Authored by: Mitchell LeBlanc.

In a previous post I introduced an argument against the existence of God. I then elaborated on the argument while responding to an objection by David Smart. Now, Chris Bolt has offered an objection to which I wish to direct some attention.

The Argument

Again, I will reintroduce the argument of which we are speaking:

(1) If God exists, then God is necessarily omnipotent and necessarily triune

(2) If God is necessarily omnipotent, then God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs

(3) If God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs, then God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune

(4) If God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune, then God is not necessarily triune

(5) Therefore, God does not and cannot exist

The state of affairs which is being referred to in premise (3) is:

(A) Toronto’s being flooded is brought about directly or indirectly by a being that has never been triune

One might understand this further with our example of Bob:

Imagine we have Bob who works at the city dam, who for some reason makes a computer error or falls asleep and as a result of such an action (or inaction) brings about that the city of Toronto is flooded. There is nothing logically impossible about this notion. Let it also be true that Bob is not triune. There is still nothing logically impossible about this notion. Given this, it is clear that (A) is true.

The Objection

Chris expresses disagreement that (A) is a logically possible state of affairs. Chris states:

Triune God brings about all things. If this is true then the state of affairs in which Toronto’s being flooded is brought about directly or indirectly by a being that has never been triune is not a logically possible state of affairs.

The Response

Where (A) is a state of affairs that has the property of being brought about only by a being who has never been triune, Chris argues that no state of affairs with such a property may obtain. Chris’ assertion can be regarded as:

(i) If God exists, necessarily: no non-triune being can bring about a state of affairs

One might worry as to the theological implications of (i). Perhaps we should look to Chapter III of the Westminster Confession for clarification:

God from all eternity did by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass. Yet so as neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty of contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established…

This passage seems wholly incoherent if one reads it with either a libertarian or a hard determinist understanding of freedom. It follows then that we must read it with a compatibilist understanding of freedom. Since the other two options seem incoherent for a Calvinist to support (libertarianism or hard determinism), it follows that they must embrace compatibilism. We should then apply compatibilism to our scenario with Bob the Dam Employee:

God decreed from all eternity that a non-triune being, Bob, would directly or indirectly bring about that the city of Toronto is flooded. Yet, Bob was not forced to directly or indirectly bring this about. That is to say, God ordained Bob’s thoughts and desires in such a way that he would freely, either through action or inaction, bring about that the city of Toronto is flooded.

But surely this is not the same as God bringing about the state of affairs himself. To illuminate the understanding of compatibilism, one might look at the Calvinist doctrine of Effectual Calling (as taken from Chapter X of the Westminster Confession – emphasis mine):

All those whom God hath predestinated unto life, and those only, he is pleased, in his appointed and accepted time, effectually to call, by his Word and Spirit, out of that state of sin and death, in which they are by nature, to grace and salvation by Jesus Christ; enlightening their minds spiritually and savingly, to understanding the things of God; taking away their heart of stone, and giving them an heart of flesh; renewing their wills, and by his almighty power determining them to that which is good, and effectually drawing them to Jesus Christ, yet so as they come most freely, being made willing by his grace.

Thus, for example, in Calvinism those who come to Christ through irresistible grace are not forced against their will to come. It is not that these people want to reject Christ and God forbids them, but rather he has changed their desires so that they come without hesitation. It seems clear then, as Calvinist Philosopher John Feinberg states:

Calvinists as determinists must either reject freedom altogether or accept compatibilism.¹

But what relevance does this bear as an analysis of (i)? Well, according to Christian tradition there are states of affairs in which man sins. My understanding is that Calvinism (or at least, non-hypercalvinism) does not affirm that God works unbelief in the hearts of the reprobate. R.C Sproul writes:

The Reformed view teaches that God positively or actively intervenes in the lives of the elect to insure their salvation. The rest of mankind God leaves to themselves. He does not create unbelief in their hearts. That unbelief is already there. He does not coerce them to sin. They sin by their own choices².

As such, consider the following state of affairs:

(B) Bob’s murdering of Tom is brought about directly or indirectly by a being that has never been triune

Now, if (i) holds, (B) is impossible and it would rather be the case that:

(B*) Bob’s murdering of Tom is brought about directly or indirectly by a being that is necessarily triune

On (B), Bob freely commits the sinful act and while God might work this towards some greater good, it is Bob who is responsible. It is Bob who brings about this state of affairs, even if by virtue of his sinful nature. On (B*) the situation is somewhat different. If we are to say that God has brought about the state of affairs, that is to say he directly brought about Bob’s murdering of Tom and it seems that God has directly inspired Bob to do evil. One might even state that under (B*) Bob commits no action at all, anymore than a tool actively performs the task intended by its wielder. If this is true, it seems that the Calvinist must reject (i) lest they accept that sinful states of affairs are brought about by God. If (i) is rejected, then (A) remains logically possible.

Recall also the response given to a consideration of a similar-type object in the initial post:

Further, one might object that it is possible that God cause a being, Bob, to perform an action so that a certain state of affairs obtains by the action of a necessarily non-omniscient being. But in this regard, has God has brought about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily omniscient? Not quite, God did not bring about the state of affairs that the lesser being did, but rather God brought about the state of affairs which brought about the lesser being to have a certain state of affairs obtain. In this regard, God still stands in causal relation and the argument still applies.

Conclusion

If the above analysis fails in accurately representing the position of Chris then I apologize. It is not an intentional misrepresentation. Further, one should be aware that arguments of this nature are plentiful and diverse that the failure of one, if it should fail, does not constitute a failure of all. Also, with the many different types of theism it is perhaps impossible for one argument to succeed in disproving all concepts of God. As such, one should not assume that the potential failure of this argument as applied to Chris’ position shows the argument wholly incorrect.

With that said, I simply have to wait and see if I’ve accurately represented Chris’s position. If I so have, I think the argument still stands. If not, there may be another approach or it may be that this argument is simply not the applicable formulation. At the very least, I hope to convey that the atheist need not rely wholly upon the alleged failure of theistic arguments for their case, and in fact, they should not.

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¹Feinberg, John. S. “God, Freedom and Evil in Calvinist Thinking,” in The Grace of God, the Bondage of the Will, ed. Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1995), 2:465

²Sproul, R. C. Chosen by God. Tyndale House Publishers, Inc, 1994. 142-43.