Authored by: Nocterro.

A Necessary Being

First I will examine this argument from Joshua Rasmussen[1]:

(1) Intrinsic properties that can be exemplified by something that has a cause are such that if any one were to begin to be exemplified, that beginning could have a cause.
(2) There can begin to be contingent (non-necessary) things.
(3) Being contingent is an intrinsic property.
(4) Some contingent things can have a cause.
(5) Therefore, there can be a cause of a beginning to the existence of contingent things [from (1) – (4)].
(6) If (5), then there is a Necessary Being.
(7) Therefore, there is a Necessary Being.

It should be noted here that this is not necessarily an argument for God, rather it is an argument for something which has causal power and cannot fail to exist. This argument employs a very weak causal principle – even weaker than the W-PSR. Rasmussen gives the following analogy to explain intrinsic properties being caused to begin to be exemplified:

Consider first the property of being an armchair. That property began to be exemplified when the first armchair was constructed, and of course, that beginning had a cause. Consider next an intrinsic property that has never been exemplified, but could be: being a fifteen-legged animal, say. It is plausible that if that property were to begin to be exemplified, that beginning could be caused: imagine an evolutionary process leading to the birth of the first fifteen-legged animal.

So considering this, (1) seems to work, at least for things such as “being blue” and “being rectangular”.

(2) and (4) seem so obvious, I do not feel that they need a defense. However, I will defend them if an objection arises. But what of (3)? Rasmussen explains intrinsic properties thus:

(I) p is intrinsic if there is no external relation r, such that (anyone who fully grasps p, thereby grasps r, and it is not necessary that if p is exemplified by an x, then x bears r to x or one of x’s parts).

An example of an intrinsic property would be mass; physical objects have mass no matter where they are, and no matter what conditions they are under. An objects’ mass always = x. Weight, however, is an extrinsic property. An objects’ weight will be X on earth, but may be Y somewhere else. So, it seems apparent that contingency is an intrinsic property. We are not contingent because of anything, we just are.

(5) of course follows from (1) – (4). (6) Follows from (5) because things can only be necessary or contingent, and something contingent cannot cause the beginning of the existence of contingent things; this thing would have to cause itself to do that. So we arrive at (7) There is a necessary Being. It should be noted here that this argument is very modest – the “Being” in the conclusion does not need to be God, or even something supernatural; this being could very well be entirely natural, as long as it is necessary.

Is God Coherent?

Given that the previous argument does not necessarily show there is a God, why do I think there is? The first step is to show that God is a coherent idea; that is, I must show that this being could possibly exist. I will start by explaining what I mean by “God”, and define His attributes:

God:

There exists a necessary being with properties including, but not necessarily limited to, perfect freedom, omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness, who caused the beginning of the existence of contingent things, and who may or may not have created the universe.

Perfect Freedom:

If P does A freely, then no cause makes him do A. He is ultimately responsible for A being done; for nothing makes him make A be done. [...] An action, I suggest, is a free action if and only if the agent’s choosing to do that action, that is having the intention to produce the result of that action, has no full explanation—of any kind, whether of the kind described by scientific explanation or of the kind described by personal explanation. [...] But the suggestion that a man might see refraining from A as over all better than doing A, be subject to no non-rational influences inclining him in the direction of doing A and nevertheless do A, is incoherent. [...] it follows that a perfectly free agent will never do an action if he judges that over all it would be worse to do the action than to refrain from it; he will never do an action if he acknowledges overriding reasons for refraining from doing it. Similarly, he will always do an action if he acknowledges overriding reasons for doing it rather than for refraining from doing it, if he judges that doing it would be over all better than refraining from doing it.[2]

Omnipotence:

A person P is omnipotent at a time t if and only if he is able to bring about the existence of any logically contingent state of affairs x after t, the description of the occurrence of which does not entail that P did not bring it about at t, given that he does not believe that he has overriding reason for refraining from bringing about x.[2]

Omniscience:

A person P is omniscient at time t if and only if he knows every true proposition about t or an earlier time and every true proposition about a time later than t which is true of logical necessity or which he has overriding reason to make true, which it is logically possible that he entertains then.[2]

Perfect Goodness:

A person P is perfectly good if P is so constituted that he always does what there is overriding reason to do, and always refrains from doing what there is overriding reason for not doing.[2]

Given that moral judgements have truth values, an omniscient person will know them. His judgements about which actions are morally bad and which actions are morally good will be true judgements. Hence a perfectly free and omniscient being can never do actions that are morally bad, and will always do the best action, or an equal best action, or a best kind or an equal best kind of action (if there are these) [3]

Swinburne’s view is that God’s perfect freedom, omnipotence and omniscience entail his perfect goodness. That is, if X is omniscient and omnipotent, X will always know what the best action is to take, and will be able to take that action. Furthermore, X will know “I ought to take the best action”. So, as per his freedom, this will be an overriding reason to take that action, and thus He will.

First Cause:
It has already been shown that this being is the cause of the beginning of the existence of contingent things (see section I). But what of the universe; is this being the direct cause of the universe, or only indirectly, by virtue of causing contingent things? Well, I think that remains to be seen. This issue still seems to me to be explored further, as there are good arguments as to whether God is the direct cause of the universe on both sides.

Granting that all these properties are coherent, it follows that God is coherent; that is, He could exist.

Moving from A to B

So, two things have been established:
1) There exists some sort of necessary being.
2) The concept of God is coherent.

But are there reasons to think that the necessary being is God (that this being has the properties of God)? I again cite Rasmussen in support that God is the necessary being. He first introduces the concept of a gridscape[4]:

(1) Gridscape S =(def) For some concrete objects, the x’s, and some intrinsic properties and/or relations, the y’s, S is the state of affairs of the x’s instantiating the y’s.

That is, imagine four concrete objects represented as dots. These dots have circles attached to them, representing properties; and lines connecting them, representing relations. He then introduces a related concept:

(2) Wholly contingent gridscape S =(def) A gridscape all of whose properties and/or relations are contingently (not necessarily) instantiated by concrete objects in the gridscape.

He then introduces a causal principle:

Causal “x ((x is a wholly contingent gridscape) → ◊(x’s obtaining is causally explained)). {or} for any bunch of contingent, intrinsic properties or relations, their joint instantiation can be causally explained. For example, John’s jellybean being red can be causally explained.

Further on, he offers an argument for the omnipotence of the necessary being (N):

For any measurable [finite] attribute A, where A consists in having determinable D to degree µ, and any concrete object x that has A, there is some degree such that it is possible for x to have D to degree µ – e or µ + e.

That is, if we say a being has a finite amount of power, that being could have a little more or a little less power. This implies that having an attribute to a certain degree is contingent, because it could have been a slightly higher or slightly lower degree. Let us assume this is the case, and we have a gridscape containing some number of contingent objects, and the necessary being from section I. Let us also assume this being has finite power. If this is the case, then this property would be contingent, and we no longer have the necessary being we need to explain contingent things. So, N must be infinitely powerful.

Next he discusses free agency:

If N is not a personal agent, then if N brings about a state of affairs, N does so in virtue of exemplifying some property or properties, perhaps in combination with some law obtaining.

The idea behind this is that if N causes X, it did so either through free choice, or because it was a certain way/had certain properties. So, let’s imagine a gridscape again, this time one in which N is not a free agent. If this is the case, then N has “probability-fixing properties”; properties which will entail that there is a certain degree of probability that a wholly contingent gridscape G obtains. But let’s say that N has a property such that it creates a 0.2 probability of G obtaining. We again run into the same problem; it could be slightly higher or lower, and this leads to a wholly contingent gridscape.

Now, what of omniscience? Again, we run into the same problem:

If N is a personal agent, then N is capable of knowing at least something.

Let’s suppose that N has a finite degree of knowledge. Once again, N could have slightly more or slightly less knowledge, which leads to a wholly contingent gridscape.

Finally, what of perfect goodness? We have previously seen Swinburne’s view; that perfect goodness is entailed by God’s other attributes. However Rasmussen gives another argument:

Now suppose that N is finitely good (has finite degree of positive moral status) or finitely bad (has finite degree of negative moral status) or both. Suppose also that: There can be no causal explanation for N’s having the degree of positive or negative moral status that it has (had and will have).

Just as with the other attributes, we see that N could be slightly more or less morally praiseworthy. This leads to the conclusion that N must be either infinitely good, or infinitely bad. Rasmussen offers this in support of N being infinitely good:

N has at least some positive moral status: there is a situation in which N would freely bring about a good state of affairs.

This, combined with Swinburne’s thoughts on moral goodness, lays out a strong case for N being perfectly good.

Conclusion

So finally, we come to this:

1) There exists a necessary being.
2) This necessary being is, given its attributes, likely to be a being we may consider “God”.

Of course, much more may be said on this line of reasoning; it is quite complex and I have not even begun to explain all the details. I have not included any possible objections, or addressed the various atheistic arguments. However, I hope this brief summary will inspire further inquiry into my new-found belief in God.

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[1]Rasmussen, Joshua. “A New Argument For A Necessary Being.” Yale & UConn Graduate Conference (Feb 2009).

[2]Swinburne, Richard. The Coherence of Theism. 2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 1993. Print.

[3]Swinburne, Richard. The Existence of God. 2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2004. Print.

[4]Rasmussen, Joshua. “From A Necessary Being to God.” International Journal of Philosophy of Religion. 66.1 (2009): 1-13. Print.