “Man the microcosm, Universe the macrocosm.” Auromere. WordPress, 18

Aug. 2009. Web. 21 Feb. 2010. <http://auromere.wordpress.com/2009/08/18/

man-the-microcosm-universe-the-macrocosm/>.

[9] Van der Hart, Rob. “Hylomorphism and Politics.” Message to Payton Alexander. 22

Sept. 2009. E-mail.

[10] Van der Hart, Rob. “Hylomorphism and Politics.” Message to Payton Alexander. 24

Sept. 2009. E-mail.

[11] Acts 4:8, 1 Corinthians 11:2, Ephesians 1:15, Ephesians 4:7, Ephesians 4:11, Ephesians 5:22, Colossians 1:18, Colossians 2:6, Colossians 2:18, 1 Peter 2:5

[12] Nordquist, Richard. “Metonymy.” About. The New York Times Company, 10 Feb. 2009.

Web. 21 Feb. 2010. <http://grammar.about.com/od/mo/g/metonymy.htm>.

[13] Block, Ned. Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 . N.p.: Bradford Books, n.d.

[14] Van der Hart, Rob

[15] ibid

[16] ibid

[17] Block, Ned

[18] OSU ASIAIN and SHAUN GRAVESTOCK (2002). Psychiatric and Behavioural Disorders in Developmental Disabilities and Mental Retardation. Edited by N. Bouras. (Pp. 464; £35.00) Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 1999.. Psychological Medicine, 32 , pp 369-376

doi:10.1017/S0033291701235223

[19] Metzger, Perry E. “What is the Role of the State?” Piermont. Metzger, Dowdeswell

& Co. LLC,, 10 Sept. 2004. Web. 28 Feb. 2010. <http://www.piermont.com/

blog/archives/permalinks/2004-08-28T12_54_13.html>.

[20] Rodrigue, Jean-Paul. “Centrality and Intermediacy.” The Geography of Transport

Systems. Hofstra University, 2010. Web. 28 Feb. 2010.

<http://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch4en/conc4en/

centralityintermediacy.html>.

[21] Van der Hart, Rob. “Hylomorphism and Politics.” Message to Payton Alexander. 24

Sept. 2009. E-mail.

[22] ibid

[23] “Muscle Atrophy.” Medline Plus Medical Encyclopedia. Medline Plus, 13 Nov. 2008.
Web. 7 Mar. 2010. <http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/
003188.htm>.

[24] Van der Hart, Rob. Personal interview. 13 July 2009. University of Oxford, England

[25] Shaffer, Marjorie. “Sensory Deprivation Affects Brain’s Nerve Connections.”
NYU Langone Medical Center. New York University, 18 July 2005. Web. 7
Mar. 2010. <http://communications.med.nyu.edu/news/2005/
sensory-deprivation-affects-brains-nerve-connections>.

[26] Van der Hart, Rob

[27] Van der Hart, Rob

[28] ibid

[29] “British Broadcasting Corporation.” BBC – Homepage. BBC, n.d. Web. 7 Mar. 2010.
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/>.

[30] Van der Hart, Rob

[31] Van der Hart, Rob. Personal interview. 27 July 2009. University of Oxford, England

Do you ever wish death on a person? The answer most have to this question is “no”. For some reason, people assume a general consensus on the definition of “person” and never ask what someone means when they say this. They are usually very sure of themselves in their analysis of what defines a human being, to the point of establishing laws around it. However, when asked about what exactly their analysis entails, they usually have absolutely no idea. I will share with you what I consider to be a person and why. I will also share that I certainly do wish death on some people, and that amongst these people are fetuses in abortion-desiring mothers. I implore you to not immediately think me a callous, murderous pig, because after reading this you may have to label yourself one.

I consider a person to be any member of the species Homo Sapiens Sapiens. This may sound like a rather obvious definition to you, but consider it. Do you actually use the same one? Are there any members of your species which you exclude the trait of personhood from? There are many people who do not consider fetuses to be human beings, or people for that matter. Likewise there are people who don’t consider the comatose to be human or in-grown parasitic Siamese twins [1] to be among many others. How do they make these distinctions? Are their essential parts to humans which all these people are lacking?

If you consider this essential part to be sentience, then it follows that comatose people are not human beings; they are merely lumps of organic matter. I would then ask you if you would be willing to use your son or your sibling, were they comatose, to cultivate your garden, or perhaps as nutritious chicken-feed. For some reason, most people are unwilling to part with their comatose relatives despite believing they are mere masses of non-humanity[2]. To me then, it seems that they really don’t consider the essential element to humanity to be sentience.

It could be that they consider independence the defining trait of a member of our species. The lack of a need to sustain oneself using another. If this is the case, then someone who directly relies on the body of another human being to survive, a parasite, is non-human. Why is it, then, that we do not take an ax to the heads of extreme sickle cell anemics? These people survive by living off the blood of other people[3], and hence, are wasting precious organic material that could be used on wounded people or for medical research. Surely we should not allow some non-human parasite to subsist on huge masses of our blood. After all, do we not immediately swat mosquitoes upon them making contact with our skin? Why, then, would we be hesitant to destroy anemics in the same way?

It must be that what constitutes a human is not independence or sentience, but some other innate characteristic. One may be compelled to ask how exactly scientists determine who is or is not a member of the species Homo Sapiens Sapiens. It’s a rather simple test: if you have 23 pairs of unique chromosomes we call “human chromosomes”, then you are a member of our species [4]. Even if you only consist of a single cell, you are still a human being. You may be reading this and thinking that to say this would make me insane. Ask yourself then; what is the difference between someone who has 1,000 human cells, and someone who has 1? 1,000,000? 10,000,000? If you cannot tell me a fixed point at which the number of cells becomes relevant, then are you not completely arbitrarily saying that I have got it wrong?

Perhaps you can think of the point at which the fetus becomes human, but don’t know exactly the number of cells that that stage would entail. In that case I would compel you to ask yourself what the difference is between a fetus at 9 months and a newborn at 9 months? You have the severed umbilical cord, but an umbilical cord can become severed in the womb as well. There is also the fact that the baby is now outside of the womb, but a fetus could likewise come outside of the womb earlier than 9 months [5]. You could say the distinction is that a fetus couldn’t survive outside of the womb like a baby can, but then you are making the claim that parasitic organisms must be non-human, in which case, you also think we should kill sickle cell anemics haphazardly. It could be that you think babies are more advanced than mere fetuses, but it has been demonstrated that at even 20 weeks, fetuses develop almost all of the higher cognitive functions that a baby will have. [5]

The fact is that there is no real difference between a fetus at 9 months and a baby at 1 day except for location. A stage of development is just that, a phase in the development of human life. Is a six year old not a person because his brain and body is still growing? The answer is no. If you kill a six year old, you have killed a human. Likewise, if you killed him as a toddler, you have still killed him, and if you killed him as a baby, the same is true, just as it would be true if you killed him as a fetus or an embryo or a zygote.

Perhaps you have been reading this with a sort of “well duh” expression, being that you do not support the killing of fetuses (abortion) in the first place and you didn’t need me to tell you that you are human from the moment of conception. But then, you have had six whole paragraphs to think about the first question. If your answer is no, then I would like to ask if you feel it is necessary to kill sometimes. If your answer to this second question is yes, then do you not wish death on people? If you feel it is necessary to kill people at times, then it must be that you desire that some people be killed (IE when it is necessary). Killing is always a choice after all, whether it is necessary or unnecessary killing, it still requires the killer to make a decision.

If your answer to the original question was yes, or you have decided to change your answer to yes at this point, then when do you wish for people to die? You could answer this with “whenever it is necessary”, but that doesn’t really help anyone does it? What is necessary for me could be that anyone reading this essay be killed. Would you not desire suicide then? I would think not. Perhaps you feel that killing should only be done in self-defense.

So when there is an inevitable threat to your life, do you have the right to take the life of another? Many would say yes indeed. Now to what degree is that threat exactly? If someone is in a trench-coat and rather suspicious looking, do we have the right to shoot them? I do not think this to be the case. However, when there is an immediate and apparent threat, like a man robbing a bank holding an AK-47, most would say lethal force is merited. So when there is an inevitable threat to your life it would seem we should reserve the right to use lethal force. Well, all births and late pregnancies incur with them an inevitable risk of stroke, hemorrhaging, heart attack and shock, infection, vaginal birth injury, and pelvic girdle pain. Now wait a minute, this is different right? I mean, the mother knew the risk she was getting herself into when she had sex surely. Now she must take responsibility for that risk. Surely it is not a mother’s fault for a condom breaking, her being drunk, or her getting raped, but I digress, let us say that this particular mother just decided to have unprotected sex with her boyfriend in a fleeting decision. Must she now deal with the risk of childbirth?

Well let’s go back to sickle cell anemics for a bit. Let us say that I had sickle cell anemia and asked you if you would be willing to part with some of your blood in small amounts for the duration of time I am in your city . I put up a very emotional case and you consent to this. Every day I show up at your house to pick up my small daily sampling of your blood. Eventually after 5 months or so you begin to feel tired, and consult your doctor. He tells you that you have an onset of mild hemophilia, and by 9 months if you continue rationing off your blood at the rate you are there are serious health risks entailed. You think about calling off the deal, but wait! It was a deal no? You did after all consent to me taking your blood for as long as I lived around you right? And I did surely mention that this amount of time was definitely going to be more than just a few months. Can you, knowing all of this, call off the deal? Don’t you have a legal and moral responsibility to me?

Of course you don’t. You made an error in calculation and you thought you could bear my burden without being aware of all the risks involved. Your blood is still your blood and you have the right to keep it inside of you however long you like. Perhaps I understand and accept this, but my wife is furious with you and then forces me to surgically attach myself to you in your sleep. Removing the complex biological link between us will kill me, but no harm will come your way. Would you not say you still have the right to remove it and thereafter end my life? Even if I mean well, the fates have put me in such a position whereby you have sufficient reason to end my life, surely, as your body is your own may force you to give it to them, willingly or unwillingly. Now you may think this analogy rather fanciful and non-sensical, but in fact a fetus does indeed suck the blood of its mother in daily regimens and it is attached by just such a biological link, the umbilical cord.

So it goes, a fetus is just as much a human as a new born or adult, and has the same rights and liberties. It does not have extra liberties. Hence, no baby has a claim to a mother’s blood, nor is a mother mandated to give birth to it. This may seem rather cruel and unusual given the baby of course never chose to be conceived and never chose to be in such a precarious position, however, unfortunate straits do not merit extra rights. The poor child living in a ghetto being beaten by his parents is not obligated to receive more educational opportunity then any rich, spoiled trust fund baby, he or she only has a right to the same education. It may be easier for one to see if they were to put themselves in the fetus’ shoes, or underdeveloped feet as it were. Would you force your mother into hemophilia or hemorrhaging risks? I don’t think anyone who truly cares for their parents, or even the abstract concepts of goodness and justice, would do such a thing. After all, even if your mother felt sympathy after going to the abortion clinic and not going through with it, does that change the fact that you were a mistake? What good is a childhood unintended or not truly desired at all points? To me just the thought of it seems to be one of the most inhuman of images.

References

[1]. Quigley, Christine. Conjoined Twins: an Historical, Biological, and Ethical Issues Encyclopedia. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &mpany, 2003. Print.

[2]. Mindell, Amy. Coma: a Healing Journey : a Guide for Family, Friends, and Helpers. Portland, Or.: Lao Tse, 1999. Print.

[3]. “Sickle Cell Anemia: Treatments and Drugs – MayoClinic.com.” Mayo Clinic Medical Information and Tools for Healthy Living – MayoClinic.com. Web. 03 Apr. 2010.

[4]. “Human Chromosomes.” Access Excellence @ the National Health Museum. Web. 03 Apr. 2010.

[5]. “When Is A Fetus Able To Survive Outside The Womb?” Science Daily: News & Articles in Science, Health, Environment & Technology. Web. 03 Apr. 2010.

<http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/11/091110135413.htm>

[6]. “WHO | Maternal and Perinatal Health.” Web. 12 Apr. 2010. <http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/maternal_perinatal_health/en/index.html>.

Introduction

Typically, moral arguments for the existence of God work by demonstrating the existence of objective moral values and then by grounding their existence in the nature of God. Philosophers who have argued in this fashion include Robert Adams, Paul Copan, and William Lane Craig.¹ In response, critics have raised three different types of objections to this form of moral argument. Type one objections simply deny the truth of moral realism, opting instead for a myriad of other views, such as noncognitivism. Type two objections, while affirming that moral realism is true, have nonetheless attempted to ground moral facts and duties in other sources. Finally, type three objections affirm that while objective moral truths exist, they are necessary truths and thus do not require an explanation. It will not be my goal to evaluate these critiques; rather, I will present a version of the moral argument that is immune from most type two and type three objections. As this argument is directed mainly toward those who entertain type two and type three objections but otherwise grant the existence of objective moral values , I will not concern myself with type one objections here. They have, in my opinion, been dealt with persuasively in the philosophical literature.²

Plantinga’s Argument

In his 1993 book, Warrant and Proper Function, philosopher Alvin Plantinga proposed what he called an evolutionary argument against naturalism.³ According to Plantinga, the probability that our cognitive faculties would have been reliable given naturalism is either low or inscrutable. This is because evolution does not select for truth per se, but for survival value. As long a particular belief ensures an organism’s survival, it doesn’t matter whether that belief is true or false. One’s beliefs could all be false yet still be advantageous toward his survival. Plantinga uses the example of Paul, a prehistoric hominid who encounters a tiger. He writes:

Perhaps Paul very much likes the idea of being eaten, but when he sees a tiger, always runs off looking for a better prospect, because he thinks it unlikely that the tiger he sees will eat him. This will get his body parts in the right place so far as survival is concerned, without involving much by way of true belief… Or perhaps he thinks the tiger is a large, friendly, cuddly pussycat and wants to pet it; but he also believes that the best way to pet it is to run away from it… or perhaps he thinks the tiger is a regularly recurring illusion, and, hoping to keep his weight down, has formed the resolution to run a mile at top speed whenever presented with such an illusion; or perhaps he thinks he is about to take part in a 1600 meter race, wants to win, and believes the appearance of the tiger is the starting signal… Clearly there are any number of belief-cum-desire systems that equally fit a given bit of behavior.⁴

Evolution could have very well produced beings whose cognitive faculties are pragmatically reliable, but unreliable in terms of producing true beliefs. Thus, the probability of our having reliable cognitive faculties given naturalism, argues Plantinga, is either low or inscrutable. We are left in the position of either doubting or being agnostic about the reliability of our cognitive faculties. But, since our cognitive faculties are reliable, we have a defeater for naturalism.

Step 1: Plantinga’s Argument and Moral Knowledge

I will now propose a modest version of the EAAN – one that argues for the falsity of naturalism on the basis of our moral faculties as opposed to cognitive faculties and that succeeds even if Plantinga’s version is false. Assume for the sake of argument that both objective moral values and warranted moral knowledge exists. Given naturalism, what would be the probability of evolution producing beings with reliable moral faculties geared toward grasping these moral truths? Even if we grant that Plantinga’s EAAN is false – that evolution does select for truths of reason – would evolution select for true moral beliefs? Unlike nonmoral truths, moral truths are what J. L. Mackie called “queer” – they cannot be inferred through observation of physical properties.⁵ So even if evolution were to select for epistemologically true beliefs, it seems unlikely that it would select for true moral beliefs due to their radically different nature. Indeed, had evolution taken a different course, it is likely that we would have ended up with a completely different set of moral beliefs. Darwin himself remarked:

If, for instance, to take an extreme case, men were reared under precisely the same conditions as hive-bees, there can hardly be a doubt that our unmarried females would, like the worker-bees, think it a sacred duty to kill their brothers, and mothers would strive to kill their fertile daughters; and no one would think of interfering.⁶

These alternate set of beliefs described by Darwin would have no doubt also been advantageous toward survival, yet they would no doubt be morally reprehensible if we were to engage in them Evolution, it seems, selects for adaptive behavior, not necessarily moral behavior. Indeed, Darwinians typically explain the origins of our moral faculties and beliefs in terms of their survival advantage and not because of their truth or falsity. Given a completely different set of conditions and thus different requirements for survival, it is plausible to suppose that evolution would have provided us with a completely different set of moral beliefs. Call these “Darwinian counterfactuals.”⁷ The processes of evolution are contingent upon the environment in which they take place. So, given a different set of conditions, it is likely that evolution would have ended up producing a different set of faculties with different beliefs about what is moral, since the conditions for survival would be different. Or suppose we were to rewind our own evolutionary development and let it play through again. Given such a scenario, it is likely that evolution would have taken a completely different route with a different set of moral beliefs. In fact, if we kept replaying this scenario, we would generate an endless number of sets of moral beliefs that would be advantageous toward survival. It thus seems that on naturalistic evolution, our moral beliefs are completely arbitrary – as arbitrary as our evolving five fingers rather than six, a fact that prominent atheistic biologist Richard Dawkins has himself admitted.⁸ Instead of rearing our young, we might have well been eating our young as it has been observed in some animal species. It is unlikely, therefore, that naturalistic evolution would have produced reliable moral faculties. But since we do have reliable moral faculties, we have a defeater for naturalism.

But suppose that evolution did occur in such a way in that mostly true moral beliefs were selected for. Does this help the naturalist? Evidently not, for it is not enough to simply account for the existence of moral knowledge – one must show this knowledge to be warranted. Indeed, for a belief to count as knowledge, it must be warranted; that is, it must be believed for genuinely good reasons. Rational insight is required. The naturalist thus has two tasks. He must:

1. Account for the existence of true moral knowledge.

2. Provide an adequate framework in which to ground moral knowledge.

Let us grant that the naturalist can account for (1). Accounting for (2) seems to be more problematic. As previously stated, our moral beliefs would have been selected for not because they are true but because they confer survivability. Moral beliefs would simply the means to a nonmoral end (Survival).⁹ But if the reason we believe in certain moral truths is because of their survival advantage, then we are not warranted in thinking that these beliefs are actually true – only that they confer some practical advantage. This is true even if evolution somehow selected for true moral beliefs. Mark Linville observes:

[G]iven an evolutionary account of human moral beliefs, there is no reason for thinking that a relation of epistemic dependence obtains, and so, given an evolutionary account, belief in moral facts is unwarranted. If our moral beliefs are without warrant, then they do not amount to moral knowledge.¹⁰

Consider the example of Bill, a brilliant mathematician who has solved many of the world’s most difficult math problems. No doubt we would consider Bill a genius. However, upon further investigation, we find out that Bill solved all of his math problems by throwing number tiles into a black bag and drawing a few at random. Though Bill may have drawn the correct numbers, we would not call him rational. The question of whether or not evolution would provide us with warranted moral knowledge “cannot be answered in a manner that leaves entirely out of account the question of how [those] beliefs are produced and sustained.”¹¹ What matters is not whether naturalism can account for moral knowledge, it is whether or not it can adequately ground it. If truth plays no part in explaining why we have certain true moral beliefs, then we do not have any moral knowledge.

Bertrand Russell allegedly once observed, “Everything looks yellow to a person suffering from jaundice.” Actually, I believe the truth of the matter is that people suffering from jaundice look yellow. But suppose that both are right: jaundiced people both appear and are appeared to yellowly. Jones enters Dr. Smith’s office, complaining of various and vague discomforts. Smith takes one look at Jones and exclaims, “Your skin has a very tawny appearance!” He diagnoses Jones with jaundice and prescribes accordingly. Later, it occurs to Smith that all of his patients have a yellowish tint, as do his charts, the floor tiles, once-white pills and the nurses’ uniforms. A simple blood test determines that he is suffering from jaundice. It dawns on the doctor that Jones would have appeared yellow to him regardless of Jones’ actual condition. Has Smith now a reason for supposing ‘Jones is jaundiced’ is false in the way that, say, a negative blood test would provide such a reason? It seems not. Perhaps Jones is jaundiced. Smith simply lacks any reason for thinking that Jones’ appearance was caused by Jones’ condition, or that the belief that Jones was jaundiced is epistemically dependent upon any medical facts about Jones. And this is to suggest that facts about Dr. Smith’s own condition have now supplied him with an undercutting defeater for his belief regarding Jones’ condition.

It thus seems that if naturalism is true, we should all be moral skeptics. Though evolution may have bestowed upon us moral faculties which allowed us to grasp the content of moral truths, we would be believing them for the wrong reasons. In essence, we would have believed in them on accident. William Hasker observes:

Occasionally, to be sure, it may happen that the thought processes generated by the physically determined functioning [In our case, survival value] of the brain will arrive at a conclusion which is correct. But this, when it happens, is simply a fortunate accident – and to say that a conclusion is reached by accident is incompatible with the claim that the the conclusion was reached by rational thinking…. [I]f my recognition that there are good reasons for a belief is not what brings about my acceptance of the belief, then I am not rational in accepting it.¹³

Naturalism is thus inadequate both as a ground and source of reliable moral knowledge.

Step 2: Is Ethical Behavior Even Possible?

Now suppose that everything I have previously said is false, that naturalism can account for the existence of warranted moral knowledge. In spite of that, naturalism does not provide the possibility for moral behavior, such that moral knowledge becomes practically useless even if we have it. Naturalism, because it views the world mechanistically, implies determinism.¹⁴ On this view, free will is non-existent, since our actions are determined by prior conditions and not by our own choosing. However, for ethical behavior to be possible, free will must exist. We cannot be punished or praised for doing something we had no control over. If we are not responsible for our own actions, then moral responsibility becomes meaningless. As Kant said, “Ought implies can.” Suppose that a mad scientist implants a chip into my brain that allows him to control my body remotely. Using a game controller, he then manipulates my body such that it robs a bank. Am I responsible in such a scenario? No, for I had no control over my actions. It is not enough for the naturalist to provide an adequate foundation for moral knowledge, for he must also provide a foundation for moral behavior.

Step 3: Moral Instantiation

There is one final challenge for the naturalist: he must show that moral values (Specifically, human dignity and equality) are instantiated in human beings.¹⁵ Given naturalism, it seems odd to think that human dignity and equality would simply be present in human beings. Who or what gives human beings these values? It doesn’t seem that value could arise from valueless causes.

Suppose the naturalist attempts to predicate dignity and equality upon human cognitive functioning. Several issues arise. First, why should we accept cognition to be a ground for these values? How does cognition ground objective dignity and equality? If these values exist as abstract Platonic forms, then why do they happen to be instantiated when we develop a certain level of cognition? It just seems to be arbitrarily asserted. Second, if one bases dignity and equality upon mental functioning, then they become degreed properties. After all, some people have a higher level of mental functioning than others, but it obviously doesn’t follow that they have more value than others. Indeed, such a notion runs afoul of the idea of equality. Third, it commits the naturalistic fallacy. One cannot move from a descriptive (An “is”) statement of biology to a prescriptive (An “ought) statement of ethics. Finally, “[i]f the naturalist claims that intrinsic dignity somehow emerges when an organism is sufficiently neurologically complex, the problem of account for the emergent of value or dignity remains. As Kant argued regarding the actual infinite, so can we regarding human worth: dignity cannot be formed by successive addition. Intrinsic value must be given at the outset, otherwise, it doesn’t matter how many nonpersonal and nonvaluable components we happen to stack up.”¹⁶

Conclusion

Naturalists have a tall task before them. They must: (1) account for the existence of warranted moral knowledge, (2) provide a robust foundation for the possibility of ethical behavior, and (3) show how moral values such as human dignity could be instantiated in a naturalistic framework. Such a task, as we have seen, is unlikely to be satisfied. It is probable to assume that naturalism is therefore false.

But how does theism fare? Standard accounts of theism hold that there exists a good and wise God who created mankind in his image and in doing so, endowed them with value. Even if God is not the ground of morality, he could instantiate it. Moreover, because God is a rational being, it seems reasonable to ground the existence of reliable moral knowledge in his being. Even supposing that such a God used evolution to produce mankind, he would have likely guided the evolutionary processes to ensure the production of beings with reliable moral faculties. Theism also provides a robust foundation for moral responsibility, since humans are endowed with genuine free will with which they can use to make moral choices. Paul Copan writes:

If moral facts are just brute givens and necessarily true, there is left unexplained a huge cosmic coin­cidence between the existence of these moral facts and the eventual emergence of morally responsible agents who are obligated to them. That this moral realm appears to be anticipating our emergence is a staggering cosmic concurrence that begs an explanation.¹⁷

And indeed the theist does indeed have a robust explanation, whereas the naturalist is ultimately left scratching his head for answers. Theism emerges as the better explanation.

___________

Sources

This argument is a metaphysical one, meaning it deals with the nature of reality. It also assumes your epistemology is that of a positivist (a person who rejects anything unless it’s logically verifiable). If you have some other epistemology, you may want to not spend much time reading the explanations of the premises and skip to the objections section.

So, we’ve got four possibilities typically when we start talking about the nature of the universe:

Skepticism: the proposition that nothing whatsoever exists.

Bundle-theory: the proposition that the only existent things are properties, and hence properties are the metaphysical nature of the universe (there are no substances).

Monism: This usually comes in two forms: emergentism, which is the proposition that only properties and physical things exist and the mind is just an emergent property of matter. The second most popular form would be idealism, which is the proposition that only properties and ideas, or mental substance, exist, the physical world merely being a description of ideas.

Dualism: This also presents itself in two forms. Substance dualism is the proposition that there exist both physical and mental substances as well as properties. Property dualism is the proposition that only mental and physical properties exist.

Now you may have noticed that property dualism shares it’s definition with bundle-theory here. In philosophy of mind, property dualism actually shares it’s definition with emergentism. In other words, property dualism sort of gets passed around a lot. We will here be using property dualism exclusively to refer to the dual properties that bundle-theory posits (mental and physical properties) without any underlying substance.

The method by which we will be eliminating metaphysical theories is deductive reasoning, however, if you were so inclined, you may also use occam’s razor to inductively get you to the same conclusion in the very same way (that is, that amongst several options, the choice with the least non-evidential assumptions is the correct one).

Now we know right off the bat that skepticism is wrong because if nothing exists then there can be no propositions, and if there are no propositions there are no truth statements, and if there are no truth statements then skepticism is self-refuting.

So we are left with several options. We know that one of them must be right, or in other words, we know, as Decartes did, that something has to exist. Now if we can deductively conclude that only one thing exists, that means we must throw out any metaphysical position here that posits the existence of more than one thing, or in syllogism:

Only 1 ontos for the universe exists

metaphysical theories 3 and 4 and the subdivisions thereof all posit more than 1 ontos.

Therfore, metaphysical theory 2, bundle-theory, is correct.

However, we have run into a problem. If we look closer, we can see that bundle-theory doesn’t just make one assertion, it makes two, and in fact it is a type of dualism and hence is equivalent to a subdivision in 4. It would seem now that our syllogism is invalid. Our conclusion is wrong because it is not exempt from the problems of all the other theories. It posits more than one ontos (nature).

Well wait a minute now, all it would seem we’d have to do is look at the theory itself and see which assertion in it we can logically verify. Under bundle-theory we have two types of properties:

1. mental properties
2. physical properties

Now if we can eliminate one of these, then we immediately justify bundle-theory as the accurate metaphysical theory. How can we do this? Well that’s where Berkeley comes in with one of his strongest proofs of idealism (or, as we can call it now, Humean-idealism):

We perceive ordinary objects (houses, mountains, etc.).

We perceive only mental properties.

Ordinary objects are mental properties.

Readers of Berkeley’s A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Understanding will note that I have simply replaced the word “idea” with “mental properties” or “bundles of mental properties”.

It is here that we can now forward Berkeley’s argument for god, which is distinct from mine. For Berkeley’s argument (or rather, arguments, as he eliminates possibilities), consult the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s article on him.

As for (finally) my argument, given our newly deductively proven metaphysics:

Only mental properties exist.

We cannot perceive everything that exists.

An omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent mind is necessary to perceive all that exists.

3 may seem to be jumping the shark, but notate that any mind which contains in it all of existence is itself omniscient, since it is aware of all that exists. Also notate that any mind which is omniscient is by necessity omnipotent, since it can imagine any event into fruition or create anything. And finally notate that by definition, one is always present in their own mind, hence omnipresence.

Non-positivist objections:

The Critique from Broad Foundationalism

“Hey, I’m a broad foundationalist though and accept all this stuff being physical as a properly basic belief.”

I will only respond to a criticism of this type with a Samuel Johnson-esque “well, I’m a broad foundationalist too and I take all this stuff being non-physical as a properly basic belief.”

The Critique from Conventionalism

“I take basic beliefs to be determined by society’s tendencies and intuitions, hence I reject your first premise.”

If you believe this, then you’ll also have to accept that god exists without argument, being that 84 percent of the world believes in him.

The Critique from Reliabilism

“I think we should judge whether or not something is true based on how good it is at predicting stuff.”

If this is so, then simply read “deductive reasoning” in this article as “occam’s razor”. Occam’s razor is lovely at predicting things and to refuse to apply it in a particular place is a special pleading fallacy.

The Critique from Narrow Foundationalism

“I believe clear and distinct truths are what we should assume, such as the physicality of objects.”

I reject this criticism on the grounds that the originator of your own epistemology did not think it clear and distinct that physical stuff existed.

The Critique from Coherentism

“You behave in a way such that physical things exist.”

No I most certainly don’t. See the Three Dialogs for Berkeley’s defense of idealism as a common-sense belief and critique of matter as an abstraction. Also see Russell’s critique of coherentism.

Positivist Objections:

Argument from Meta-Ethics.

“An objective morality exists, and such a morality cannot be determined by a god nor be intrinsic to him as per Euthyphro.”

This is actually a good refutation, but if you don’t mind try to ignore it in your own objections, since I’m looking for possible refutations I haven’t already thought of.

Begging the Question

“You seem to be saying there are mental properties that aren’t perceived, since god isn’t perceived by anything here.”

There are two ways to respond to this. The simple and cheap way is god perceives himself.

The better way would be to use the Leibnizian Cosmological Argument, since existence is just redefined here as “being perceived” we can directly translate the term “necessary existence” to “necessarily perceived thing”.

Non Causa Pro Causa

“An omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent being does not follow from 2.”

I explain why it does follow after premise 3.

Equivocation

“Hume used properties to describe tropes, as he was a nominalist”.

Either definition works for the purposes of this argument.

Contra Berkeley’s Core Argument

“We have deductive reason/inductive evidence for physicalism.”

First define what matter is without begging the question, then refute the master argument, then solve interactionism/justify the existence of matter.

—————————————————————————————

That covers all the stuff I can forsee. Feel free to bring up the objections I’ve already mentioned for further analysis if so inclined (with the exception of the meta-ethics critique). Also if anyone is curious, the reason I haven’t revoked my atheism after formulating this is because I want to rigorously examine whether or not it is fallacious.

Further Reading:

Berkeley, George. A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. Philosophy

Collection. Web. 09 June 2010. <http://philosophy.eserver.org/berkeley.html>.

“Skepticism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).” Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy. Web. 09 June 2010. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/>.

Bergmann, Gustav. The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism. New York:

Longmans Green, 1954.

The argument I presented in my previous piece, while only edited for purposes of removing grammatical and structural errors, reads as follows :

1. The Judeo-Christian God has revealed to human beings a perfect, objective moral set of ethical facts, contained in the Bible. (Ten commandments, Jesus, et. al)
2. An objective set of ethical facts must be followed by all beings.
3. Human beings and any God must hold to be true the same objective, perfect, set of ethical facts.
4. God must follow any objective or perfect set of ethical facts.
5. As God is perfect, he cannot follow an imperfect set of ethical facts.
6. The Judeo-Christian God, as described in the Bible, does not adhere to ethical facts humans find to be true.
7. Given [2-6], either God or human beings follow an imperfect set of ethical facts.
8. Given [3-7] God must follow a perfect set of ethical facts.
9. Human beings must believe to be true an imperfect, non-objective set of ethical facts.
10. From [1-9], the Judeo-Christian God cannot have revealed to Human beings a true, objective, perfect, set of ethical facts

In this argument I define objective to mean : not subject to personal beliefs or whims, nor dependent upon the ideas or beliefs of any mind(s) or entity(entities). Objective ethical fact : Moral statements, i.e killing is wrong, which are true independent of any individual entity or group of entities. Given these definitions, I will defend the argument which I have presented.

A being is morally perfect if it follows any and all ethical facts it is aware of which pertain to it. Do note, though, this takes into account the concept the lesser of two evils, along with other situations which would force the being into making a morally bad decision.

“21 Then Peter came up and said to him, “Lord, how often will my brother sin against me, and I forgive him? As many as seven times?” 22 Jesus said to him, “I do not say to you seven times, but seventy times seven.”

Beatrice:          What do you think the problem of evil can accomplish? Can it argue someone out of their faith?

Adam:             I think so. People do lose their faith, and evil is a common reason why. It isn’t always argued or reasoned: I don’t think people are carefully constructing inductive arguments when they ask why God let their child die. Evil might subvert or damage one’s relationship with god: you might hate god, or believe that he hates you. This doesn’t make sense if God exists as advertised by religion: he hasn’t (and can’t) do anything to warrant hatred, and loves us all.

But whether there is a good argument matters. If evil doesn’t really suggest Atheism[1], then those who renounce God in the face of evil are making a tragic error. But if it does, perhaps we should make a more sober conclusion: instead of a malicious or uncaring god, perhaps there isn’t one at all. Perhaps we live unsupervised by a caring creator, and so evil is wholly expected: the world was never made to make life good for us.

Beatrice:          What do you mean by ‘good argument’? That any reasonable person aware of it must accept its conclusion? That it would be decisive for an ‘ideal’ agnostic?[2]

Adam:             Neither. I can’t think of any argument that would persuade everyone who is reasonable. And although an ideal agnostic standard is closer to the mark, I don’t think it is very helpful here – unlike some more arcane fields of philosophy, I think everyone has prior commitments and intuitions about God.

So I’d want something like the following: A good argument is one that can change a rational person’s degree of belief. A reasonable person, after considering the premises and the inferences of the argument being offered, adjusts their confidence in the conclusion.

Invalid arguments are never good. But probably unsound arguments might be. Even if a given premise of an argument is believed to be probably false, it might still undermine great confidence in the opposite of its conclusion. If you were certain of X, but only pretty sure that Y, then being presented a valid argument that X iff Y, then perhaps you shouldn’t be certain of X, but only pretty sure, like you are of Y.

Beatrice:          Perhaps, but you might do the opposite. On realizing X iff Y, and that you are certain of X, why not conclude that, in fact, you should be certain of Y too? That might be reasonable – yet it would mean this isn’t a good argument: they’re still certain of X. Yet in principle any argument can be ‘turned around’ and played in reverse to deny the premises used in a ‘Moorean shift’. So are there no good arguments?

Adam:                         There are perhaps two degrees of belief at work here: you’re actual likelihood assessment, and your confidence in that likelihood assessment. I may believe something is as likely as not because of long and bitter enquiry, or through simple ignorance – and it would take a lot more argumentative might to shift the former P ~ 0.5 than the latter.

So you might need a suite of arguments: if I thought, when showing X iff Y to get someone to be uncertain of X instead of certain of Y there was a risk they’d reinforce their priors, I might want need other arguments to close off this option – separate reasons why you shouldn’t be certain of Y.

Beatrice:          Similar difficulties apply when trying to provide these reasons for why Y shouldn’t be considered certain – perhaps I might be inclined to reverse that argument too. That doesn’t seem an unrealistic prospect for real arguments like the Argument from Evil: it touches on lots of side concerns about ethics, free will, divine foreknowledge, and so on. All of these have a plethora of different positions – all held, I imagine, by pretty reasonable people. These in turn may draw their credence from still more beliefs, and so on. To get someone to accept the Argument from Evil might require you to transform their entire web of beliefs from the locus of one argument.

Adam:                         I don’t quite agree. You are right that I am faced with lots of different webs of belief to negotiate, but I don’t need to offer arguments for every single remotely relevant belief. I might argue that a given belief doesn’t matter either way; the argument still works whether it is Z or not-Z. Or I might offer parallel arguments, one for if Z, and one for if not-Z (or for all the alternative reasonable positions if it isn’t yes or no) for the conclusion I am after.

That’s hard, but no one wants the problem of evil to be successful with some prior beliefs, but not with others; they want it to be shown that evil is good evidence or not regardless of the variation in prior beliefs sensible people may have. I think some issues cannot be side-stepped (for example, the issue of free-will) but many can.

Beatrice:          Fine. But even if an argument has persuasive power, that needn’t change someone’s mine. Even if evil does provide evidence against God, other concerns might give stronger evidence in favour.

Even if we can see that God probably doesn’t exist, then that isn’t necessarily important. I don’t think many people believe in God through evidentialist grounds – it means more than that. Likewise, I don’t think probability assignments have all that much to do with the religious form of life. Even if I thought God was unlikely, I might believe in him out of the hope he was there.[3]

Adam:             I agree with you. Even if evil does constitute evidence against God it may still be the cumulative case for Theism over Atheism is decisive. When considering multiple arguments, the picture I’ve given above becomes even more complicated. But evil is a better place to start than most: it is a common reason why people don’t believe, and ‘hits you in the gut’ a way more metaphysical concerns with natural a/theology lack.

I also agree to your second point: one needn’t believe that God probably exists to have faith in him – so for these people, God’s probability is moot. Yet I think it can inform doxastic attitudes: if you think that a world without God isn’t that bad, then you might consider having faith in God similar to hoping that you’ll receive a fortune: you might, if asked, accept that it would be good, but this won’t motivate the sort of committed hope which could resemble a ‘living faith’.

Beatrice:          Life might be wonderful for you, but what about everyone else? If God doesn’t exist, then many people – often those who form ‘case studies’ of the problem of evil – have lives that are horrendous. Whatever goods in their lives are not only outweighed but defeated by the evils they suffered.[4] So perhaps hope for them should motivate faith.

Adam:                         Pace universalism, Theists don’t hope for this either – many that live awful lives will lose out post-mortem too.[5] Perhaps whatever account they offer is still better than likely oblivion, but it doesn’t seem very hopeful to me.

Why not a universalist? Because I think it is too remote a possibility to be worth hoping for. Like me magically becoming rich, it is something that I would like, and something that is for all we know possible, but it seems a waste of time to bother entertaining hope that it will happen. So too a universalist God, if the argument from evil works as well as I think it does.

Beatrice:          Fine. So what is the argument?

Evil:

Adam:             Consider:

1)    If God exists, there are no examples of pointless evil.

2)    There are cases of pointless evil.

3)    God does not exist.[6]

‘Pointless’ means without justification. A gratuitous evil is not one that is necessary, in whatever sense, for an outweighing good.[7]

This is the core of the problem of evil. It’s surely a valid argument. I think it is basically sound as well. We don’t know for certain that there are pointless evils, but it’s pretty damn likely given the lots of apparently pointless evils that some are pointless.

Beatrice:          I know most of the criticism hinges on (2), or the evidential premise, but I have doubts about the theological premise as well. I think there may be cases where God would permit a particular case of evil, not because it itself locally permits a greater good, but that permission of that evil might be globally necessary, in whatever sense. Perhaps God must permit a certain number of horrendously evil events to occur such that we realize our fallen nature, but there are no particular events specified.[8]

This is similar to other principles that might ‘tie god’s hands’. Perhaps God cannot stop a young child being raped and murdered because he must maintain a world of moral choices, or perhaps he must allow her to drown because he cannot allow massive irregularities of the laws of nature. This gives a Theist a lot of latitude: defences, along these lines, can be vague.

Adam:             I agree with this sort of vagueness, but there still must be global justification, even if local explanations are lacking. But I wouldn’t agree with the hypothesis that there is no minimum: even if no explanation can be demanded for why this child as opposed to that, but one can be for how many children in total. Perhaps to some extent this is out of his hands, but he must pick the best strategy to minimize this global evil.[9]

I agree such concerns are useful in local evil. A valid defence to a particular charge isn’t why that child suffered, but that some children needed to – and if so, then why not that one? I am happy to argue against candidates of such defences, should the need arise.

Given how we’ve alluded to case studies and suffering children, here’s an example from recent news – if I’ve mistaken some the details, I hope you’ll agree that evils like this can and do occur.

The Puttick family was, by all accounts, an idyllic one. Neil and Kazumi were devoted to each other and their newborn son, Sam. One friend of the family said: “if you could bottle up a perfect marriage, theirs would be it.”

They were involved in a car accident in 2005. Kazumi’s legs and pelvis were broken. Sam’s spine was severed at the neck – he would have died were it not for two doctors who stopped to help. On being rushed to hospital, the parents were told that Sam’s injuries were catastrophic. Neil was defiant:

“… I believe in my heart the doctors are wrong and he will win. I believe God is with us and Sam will walk, talk and breathe again.

He was a miracle when he came to us, it was a miracle when he survived the crash and it will be a miracle when he recovers. These things do happen and they will happen to Sam.”

Sam survived, and flourished. Both Neil and Kazumi quit their jobs to devote their time to looking after Sam and raising the money necessary for his care. The wider community helped out too with sponsored events. They also sent pictures of themselves from all over the world holding cards with ‘Hi Sam!’, which Sam enjoyed immensely. Given all of this, perhaps the evil of Sam’s injury was outweighed (or even defeated) by all of these goods.

Sadly, that isn’t the end of the story. At the age of five Sam fell ill with meningitis, and it became clear there was no hope of survival. Neil and Kazumi took Sam home, and he died soon afterwards. His parents put Sam’s body in a rucksack, and filled another one with his toys. They carried both of these to the cliffs at Beachy head. Beachy head is a suicide hot-spot: a Chaplaincy has been set up there solely to try and prevent suicides. Yet neither they nor any passers-by saw Neil and Kazumi. They threw themselves to their deaths.

The point of this story is not to give other another ‘theodicial nasty’, but rather to point out the usual sub-categorizations (‘natural evil’, ‘moral evil’) aren’t always clear, and aren’t always useful. It also brings into stark relief some of the harder problems with the usual theodicies

Beatrice:          This is horrific. But what are these ‘harder problems’ why couldn’t one try and offer accounts for the natural and moral evil involved in events like these?

Adam:                          Take moral evil. The usual discussions of moral evil involve what I call deliberate moral evil: someone explicitly intends to harm someone else. An example would be van Inwagen’s example of “The Mutilation”, the true story of a woman who was raped, beaten, and both arms severed at the elbow, or Rowe’s case of “Sue”, where a young child was raped and killed.[10] Examples like these are picked to provide the ‘toughest case’ a free will defence needs to answer – if it works for them, perhaps it can work elsewhere.

Yet I think ‘Radical evils’ – to use Arendt’s phrase – aren’t the hardest ones for Theists to account for – such profound deliberate evils fit well with a Theistic account of mankind’s nature.[11] The hardest ones are cases where the choices leading to the moral evil are far less significant than the evil itself. Suppose that a Doctor – if only he knew that Sam Puttick had meningitis – could have stopped the infection before it got out of control. Or that perhaps, if he were an incredibly good Doctor he would have made the diagnosis in time, but as he was only a good Doctor he did not. There seem lots of instances where God could have gently guided people’s morally-irrelevant decisions towards the good. God might have to allow evil things to happen when people will the wrong, but why allow evil things to happen when people will the good?[12]

Beatrice:          This ties into global concerns I suggested earlier. Perhaps there are certain ‘freedom’ thresholds that God needs to keep in order to preserve a moral world, a Vale of soul-making, or something like this?

Adam:             But these ‘choices’ have no moral bearing – so why should God protect them? Surely God would want to facilitate good acts wherever possible by this ‘guidance’.

Beatrice:          Who says he doesn’t? Such ‘commonplace miracles’ are mentioned often in the lives of believers.

Adam:                         Perhaps, but what about these instances of ‘missed providence?’ What thresholds need to be observed for these morally irrelevant choices: why can’t God offer a guiding hand all the time?

Beatrice:          What about a threshold of mystery? Maybe if God did guide us too much we’d begin to wonder at all these little coincidences, why providence always favoured us.

Adam:             We seem to be going in a circle – you said a minute ago that God really did guide us so much that some of us (albeit believers) twig that he’s at work in these ‘commonplace miracles’. Besides, Theism – at least the Theism of world religions – entails commitment to the idea that God does get intervene drastically: consider the lives of Jesus or Muhammad. If he’s willing to do that, what plausible excuse does he have to do something far more subtle?

Of course, all of these leads to the problem of hiddenness – that, actually, God being mysterious and apart is exactly what we shouldn’t expect on Theism.[13] To appeal to it as a solution to evil seems to be avoiding one monster by throwing oneself down the throat of another.

This concern ramifies elsewhere: after all, the precipitating cause of the Puttick tragedy was a natural evil – meningitis. Now, I suspect you will offer some defence of natural evil on the need for having a regular order of the natural world.

Beatrice:          Partly. I also find it strange when Atheists are so confident in suggesting adjustments to the laws of nature – that we all be unable to be bodily harmed, say – as definite improvements. I have little idea what the world would be like under radically different natural laws, if you’ll excuse the term.

Adam:             It is better to focus on fairly minor changes to natural laws, especially those where we can easily imagine what the world would be like, for example a world without HIV or Polio. If we imagine an ‘evil landscape’ or phase-space, it may well be that far away from our location on this evil landscapes that there are minima lower than ours – but it’s hard for us to assess worlds so far from our own. However, if I only want to show our world has some pointless evil, then showing a local minimum nearby would be sufficient.

But the Puttick’s point to another problem: that the world doesn’t need to be actually regular. It just needs to appear regular. So it seems clear God could have simply prevented Sam Puttick from getting ill whilst still keeping up appearances of regularity and order. It isn’t like people would wonder “isn’t it strange Sam didn’t die of meningitis when he was five? That’s terribly irregular.”

Beatrice:          Two concerns. One: why not say that genuinely regular worlds are better than apparently regular worlds, in a similar way to genuinely living is better than plugging yourself into an experience machine? Two: What about the argument that there wouldn’t be a minimum to suffering, because if God stopped this instance of suffering, he should have stopped that one too, then another, and then we end up removing all the evil which was serving a purpose in the first place?

Adam:                         I think your first argument will struggle. The Theistic god regularly breaks the natural order, so you need a plausible account to justify these to avoid allegations of special pleading. I also don’t see the strength of the analogy with the experience machine: we don’t hook ourselves up because we want genuine experiences, but I don’t see the appeal of living in a world with genuinely regular laws over one with apparently regular laws. After all, for all I know, the laws aren’t regular anyway.

For the second concern, consider the world has so much evil to achieve a certain threshold. Surely we can rearrange this: so the meningitis that got Sam could have affected someone who would survive. You may then say your argument applies just as well to this: because if we rearranged this evil, why not that evil and end up with an evil being rationally arranged. Yet this isn’t true – there would be a global reason why he couldn’t eliminate all evils. We can know that your threshold concern doesn’t apply – simply because we realize that we would be none the wiser about God’s intervention in Sam’s case than if he didn’t. So we know by inspection we aren’t at the minimum threshold.

Beatrice:          Is it really as simple as that? The minimum threshold must be vague – we can’t lie ‘on the limit’, because that itself could be taken to show God’s action in the world.

Adam:                         I think you might be confusing me unnecessarily. If we grant God requires some mystery in his action in the world as justification for great natural evils. I think Sam’s case is sufficient to knock that over – if it never happened, we wouldn’t lose any of this mystery. It’s an open question how many such evils God could remove without violating this global concern, but it’s pretty clear there’s at least one.

There is a general worry here too. If you expand this idea of mystery too far – that God must make it appear that he doesn’t exist, then you might end up with a position like “God exists, but he makes the world looks like he doesn’t”. If you do, why shouldn’t someone turn around and say “Then I reject this idea in the same stroke as I do external world scepticism”?

Beatrice:          No, I see the problem. I think you are right about explanations for evil being much harder than I might hope. There are two worries: one is that the concerns a Theist offers simply don’t ‘cut it’. A theist might not agree, but I confess I am tempted to agree with Ivan Karamazov when he says free will concerns are never enough to justify the suffering of an innocent child.[14]

The second problem, which we’ve talked about, is instrumental. Even if free will, or soul making or similar are valid concerns, God seems to have done a cack-handed job of realizing them – that we can see that someone interested in free will, or soul making, or whatever, could do it better. I see that you are right in that looking at evils together, how evils can engender or amplify each other presents difficulties for the Theist.

Adam:             The usual dialectical moves in the problem of evil involve the Atheologian cutting out whole classes of evil to side-step potential theodicies. So you avoid moral evil to dodge the free will defence, and you usually end up with instances of animal suffering as the toughest problem for Theists to provide explanations for.

This approach is, to my mind, misguided: it concedes far too much ground, and ignores all the interactions which, to my mind, make evil so difficult. The cases of the Putticks, I think, is so awful precisely because of how it happened despite the moral virtues of all involved (worse, perhaps it happened because of these moral virtues: perhaps, if Sam and Kazumi were not such utterly devoted parents, they might still be alive today).

This discussion kicked-off because I wanted to justify premise (2) in my argument: that there are pointless evils. Given the formidable difficulties I’ve pointed out by trying to show it likely there are ‘points’ to the evils we observe. I think it is fair to say (2) is probably (or almost certainly) true. Given (1), or something in the neighbourhood or (1) is also true, would you be willing adjust your likelihood of god downwards?

Beatrice:           Evil already ‘adjusts it downwards’, in whatever sense. However, what you’ve said about scepticism reminded me of something. I think I might have let you go too far in your argument. I think we should be a bit more sceptical.

Appearance

Beatrice:          I think there might be another way to think about evil. We have both been groping around some of the difficulties and trying to work out how it falls together. I don’t think we are in any position at all to figure out the problem of evil. It might look like some evil is unjustified, but that is only in the same way that a patch of grass seems not to have insects on when we view it from a skyscraper. We do not satisfy the Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access (CORNEA for short).

Wykstra put it something like this:[15]

“For X to say ‘it appears that P’, it must be reasonable for them to believe, if it were not-P, it would appear otherwise.’

In a similar way, Evil’s might appear pointless, but on further reflection we should see that we are in the skyscraper case. If so, then the rest of the discussion on evil doesn’t matter: instead of getting God’s acquittal, we’ve found out our verdict is unsafe.

Adam:             It’s hard to see, if we should doubt the appearance of pointless evil, what else we should doubt as well. How about this:

M)        Suppose you were able to stop Neil and Kazumi Puttick committing suicide. If God exists, then it’s likely that he sees great goods beyond our ken. Thus, although it might appear that stopping these people committing suicide is good, in fact we aren’t in a position of epistemic access to say this.

Yet this is strange.[16]

Beatrice:          Why should I be committed to something like this? I only need to be sceptical about how god must interact with the moral world.

Adam:             What would distinguish this from simply appealing to your reasons for Theism (whatever they may be) to rebut the argument from evil: “Sure, it appears that there are instances of pointless suffering, but I think different rules apply to God.”

And I think, if not this, you are committed to different rules. If the world is so morally obscure such that only God can fathom out the right thing to do. Yet in our day-to-day lives he ensures we can trust our faculties for the bulk of our decision making. That seems pretty ad-hoc to me.

Beatrice:          What’s the problem? Why not say that – but for the grace of God – we have no hope of understanding our moral world. This isn’t (at least for me) an ad hoc adjustment. It fits in quite nicely with the noetic effects of sin.

Adam:                         Sure, but these seem extensions to the Theistic hypothesis, and although they purchase immunity from disconfirming evidence, but at the risk of making the conjunction of (Theism & Extension) implausible – it becomes ‘top heavy’.[17] This worry I think applies if you make further moves: for example, why can’t, if there’s evil which God must permit for reasons beyond our ken, could God not give us some sense of assurance that it is all for the best? You might say ‘Why not apply CORNEA to this, too?’ but I think people are at liberty to think that God permits evils for reasons beyond our ken, and in a bulk of theses cases must, also for reasons beyond our ken not assure of that he is permitting these evils for reasons beyond our ken seems, to me, flatly ridiculous. It doesn’t get off the ground as an explanatory hypothesis, and I can only urge you to think the same.

I think we can argue that moral obscurity is implausible by its own merits. The argument in favour relies on a comparative judgement – God, if he exists, would possess intellectual and moral capacity vastly in excess of our own. Yet this isn’t enough to get to the conclusion, which is that we aren’t in a position to trust moral appearances.

Analogies offered by William Alston for sceptical theism can be co-opted to make this point clearer.[18] He points to examples like chess grandmasters to laymen, physics professors to students, or parents to children suggest instances where the former can’t explain their reasons to the latter (‘Why did you move the pawn there?’ ‘How did you derive that?’ ‘Why can’t we eat?’) yet their beliefs or behaviours being wholly reasonable. So here’s the problem – focus on the chess example:

Even if a layperson can’t dissect out optimal play or a complicated mid-game scenario, he might be able to do something simple like assess whether black is in checkmate. He might be able to work out less categorical circumstances: if white has got a pawn and black all his pieces, then they’d be surely reasonable to think ‘black is winning’. Now, a grandmaster can be more confident that ‘black is winning’, and perhaps supply many more reasons why black is in fact winning, but that still doesn’t mean our layperson isn’t in a position of epistemic access. We don’t show that by pointing to people who have far better access than us. We show the situation at hand is inaccessible.

Why believe that for day-to-day ethical scenarios? Given most conceptions of normative ethics, we are able to morally assess states of affairs somewhat competently. Moreover, these theories tend to be axiologically complete – we don’t hold open the door for other things being good besides what we specify, so qualities of ‘goods beyond our ken’ seem implausible. Instances of ‘goods beyond our ken’ with qualities we already know are plausible, but, on the bulk of normative theory, this isn’t so common as to make appearances untrustworthy. It might be harder to assess things like justification, greater goods and other concerns in the problem of evil, but it still remains surely accessible.

Of course, some moral questions might really be inaccessible – but the problem of evil looks at cases where it seems clear that something is pointlessly evil. Of course, it might be that all the apparent evils we observe aren’t evil at all. But I never claimed to be infallible. Besides, given there are lots of apparently gratuitous evils, it seems a pretty safe bet that at least some of these are gratuitous. CORNEA needs to convince us that the appearances of pointlessness give no reason to think it is pointless because we aren’t in a position of epistemic access. But we’ve seen believing that we have access (even if God’s is far better) is highly plausible. So CORNEA collapses – not because of wider conceptually difficulties, but because it simply doesn’t apply to the circumstances. We aren’t ‘on a skyscraper’ regarding pointless evil. We’re in the thick of it.

Beatrice:          Then perhaps theodicy has a role after all: to try and ‘muddy the waters’ of what appears to be. If one can be convinced that the appearances aren’t as clear as one thinks – that it is more like dissecting a complicated midgame than seeing if you’re in check, then assumedly sceptical Theism is back in the game.

Adam:                         Yes, if. Concerns of soul-making or free will or regularity do ‘muddy the waters’. Yet it needs to be made entirely opaque for a sceptical defence to work. Perhaps we do see through a glass darkly, but the image is clear enough to me.

REFERENCES:

Adams, Marilyn M. (2006). Christ and Horrors, Cambridge. Cambridge University Press

Adams, Robert M. (1972) “Must God Create the Best?” Philosophical review, 81(3): 317-332

Alston, William P. (1996) “Some (Temporarily) Final thoughts on the Evidential Argument from Evil,” In Howard-Snyder (ed.) The Evidential Problem of Evil. Bloomington. Indiana University Press.

Almeida, Michael J and Oppy, G. (2003) “Sceptical Theism and Evidential Arguments from Evil,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81: 496–516.

Chrisholm, Roderick M. (1968) “The Defeat of Good and Evil,”, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 42: 21–38

Draper, Paul. (1989). “Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists,” Noûs, 23: 331-350

Hasker, W. (2008). The Triumph of God over Evil: Theodicy for a World of Suffering, Downer’s Grove: InterVarsity Press.

Howard-Snyder, Daniel and Howard-Snyder, Frances. (1994) “How an Unsurpassable Being Can Create a Surpassable world.” Faith and Philosophy 11: 260-268

Howard-Snyder, Daniel and Moser, Paul K. (2001) Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, New York: Cambridge University Press

van Inwagen, Peter (2006) The Problem of Evil, Oxford: Oxford University Press

van Inwagen, Peter (1991) The Problem of Evil, The Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence. Philosophical perspectives, 5: 135-165.

Murray, Michael J. (1993) “Coercion and the Hiddenness of God,”

Pojman, Louis P. (1991) “Faith, Doubt and Hope” in Contemporary Classics in Philosophy of Religion, eds. Ann Loades and Loyal Rue, Open Court pp. 183-207

Rowe, William L. (1979). “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 16: 335-41

Rowe, William L. (1984) “Evil and the Theistic Hypothesis: A response to Wykstra” International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 16: 95-100

Rowe, William L. (1996). “The Evidential Argument from Evil: A Second Look,” in Howard-Snyder (ed.), The Evidential Argument from Evil, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996, 262-85.

Rowe, William L. (2006). “Friendly Atheism, Skeptical Theism, and the Problem of Evil,” International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, 59: 79-92

Russell, Bruce and Wykstra, Stephen J. (1988) “The ‘Inductive’ Argument from Evil: A Dialogue” Philosophical Topics, 16(2): 133-160

Schellenberg, John R. (2005) “The hiddenness argument revisisted,” [two essays] Religious studies, 41:201-215 and 287-303.

Schellenberg, John R. (1993) Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason. Ithaca: Cornell University Press

Weilenberg, Erik J (forthcoming) “Skeptical Theism and Divine Lies” Religious Studies

Wykstra, Stephen J. (1984). “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of `Appearances’.” International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, 16

Wykstra, Stephen J. (2009). “CORNEA (1984 – 2009) In Memoriam?” Presentation at the 18th Baylor Philosophy of Religion Conference. Available online at:

Wykstra, Stephen J. (2007): “Cornea, Carnap, and Current Closure Befuddlement” in Faith and Philosophy 24:1 88.

[2] See van Inwagen (2006) Ch. 2 for an example of this criterion of ‘philosophical success’

[3] Pascal’s wager is a common argument, but here rational self-interest is not being appealed to, but rather “if God does not exist, life might not be splendid”. See Pojman (1991)

[4] ‘Defeat’ is being used in a manner after Chrisholm (1968). Evils and Goods can be outweighed by greater goods or evils. They are only defeated if that evil or good is a necessary part of the greater whole that is good or evil.

[5] This concern can explicitly motivate commitment to universalism. See (M. Adams 1999) p229-230

“Traditional doctrines of hell go beyond failure to hatred and cruelty by imagining a God Who not only acquiesces in creaturely rebellion and dysfunction but either directly organizes or intentionally “outsources” a concentration camp (of which Auschwitz and Soviet gulags are pale imitations) to make sure some creatures’ lives are permanently deprived of positive meaning.”

[6] Formations of the ‘evidential problem of evil’ are on these lines, although they might be expressed in probabilistic or Bayesian idiom (see Draper (1989)). Here, I use Rowe’s formulation, expressed first in Rowe (1979)

[7] The concept of ‘gratuitous evil’ is difficult, but will not be discussed here.

[8] van Inwagen (2006, 1991) and Hasker (2008) are two who employ this approach.

[9] Two problems: Robert Adam’s has suggested that God is ‘within is rights’ not to minimize evil (R. Adams 1972). It is also commonly urged that God cannot minimize evil, because there simply is no minimum: God is not able to do it in a similar way that he can’t tell us the last integer (See Howard-Snyder and Howard Snyder (1994)). I urge that even though God could add goods to a world without end, there is a limit to pointless evils – none. Thus (at least on this point) it is fair to demand god minimize evil.

[10] See Rowe (1979) and van Inwagen (2006) respectively.

[11] One might hope that evils like the mutilation or Sue’s murder are natural evils because those who committed them weren’t sane. Sadly, even if those evils really were done by madmen, it seems likely that at least some evils as horrific as them were done by people who were ‘in their right mind’.

[12] This point is developed, in part, from a fleeting mention in Russell and Wykstra (1988)

[13] For snapshots of the evolving discussion on the ‘Problem of divine hiddeness’, See Schellenberg (2005, 1993), Murray (1993), and Howard-Snyder and Moser (2001)

[14] See Dostoevsky The Brothers Karamazov, Ch. 5.

[15] After Wykstra (1984). Much like the original argument (which it was a response to) it can also be phrased in probabilistic idiom. Rowe (2006) and Wykstra (2009) give the two sides of this developing conversation.

[16] These reductios are a common response to sceptical Theism (of which Wykstra’s work is one branch). Besides arguing that it entails moral scepticism (Oppy and Almeida (2003)), it’s also been suggested that it leads to violations of epistemic closure (Wykstra 2007) and that Theists should not trust God’s revelation (Weilenberg forthcoming)

[17] This is the main objection Rowe deploys against sceptical Theism: that the ‘extension’ of moral obscurity isn’t plausible ‘by its own lights’, even if it purchases immunity from disconfirmation by apparent evil. See Rowe (1984)

[18] See Alston (1996)

Collins’ Argument Paraphrased

Collins’ cosmological fine-tuning argument is deceptively simple, yet requires an extensive vocabulary of abbreviations, various hypotheses, and scientific and philosophical terms. Here, I will attempt to offer a version of the argument that is more accessible, without losing any of the power or simplicity of the original¹.

1. Given the fine-tuning evidence, it is very, very surprising that a life-permitting universe (LPU) exists, under a naturalistic single universe hypothesis (NSU).

2. Given the fine-tuning evidence, it is not surprising at all that a life-permitting universe exists, under a theistic hypothesis (T).

3. The theistic hypothesis was advocated prior to the discovery of the fine-tuning evidence, and thus is not ad hoc.

4. Therefore, by the likelihood principle, LPU (the existence of a life permitting universe) strongly supports T (the theistic hypothesis) over the NSU (naturalistic single universe hypothesis).

(Collins 2009, p. 207)

The fine-tuning evidence of which Collins writes is the fact that the laws, constants, and initial conditions of our universe must fall within a very narrow range in order for a universe to be life permitting. A life permitting universe is one which can support the existence of, what Collins calls, embodied moral agents; complex physical beings possessing intelligence and the ability to make moral choices and affect one another. The naturalistic single universe hypothesis states that there is only one universe and that the values of the constants, laws, and initial conditions are a unexplainable brute fact, and could have had any value from a very wide range. The theistic hypothesis states that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, eternally existing, and free creator of the universe. And the likelihood principle states that the degree that a piece of evidence counts towards one hypothesis over another, is proportional to the ratio of how surprising the evidence is under each hypothesis.

The justification for the first premise comes from the fact that there is a very large range of values that each physical constant could have taken, but only a very small range of values which would have allowed the resulting universe to be life-permitting. And, given the naturalistic single universe hypothesis, there is no reason to expect each constant to take one value, as opposed to any other. That each constant took a value which allows the universe to be life-permitting, then, is very surprising under NSU.

The second premise is justified by appealing to God’s motivations, which we can know by reasoning from the attributes that Collins takes Him to have. Collins explains that the only reasons God would have to do anything would be to increase the moral and aesthetic value of reality (2009, p. 254). From that, it is reasonable to conclude that the existence of embodied moral agents does add significantly to the moral and aesthetic value of reality. Therefore, it is not surprising at all that God would create a universe (with aesthetic value in its own right) which could hold such creatures.

The third premise seems obvious, in that the theistic hypothesis was widely held well before the fine-tuning evidence came to be understood.

As for the conclusion, the likelihood principle is fairly uncontroversial and derivable from Bayes’ Theorem. If the first two premises are true, then LPU does serve as powerful evidence for T and against NSU.

The Understatement of the Century

Imagine a trial where the defendant stands accused of stabbing a man to death in the victim’s living room. The accused takes the stand, and admits to being in the victim’s house at the time of the murder. Does this evidence support the “defendant is guilty” hypothesis or the “defendant is innocent” hypothesis?

It seems easy to see that it would be unsurprising that the defendant would be in the house at the time of the murder, if he is guilty. It also seems quite surprising that the defendant would be in the house if he were innocent. Using the likelihood principle, this evidence counts toward the guilty hypothesis and against the innocent hypothesis.

Were this singular piece of evidence to be the extent of our knowledge of the events in question, this conclusion seems quite reasonable. But how would our evaluation change, were we to also know more specific facts about the case? If the defendant were locked in the basement of the victim’s house at the time of the murder, it would still be true that he was in the house at the time of the murder. But the additional, more specific evidence seems able to render the initial likelihood calculation irrelevant when determining which hypothesis is supported by the evidence.

What exactly is the relationship between more general pieces of evidence which seem to favor one hypothesis over another, and the more specific evidences which point in the opposite direction? And, most importantly, what does this have to do with the fine-tuning argument?

As for the first question, Paul Draper calls this the fallacy of understated evidence. “This fallacy (i.e., mistake in reasoning) is committed when one uses some relatively general known fact about X to support a hypothesis when a more specific fact about X (that is also known to obtain) fails to support that hypothesis. (Draper, 2008)” We can see that this applies to the case of the man accused of murder; the general fact is that he was in the victim’s house at the time of the killing, the specific fact is that he was locked in the basement while the murder took place.

As for the second question, Draper accuses Collins of unintentionally committing the fallacy of understated evidence by, “understating what we know about life, Collins makes the fine-tuning data appear to support theism more than it really does. (Ibid.)” He agrees with Collins that the mere fact that intelligent life, of some sort, exists is less surprising under theism than naturalism. But Collins ignores the more specific evidence that humans are the only form of intelligent life known to exist. Draper takes this more specific evidence to point strongly toward naturalism.

Menschliches, Allzumenschliches

Let us consider a second, more specific piece of evidence:

HE: The only intelligent life we know to exist is human.

Then, the following argument can be formed:

5. Given the fact that intelligent life exists, it is not surprising at all that the only intelligent life we know to exist is human, under a naturalistic single universe hypothesis (NSU).

6. Given the fact that intelligent life exists, it is very, very surprising that the only intelligent life we know to exist is human, under a theistic hypothesis (T).

7. The theistic hypothesis was advocated prior to the discovery of the fine-tuning evidence, and thus is not ad hoc.

8. Therefore, by the likelihood principle, HE (humans are the only form of intelligent life known to exist) strongly supports NSU (the naturalistic hypothesis) over T (the theistic hypothesis).

Under the naturalistic single universe hypothesis, it is no surprise at all that HE is the case. In evolutionary terms, intelligent life is expensive, requiring huge amounts of resources. Given that intelligent life exists, we should expect that it would be relatively unsophisticated, only incrementally better morally, aesthetically, in intelligence, and in emotional sophistication than its evolutionary ancestors, and far more common in the universe than more advanced life.

However, under the theistic hypothesis, HE is very surprising. If God’s motivation can be understood entirely in terms of adding moral and aesthetic value to the universe, that the most morally and aesthetically valuable intelligent life is human, seems very unlikely. An omnipotent God would have the power to create life which was not constrained by its evolutionary history, which was not limited in morally and aesthetically irrelevant ways, and which was “better” intellectually, physically, and emotionally. Given that intelligent life exists and the truth of the theistic hypothesis, HE is very, very surprising indeed.

The conclusion of this argument mirrors the conclusion of Collins’. As HE entails that a life-permitting universe exists, by using the more specific evidence, we should expect to obtain a more accurate conclusion. And, if this conclusion is true, it should dampen, if not extinguish entirely, the persuasive power of Collins’ fine-tuning argument.

Of Angelic Aliens…

One possible objection to this reasoning rests on the idea that, although humans are not the only kind of intelligent life we would expect God to create, our existence is a net-positive, all things considered. So the creation of humans could very well play a role in maximizing the moral and aesthetic value of reality.

I will agree with the first part of that objection; it does seem that humans, for all our flaws, are a net-positive in terms of moral and aesthetic value. But I would disagree with the second part; our existence cannot fit with a plan to maximize the moral and aesthetic value, carried out by an omnipotent being.

It seems very easy to conceive of a species of intelligent life, which was morally and aesthetically superior (if only marginally) to humans, able to live and thrive in exactly the same kinds of environments as humans, and which would be far more likely candidates for existence under the theistic hypothesis. It would be very surprising, if all of our intuitions of what kind of intelligent life is possible were false. Therefore, it would be very surprising were HE to be true, even if it were also true that humans play but a small role in a larger plan to maximize the moral and aesthetic value of reality.

…and Panglossian Possibilities

A different sort of objection to the probability calculation involving HE, is that it is possible that humans are much, much more morally and aesthetically valuable than we give them credit for, that it is possible that God has knowledge of some kind of moral consideration which makes the existence of humanity consistent with the maximization of moral and aesthetic value.

On the face of it, I would agree; this is certainly a possibility. God, with his perfect view of the moral landscape, would possess a better perspective on the relevant moral issues regarding the value of humanity. But what we are concerned with, for the purposes of this argument, is not mere possibility, but the likelihoods of those possibilities.

If the theist maintains that she would not expect to know the relevant moral considerations which would affect what actions God would take in order to maximize the moral and aesthetic value of reality, this does nothing to undercut how surprising it would be, to us, that morally and aesthetically superior beings would not raise the moral and aesthetic value of reality more than morally and aesthetically inferior beings.

So, without some kind of explicit justification for the idea that, contrary to our own moral intuitions and reasoning, God does have a good moral reason for creating humans, which is also non-ad hoc and does not fall victim to Collins’ probabilistic tension criticism for extended hypothesis, we are completely justified in continuing to believe that HE is surprising.

Conclusion

The fine-tuning argument does show that the existence of intelligent life is more likely if theism is true, rather than if naturalism is. Were the singular fact that intelligent life exists make up the totality of our evidence, this argument would require the rational person to significantly revise their degree of belief in theism upward, and their degree of belief in naturalism downward. Unfortunately for the proponents of the fine-tuning argument, LPU is not all the evidence we have available to us. If the mere specification of the kind of life which is known to exist is enough evidence to cancel out the epistemic effects of the fine-tuning argument, then there seems to be no repairing it.

Notes

[1] I have endeavored to reproduce the argument without introducing any subtle errors. To be sure, any that are found are due to my rendering of the argument, not the original. I would urge anyone interested in learning more about fine-tuning arguments to read the original, as it is a model of clarity and precision.

Works Cited

Collins, Robin. “The Teleological Argument: An Exploration of the Fine-Tuning of the Universe.” The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Ed. William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.

Draper, Paul. “Collins’ Case for Cosmic Design (The Great Debate).” The Secular Web. Internet Infidels Inc., 2008. Web. 26 Apr 2010. .

Indeed, the answer most Christians will give when faced with the Problem of Evil is something like, “Well, God gave us free will”, and that will be the start of all the nonsense.  The ultimate problems will then usually center around whether we are actually free, or why God would give us free will in the first place.

But I’m just introducing the problem, at this point.

The free will defense is so disputable, and there are so many places where even Christians will disagree on it.  Indeed, as a theodicy, I’m not confident in its ability to explain away natural evils.  We will bicker back and forth, demanding Scriptural support for its premises and conclusions, so I don’t think it’s a very productive answer.  Not that I don’t advocate its use, mind you. In Plantinga’s formulation, I think it is a perfectly legitimate piece of theology.

However, there is a colder and more heartless answer to the Problem of Evil than Alvin Plantinga’s famous appeals to love and freedom.  It offers no emotional relief to the oppressed, or the poor, or the meek at all.  It is St. Augustine’s privatio boni, or the “privation of good”.  It attempts to dismantle the Problem of Evil not by redefining God, or even by redefining man: it solves the problem by redefining evil itself.

What is the nature of good and evil?

Regardless of what image the above subtitle may conjure up, don’t get to thinking that the question of relativism vs. objectivism will have any bearing on this argument.  The privatio boni is a description of the relationship between good and evil, not the broader nature of morality as a whole.

The argument works in metaphors.  So, let’s begin by discussing light and shadow as a metaphor for the problem.  In a way, shadows do not really exist.  They are phenomenal, and not noumenal, which is to say they are not things in themselves.  They are mere phenomena of something else, which in this case is light.  A shadow, or more properly, darkness, is the absence of light; it is the non-existence of a thing.  Shadows can be said to exist in the sense that “nothings” exist.  To put it bluntly, a shadow is just another kind of nothing.

After all, there is no such thing as a flash-dark, though there are flashlights.  See, when I shine a light on my hand so as to cast a shadow on the wall, such that the circle of light is 60% light and 40% shadow, for example, is the flashlight producing both light and darkness?  Does its bulb produce 60% light and 40% darkness?  Of course not!

Now, you might say that of course it is not the flashlight’s fault that there is a shadow on the wall, but rather the hand’s.  Indeed, this is true.  But what is this shadow like?  Is this new hand-shaped patch on the wall any darker than it was before the light was ever shone around it? Again, of course not!

If anything, the patch is going to be just a little bit brighter, since light has been added to the room.  It is simply not physically possible for the wall to get any darker by shining a light on it in some places.  It may appear to be so, but that really is just our perception.  It only appears darker because the surroundings have just become brighter.

The flashlight is producing nothing but light, and the hand is producing no darkness.  Yet still, as I write this, the thought occurs to me that there is a deeper meaning to that phrase: The flashlight produces nothing but light.  If the darkness is nothing, the flashlight is indeed producing ‘a kind of nothing’ but light; darkness but light.  But that’s just a grammatical twist, and doesn’t matter to my argument.

So I would say, in conclusion, that it is not the flashlight’s fault that there is darkness on the wall, and that the hand hasn’t made any darkness either, so there is no darkness being made.  Therefore, I would say the same of good and evil.  Evil is but the absence of good, and doesn’t really exist.  So if God has created the world, He is like the flashlight.  There is, on the wall, a great circle of shadows, but all He has done is created good!  The evil, just as darkness is the lack of light, is the absence of the good God has created, and so it is precisely what He has not created.  Just as there is no contradiction between my own shadow and the existence of the sun, there is no contradiction between the existence of a perfect God and an evil creation.

In St. Augustine’s own words.

St. Augustine originally explained this doctrine in his Enchiridion, a piece of which I have pasted below:

And in the universe, even that which is called evil, when it is regulated and put in its own place, only enhances our admiration of the good; for we enjoy and value the good more when we compare it with the evil. For the Almighty God, who, as even the heathen acknowledge, has supreme power over all things, being Himself supremely good, would never permit the existence of anything evil among His works, if He were not so omnipotent and good that He can bring good even out of evil. For what is that which we call evil but the absence of good? In the bodies of animals, disease and wounds mean nothing but the absence of health; for when a cure is effected, that does not mean that the evils which were present—namely, the diseases and wounds—go away from the body and dwell elsewhere: they altogether cease to exist; for the wound or disease is not a substance, but a defect in the fleshly substance,—the flesh itself being a substance, and therefore something good, of which those evils—that is, privations of the good which we call health—are accidents. Just in the same way, what are called vices in the soul are nothing but privations of natural good. And when they are cured, they are not transferred elsewhere: when they cease to exist in the healthy soul, they cannot exist anywhere else.

—St. Augustine of Hippo, Enchiridion of Augustine, Chapter 11: What is called Evil in the Universe is But the Absence of Good

See, the point that Augustine is making is that since our perceptions are based on contrast, we see things like light and dark as opposites.  However, a basic study of optics would show this kind of ‘symmetry’ to be merely imagined.  Darkness is not the polar opposite of light, but the absence thereof.  Augustine establishes this concept in the idea of sickness in the body, which lines up very nicely with his extension of the metaphor to include vices in the soul.  He concludes that evil is insubstantial, and that good and evil are really asymmetrical, no matter how we may see them.

Conclusion: How is this a theodicy?

Now, look back on what I said in the first section of this paper regarding the nature of good and evil in general, and consider this in the context of what Augustine says about the soul.  The idea is that while Augustine considers the issue of vices in the soul to be like sicknesses of the flesh, and I suppose them to be like shadows in the light, we can extend the metaphor to include all evil in the world.  The extension goes like this: Augustine extends concept of sicknesses in the body to vices in the soul, and I extend the concept of shadows in the light (or sicknesses in the body, whichever) to evils in the world.  In doing so, we formulate the privatio boni into a successful theodicy, and the Problem of Evil is rendered useless.