Authored by: Mitchell LeBlanc.

In response to my debate with RazorsKiss on whether or not God is the basis for all knowledge, Dawson Bethrick has provided a critical review of the discussion on his blog. Following his series of articles, presuppositionalist Chris Bolt has posted a video response to one specific article on his blog, “Choosing Hats“. The discussion stems from the following portion of my debate with RazorsKiss:

ML: What if God is deceiving you?

RK: “…in the hope of eternal life, which God, who cannot lie, promised long ages ago, but at the proper time manifested, [even] His word, in the proclamation with which I was entrusted according to the commandment of God our Savior…” (Titus 1:2-3) . God cannot lie.

ML: But God was the author (or inspiration) of those very words. If his intent was to deceive, he has just succeeded. I ask again, what if God is deceiving you?

RK: For if [the] dead do not rise, then Christ is not risen. And if Christ is not risen, your faith [is] futile; you are still in your sins! Then also those who have fallen asleep in Christ have perished. If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men the most pitiable. ~ 1 Cor 15:9

ML: Again, all scripture and proposed action of God are immediately discounted if the motivation in fact was to deceive. Can you show that God is not deceiving you in all your knowledge of him?

RK: If God intended to deceive, He would not be God. He would be Satan. Therefore, you would likely have to use the TANS argument. A God of that character is not God at all, and therefore, yet again, another impossible (redefinition) advanced as an argument. If we could win by redefining things, debates would be fairly short affairs

ML: “If God intended to deceive, He would not be God. He would be Satan.” – Is this statement not based off of information expedited to you from the same deity in question?

RK: A God who is evil instead of good, who is a liar rather than the truth, is mutable rather than immutable, and imperfect rather than perfect, unjust rather than just… we could go on. Your questions all seem to entail redefinitions. “if God had an impossible definition for any being claiming to be the God you believe in, or any god at all, could he do _X_”. To claim that the antithesis of the self-existent and omnipotent God that I believe in is possible – seems to be.. a stretch.

ML: I cannot help but feel you are being evasive at this point. Every bit of the knowledge of God you have, comes from his proposed self-revelation. If God’s intent was surely to deceive you, are you saying he could not? Would you know? Your argument is as follows: God does not deceive. Proposed being X deceives. Therefore X is not God. You are begging the question RK.

RK: Sir, I’m not going to change my answer because you continue to ask it. “God” entails the properties already outlined. If a being does not conform to those properties, as I answered in response to your very first question – that is no god at all. I’m not going to contradict myself so that you can continue your argument. Further, I’ve stated, multiple times, that God is axiomatic to all human reasoning. You’re asking me, on the basis of your presupposition, to overthrow everything I’ve said thus far, to answer a question the way you prefer.

If at this point in the article you have not watched Chris Bolt’s video response, I suggest you do so now.

Bolt’s first problem is with the very question itself, he states that it comitts a complex question fallacy. Seeing as this was a Q and A, I do not see the harm in asking a question such as the one I asked to RazorsKiss. I did not present a false dichotomy of a yes or no, in which case I would agree that a labelling of my question as fallacy would be warranted.

Consider if I asked: (1) “Do you know that God is deceiving you?” rather than (2) “What if God is deceiving you?”

(1) is clearly riddled with problems, providing only two possible answers, both of which may fail to accurately convey a true statement. However, my question (2) does not force an answer in a similar manner. It is a hypothetical, and though Presuppositionalists love to discount the value of hypotheticals, during my questioning period I feel apt to ask such a question.

Both RazorsKiss and Chris Bolt present the same objection to the question, immediately pointing out the fact that they disagree with my very “presumption”. As you can see from the quoted text, and the video from Chris Bolt, both of them agree that a God who lies is not the God in whom they believe, a lying God is not the Christian God.

I would first like to explain that while the idea of a lying God is logically absurd on a Thomist conception of God, it is not logically absurd on a Presuppositionalist conception.

From Presuppositionalism, all that is known of God is that which is revealed and furthermore the axiom (if you can call it that) by which said revelations are made apparent is the Bible.

I’ve said that a lying God is logically absurd on a Thomist conception because a Thomist (or an evidentialist) may not appeal directly to the Bible to justify one of God’s characteristics. They, in fact, would probably do so ontologically by establishing a deductive argument. However, on the presuppositionalist side qualities of God are not subject to such deduction because of the proposed axiomatic nature of both himself and his revealed text.

So whereas a Thomist may appeal to Anselm’s defining of God as that which none greater can be conceived, and conclude thereby that God must be honest rather than a liar, it seems they are apt in doing so:

1. God is the being that which none greater can be conceived

2. It is greater to be honest than to be a liar

3. Therefore, God is honest.

 But a presuppositionalist cannot make such a deduction as God is not a conclusion, but rather an axiom! This means that God is proposed as being foundational prior to all further thought or analysis, this includes deduction!

We do not prove or demonstrate our axioms, they are self-evident by their very nature. Consider the axiom “existence exists”, this is not a deduction but rather a precondition for all further thought. Since the presuppositionalist is providing God as an axiom, God cannot be subject to any deduction.

It is important at this point to reintroduce the two axioms upon which Presuppositionalists claim to build a foundation of knowledge. I will quote RazorsKiss from our debate:

3. As a Christian, I have two axiomatic, interrelated foundations for my epistemology, and for everything else I encounter through the grid of that epistemology. The Triune God of Scripture – who created the universe and all it contains; who established and even now maintains the laws which govern that creation. That is foundation one.

4. The self-revelation of that self-existent, self-conscious, self-sufficient, omniscient, omnipotent, all-wise, immutable, eternal, and sovereign God; The Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, are the self-communication of the extent, nature, and specifics of His eternal properties – which are the guarantor of the laws and assumptions which we, as creatures in the image of that God, require to operate rationally and coherently. That is foundation 2.

Thus we have axiom #1: The Christian God and axiom #2: The Christian Scriptures

First, one must analyze from where the revelation that God is honest arises. Axiom #1 merely asserts the existence of God, but does nothing to ascribe it attributes outside of a referent to the scriptures. Thus, we must turn our attention to axiom #2.

Prior to doing so, it may be prudent for those unfamiliar to explain that the presuppositionalist establishes the truth of its worldview from the inability of all other proposed systems to account for rationality. I won’t get too involved in this claim right now, as it is covered in depth in the aforementioned debate.

Currently we are presented with three following claims:

(A) All knowledge depends on two axioms: (1) The Christian God, (2) The Christian Scriptures

(B) This dependence is affirmed by the impossibility of the contrary

and specific to our conversation:

(C) God cannot lie

My point in the debate, I think, was quite clear. If the reason that one accepts that God cannot lie, is that the Bible states that God cannot lie (as RK asserted) they are in an awkward position if the proposed God is, in fact, a liar.

Thus, my assertion outlined essentially the following:

(1) The God of the Triune Scriptures may be deceiving me in my knowledge of him

(2) The Bible is God’s word as revealed by him to humanity

(3) The Bible may be deceptive in nature

Both RK and Bolt reject (1), stating as we’ve previously heard that God cannot lie. But what is the manner in which they assert that he cannot? The Bible itself.

It should be clear that if it is possible that God be deceptive, the Bible and any subsequent revelation by him to humanity cannot be affirmed as absolute truth. I do not think that RK and Bolt disagree with me on this, but rather they disagree with my assertion that God might be deceiving humanity.

On a presuppositionalist worldview, one accepts that God is honest because the Bible states that he is honest (and therefore because he has revealed to humanity that he is honest). Since the Bible is an axiom of presuppositionalism this is assumed not to be open to question.

But is there not a hidden presupposition at this point? For as one reads the Bible, do they not already PRESUME that what they read is the true word of God? This seems to be a matter of temporal cognition:

Does one read the bible and then determine it is true or does one determine the Bible is true, and then read it?

Should one read the Bible and then determine it is true, I am curious as to the basis on which this is done and how this criteria excludes the possibility of God’s deception without vicious circularity. If one determines the Bible is true prior to reading it, I am curious as to how they know it is God’s revealed word in the first place.

A presuppositionalist may point to axiom #2 as already clarifying this issue, but I do not see how it does. To say that the Bible is the self-communication of God’s nature and this fact should be taken as axiomatic raises the a variation of the same question.

An axiom must, as I’ve said before, be self-evident. But consider the two different proposed manners of self-evidence:

(1) Existence exists

(2) A finite whole is greater than any of its parts

(3) The Bible is the word of God

(1) and (2) are true by virtue of nothing other than themselves. They are not subject to the question I’ve posed regarding (3).

While I may ask of (3): “Does one read the bible and then determine it is true or does one determine the Bible is true, and then read it?” How can I ask the same (or any similar variation) of (1) and (2)?

Perhaps the presuppositionalist will appeal to the “impossibility of the contrary” at this point, stating that axiom #2 must be granted because it is impossible for knowledge to stand upon anything else! But surely I can ground knowledge upon the proposition that God MIGHT be lying to me, and therefore possess faith in his honesty. Presumably, this is unacceptable to the Presuppositionalist as they seek certainty. As such, I am interested to hear an answer as to the means of acquired certainty regarding my aforementioned question.

Even if I could not ground such knowledge, there is still ample discussion to be had on whether or not contrary to Christianity is truly impossible (See: Bethrick’s Article).

Furthermore, it should be called into question whether or not axiom #2 meets the criteria for an axiom (See: Bethrick’s Article)! For if my dichotomy is a true dichotomy (I’ll leave it to Chris to show that it isn’t) there are other axioms that preclude the reading of the Bible! For precisely how does one establish that the Bible exists, or that their identification of the Bible as the Bible is warranted? Presumably, through the very axioms I presented in my debate against RK.

1. Existence exists

2. A thing is what it is (A=A)

3. Consciousness is consciousness of objects

Are these being presupposed in one’s analysis of the Bible as well?

In conclusion, I do not yet see reason to accept that speaking of God as lying is as speaking of a God with fur insofar as they are not the God that presuppositionalists refer to. I am referring to the very same God they are, with a question as to its nature and surely my question cannot be dismissed on the account of mere definition without justification.