Are Possible Worlds Compatible with Christian Theism?

Are Possible Worlds Compatible with Christian Theism? 11/12/09

If the Christian God has pre-ordained all of existence, does it make sense to speak of "possible worlds" or modal propositions in general? Some people have claimed this, but further analysis into God's perfection and immutability seems required to make a case either way.

Authored by: Mitchell LeBlanc.


Recently, RazorsKiss from Choosing Hats has made the claim that the notion of Possible Worlds are wholly incompatible with Christian theism. He has offered an argument for his claim. I’ve briefly formulated an argument which attempts to show the opposite, that Possible Worlds are compatible with Christian theism. Now, one might suggest that there is no need for such an argument since among philosophers of religion, this is taken for granted. I agree, of course, but there is no harm in exercising our minds.

The Argument

(1)    If God is omnipotent, he can bring about any state of affairs conceivable for God to bring about

(2)    Both the sustaining and non-sustaining of material human life at time, t, are states of affairs conceivable for God to bring about

(3)    God is omnipotent

(4)    God can sustain or not sustain material human life at time, t

(5)    If material human life is being sustained at time, t then it is not being not-sustained at time, t

(6)    If material human life is being not-sustained at time t then it is not being sustained at time t

(7)    God must either be sustaining or not-sustaining material human life at time t

(8)    If God is omniscient, he knows everything that is conceivable for God to know

(9)    If God cannot make free choices, he is not perfectly free

(10) God is perfectly free

(11) God can make free choices

(12) It is conceivable for God to know the outcome of his choices

(13) God is omniscient

(14) God knows the outcome of his choices

(15) God knows the outcome of sustaining material human life at time t

(16) God knows the outcome of not-sustaining material human life at time t

(17) Both states of affairs cannot obtain at time t

(18) If God has knowledge of the outcome of both states of affairs, he has such knowledge without one state of affair obtaining

(19) Either God has counterfactual knowledge of at least one state of affair or God is not omniscient

(20) God has counterfactual knowledge of at least one state of affair

Possible Objection

The biggest objection I see coming from RK is that of (9) and further deductions. What does it mean to say that God is perfectly free?

We must first note that RK has listed some characteristics of God in his third premise:

God is Simple(a), Sovereign(b), Holy(c), Immutable(d), Eternal(e), Wise(f), Infinite(g), Knowing(h), Powerful(i), Near(j), Loving(k), Merciful(l), Gracious(m), Just(n), Good(o), Spirit(p), Revelatory(q), Glorious(r), Joyful(s), Patient(t), Incomprehensible(u), Jealous(v), Transcendent(w), True(x), Wrathful(y), Self-Existent(z), Self-sufficient(A), Trinitarian(B), Perfect(C)

Most relevant here are those of Immutability and Perfection. RK may object to (9) saying that (i) God cannot do anything other than he has already intended to do, (ii) God is free only insofar as his actions are in accordance with his nature.

Now (i) seems entailed by (ii) insofar as immutability is part of God’s nature. We will take God’s immutability to mean that God cannot change. We must also wonder whether or not RK wishes to assert that God is perfectly free. It seems to me that if God is not perfectly free, he deserves no worship for his actions any more than we worship a Pepsi machine for mechanistically dispensing our refreshing cola when we insert our money.

Richard Swinburne, Emeritus professor of Christian Philosophy at Oxford University writes extensively on the subject:

We can understand ‘immutable’ in a weaker or stronger way. In the weaker way to say of a person that he is immutable is simply to say that he cannot change in character. To say of a free an omniscient creator that he is immutable is simply to say that, while he continues to exist, necessarily he remains fixed in his character… Theists have, however, sometimes understood immutability in a much stronger sense. On this understanding to say that God is immutable is to say that he cannot change at all. (Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism. 1993, pg 221)

How might this relate to the idea that God has determined all occurrences from the “beginning”? Swinburne continues with an example of Augustine worshiping God at one time, but not another:

This would not rule out God at one time not being worshipped by Augustine, and at a later time being worshipped by Augustine. For in such a case, intuitively, Augustine changes but God does not. It might seem that it rules out God acting – for acts take places at particular times; in action God changes from not doing a certain action to doing that action. This difficulty could be avoided if one said that all that God brings about he has chosen ‘from all eternity’ to bring about. The effects (e.g. the fall of Jerusalem, the fall of Babylon) which God brings about occur at particular times (587 BC and 538 BC respectively). Yet God has always meant them to occur at those times – i.e. there was no time at which God did not intend Jerusalem to fall in 587 BC. When 587 BC arrived there was no change in God – the arrival of the moment put into effect the intention which God always had… If God has thus fixed his intention ‘from all eternity’ he would be a very lifeless thing; not a person who reacts to men with sympathy or anger, pardon or chastening because he chooses to there and then. Yet, as we saw… the God of the Old Testament, in which Judaism, Islam and Christianity have their roots, is a God in continual interaction with men, moved by men as they speak to him, his action being often in no way decided in advance. We should note, further, that if God did not change at all, he would not thinking now of this, now of that. His thoughts would be one thought which lasted forever. (Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism. 1993, pg 222)

Now, what of Immutability as RK proposes? Swinburne states:

It seems to me that although the God of the Old Testament is not pictured as such a being, nevertheless a perfectly free person might act in fact only on intentions which he had had from all eternity, and so in a strong sense never change. However, a perfectly free person could not be immutable in the strong sense, that is unable to change. For an agent is perfectly free at a certain time if his action results from his own choice at that time and if his choice is not itself brought about by anything else. Yet a person immutable in the strong sense would be unable to perform any action at a certain time other than what he had previously intended to do. His course of action being fixed by his past choices, he would not be perfectly free. Being perfectly free is incompatible with being immutable in the strong sense…

Why should many theists have wished to suppose that God is immutable in the strong sense? The belief that God is immutable in this sense does not seem to me to be much in evidence in Christian tradition until the third or fourth century A.D. It came, I suspect, from neo-Platonism. For a Platonist, things which change are inferior to things which do not change, Aquinas, claiming that God is altogether unchangeable, gives as one of his reasons that ‘anything in change acquires something through its change, attaining something not previously attained. Now God… embracing within himself the whole fullness of perfection of all existence cannot acquire anything. Being perfect already he can lack nothing. However, an obvious answer to this point is to suggest that the perfection of a perfect being might consist not in his being in a certain static condition, but in his being in a certain process of change. Only neo-Platonic dogma would lead us to suppose otherwise. That God is completely changeless would seem to be for the theist an unnecessary dogma. It is not… one implicit in the Old or New Testaments. (ibid.)

Conclusion

It seems to me that if God’s perfection entails, as Swinburne suggests, being in a certain process of change, then this idea that he does not make free choices due to his immutability fails. Given this, if the rest of the argument is sound then it seems to suggest that God would have counterfactual knowledge. This itself entails that possible worlds are indeed compatible with Christian theism.

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  • http://www.choosinghats.com/ C.L. Bolt

    Cool I get a break.

    ;D

  • http://www.choosinghats.com C.L. Bolt

    Cool I get a break.

    ;D

  • http://intensedebate.com/people/MitchLeBlanc MitchLeBlanc

    Haha! Well, it is the holidays. ;)

  • http://intensedebate.com/people/MitchLeBlanc MitchLeBlanc

    Haha! Well, it is the holidays. ;)

  • http://razorskiss.net/wp/ RazorsKiss

    Swinburne probably isn't the best authority to cite, as it is well known that he's unorthodox (ironically, given he's Eastern Orthodox) in his views on the trinity, eternality, omniscience, omnipotence, and immutability (as you stated) of God. In fact, he's probably the most-cited philosopher, by open theists.

    As such, his assertions aren't exactly relevant. Gotta look these guys up before you use them as sources, man! Especially considering that all of what he is unorthodox concerning is precisely the subject of the discussion.

  • http://razorskiss.net/wp/ RazorsKiss

    Swinburne probably isn't the best authority to cite, as it is well known that he's unorthodox (ironically, given he's Eastern Orthodox) in his views on the trinity, eternality, omniscience, omnipotence, and immutability (as you stated) of God. In fact, he's probably the most-cited philosopher, by open theists.

    As such, his assertions aren't exactly relevant. Gotta look these guys up before you use them as sources, man! Especially considering that all of what he is unorthodox concerning is precisely the subject of the discussion.

  • http://intensedebate.com/people/MitchLeBlanc MitchLeBlanc

    I don't understand what you mean by "Gotta look these guys up…" am I only to utilize sources which agree with your position?

    Also, am I correct in assuming that you object to (9) or do you also object to some of the other premises?

  • http://intensedebate.com/people/MitchLeBlanc MitchLeBlanc

    I don't understand what you mean by "Gotta look these guys up…" am I only to utilize sources which agree with your position?

    Also, am I correct in assuming that you object to (9) or do you also object to some of the other premises?

  • http://intensedebate.com/people/MitchLeBlanc MitchLeBlanc

    It's not as if I identify Swinburne with being unorthodox and then search his writings for support, that's not how scholarship works. Swinburne is, obviously, a very competent and respected philosopher of religion. As such, if you have a disagreement with him I don't think you can just write if off as him being unorthodox. I actually do assume that you have some argument for why you believe Swinburne is incorrect and I think it would be more beneficial to present that, than to attack the person.

    You haven't told me whether or not (9) is the premise with which you have the most disagreement. Secondly, it's fine to say that God is changeless, I just want to see an argument supporting the position. Presumably, it would have to be one, as Swinburne states, that posits changelessness as a precondition of perfection.

    Clearly, the portion of my argument that analyzes God's free choice are premises (9)-(11) so I assume that any subsequent discussion will take place around these (if this is where your objection lies).

    On a second, slightly unrelated note, I object to statements such as "Swinburne's definition is not compatible with Christianity" because of the inherent subjectivism. Presumably, Swinburne might say the same thing back to you, leaving us with no illumination on the matter whatsoever. I find that every sect of Christianity believes that it is the correct one, and they all speak as if all others are clearly and obviously false. Perhaps this is just a pet peeve of mine…

  • http://intensedebate.com/people/MitchLeBlanc MitchLeBlanc

    It's not as if I identify Swinburne with being unorthodox and then search his writings for support, that's not how scholarship works. Swinburne is, obviously, a very competent and respected philosopher of religion. As such, if you have a disagreement with him I don't think you can just write if off as him being unorthodox. I actually do assume that you have some argument for why you believe Swinburne is incorrect and I think it would be more beneficial to present that, than to attack the person.

    You haven't told me whether or not (9) is the premise with which you have the most disagreement. Secondly, it's fine to say that God is changeless, I just want to see an argument supporting the position. Presumably, it would have to be one, as Swinburne states, that posits changelessness as a precondition of perfection.

    Clearly, the portion of my argument that analyzes God's free choice are premises (9)-(11) so I assume that any subsequent discussion will take place around these (if this is where your objection lies).

    On a second, slightly unrelated note, I object to statements such as "Swinburne's definition is not compatible with Christianity" because of the inherent subjectivism. Presumably, Swinburne might say the same thing back to you, leaving us with no illumination on the matter whatsoever. I find that every sect of Christianity believes that it is the correct one, and they all speak as if all others are clearly and obviously false. Perhaps this is just a pet peeve of mine…

  • http://razorskiss.net/wp/ RazorsKiss

    The fact that you go immediately to someone widely known as unorthodox for support for your position should be telling as to whether it's compatible with Christianity or not. By definition, he is *not* compatible – therefore not representative.

    When I'm debating, say, a Muslim; if he immediately goes to liberal theologians as his sources, and presents them as compatible with orthodox Christianity, I'd be well-justified to point out that the position he is saying is compatible is, in fact, not so. In fact, i can point you to several debates of Dr. White's where just that has happened.

    Or, take the Quran. When it references the Trinity, it considers it to be composed of the Father, the Son, and the Virgin Mary. Yet, this is not so. It also assumes we are speaking of a Triad of Beings, not a Trinity. Neither is the case. To use his unorthodoxy as support for a "compatible" position might work with open theists, but it won't represent Christianity.

    As to where your argument fails: "Given this, if the rest of the argument is sound then it seems to suggest…"

    It's not a given, and you just won't won't find that in orthodox theology. Therefore, since it is not given "That God is completely changeless would seem to be for the theist an unnecessary dogma" (ie: I don't give it, and can't – and neither will the vast majority of even professing Christians) then it cannot be considered to be "Compatible with Christian Theism" – which was the stated goal, was it not?

    Using your stated definitions per Swinburne is not compatible with Christianity. Therefore, not successful.

  • http://razorskiss.net/wp/ RazorsKiss

    The fact that you go immediately to someone widely known as unorthodox for support for your position should be telling as to whether it's compatible with Christianity or not. By definition, he is *not* compatible – therefore not representative.

    When I'm debating, say, a Muslim; if he immediately goes to liberal theologians as his sources, and presents them as compatible with orthodox Christianity, I'd be well-justified to point out that the position he is saying is compatible is, in fact, not so. In fact, i can point you to several debates of Dr. White's where just that has happened.

    Or, take the Quran. When it references the Trinity, it considers it to be composed of the Father, the Son, and the Virgin Mary. Yet, this is not so. It also assumes we are speaking of a Triad of Beings, not a Trinity. Neither is the case. To use his unorthodoxy as support for a "compatible" position might work with open theists, but it won't represent Christianity.

    As to where your argument fails: "Given this, if the rest of the argument is sound then it seems to suggest…"

    It's not a given, and you just won't won't find that in orthodox theology. Therefore, since it is not given "That God is completely changeless would seem to be for the theist an unnecessary dogma" (ie: I don't give it, and can't – and neither will the vast majority of even professing Christians) then it cannot be considered to be "Compatible with Christian Theism" – which was the stated goal, was it not?

    Using your stated definitions per Swinburne is not compatible with Christianity. Therefore, not successful.

  • http://razorskiss.net/wp/ RazorsKiss

    Okie dokie Mitch; you're perfectly, unwaveringly, infallibly right, as usual. Far be it from a Christian to actually define Christianity.

    I'm not getting into these silly discussions with you. If you want interaction from anyone serious, change the argument. If you don't, leave it like it is, and tilt some more windmills. It's not going to convince anyone but Open Theists. Have a good Christmas season.

  • http://razorskiss.net/wp/ RazorsKiss

    Okie dokie Mitch; you're perfectly, unwaveringly, infallibly right, as usual. Far be it from a Christian to actually define Christianity.

    I'm not getting into these silly discussions with you. If you want interaction from anyone serious, change the argument. If you don't, leave it like it is, and tilt some more windmills. It's not going to convince anyone but Open Theists. Have a good Christmas season.

  • http://intensedebate.com/people/MitchLeBlanc MitchLeBlanc

    There's no need to be sarcastic RK. I just see no reason to accept that your interpretation of Christianity is the "true" interpretation (or by that virtue, a false one). Every Christian I've spoken to has professed the absolute truth of their denomination, so what am I to do?

    I also don't think that it is a silly discussion. Presumably there are arguments to show that perfection entails changelessness, that is what I'm asking you to provide. Swinburne is absolutely correct in saying that it is in line with neo-Platonist thought, and from my understanding, Reformed Theology attempts to distance itself from Greek philosophy.

    Have a happy holidays.

  • http://intensedebate.com/people/MitchLeBlanc MitchLeBlanc

    There's no need to be sarcastic RK. I just see no reason to accept that your interpretation of Christianity is the "true" interpretation (or by that virtue, a false one). Every Christian I've spoken to has professed the absolute truth of their denomination, so what am I to do?

    I also don't think that it is a silly discussion. Presumably there are arguments to show that perfection entails changelessness, that is what I'm asking you to provide. Swinburne is absolutely correct in saying that it is in line with neo-Platonist thought, and from my understanding, Reformed Theology attempts to distance itself from Greek philosophy.

    Have a happy holidays.

  • http://www.choosinghats.com/ C.L. Bolt

    In order to touch RK's argument, you either need to present an argument that Swinburne's understanding on these tenets is the same as that belonging to RK, or argue that RK is objectively wrong about the tenets, or address RK's argument upon his own understanding of the tenets. I hope this makes sense.

    I met an atheist yesterday who believed in God by the way.

  • http://www.choosinghats.com/ C.L. Bolt

    The trouble is that you are equating Swinburne's view with "Christian theism" and then arguing "that Possible Worlds are compatible with Christian theism". You write, "I object to statements such as 'Swinburne's definition is not compatible with Christianity' because of the inherent subjectivism", which assumes that RK does not have an argument for his claim which would render the "subjectivism" objection incorrect. The argument in question is not which view of Christian theism is correct, however, but whether or not possible worlds is consistent with Christian theism as RK has understood it. I do not think RK is guilty of the genetic fallacy, I think he is just saying that while this may work in the case of Swinburne's understanding of Christian theism (which is wrong), it will not work in the case of RK's understanding of it.

  • http://www.choosinghats.com C.L. Bolt

    The trouble is that you are equating Swinburne's view with "Christian theism" and then arguing "that Possible Worlds are compatible with Christian theism". You write, "I object to statements such as 'Swinburne's definition is not compatible with Christianity' because of the inherent subjectivism", which assumes that RK does not have an argument for his claim which would render the "subjectivism" objection incorrect. The argument in question is not which view of Christian theism is correct, however, but whether or not possible worlds is consistent with Christian theism as RK has understood it. I do not think RK is guilty of the genetic fallacy, I think he is just saying that while this may work in the case of Swinburne's understanding of Christian theism (which is wrong), it will not work in the case of RK's understanding of it.

  • http://www.choosinghats.com C.L. Bolt

    In order to touch RK's argument, you either need to present an argument that Swinburne's understanding on these tenets is the same as that belonging to RK, or argue that RK is objectively wrong about the tenets, or address RK's argument upon his own understanding of the tenets. I hope this makes sense.

    I met an atheist yesterday who believed in God by the way.

  • http://intensedebate.com/people/MitchLeBlanc MitchLeBlanc

    Hi Chris,

    You said: "The argument in question is not which view of Christian theism is correct, however, but whether or not possible worlds is consistent with Christian theism as RK has understood it"

    Yes, I would agree. I had expected that RK would disagree with (9) as I indicated in the post, but I was interested as to the nature of the disagreement. Am I somehow wrong in asking RK to provide a justification for his position that changelessness is a precondition of perfection? I understand that RK and Swinburne come from different theological backgrounds, but surely this can't be where the "buck stops" so to speak.

    You said: "I think he is just saying that while this may work in the case of Swinburne's understanding of Christian theism (which is wrong)"

    Out of curiosity, if Swinburne were to lay the charge on you that your position is incorrect, how might you two go about resolving the dispute?

    You said: "In order to touch RK's argument, you either need to present an argument that Swinburne's understanding on these tenets is the same as that belonging to RK, or argue that RK is objectively wrong about the tenets, or address RK's argument upon his own understanding of the tenets."

    I could do these yes, but I thought that a more fruitful discussion might center around the basis for his disagreement with (9). I suppose I could have centered an entire post around that question…

    As for your meeting of an atheist who believes in God, it reminded me of this paper: http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstr...

  • http://intensedebate.com/people/MitchLeBlanc MitchLeBlanc

    Hi Chris,

    You said: "The argument in question is not which view of Christian theism is correct, however, but whether or not possible worlds is consistent with Christian theism as RK has understood it"

    Yes, I would agree. I had expected that RK would disagree with (9) as I indicated in the post, but I was interested as to the nature of the disagreement. Am I somehow wrong in asking RK to provide a justification for his position that changelessness is a precondition of perfection? I understand that RK and Swinburne come from different theological backgrounds, but surely this can't be where the "buck stops" so to speak.

    You said: "I think he is just saying that while this may work in the case of Swinburne's understanding of Christian theism (which is wrong)"

    Out of curiosity, if Swinburne were to lay the charge on you that your position is incorrect, how might you two go about resolving the dispute?

    You said: "In order to touch RK's argument, you either need to present an argument that Swinburne's understanding on these tenets is the same as that belonging to RK, or argue that RK is objectively wrong about the tenets, or address RK's argument upon his own understanding of the tenets."

    I could do these yes, but I thought that a more fruitful discussion might center around the basis for his disagreement with (9). I suppose I could have centered an entire post around that question…

    As for your meeting of an atheist who believes in God, it reminded me of this paper: http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstr...

  • ZaoThanatoo

    You could have saved yourself some space by just writing:

    P1: If Richard Swinburne is right then RK is wrong.
    P2: Richard Swinburne is right.
    C: Therefore RK is wrong.

    Of course, the fallacy might be just a bit more evident that way…

  • ZaoThanatoo

    You could have saved yourself some space by just writing:

    P1: If Richard Swinburne is right then RK is wrong.
    P2: Richard Swinburne is right.
    C: Therefore RK is wrong.

    Of course, the fallacy might be just a bit more evident that way…

  • http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/possible-worlds-and-christian-theism-pt-2/ Possible Worlds and Christian Theism: Pt. 2 | Urban Philosophy

    [...] previous post on this topic was rather non-productive. I presented an argument, which generated a few responses [...]

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