A Possible Disproof of God’s Existence

A Possible Disproof of God’s Existence 17/12/09

Might certain attributes of God conflict with each other? Mitch LeBlanc briefly presents an argument which purports to show that being triune or omniscient conflicts with omnipotence.

Authored by: Mitchell LeBlanc.


Perhaps the most promising attempts at disproving God’s existence come from exploring possible contradictions in his proposed attributes. The following argument, adopted from Michael Martin¹ is one such argument. I will present two iterations of the argument, one which is Christian specific and one which is applicable to a broader concept of God. I will then outline some possible objections and offer brief replies.

The Argument

For those who may not like syllogisms, the argument can be stated as such: Could an omnipotent being bring about the state of affairs q where q = that Toronto’s being flooded is brought about directly or indirectly by a being that has never been triune/omniscient?

Christian-Specific

(1) If God exists, then God is necessarily omnipotent and necessarily triune

(2) If God is necessarily omnipotent, then God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs

(3) If God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs, then God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune

(4) If God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune, then God is not necessarily triune

(5) Therefore, God does not and cannot exist

General Theism

(1′) If God exists, then God is necessarily omnipotent and necessarily omniscient

(2) If God is necessarily omnipotent, then God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs

(3′) If God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs, then God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily omniscient

(4′) If God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily omniscient, then God is not necessarily omniscient

(5) Therefore, God does not and cannot exist

(3) and (3′) follow from the fact that such a sate of affairs is logically possible given that human beings who are not triune/omniscient can bring about such states of affairs. (5) follows deductively and shows that a being who is necessarily omnipotent cannot be necessarily triune/omniscient as well.

Possible Objections

One might state that (2) is an improper definition of omnipotence. It could be said that divine omnipotence is best understood as stating: God can do anything that is in accordance with his nature. But what kind of omnipotence is this? This implies that every being is omnipotent for it is true of every being that they can do anything in accordance with their nature. It seems that this is a mere truism and devoid of meaning. One may state that omnipotence need not make claims of ability, only claims of power and that God being omnipotent merely states that there is no being more powerful than God. This is not really an objection to the argument as the person raising it would be speaking of something wholly different than what is being discussed. The argument is certainly one of ability and would need to be reformulated in lieu of any redefinition.

Further, one might object that it is possible that God cause a being, Bob, to perform an action so that a certain state of affairs obtains by the action of a necessarily non-omniscient being. But in this regard, has God has brought about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily omniscient? Not quite, God did not bring about the state of affairs that the lesser being did, but rather God brought about the state of affairs which brought about the lesser being to have a certain state of affairs obtain. In this regard, God still stands in causal relation and the argument still applies.

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¹Martin, M. (1990). Atheism: A philosophical justification (p. 310). Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press.

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  • noen
    Don't you do any philosophy around here or is it all hermeneutics?
  • Mitch , Martin, Nicholas , and Nicholas Everitt in " The Non-Existence of God " and Theodore Drange in his book note , in effect that His incoherent attributes contradict each other, which means we ignostics cam indeed claim that there is no God! I find that as we atheists debunk His being the First Cause and otherwise, again He has no attributes and so, agian , the ignostic challenge goes forth.. This is what I was going to add at another series of posts.
    Carneades makes the ignostic argument . Rabbi Sherwin Wine named it so.[ Paul Kurtz calls it igtheism and others theological non-cognitivism.]. Ayers thought that it not only quash theism but atheism as well, but I take it to be a part of strong atheism. We not only have the problem of evil , but also this one, Shelelnberg's hiddenness problem,,Drange's argument from unbelief , the atelic , the argument from pareidolia, and the new autonomy argument.. I combine this challenge with the Ockham. Either He has no referents, and in that sense no meaning or else, contrary to Alister McGrath, Dawkins's nemesis, He is a useless redundancy. I note that as it takes convoluted, ad hoc assumptions for Him, He is no simple matter in that sense.
    Steele states that He is meaningful in that we understand matters about Him , but not in my sense.
    I await your replies.

    Mitch, you rock,sir!
    I use the present tense for dead philosophers as to their thought.
  • Hello Morgan,

    I think that the task is still upon philosophers of religion to outline definitions of God's attributes which aren't in conflict. I find this specific argument resolved by Weilenberg's definition of Omnipotence (as expanded on by Brian Leftow) but I've not examined it further for complications.
  • Molzahn
    "God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune. [...] a state of affairs that has the property of being brought about by a being other than God seems logically possible"

    So to summarize this, you are stating that whatever state of affairs a triune god can establish a non-triune being can too, therefore this omnipotent force is not necessarily triune. If this is your case, provided that a non-triune omnipotence is logically possible, a triune omnipotence is not necessarily the case.

    Here's where I don't follow your line of reasoning. From "not necessarily true" you somehow leap to the conclusion that "God does not and cannot exist." Logically, the most you could say is that God does not necessarily exist.

    If I may. This commits the logical fallacy of an inverse error. You established that:

    "If quality X is necessarily true, God exists
    quality X is not necessarily true
    therefore God does not exist"

    This isn't a logically sound chain.

    There is of course the chance that I misunderstood your meaning, but this is my understanding of the proposition.
  • That's not accurate, no. I think I've explained the premises better in this post: http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/ryft-on-a-p...
  • NZBeauty86
    Hi there,

    This is probably lack of ability on my part but I don't understand the argument at all. Can someone explain a little clearer to me what this article is saying about God?

    What I got from it is this:

    -God is omnipotent and triune and can make anything happen as long as it is logically possible. God can influence a being who is NOT triune to cause something within the limits of logic, and so therefore God is not triune and therefore not real?? this doesn't make any sense.
  • That's not correct, no. We're saying that if God can bring about all logically possible state of affairs, and a state of affairs which has the property of being brought about by a non-triune being is a logically possible state, that God can bring this state about. But it seems that he cannot bring this state of affairs about so long as he is necessarily triune. So if God is to mean a being which has omnipotence in this manner, then God does not and cannot exist. That is the gist of the argument.
  • VazScep
    Ah yes, thanks for clearing up my confusion.

    I'm possibly still confused as to the substance of the argument, because at the moment, I have to agree with Bolt in that it looks much like the unliftable rock argument. You note that an unliftable rock is impossible in the face of an omnipotent being, and God cannot be expected to do the impossible, but the rock argument can be adapted to make this counter less obvious: *can God make an object that cannot be lifted by its maker?* The notion of an object which cannot be lifted by its maker is conceivable even in the presence of a God, but God cannot make one.

    On my current reading, it looks to me like the argument can be boiled down to: can God bring about a state of affairs which is not brought about by God. Again, I hope I haven't misunderstood you.
  • Right, well as I've said before a state of affairs in which there is a rock to heavy for God to lift is a logically impossible state of affairs given God's omnipotence. However, a state of affairs that has the property of being brought about by a being other than God seems logically possible (Bolt disagrees and I've tried to address his argument). If this line of reasoning can be maintained, then there is some logically possible state of affairs which God cannot bring about and either the definition of Omnipotence needs reworking, God's proposed second attribute (whatever is used in the argument) needs to be contingent, or he simply does not exist.
  • VazScep
    Where do premises 4 and 4' come from? I can't see why they would be true.

    It actually seems that you want to replace 3 by its converse: *any state of affairs that can be brought about by God can be brought about by a non-triune being*. On this assumption, it is more plausible to conclude that God is not necessarily triune (but even that's debatable). And the argument doesn't generalise. It seems quite clear to me that the converse of 3' is false, and that there are states of affairs that can only be brought about by an omniscient being.

    I've either misunderstood where 4 came from, or you might be mixing up necessary and sufficient conditions.
  • (4) follows from (3) in that if the being in question can bring about a state of affairs that has the property of being brought about by a being that has never been triune, than the being which brought about the state of affairs must not be triune... for how could the state of affairs have such a property if caused by a triune being? So, if a state with such a property can obtain, the being that brings it about is not triune.

    Your suggested replacement would constitute a different argument, I think. Thoughts?
  • noen
    I likewise do not see how the 4's follow from the 3's. What this is saying is "Can God who is omniscient, make himself non-omniscient?" I suppose we could shorten that to "Can God die?" I suppose he could but then he wouldn't be a god.

    The whole exercise is silly.
  • Consider this, pantheism is a logical extreme of metaphysics. As a neuron is to a mind an individual is to God. Our bodies are not all thinking bits, in the brain there are supporting/routing structure (white matter) and computational structure (gray matter). As our mind emerges from the communications between individual neurons, "God" can emerge between individual people. As with our bodies, not all matter needs to think and this is reflected in the Universe as well, some things just are: but thinking bits are embedded within this wider process' of the Universe as expressions of its nature. With metaphysics any two things can be combined into one. Following this logical progression, start with atoms, go to cells, go to organs, go to beings, go to nations, go to worlds, and so on until your reach the Totality of the Universe. Every level of existence is in its own reality, being an organ is different than being a brain and so being God would be an alien reality to us but the equivalence of existence would remain. But of course the limits of pantheism, for omniscience and omnipotence remain - and you have to choose to believe in metaphysics.
  • Instead of omniscience and omnipotence, what about the context of pantheism? God IS everything. All the contradictions, all the illogic, a drop of sand to a sheet of cloud. There are limits, not omniscient as information cannot travel faster than light, not omnipotent because some parts do not think they only compute in a basic sense of being themselves. But together as a wholeness, being everything represents every aspect of the Universe. God is all.

    ?
  • This argument would not apply to a Pantheistic being... though I'd say that Pantheism is just a form of atheism. =)
  • noen
    So Spinoza was an atheist? No, I don't think so. You are confused.
  • I have retracted my post until you show that this is not such an argument as I have suggested. I am giving you the benefit of the doubt especially given how quickly I read over everything before.
  • Wow this is excellent! You could modify this argument in any number of creative ways too. For example, can God make Himself exist and not exist at the same time and in the same respect? Can God make a square triangle? Another one I just thought of might be a question about whether or not God can make a rock so big he cannot lift it! Theism is just absurd.
  • Those are not even close to the argument I'm presenting Chris. I've nowhere attempted to suggest that God can do the logically impossible.
  • The point of the rock argument is that God cannot do the logically impossible and so must not be omnipotent, not that God can do the logically impossible. This is to say that the rock argument does not suggest that God can do the logically impossible, so I am not sure why you have attempted to defend your argument by stating that you have not attempted to suggest that God can do the logically impossible.

    The second premise of the argument may require some explanation when it comes to definitions concerning omnipotence. God accomplishes all of His holy will.

    The fourth premise is false and I do not see how it allegedly follows.
  • The rock argument attempts to show that there is an act that God cannot do, namely create a rock so heavy that he cannot lift it. The argument fails on the account that a rock so heavy that God cannot lift is not a possible state of affairs. As such, one of the definitions of omnipotence currently embraced is that God can bring about any logically possible state of affairs. This is the definition of omnipotence which the above argument argues against. I defended my statement by saying that I've not attempted to assert that God can do the impossible, as the Rock paradox asserts should be the case.

    Let's analyze the comparisons you have made and discern whether or not they accurately grasp what this argument is attempting to show.

    Can God make Himself exist and not exist at the same time and in the same respect? No. Because such is not a logically possible state of affairs.

    Can God make a square triangle? No. Because the obtaining of a square triangle is not a logically possible state of affairs.

    This argument is not making a claim similar to the aforementioned, wherein God's inability does not compromise his omnipotence. The state of affairs q, where q is that Toronto’s being flooded is brought about directly or indirectly by a being that has never been triune/omniscient is not a logically impossible state of affairs. A human being, who is neither triune nor omniscient can cause, directly or indirectly, the flooding of Toronto, hence the state of affairs is logically possible.

    But can God cause this logically possible state of affairs to obtain? Not if God is either triune or omniscient, in which case God's triunity or omniscience is in direct contradiction with his omnipotence (as earlier defined).

    (4) states that if God were to bring about such a state of affairs, he must not be necessarily triune or omniscient, since that would prevent the state of affairs from obtaining.

    As such, we have a logically possible state of affairs which God cannot bring about and any definition of omnipotence that states that he can bring about any logically possible state of affairs, is false. As such, any God with this type of omnipotence cannot exist if it is also purported to be necessarily triune, omniscient, (insert attribute here).
  • Perhaps I am lost, but I am still not seeing a contradiction between a and b even given c:

    a) God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs

    b) God is triune

    c) God caused Joe to flood Toronto
  • God causing Joe to flood Toronto would cause a state of affairs to obtain where the flooding of Toronto was brought about either directly or indirectly by a being that IS triune as God still stands in a causal relation.

    The state of affairs I'm proposing is one in which the flooding of Toronto is brought about either directly or indirectly by a being that is not necessarily triune.

    The contradiction between (a) and (b) lies in that one such possible state of affairs covered by (a) necessarily excludes (b).

    So, a God who is omnipotent and triune cannot bring about a state of affairs in which Toronto's being flooded is brought about by a being that has never been triune. The state of affairs is logically possible, but God cannot bring it about. Hence, triunity stands in conflict with God's omnipotence (and so would Omniscience, etc). As such, there is a logically possible state of affairs that God cannot bring about.
  • I must have read the argument over twenty times now. Apparently I am missing something or there is a hidden premise. It is not that I am stumped by the argument, I am trying to figure out where exactly the argument is. I have got to be misreading something.
  • Well, I'm writing a response to Ryft (as he has written a response to me) which may clear some things up. Expect it shortly...
  • @Jeron It would absolutely not be a "God" in a general interpretation. However, as a meta-entity when you consider the amount of information contained in the totality of the individuals involved in the net actions, well that is a lot of thought compared to you and I so maybe "God" would just be a name for the relative comparison of the computation involved. If you thought of these net actions as an entity in themselves - if they had a reality it would be organized in a method alien to us and it could no more sense us than we can sense a particular neuron in our brain.
  • Jeron
    @Bill

    Would a 'god' that is composed of the actions of faithful people really be a 'god' as generally described? I don't think even such things as being a -being- apply to such a concept. ;)
  • I prefer to think of it from a metaphysical perspective. What makes a rock a rock instead of a collection of atoms? An abstract boundary drawn around those atoms that we call a rock. God to me exists as an abstract boundary drawn around the actions of people who have faith in it. There are many Gods or groupings and everyone has many memberships and degrees of membership. This necessarily says that God is composed of people so that God can live or die and is only capable of the net actions its followers are capable of. Once you get into meta-organization such as this practically any organization is possible. That does not make any of them real but it may be useful for illumination.
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