Authored by: Mitchell LeBlanc.

Previously, I authored an article entitled “A Possible Disproof of God’s Existence.” There were then two more installments as replies to Ryft and Bolt. In this article I will attempt to show that the argument succeeds in showing the shortcomings of one often utilized definition of omnipotence, but that in light of a more refined definition, fails to establish that God does not exist.

Definitions

The most commonly used definitions of omnipotence (in non-academic circles) seem to be:

(A) God can do anything

(B) God can do anything that is in accordance with his nature

(C) God can do anything logically possible

All three of these definitions are insufficient. In the case of (A) the Cartesian idea that God could alter necessary truths has long been discarded so I shall not identify the problems therein.

With regard to (B), the definition is shown to be inadequate by Plantinga’s illustration of McEar. Put simply, if (B) is the proper definition of omnipotent then every being is omnipotent. McEar, the poor sap who’s nature determines that he can only scratch his ear, is omnipotent according to (B) and this is clearly absurd.

So what of (C)? The argument provided in the first article on the “Disproof” illustrates precisely why (C) fails. Put shortly, there are logically possible states of affairs which God cannot bring about.

A Better Definition

Erik J. Weilenberg in his paper, “Omnipotence Again,” has presented a definition of Omnipotence which successfully evades the initial argument I presented:

(D) x is omnipotent if and only if it is not the case that there is some state of affairs, p, such that x is unable to bring about p at least partially because of a lack of power in x

For this definition of omnipotence, consider the example of Hercules, as Weilenberg presents. Assume that Hercules is the strongest possible man and that you want to test his strength. Weilenberg continues:

…We ask Hercules to life a one hundred pound stone. He lifts it easily. Next we ask him to lift a one thousand pound stone; He does so. Similarly for ten thousand pounds, one hundred thousand pounds – Hercules even lifts a million pound stone.

So far we have failed to prove that Hercules is not the strongest possible person. But now imagine that we take a ten pound stone and coat it with a substance that renders it incredibly slippery. It is so slippery that no one can get a grip on it. Now we as Hercules to lift this ten pound stone. Hercules cannot grip the stone and so cannot lift it. “Aha!” we declare triumphantly, “Hercules, you are a liar! You said that you were the strongest possible person, yet you cannot lift this ten pound stone. This proves that you are not the strongest possible person.”

But of course, we have not proven that Hercules is not the strongest possible person. For we know that Hercules is strong enough to lift the slippery stone – we have just seen him lift much heavier stones. It is not a lack of strength that prevents Hercules from lifting the stone; it is the slipperiness of the stone.

Imagine that we have somehow acquired a ten pound stone that is essentially slippery. It is so slippery that no human can grip it, and so no human can lift it. Let’s assume that Hercules is essentially human. It follows that there is no possible world in which Hercules lifts this stone. Yet is seems clear that Hercules is strong enough to lift the stone – even though it is metaphysically impossible that he do so.

The example can be expanded to many other situations. Imagine Hercules is so honest that he cannot break promises and he at some point promised not to lift some ten pound stone. It does not follow from Hercules being unable to lift the stone that he is therefore not strong enough.

Similarly, this applies to God. His inability to bring about some state of affairs is not sufficient to show that he is not omnipotent. We must further ask why can’t God bring about some state of affairs. If the answer is that God lacks the power to do so, then and only then is he not omnipotent.

The Argument Defeated

So, with respect to the argument I presented, “A Possible Disproof of God’s Existence,” the inability of God to actualize some logically possible state of affairs is not sufficient to show that God is not omnipotent. In the specific argument I outlined, the reason that God cannot actualize some state is not due to a lack of power in God but rather his necessary omniscience and necessary triunity. Given this definition of omnipotence, it is clear that the argument I’ve previously presented succeeds in showing that (C) is an incorrect definition of omnipotent, but fails in establishing the non-existence of God – that is, unless someone insists on defining their God’s omnipotence as (C).