Authored by: Mitchell LeBlanc.

As a response to my previous article, “Bolt’s Blunder: Misunderstanding Apologetics“, Chris Bolt has replied in turn with his own article. Throughout the piece he makes reference to a number of “inconsistencies” I’ve apparently made. It shall be interesting to discern whether or not these actually are inconsistencies or failures of reading comprehension on Bolt’s part.

As a matter of preliminaries, I feel it prudent to address the first claims of inconsistency Bolt has placed on me. Granted these are not wholly relevant to the topic at hand, but as they were brought up it is prudent to deal with them accordingly.

Bolt said:

Mitch often ranges well beyond the scope of a topic in responding to it; that this is the case may be seen in his presentation of numerous contradictory views in his responses to me concerning the Problem of Induction and in his introduction of a version of the Ontological argument wherein he attempted to show that the traditional apologist can affirm that God cannot lie (even though he subsequently admitted that he did not accept the argument anyway) while trying to show that in the presuppositionalist view God might lie.

The matter of ‘contradictory responses’ in my posts on Induction is something I thought was a settled issue. Nowhere was I being inconsistent, I was attempting to elucidate the full scope of the issue at hand for the readership. The series of posts ended for Bolt with a response discounting a pragmatic justification for Induction. I do not find this inconsistent with any of my previous replies as I have told Bolt, and as he should know from his time on this website, the primary purpose is elucidation and that comes before any outlining of my own views. As such, the ‘inconsistencies’ which Bolt refers to when speaking of our discussion on induction are misinterpretations.

Bolt also ended with an espousal of the Christian’s ability to account for the Uniformity of Nature but did not respond to the subsequent criticism in my “Final Response to Bolt on Induction“.

This matter of this Ontological Argument seems to be a source of confusion, I had thought the issue settled in my “Response to Bolt’s Misunderstanding“.

In matters of the Ontological Argument philosophers deal with what is called “maximum excellence” or “modal perfection”, these classifications necessarily include honesty as a positive property attributable to God. As such, the Ontological Argument if successful would establish an honest God. I am not sure where the problem lies. One can find a recent formulation of the Ontological Argument from Dr. Maydole, accessible here.

We can now move on to Bolt’s latest claims.

In response to my saying “I am not one to defend Christian apologists, as you can imagine, they and I disagree on many things”, Bolt says that I’m lying! I think this is merely a matter of semantics, when I say that I’m not one to do it, I have not made a habit out of doing so. I was speaking colloquially. We could argue for days on what constitutes a habit, but it is besides the point.

When I stated that I was a firm defender of philosophy and philosophical discourse, Bolt said:

Notice again the inconsistency. Mitch is defending non-presuppositional schools of apologetics and I am defending presuppositional apologetics, both of us launching attacks upon the other school, yet he sees himself as defending philosophical discourse in his efforts while I am apparently not. Where is the difference? Is Mitch implying that if someone argues against his philosophical monstrosities that one is no longer engaging in philosophical discourse?

The implication is that presuppositionalism is bad philosophy in a manner akin to Young Earth Creationism being pseudo-science. In many regards, it is accurate to say that presuppositionalism is to the philosophy of religion what creationism is to biology. I don’t expect Bolt to agree with me, but I fail to see how this is an inconsistency.

I stated:

My defense of Classical/Evidentialist apologetics is a defense of coherent philosophical approaches…

to which Bolt replies:

Either Mitch accepts Classical and Evidentialist apologetics as philosophically coherent or he does not. His statement here would indicate that he does accept them as philosophically coherent, but then why is he not a Christian Theist? His actual position, so far as I understand it, is atheism which would entail the rejection of these apologetic arguments. If he rejects Classical and Evidentialist apologetics then he surely does so because they are not philosophically coherent. This inconsistency plagues Mitch’s responses. The truth is that neither he nor I accept the arguments as philosophically coherent, and he is making a mess of himself by trying to pretend that he does.

What appears to Bolt as an inconsistency is actually just a misunderstanding on his part. I wholeheartedly accept the Classical and Evidentialist apologetic methods as being philosophically coherent. That is to say, I am an agnostic atheist and I accept, along with professional philosophers of religion, that the Classical and Evidentialist (and Reformed Epistemological to some extent) methods are the only coherent means in our attempt to establish the existence of God. There is no inconsistency in my accepting of the method of argumentation but rejecting the conclusions arrived at from said method. To suggests such would be so absurd to say that in my ‘acceptance’ of Modal Logic as an apt system to reveal logical contingency, I must thereby accept the conclusions of every modal argument. This is pure nonsense and there is no inconsistency with my statement.

I also charged presuppositionalism as being a type of Fideism. Bolt seems to think there is another inconsistency:

This brings us to yet another contradiction in what Mitch has written. He claims that pressuppositionalists belittle reasoned discourse and favor instead a type of Fideism. For one, this is an amazing assertion coming from someone who claims to have been studying the presuppositional method. This aside, Mitch has elsewhere written, “All matters of demonstrating God’s existence are in the realm of Philosophy. Even for the presuppositionalist, it is merely a philosophical defense of God…”, which directly contradicts his claim that presuppositionalism is fideistic. Further, what exactly has the recent obsession with “refuting presuppositionalism” over on Mitch’s site been about anyway? There he has presented three different articles explicitly setting out as per their titles to refute presuppositionalism. There is simply no material or need to do this with truly fideistic systems. Mitch is yet again exhibiting inconsistency.

We should of course, first define Fideism. Plantinga defines it as a system with  ”urges reliance on faith rather than reason, in matters philosophical and religious” (via the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). The presuppositionalist in suggesting that a belief in God is required to formulate a coherent worldview certainly seems Fideistic. As for the quotation which Bolt takes from a previous post, I still stand by it. In fact, I think that anything which involves thinking is within the realm of Philosophy. Fideism as an epistemological theory is not somehow thereby removed from Philosophy, it still lies within it. Does bolt think that Fideism is so removed? Fideism is the placement of faith as having primacy over reason, this in no way implies that Fideism escapes the encompassing nature of Philosophy.

It is of course true that I have recently authored articles critical of presuppositionalism, but is Bolt honestly saying that this would be unnecessary if presuppositionalism truly was Fideistic? By this criteria, all Fideistic systems would go unchallenged (and unsupported), forever! How absurd a notion is this. Perhaps he is merely saying that such criticisms would simply have no effect, I am beginning to agree. Or perhaps Bolt simply misunderstood. In saying that presuppositionalism is Fideistic, I was making an observation. He is more than welcome to disagree (and I’m sure many do, either presuppositionalist or not). I do see presuppositionalism as a type of Fideism, masquerading as non-Fideistic philosophy. Whether or not this is true remains to be seen, and it is quite possible that I may reverse my opinion that presuppositionalism is Fideistic, but whether I do this or not is largely irrelevant as there is no inconsistency in anything I have said on the matter.

Bolt quotes me as saying:

It is my continued desire that the Philosophy of Religion play host to reasoned discussion between both believers and non-believers that can be conducive to the formulation of coherent positions.

and then asks:

Does Mitch hold that there are such things as contradictory coherent positions? I have a difficult time making sense of this statement otherwise.

Of course not! I do not think the topic of God’s existence is a closed on in Philosophy, so I was merely stating that it is my hope that continued discussion between both viewpoints eventually lead to a conclusion!

Bolt quotes me further as saying:

It would also be prudent for Bolt to note that it is not uncommon in academia for non-theists to critique other non-theists work, or that they respond with defeaters to non-theistic objections to criticisms of a theistic argument.

and then states:

Again, Mitch is hardly an authority regarding “academia”, regardless of what he and his friends on his site believe.

This is simply uncalled for. Bolt’s entire post is dripping with this type of underhanded sarcasm. It is not fair to the readers of UrbanPhilosophy.net to be subjected to such a sneaky insult. I feel that I have been quite kind and gracious in our exchanges and I certainly do not know of any negative interactions had between Bolt and any UP.net member.

In the next portion, Bolt is speaking of the Moreland quote outlined in my previous article. If you have not read this quotation yet, it would be prudent to do so before continuing.

I stated:

With regard to the statement that ‘in the order of being there would have to be the city of Atlanta before there could be a map showing one how to get to Atlanta’ Bolt objects that this need not necessarily be the case. He offers an example of a map to CandyLand. There are a few problems with this objection. Firstly, the existence of CandyLand as espoused by his map is presumably not representative of an actual state of affairs. Similar to a map of Middle Earth, the plotted locations represent their co-ordinates in some possible world, the references need not be actualized. In this regard, his map to CandyLand and a map of Middle Earth are not necessarily false constructs, they simply represent a non-actualized reality, that of a fictional world.

Bolt objects by repeatedly saying that what is the case for CandyLand could be the case for Atlanta., but he makes a grave error when he states:

This could be the case [that the point on a map represents a false construct] also with a map to Atlanta. It need not exist for there to be a map to it.

This is simply false! The mapped point would at least have to exist as a modal proposition. Atlanta need not actually exist to plot it, but any plotting of it necessitates possible existence. That is to say, the map represents a modal proposition where in some possible world X exists (provided there is no logical impossibility in the proposition). Every fictional map is a possible world just as every fictional story is a possible world. As such, there is nothing inconsistent with representing a point on a map which does not possess actual existence.

I stated:

But is it possible for someone to map something that doesn’t exist at all? I’d argue not.

To which Bolt states:

Actually, Mitch just argued that one can. What he is about to do is equivocate on what he means by “exist” in an ad hoc attempt to save Moreland’s statement.

I did no such thing! I’m not equivocating at all, the distinction between actual and possible existence is clear.

Thus, Moreland’s point is made. The order of being always holds primacy over the order of knowing. Modal semantics only strengthen this claim, it is logically impossible that something can be known without being. Bolt should not misinterpret this as saying that it is logically impossible that something can be known without actually being, the distinction is tantamount to understanding the entire point of Moreland’s passage.

I stated:

The fact is, to be plotted on a map the object/location being plotted must possess either actual or possible existence. In both respects the existence holds primacy over the plotting in the order of being.

Bolt replied:

Mitch has not shown that it need possess actual existence. It need not. Mitch has only tried to show that it need possess possible existence, but Moreland is not talking about possible existence anyway, so this has nothing to do with Moreland’s argument. Really one is left wondering why an atheist would ever go to such great lengths to try and save a bad illustration set forth in a bad argument by a Christian apologist.

Again Bolt misses the point entirely. It should be as clear as day that to be plotted on a map, the object must possess either actual or possible existence. That I have not shown the necessity of actual existence is irrelevant and an odd request.

Saying that Moreland’s passage is not referring to possibilities therefore any mention of them is not an objection! Bolt made a criticism of Moreland’s statement, to which I am offering a reply that is wholly relevant.

I stated:

For the person who was not aware of the existence of Atlanta, in looking at the map, could at least discern that (i) Atlanta exists (ii) I either am in Atlanta, or must move to get to Atlanta (provided the person new their position on the map)

To which Bolt objects:

Mitch presented an argument that Atlanta must possess possible existence but now reasserts that one can know that Atlanta actually exists if there is a map to Atlanta. He thus equivocates on “exists” and asserts something which has already been shown to be false. He cannot argue that he is speaking of merely possible existence in the above quote, as one cannot be in or move into a possible existence as it is not actual.

This is yet another misunderstanding on Bolt’s part. I did not state that Atlanta actually exists if there is a map to Atlanta, that is ludicrous. Bolt almost touches on the relevant point towards the end where he mentions that “one cannot be in or move into a possible existence”. This is true if the person is actual by my example didn’t necessitate this, in fact, it seems clear to me that in my example even the person is being treated as a modal proposition.

If I were to write out my modal indicators, my above statement would read: “In the case of possible world W1, the person who was not aware of the existence of Atlanta, in looking at the map, could at least discern that (i) Atlanta exists (ii) I either am in Atlanta, or must move to get to Atlanta…”

I could have included the modal indicator, but I thought the context of the passage implied it. At any rate, this is yet another ‘inconsistency’ which can be chalked up to Bolt’s misunderstanding.

I stated:

But I fail to see the relevance of this objection. It is only relevant in light of his next criticism.

Bolt replies:

Notice Mitch writes that he cannot see how an objection is relevant and in his very next sentence writes that the same objection is relevant. This is yet another example of the aforementioned inconsistency found throughout what Mitch writes.

This is just grasping for straws! Perhaps I overestimate that the reader will understand the first sentence in light of the second. It is clear that I am stating the relevance of the objection on its own is non-existent.

I stated:

It is interesting to note here that Moreland does not claim that one needs a map to KNOW God, but rather needs a map to find God

To which Bolt replies:

The quote is: “But in the order of knowing, it might be the case that one would need a ‘map’ to God, i.e., a theistic argument.” My interpretation of what Moreland is stating here fits with the context of the sentence and argument since Moreland is speaking of the order of KNOWING, not the order of FINDING…  Consider what one might mean by “find God”. There is no meaning to “find God” I can think of which might require a traditional theistic proof.

My reading of Moreland’s material leads me to conclude that his use of “find” is synonymous with uncover, arrive at, realize, etc… It is not my understanding from his work that he denies the a priori knowledge of God.

Bolt states:

What does it mean to “reveal…known knowledge” anyway? Is not all knowledge known? If something is known, what would it mean to reveal said knowledge?

I didn’t think I’d have to explain this to a Calvinist! All knowledge is known, but it’s my understanding that Bolt’s own theology states that it is suppressed. Thus, the revealing of such known knowledge would be similar if not identical to an ‘un-suppressing’.

Bolt seeks further to establish a divide between God’s metaphysical priority and his epistemological priority. For a philosopher of religion this move seems to be just silly. If it is the case that God holds metaphysical priority and all existents are contingent upon God’s necessary existence then this precludes God’s having epistemological priority, it could not be any other way. It would in fact be the case, necessarily.

I stated:

Where Moreland states: The presuppositionalist is wrong to think that if an argument leads on to a belief in the existence of God, this God could not be the God of Christianity…Bolt responds with the claim that the God in which Antony Flew believes cannot be the Christian God. It is true that Flew was led to belief in a God through argument, and that his concept of God is deistic.

To which Bolt replies:

A deistic god is not the Christian God. So again, Flew was led to belief in the existence of a god through argument, but this god is deistic and hence not the Christian God. Moreland’s statement is, again, false.

But according to Bolt there is no deistic God, there is only the Christian one. So the attributes which Flew ascribes to the deistic God are actually attributes of the Christian God, to a lesser extent. He’s believing in the same God to a lesser degree.

Bolt states that he agrees with me when I say:

If it is the case that only one God exists, and that it is the Christian God then anyone professing belief in a God as a result of argument must believe in the Christian God insofar as the presented arguments are sound.

His issue is that he does not deem the theistic arguments to be sound. Of course, neither do I. (please don’t confuse this to mean I think the methods are unsound as well)

Bolt seems to find that I am inconsistent, he claims that at some times I state that a theistic argument can prove the Christian God and at other times I do not. In order to examine whether or not this is true, let’s examine it further.

I stated in a previous comment on one of Bolt’s posts about a traditional argument:

This argument alone does not arrive at Christian theism, obviously

and I later qualified by stating:

That quotation is a lack of clarity on my part. I should have said that traditional arguments that are given in a cumulative apologetic. It was also in specific reference to a discussion on the Ontological Argument, I think. It is still my position that if the Ontological Argument holds, it cannot possibly argue for any other God than the one that necessarily exists, by virtue of the modal approach it takes.

Bolt takes issue by stating:

Unfortunately this does not clarify things much, but we can refute what Mitch writes concerning the problem before us anyway. The Ontological Argument need not require belief in the Christian God. This is true upon my presuppositions, but it is also true upon the traditional apologist’s presuppositions. How does Mitch keep trying to argue against this? By assuming that traditional arguments are to be used in a so called cumulative case apologetic. There are fatal problems with such an approach; why might not the cosmological argument refer to one god and the teleological to another? Why assume the arguments are connected at all? What has a person actually argued for prior to bringing in the rest of the apologetic? Most important here is this consideration: any one of the traditional arguments is not the equivalent of the sum of the traditional arguments. Traditional arguments do not make the case for the Christian God. All of this may nevertheless be set aside as well, for Moreland never qualifies his statement the way that Mitch does. It is false to assume that because someone comes to believe in a god via theistic argument that the person believes in the Christian God, yet this is precisely what Moreland states, “The presuppositionalist is wrong to think that if an argument leads on to a belief in the existence of God, this God could not be the God of Christianity…”. Aristotle no doubt came to belief in a very different god as did Flew; both via arguments. Moreland’s statement is false. Mitch’s statement is not Moreland’s, but it is likewise problematic.

I am unsure what Bolt means when he says that the Ontological Argument need not require belief in the Christian God. The Ontological Argument establishes a God which necessarily exists (a task far beyond most other arguments) and if the only God which exists is the Christian God, then the Ontological Argument establishes that the Christian God exists necessarily. Obviously, Bolt has issue with a cumulative apologetic, he seems to want a “magic bullet”, perhaps things are not as simple as Bolt thinks they are.

He asks why the cosmological argument might refer to one god and the teleological to another. At the very least, a theistic application of Occam’s razor removes this possibility. Furthermore, one could apply Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles [∀F(Fx ↔ Fy) → x=y]. That is to say that if there is no difference between ‘either’ god established, they are necessarily the same. We would be forced to identify one characteristic that one God had that another did not, but since god definitionally possesses all possible attributes, this is absurd.

Of course, Bolt keeps replying that these certain people have come to believe in different gods but this just sounds silly to me, if it is necessarily the case that there exists only one God and that God is the Christian God then anyone who professes belief in a god who possesses a positive attribute is professing belief in the Christian God, just to a lesser degree than that which may be possible. I don’t know of a simpler way to convey this. Aristotle and Flew may have thought they have come to different Gods than Chris Bolt, but if God is the Christian God, they could not have. That is to say, the Christian God possesses all the attributes which Aristotle attributed to his prime mover and that Flew attributes to his deity. For the arguments which brought them to these conclusions to be sound, a God must exist and insofar as the Christian God exists, such arguments were sound only because the Christian God existed.

Bolt may take issue with the fact that no single argument meets the uniqueness proof in that it can establish the Christian God outright, but he is simply asking too much. Traditional arguments in a cumulative case possess the capability to prove the existence of the Christian God. If he wants to isolate a single argument and criticize an entire apologetic on the basis of that argument alone he’s being very silly. It seems that he may even be committing a Fallacy of Composition:

(A) No traditional argument can prove the existence of the Christian God

(B) Therefore, no set of traditional arguments can prove the existence of the Christian God

This is obviously fallacious.

He goes on to state:

If the full reality of God’s nature is not proven then God has not been proven.

But I see no good reason to accept this statement. In fact Bolt seems kind of foolish to imply that he has complete knowledge of God’s nature. Are there really no mysteries left in God for Chris Bolt? He knows everything about God’s nature?

Bolt also stated:

No, they [apologists] do not all present cumulative cases. No, proponents of the Ontological Argument do not always not present a cumulative case. Is Mitch just making this stuff up as he goes? It is certainly not true.

We should distinguish between Philosophers and Apologists of course. A Christian Philosopher may not be an apologist and may publish articles focusing on just one argument, obviously. But if there are Classical/Evidentialist apologists out there who are not using cumulative cases, this seems to be a fault of the apologist and not of the method.

Bolt also accuses me of being like Jello when I outlined a possible scenario in which an atheist would arrive at the existence of God. I said that I did not feel that such a move was warranted, and Bolt saw this as a contradiction. Surely just because I see a move as unwarranted does not mean the move is impossible. Again an alleged inconsistency is merely a misunderstanding by Bolt. It is wholly possible that an atheist come to the Christian God through a cumulative approach, I just do not see the current arguments convincing enough to warrant such a move. This does not mean the apologetic method is defeated, merely that I find the arguments insufficient (not the method!).

Bolt begins to critique my analysis of his argument. His argument is:

(1)If the Christian worldview is true then Christ is Lord of all.
(2)According to Craig, Christ is not Lord of all.
(3)Therefore according to Craig, the Christian worldview is not true

I granted (1) and criticized (2) on the basis that anyone who has read Craig’s work knows that this is not the case. Bolt attempts to reformulate my criticism as:

I think he means something like, as anyone who has read Craig’s work [knows], Craig obviously [considers this] untrue? If so, he has granted the second premise of the argument. Since the argument is valid, the conclusion follows that according to Craig, the Christian worldview is not true. Yet Craig is arguing that it is true, thus Craig defeats himself through his apologetic method.

His reformulation is questionable, it is even more questionable as to how that would concede the point. Even if we accepted his reformulation and said that “Craig considers that the statement “according to Craig, ‘Christ is not the lord of all’ false”, how does this grant the premise? It is wholly consistent with (2) being false! This is simply incoherent.

This is where we arrive at the issue of Craig’s statement of “checking one’s view at the door”. We all know that presuppositionalists claim that objectivity is impossible, but this has not been demonstrated. There is still the issue of the common ground of reality which both the believer and unbeliever share. In this respect Craig ‘checking his view at the door’ does not outright deny the existence of God, but it is rather an agreement to argument upon the common ground shared between believer and unbeliever!

It’s not as if suddenly, for Craig, the qualifiers for the various propositions in his head become ~God, how absurd of an idea is that?

I stated:

In fact, to establish this [that all propositions lose modal contingency] from his position Craig would have to make the fantastical argument that he exists necessarily rather than contingently.

Bolt says this is false, but does not demonstrate how. Craig does not suddenly presume that his existence is logically necessary when he is debating with an unbeliever. How then, is he being objective? As I’ve said before, by extending the invitation to discuss on the common ground of reality that both he and his opponent share.

In closing I said that the differences between apologetic methods came down to:

… whether or not presuppositionalism formulates a sound argument for the existence of God.

Bolt replied:

Since Mitch holds that presuppositionalism does not have a “sound” argument for the existence of God, and presuppositionalism differs from classicalism on this point, it follows that classical apologetics includes a sound argument for the existence of God. However, Mitch is an atheist and does not accept that God exists. Therefore Mitch is by his own argument shown to be irrational, since one rejects a sound argument upon pain of irrationality.

This is perhaps the epitome of silliness. It does not follow from what I said that I accept classical arguments as sound, I merely acknowledge that the classical method has the potential of generating a sound argument for God’s existence (if it hasn’t done so in one I am ignorant of). This is contrasted with the current state of presuppositional apologetics which are dead in the water in terms of philosophical merit.

Bolt closes:

Now watch him backtrack and try to clean up his sloppy argument! “Oh, oh I did not mean that!” Sure, but tomorrow he will repeat it again and deny saying it before. Yeesh.

That is simply rude.

It seems that upon further inspection, these ‘inconsistencies’ are just Bolt’s misunderstandings.

In closing, I would like to request that Bolt begin to make proper links back to the material he is responding to on this website. I offer links to his work and it seems courteous to do the same in return.