Authored by: Mitchell LeBlanc.

I recently responded to a post by Chris Bolt in which he criticized the apologetic method of William Lane Craig. The criticism is one that is native to presuppositionalism and establishes its superiority over both Classical and Evidentialist approaches to apologetics. In some manifestations, it becomes so bold as to make the claim that any other apologetic system is sinful! I am not one to defend Christian apologists, as you can imagine, they and I disagree on many things. However, I am a firm defender of philosophy and philosophical discourse. My defense of Classical/Evidentialist apologetics is a defense of coherent philosophical approaches in the face of those, like presuppositionalism, which do nothing but belittle reasoned discourse in favor of a type of Fideism. It is my continued desire that the Philosophy of Religion play host to reasoned discussion between both believers and non-believers that can be conducive to the formulation of coherent positions. It would also be prudent for Bolt to note that it is not uncommon in academia for non-theists to critique other non-theists work, or that they respond with defeaters to non-theistic objections to criticisms of a theistic argument. There is no conspiracy, good philosophers are aimed towards the truth, wherever that leads.

The article to which I initially responded criticized William Lane Craig’s apologetic approach on the grounds of his plea to examine claims objectively. Objectivity is something the presuppositionalist deems impossible, and they subsequently deem that Craig in asking for such is leaving Christ on the sidelines while trying to show his existence.

I posted a quotation from J.P Moreland and one from Richard Howe. Bolt has chosen to respond to my comments in an article of his own, and it is this to which I am responding.

It would be prudent to note, firstly, that I have nowhere claimed that Bolt is an evil presuppositionalist nor have I claimed that presuppositionalism is evil. I have made clear my objections to the apologetic system but I do not seek to draw conclusions about the person professing the system. It may very well be that Bolt is a nice person, or perhaps he is evil. In any respect, I’ve not asserted one or the other.

As I’ve said, I made use of two quotations:

Take as an example the illustration of a map to Atlanta. In the order of being, there would have to be the city of Atlanta before there could be a map showing one how to get to Atlanta. Thus, in the order of being, Atlanta is first. However, in order to find one’s way to Atlanta, one might need a map. Thus, in the order of knowing, the map is first. In the theistic argument debate, the theist certainly sees that in the order of being God is first, since, if God is the creator of all things besides Himself, then, if there was not a God, there would be nothing else at all, not even an argument for God. But in the order of knowing, it might be the case that one would need a “map” to God, i.e., a theistic argument. Just as using a map to find Atlanta says nothing amiss about the metaphysical priority of Atlanta to the map, likewise, to use a theistic argument to find God says nothing amiss about the metaphysical priority of God to the argument. The presuppositionalist is wrong to think that if an argument leads on to a belief in the existence of God, this God could not be the God of Christianity… It does not imply that somehow the being of God is secondary. Presuppositionalists mistakenly assume that to have the argument first in the order of knowing is to tacitly deny that God is first in the order of being, it does not.

and

Even if one granted that human beings are estranged from god by virtue of man’s rebellion, it does not follow that human beings are estranged from reality itself. Surely even the most extreme Calvinist would admit that gravity affects the sinner as much as the saint. It is from this common ground of reality that the Classical tradition has built its natural theology.

Both quotations can be found in this essay. The former is attributed to J.P Moreland whereas the latter is that of Richard Howe.

Bolt takes issue with the first quotation. With regard to the statement that “in the order of being there would have to be the city of Atlanta before there could be a map showing one how to get to Atlanta” Bolt objects that this need not necessarily be the case. He offers an example of a map to Candyland.

There are a few problems with this objection. Firstly, the existence of CandyLand as espoused by his map is presumably not representative of an actual state of affairs. Similar to a map of Middle Earth, the plotted locations represent their co-ordinates in some possible world, the references need not be actualized. In this regard, his map to CandyLand and a map of Middle Earth are not necessarily false constructs, they simply represent a non-actualized reality, that of a fictional world.

But is it possible for someone to map something that doesn’t exist at all? I’d argue not. I could pick up a sheet of blank paper and begin to map a small town, while this town may not possess actual existence it possesses existence in the form of a possible state of affairs. In this regard, the existence of this small town remains first in the order of being as it must be conceptualized prior to plotting, even if this world is fictional.

As such, in regards to the actual world, the city of Atlanta holds primacy over the map showing its location in the order of being. It just so happens that Atlanta exists actually and the map corresponds so in turn. The matter of a map representing an actual or a possible state of affairs is wholly besides the point. The fact is, to be plotted on a map the object/location being plotted must possess either actual or possible existence. In both respects the existence holds primacy over the plotting in the order of being.

Next Bolt objects to the statement that “in order to find one’s way to Atlanta, one might need a map. Thus, in the order of knowing, the map is first” by responding that:

Knowledge of Atlanta and knowledge of how to get to Atlanta are two different things. Moreland is equivocating. It has already been granted that in order to find one’s way to Atlanta, one might need a map. It has not been granted that in order to know that there is an Atlanta one needs a map.

But the weight of this objection is questionable. With specific regard to the map example, knowledge of Atlanta would necessarily entail knowledge of how to get to Atlanta at least in a primitive form. For the person who was not aware of the existence of Atlanta, in looking at the map, could at least discern that (i) Atlanta exists (ii) I either am in Atlanta, or must move to get to Atlanta (provided the person new their position on the map). But I fail to see the relevance of this objection. It is only relevant in light of his next criticism.

In response to Moreland’s claim that “…in the order of knowing, it might be the case that one would need a ‘map’ to God, i.e., a theistic argument”, Bolt states:

Moreland implies that presuppositionalists present no theistic arguments, which is false. He is also blatantly contradicting the claim of Scripture that everyone knows God without theistic arguments. The phrase “it might be the case” is false as according to Scripture it is certainly not the case.

The presuppositionalist does not just state that God must exist in order for there to be knowledge, but that God must be known. J.P. Moreland has never presented an argument for the existence of God which did not already presuppose the knowledge of God.

It is interesting to note here that Moreland does not claim that one needs a map to KNOW God, but rather needs a map to find God. This answers Bolt’s criticism that it blatantly contradicts scripture. Moreland, Craig and most Christian philosophers I am aware of all embrace the notion that belief in God is properly basic, that is to say, they accept Plantinga’s philosophical notion (which is consistent with the Bible) that belief in God requires no argument and is rather a gift from God Himself in the form of self-evidence. As such, Moreland is not claiming that one needs an argument to KNOW that God exists, but rather that one may require an argument to FIND God, or reveal such known knowledge. This is not inconsistent with Christianity stating that all men have an innate knowledge of God.

To briefly touch on the first portion of Bolt’s objection, it can be debated amongst philosophers as to whether or not what presuppositionalism provides meets the criteria for an argument, but if we are to grant that TAG is such a formulation it is true that presuppositionalism at least presents one argument. But this is not inconsistent with what Moreland has said, and rather it diverges into a separate discussion on whether or not the argument given by presuppositionalists is sound. I discuss this in my recent article, “The Case Against Presuppositionalism: Part III“.

Where Moreland states that:

Just as using a map to find Atlanta says nothing amiss about the metaphysical priority of Atlanta to the map, likewise, to use a theistic argument to find God says nothing amiss about the metaphysical priority of God to the argument.

Bolt says:

First, Moreland is equivocating as “finding God” must mean something quite different from “finding Atlanta” since both are not “found” in the same way at all, the one being a particular location. Second, Scripture does not allow any room for the view that people are able to “find God” through theistic arguments, as God is already “found” or known. Third, the necessity of theistic arguments with respect to some people results in all sorts of absurdities regarding those who lived prior to such theistic proofs were formulated and those who are intellectually incapable of grasping such proofs. Fourth, there is at the very least a claim that there is an epistemological priority of God to the argument which Moreland has not touched upon at all.

The notion of equivocating the term “finding God” is one where I see no problem, the map example is after all an example and similes are being drawn. Bolt’s second and third objection have been dealt with above. The question of the epistemological priority of God is the question of presuppositionalism as a whole, of course, and cannot be dealt with here. Just briefly, however, even the Classical/Evidentialist philosopher would agree that there is an epistemic priority of God for all existent things exist contingent upon God’s necessary existence. That is to say, not only could nothing be known without God, there would be nothing to know and nobody to not know it! I do not see where the non-presuppositionalist disagrees with this statement.

Where Moreland states:

The presuppositionalist is wrong to think that if an argument leads on to a belief in the existence of God, this God could not be the God of Christianity…

Bolt responds with the claim that the God in which Antony Flew believes cannot be the Christian God. It is true that Flew was led to belief in a God through argument, and that his concept of God is deistic. It is puzzling though, precisely how many Gods does Chris Bolt think exist? If it is the case that only one God exists, and that it is the Christian God then anyone professing belief in a God as a result of argument must believe in the Christian God insofar as the presented arguments are sound. They would simply fail to grasp his nature properly. This might sound peculiar at first, but it seems to logically follow from the statement that there is only one God. That is to say, there is not another God existing beside the Christian God whom Flew has been convinced to believe in as a result of argument. If the premises of the argument were sound, they must be expressing qualities of the existent God, and if that existent God is the Christian God then Flew is believing in him without knowing it, but believing in him to a lesser degree than say, a Christian would. In fact, it seems that any notion of God conceivable would at least grasp some quality of the Christian God (if the Christian God exists as the totality of all), for what positive quality could God lack?

In fact, the error is not one of the argument, but would be one of the person acknowledging the conclusion. Flew’s belief that he believes in God X is incorrect, but his belief in God X is not incorrect, just underdeveloped or misguided.

But does this then necessitate that God could be attributed false properties? Could an argument establish that God is evil and lead someone to believe in an evil God? How then would this be representative of the Christian God. Well, the issue is an interesting one to ponder but all arguments I know which have attempted to show that God is evil have failed miserably, they are horribly unsound. Evil is in fact a negative quality and God does not possess negative qualities. These attributions are in fact at odds with our basic philosophical notions of God as possessing maximal greatness.

So unless Bolt believes in a pantheon of Gods it is necessarily the case that any belief in God is a belief in the Christian one insofar as it is necessarily the case that the Christian God is the only God which exists! Miscategorizations or misattributions would be due to a sort of “seeing through a glass; darkly”, a fault not of the argument but of the interpreter.

But is it not the arguments fault for not attempting to express the full reality of God’s nature? I do not think so. In fact, I do not think that any Classical/Evidentialist Philosopher would seek to establish all the attributes of God with one argument, they present cumulative cases (that is except for proponents of the Ontological Argument). It is thereby unfair to extract these arguments from the set in which they are intended for delivery and criticize them on a one by one basis for not establishing a thorough enough conclusion. In fact, one could make one argument out of all of Craig’s arguments (for example), but what a long winded argument that would be and you’d probably need a degree to read along!

The quote which Bolt presents from Moreland is indicative of such usage of one theistic argument as a “magic bullet”:

In summary, it is most reasonable to believe that the universe had a beginning which was caused by a timeless, immutable agent. This is not a proof that such a being is the God of the Bible, but it is a strong statement that the world had its beginning by the act of a person. And this is at the very least a good reason to believe in some form of theism. (J.P. Moreland. Scaling the Secular City: A Defense of Christianity. Baker Books. Grand Rapids, MI. 1987. Pg. 42.)

This is representative of the pivotal first step in a cumulative case. One must walk before they run and it is difficult to see how one should be faulted for this.

In response to the notion of reality being the common ground between the believer and the non-believer (where it was stated that gravity effects the sinner as much as the saint), Bolt states:

The unbeliever cannot account for the knowledge of something like gravity because she will not accept that Jesus is the Lord of gravity. Of course, Moreland might not either, and that is the problem pointed out in my previous post.

This brings us right back to whether or not presuppositionalism is a coherent philosophical system, and sadly Bolt misses the point. The common ground of reality affect both the believer and the non-believer, and this is a common ground from which dialogue may begin. Knowledge of gravity is not required for the effects of gravity. We do not see babies flying because they do not understand physics! The point is that reality is something that effects us all, God-fearing or not. The notion of whether or not one can “account” for gravity should be illuminated through sound, reasoned, argument. It is not difficult to see the move an atheist who experiences the effects of gravity may move towards establishing the existence of God. Perhaps it is the case that gravity exists and that gravity is a natural law and that the best explanation for the natural law of gravity is an intelligent designer. If the non-believer will accept such “natural” theological propositions, they have establish a creator of the Universe, the first step in what could be a cumulative case for Christian theism. I do not think such a move is warranted, but it is not impossible to work from common ground to belief in the Christian God as the presuppositionalist so states.

I have been asked to deal with an argument Bolt presented in his initial post on Craig’s argumentation:

(1)If the Christian worldview is true then Christ is Lord of all.
(2)According to Craig, Christ is not Lord of all.
(3)Therefore according to Craig, the Christian worldview is not true.

I think the issues have already been addressed. I shall grant (1), so the obvious issue is (2). It’s obviously untrue for anyone who has read Craig’s work, but the justification Bolt presents is shoddy at best. William Craig has said numerous times that he does not believe on the basis of argument. He is in agreement with Plantinga that belief in God requires no argument to be justified, as it is properly basic (a tenet of reformed epistemology). His arguments do not validate his faith, they only seek to demonstrate said rationality.

After Bolt’s argument, he says:

Now obviously Craig holds that the Christian worldview is true and he seeks to prove portions of it. The point here is not that Craig is actually an unbeliever, but rather that even before Craig begins his arguments he undercuts them all and concedes the debate with his methodology.

Bolt undercuts (2) on his own at this point. Thus, we cannot grant (3). What is really at discussion is whether or not Craig’s apologetic method acknowledges Christ as ‘lord of all’. Bolt says that it does not because he attempts to establish an objective ground from where to begin. But this does not necessitate that Craig has stopped accepting that his existence, and subsequently his thinking is contingent upon God. In fact, to establish this from his position Craig would have to make the fantastical argument that he exists necessarily rather than contingently. The presuppositionalist says that without God, nothing can be proven. It’s even more dire than that under Classical/Evidentialist apologetics as without God there is absolutely nothing. God is the necessary precondition for everything, the disagreement lies with how presuppositionalists attempt to show this.

When Craig makes his arguments he has not forsaken knowledge of Christ, which God does Bolt think Craig is representing? There is nothing inconsistent with Craig making the arguments the way he does, acknowledging that the unbeliever has an innate knowledge of God (he references this in his writings) and that they may need arguments to uncover or accept what they already know just as one needs a map to find Atlanta.

It is verging on incoherence to say that if one attempts to speak about God from a mutually accessible sphere (that of reality between the believer and unbeliever) that they have then undercut their position. It is perhaps even more absurd to say that no sphere exists, for surely, as said before, gravity effects both the believer and the non-believer in the same way. Even Paul himself offers evidentialist arguments for the Resurrection in his writing, did Paul somehow undercut his position?

No classical apologist that I know of denies matters of “presupposition”, if the presuppositionalist position just seeks to establish that without God, nothing could be demonstrated, then all classical apologists agree with presuppositionalism on the conclusion and disagree on the method. What differs is whether or not presuppositionalism formulates a sound argument for the existence of God and whether or not it is sound as an apologetic method.

All in all, I feel the points of Bolt’s argument have been addressed by my previous points, but as he requested I’ve added this previous portion to deal with it directly.