Authored by: Timothy H..

Abstract: A recent trend seems to indicate that it is quite the rage these days for atheists to grant the existence of objective moral values. In this paper, I defend a three-stage moral argument that does not attempt to ground the existence of moral values and duties in God. Because of this, it is immune from several types of objections usually leveled against moral arguments.

Introduction

Typically, moral arguments for the existence of God work by demonstrating the existence of objective moral values and then by grounding their existence in the nature of God. Philosophers who have argued in this fashion include Robert Adams, Paul Copan, and William Lane Craig.¹ In response, critics have raised three different types of objections to this form of moral argument. Type one objections simply deny the truth of moral realism, opting instead for a myriad of other views, such as noncognitivism. Type two objections, while affirming that moral realism is true, have nonetheless attempted to ground moral facts and duties in other sources. Finally, type three objections affirm that while objective moral truths exist, they are necessary truths and thus do not require an explanation. It will not be my goal to evaluate these critiques; rather, I will present a version of the moral argument that is immune from most type two and type three objections. As this argument is directed mainly toward those who entertain type two and type three objections but otherwise grant the existence of objective moral values , I will not concern myself with type one objections here. They have, in my opinion, been dealt with persuasively in the philosophical literature.²

Plantinga’s Argument

In his 1993 book, Warrant and Proper Function, philosopher Alvin Plantinga proposed what he called an evolutionary argument against naturalism.³ According to Plantinga, the probability that our cognitive faculties would have been reliable given naturalism is either low or inscrutable. This is because evolution does not select for truth per se, but for survival value. As long a particular belief ensures an organism’s survival, it doesn’t matter whether that belief is true or false. One’s beliefs could all be false yet still be advantageous toward his survival. Plantinga uses the example of Paul, a prehistoric hominid who encounters a tiger. He writes:

Perhaps Paul very much likes the idea of being eaten, but when he sees a tiger, always runs off looking for a better prospect, because he thinks it unlikely that the tiger he sees will eat him. This will get his body parts in the right place so far as survival is concerned, without involving much by way of true belief… Or perhaps he thinks the tiger is a large, friendly, cuddly pussycat and wants to pet it; but he also believes that the best way to pet it is to run away from it… or perhaps he thinks the tiger is a regularly recurring illusion, and, hoping to keep his weight down, has formed the resolution to run a mile at top speed whenever presented with such an illusion; or perhaps he thinks he is about to take part in a 1600 meter race, wants to win, and believes the appearance of the tiger is the starting signal… Clearly there are any number of belief-cum-desire systems that equally fit a given bit of behavior.⁴

Evolution could have very well produced beings whose cognitive faculties are pragmatically reliable, but unreliable in terms of producing true beliefs. Thus, the probability of our having reliable cognitive faculties given naturalism, argues Plantinga, is either low or inscrutable. We are left in the position of either doubting or being agnostic about the reliability of our cognitive faculties. But, since our cognitive faculties are reliable, we have a defeater for naturalism.

Step 1: Plantinga’s Argument and Moral Knowledge

I will now propose a modest version of the EAAN – one that argues for the falsity of naturalism on the basis of our moral faculties as opposed to cognitive faculties and that succeeds even if Plantinga’s version is false. Assume for the sake of argument that both objective moral values and warranted moral knowledge exists. Given naturalism, what would be the probability of evolution producing beings with reliable moral faculties geared toward grasping these moral truths? Even if we grant that Plantinga’s EAAN is false – that evolution does select for truths of reason – would evolution select for true moral beliefs? Unlike nonmoral truths, moral truths are what J. L. Mackie called “queer” – they cannot be inferred through observation of physical properties.⁵ So even if evolution were to select for epistemologically true beliefs, it seems unlikely that it would select for true moral beliefs due to their radically different nature. Indeed, had evolution taken a different course, it is likely that we would have ended up with a completely different set of moral beliefs. Darwin himself remarked:

If, for instance, to take an extreme case, men were reared under precisely the same conditions as hive-bees, there can hardly be a doubt that our unmarried females would, like the worker-bees, think it a sacred duty to kill their brothers, and mothers would strive to kill their fertile daughters; and no one would think of interfering.⁶

These alternate set of beliefs described by Darwin would have no doubt also been advantageous toward survival, yet they would no doubt be morally reprehensible if we were to engage in them Evolution, it seems, selects for adaptive behavior, not necessarily moral behavior. Indeed, Darwinians typically explain the origins of our moral faculties and beliefs in terms of their survival advantage and not because of their truth or falsity. Given a completely different set of conditions and thus different requirements for survival, it is plausible to suppose that evolution would have provided us with a completely different set of moral beliefs. Call these “Darwinian counterfactuals.”⁷ The processes of evolution are contingent upon the environment in which they take place. So, given a different set of conditions, it is likely that evolution would have ended up producing a different set of faculties with different beliefs about what is moral, since the conditions for survival would be different. Or suppose we were to rewind our own evolutionary development and let it play through again. Given such a scenario, it is likely that evolution would have taken a completely different route with a different set of moral beliefs. In fact, if we kept replaying this scenario, we would generate an endless number of sets of moral beliefs that would be advantageous toward survival. It thus seems that on naturalistic evolution, our moral beliefs are completely arbitrary – as arbitrary as our evolving five fingers rather than six, a fact that prominent atheistic biologist Richard Dawkins has himself admitted.⁸ Instead of rearing our young, we might have well been eating our young as it has been observed in some animal species. It is unlikely, therefore, that naturalistic evolution would have produced reliable moral faculties. But since we do have reliable moral faculties, we have a defeater for naturalism.

But suppose that evolution did occur in such a way in that mostly true moral beliefs were selected for. Does this help the naturalist? Evidently not, for it is not enough to simply account for the existence of moral knowledge – one must show this knowledge to be warranted. Indeed, for a belief to count as knowledge, it must be warranted; that is, it must be believed for genuinely good reasons. Rational insight is required. The naturalist thus has two tasks. He must:

1. Account for the existence of true moral knowledge.

2. Provide an adequate framework in which to ground moral knowledge.

Let us grant that the naturalist can account for (1). Accounting for (2) seems to be more problematic. As previously stated, our moral beliefs would have been selected for not because they are true but because they confer survivability. Moral beliefs would simply the means to a nonmoral end (Survival).⁹ But if the reason we believe in certain moral truths is because of their survival advantage, then we are not warranted in thinking that these beliefs are actually true – only that they confer some practical advantage. This is true even if evolution somehow selected for true moral beliefs. Mark Linville observes:

[G]iven an evolutionary account of human moral beliefs, there is no reason for thinking that a relation of epistemic dependence obtains, and so, given an evolutionary account, belief in moral facts is unwarranted. If our moral beliefs are without warrant, then they do not amount to moral knowledge.¹⁰

Consider the example of Bill, a brilliant mathematician who has solved many of the world’s most difficult math problems. No doubt we would consider Bill a genius. However, upon further investigation, we find out that Bill solved all of his math problems by throwing number tiles into a black bag and drawing a few at random. Though Bill may have drawn the correct numbers, we would not call him rational. The question of whether or not evolution would provide us with warranted moral knowledge “cannot be answered in a manner that leaves entirely out of account the question of how [those] beliefs are produced and sustained.”¹¹ What matters is not whether naturalism can account for moral knowledge, it is whether or not it can adequately ground it. If truth plays no part in explaining why we have certain true moral beliefs, then we do not have any moral knowledge.

Bertrand Russell allegedly once observed, “Everything looks yellow to a person suffering from jaundice.” Actually, I believe the truth of the matter is that people suffering from jaundice look yellow. But suppose that both are right: jaundiced people both appear and are appeared to yellowly. Jones enters Dr. Smith’s office, complaining of various and vague discomforts. Smith takes one look at Jones and exclaims, “Your skin has a very tawny appearance!” He diagnoses Jones with jaundice and prescribes accordingly. Later, it occurs to Smith that all of his patients have a yellowish tint, as do his charts, the floor tiles, once-white pills and the nurses’ uniforms. A simple blood test determines that he is suffering from jaundice. It dawns on the doctor that Jones would have appeared yellow to him regardless of Jones’ actual condition. Has Smith now a reason for supposing ‘Jones is jaundiced’ is false in the way that, say, a negative blood test would provide such a reason? It seems not. Perhaps Jones is jaundiced. Smith simply lacks any reason for thinking that Jones’ appearance was caused by Jones’ condition, or that the belief that Jones was jaundiced is epistemically dependent upon any medical facts about Jones. And this is to suggest that facts about Dr. Smith’s own condition have now supplied him with an undercutting defeater for his belief regarding Jones’ condition.

It thus seems that if naturalism is true, we should all be moral skeptics. Though evolution may have bestowed upon us moral faculties which allowed us to grasp the content of moral truths, we would be believing them for the wrong reasons. In essence, we would have believed in them on accident. William Hasker observes:

Occasionally, to be sure, it may happen that the thought processes generated by the physically determined functioning [In our case, survival value] of the brain will arrive at a conclusion which is correct. But this, when it happens, is simply a fortunate accident – and to say that a conclusion is reached by accident is incompatible with the claim that the the conclusion was reached by rational thinking…. [I]f my recognition that there are good reasons for a belief is not what brings about my acceptance of the belief, then I am not rational in accepting it.¹³

Naturalism is thus inadequate both as a ground and source of reliable moral knowledge.

Step 2: Is Ethical Behavior Even Possible?

Now suppose that everything I have previously said is false, that naturalism can account for the existence of warranted moral knowledge. In spite of that, naturalism does not provide the possibility for moral behavior, such that moral knowledge becomes practically useless even if we have it. Naturalism, because it views the world mechanistically, implies determinism.¹⁴ On this view, free will is non-existent, since our actions are determined by prior conditions and not by our own choosing. However, for ethical behavior to be possible, free will must exist. We cannot be punished or praised for doing something we had no control over. If we are not responsible for our own actions, then moral responsibility becomes meaningless. As Kant said, “Ought implies can.” Suppose that a mad scientist implants a chip into my brain that allows him to control my body remotely. Using a game controller, he then manipulates my body such that it robs a bank. Am I responsible in such a scenario? No, for I had no control over my actions. It is not enough for the naturalist to provide an adequate foundation for moral knowledge, for he must also provide a foundation for moral behavior.

Step 3: Moral Instantiation

There is one final challenge for the naturalist: he must show that moral values (Specifically, human dignity and equality) are instantiated in human beings.¹⁵ Given naturalism, it seems odd to think that human dignity and equality would simply be present in human beings. Who or what gives human beings these values? It doesn’t seem that value could arise from valueless causes.

Suppose the naturalist attempts to predicate dignity and equality upon human cognitive functioning. Several issues arise. First, why should we accept cognition to be a ground for these values? How does cognition ground objective dignity and equality? If these values exist as abstract Platonic forms, then why do they happen to be instantiated when we develop a certain level of cognition? It just seems to be arbitrarily asserted. Second, if one bases dignity and equality upon mental functioning, then they become degreed properties. After all, some people have a higher level of mental functioning than others, but it obviously doesn’t follow that they have more value than others. Indeed, such a notion runs afoul of the idea of equality. Third, it commits the naturalistic fallacy. One cannot move from a descriptive (An “is”) statement of biology to a prescriptive (An “ought) statement of ethics. Finally, “[i]f the naturalist claims that intrinsic dignity somehow emerges when an organism is sufficiently neurologically complex, the problem of account for the emergent of value or dignity remains. As Kant argued regarding the actual infinite, so can we regarding human worth: dignity cannot be formed by successive addition. Intrinsic value must be given at the outset, otherwise, it doesn’t matter how many nonpersonal and nonvaluable components we happen to stack up.”¹⁶

Conclusion

Naturalists have a tall task before them. They must: (1) account for the existence of warranted moral knowledge, (2) provide a robust foundation for the possibility of ethical behavior, and (3) show how moral values such as human dignity could be instantiated in a naturalistic framework. Such a task, as we have seen, is unlikely to be satisfied. It is probable to assume that naturalism is therefore false.

But how does theism fare? Standard accounts of theism hold that there exists a good and wise God who created mankind in his image and in doing so, endowed them with value. Even if God is not the ground of morality, he could instantiate it. Moreover, because God is a rational being, it seems reasonable to ground the existence of reliable moral knowledge in his being. Even supposing that such a God used evolution to produce mankind, he would have likely guided the evolutionary processes to ensure the production of beings with reliable moral faculties. Theism also provides a robust foundation for moral responsibility, since humans are endowed with genuine free will with which they can use to make moral choices. Paul Copan writes:

If moral facts are just brute givens and necessarily true, there is left unexplained a huge cosmic coin­cidence between the existence of these moral facts and the eventual emergence of morally responsible agents who are obligated to them. That this moral realm appears to be anticipating our emergence is a staggering cosmic concurrence that begs an explanation.¹⁷

And indeed the theist does indeed have a robust explanation, whereas the naturalist is ultimately left scratching his head for answers. Theism emerges as the better explanation.

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