Authored by: Mitchell LeBlanc.

Note: This is to serve as an overview or introduction to the issue of Divine Omnipotence. This is not an argument or statement of conclusion, but an example of a reasoning process and the main issues at hand.

In order to answer the question, “Can God Sin?”, one must first resolve the issue of God’s omnipotence.

Omnipotence literally means ‘all power’, yet we must understand what it means to say that something is “all powerful”. When speaking of God, and his omnipotence there are three possible explanations as to the meaning of the statement, ‘God is all-powerful’.

A: God can do anything

B: God can do anything, including that which is logically impossible

C: God can produce any conceivable thing or arrangement of things

In regards to A, it is often misunderstood  by asserting such that whatever question could arise regarding ability, God could suffice with a positive answer. There is an obvious problem here, especially for a God who is proposed as being incorporeal. Can an incorporeal God swim accross Lake Ontario? Can an incorporeal God cycle 500 miles in under a second?

In this explanation, God’s omnipotence is qualified by an underwritten factor: logical possibility. That is to say in A, God can do anything which is logically possible, but he cannot do that which isn’t. This explanation excludes God’s ability to create a square circle, or a five sided triangle.

But are there logically possible feats which are beyond God’s power as well?

There are variations of a question which are often brought up in casual discourse regarding God’s omnipotence that usually lead in the theist citing A as the definition of God’s omnipotence. That question is a variation of “Can God create a stone so heavy he cannot lift?”

The question attempts to invoke a paradox. Both possible answers to the question (yes, or no) seem to lead to the conclusion that there is something which God cannot do. The theist response to this question is that creating a stone so heavy that God himself cannot lift is illogical, but is it?

We must ask ourselves, is it logically possible that something may be created that cannot be destroyed by its maker? The simple answer is ‘yes’. Human beings surely possess the ability to perform such feats. One example of such could be a futuristic nuclear fallout shelter, made impervious to all humanly destruction by its maker. Indeed it would be created by the maker, but not destructable. It is obvious then that there is no logical impossibility with the idea of a maker creating something that he later cannot destroy.

Could God perform such a feat? If he CANNOT, we can identify that there is a logically possible thing that God cannot do. If God CAN then we must envision that God brought about a state of affairs in which something was made by God that cannot be destroyed by God. Again, there is no logical impossibility in a maker destroying a creation as this too is evident often. Furthermore, there seems to be an impossibility in the very attempt to conceive of a created thing which is indestructible on all accounts (what created thing could survive the death of the entire Universe?).

It is thereby established that while an objection that God can only do that which is logically possible may be warranted, there are clearly instances in which God is unable to do the logically possible as well. To suggest that creating a stone so heavy that God cannot lift is such a logical impossibility is to arbitrarily equate the definition of logical impossibility to God’s ability. It would be stating: “Anything that God cannot do is logically impossible”

Surely this objection cannot stand, as it reads as follows:

• What is logically possible is defined by what God can do. If God can do something, it is logically possible.

• What is logically impossible is defined by what God cannot do. If God cannot do something, it is logically impossible.

This is obviously fallacious reasoning:

P1: God cannot everything but that which is a logical impossibility

P2: God cannot create an object that he cannot destroy

C: Therefore, creating an object that the maker cannot destroy is a logical impossibility

As I have shown above, there is NO logical impossibility with regards to the creation of such an object. If it were, we should quickly strategize other ways to survive a potential nuclear holocaust as a fallout shelter (or equivalent) is a logical impossibility.

With specific regard to the Christian God, it may be interesting to note that the Bible itself tells us of things which God cannot do. Namely, swearing by anything higher than himself  or breaking his word.

An analysis of B reminds us of Descartes. He proposed that God can do anything, including the logically impossible. Interestingly enough, while many people point to mathematical truths (such as all circles not being squares) there conclude that God cannot do the logically impossible, but Descartes looks to the sae mathematics and concludes the opposite. For Descartes, all mathematical truths owe their existence to God just as with anything else he has created.

There is an obvious problem regarding this type of God. If God truly can do anything, including the logically impossible  it would not matter if we stumbled across a proof for the non-existence of God, as God being that which can do the logically impossible could very well exist in the face of all reasoned discourse telling us otherwise! A God such as Descartes God, as J.L Mackie says, is “outside the realm of rational enquiry and discussion.”

Furthermore, when we speak of logical impossibility we often use examples such as ‘square circle’ or ‘a statement which is both true and not true’. J.L Mackie reminds us that “a logical contradiction is not a state of affairs which it is supremely difficult to produce, but only a form of words which fails to describe any state of affairs.”

With regards to C, “God can produce any concievable thing or arrangement of things,” we must be very careful to show how it is different from A.

To quote Aquinas:

“God’s power, considered in itself extends to all such objects as do not imply a contradcition… And as regards things that imply a contradiction, they are impossible to God as being impossible in themselves. Consequently, God’s power extends to things that are possible in themselves: and such are the things that do not involve a contradiction.”

Superficially, from this explanation it looks like C is simply A, but Aquinas thinks there are many logically possible feats that God can’t do (mainly because of his lack of body). For example, God cannot cut his hair, or wax his chest. But, Aquinas states, God can create whatever can genuinely be and that this is omnipotence.

Aquinas further argues:

“Something is judged to be possible or impossible from the implication of the terms: possible when the predicate is compatible with the subject, for instance, that Socrates is seated; impossible when it is not compatible, for instance, that a human being is a donkey.”

Aquinas is concluding that God can bring about anything that is possible absolutely speaking:

“The divine being, on which the notion of divine power is founded, is infinite existence, not limited to any kind of being, but holding within itself and anticipating the perfection of the whole of existence. Whatever can have the nature of being falls within the range of things that are absolutely possible, and it is with respect to these that God is called all-powerful.”

Simply put, C argues that it is not possible for an agent to bring about an impossible state of affairs (think: square circle), since if it were, it would be possible for an impossible state of affairs to exist. That in itself, would be contradictory.

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy futher states:

“[It is also not] possible for an agent to bring about a necessary state of affairs (e.g., that all cubes are shaped). It is possible for an agent, a, to bring about a necessary state of affairs, s, only if possibly, (1) a brings about s, and (2) if a had not acted, then s would have failed to obtain. Because a necessary state of affairs obtains whether or not anyone acts, (2) is false. As a consequence, it is impossible for an agent to bring about either a necessary or an impossible state of affairs. Obviously, an agent’s having the power to bring about a state of affairs entails that, possibly, the agent brings about that state of affairs. Thus, [the omnipotence defined in B]  is incoherent. Henceforth, it will be assumed that it is not possible for an agent to have the power to bring about any state of affairs whatsoever.”

To touch back on our “Can God create a stone so heavy he cannot lift?” problem, Aquinas would respond with a resounding “no”. In remembering that C states that ‘God can make to be anything which can be thought of as able to be“. A stone which God cannot lift is not obviously capable of being.

How does this differ from the conclusion in A? To put it mildly, in A, it is not logically impossible for a maker to create an object that he cannot destroy. In C, it is only possible for God to bring about that which is able to be.

Comparing A and C, there is no logical impossibility in a maker creating an object that he cannot destroy (A), but there is a problem when God tries to bring about that which cannot be (C) in this case that is the stone too heavy for him to lift. If it is true that everything other than God is wholly derived from God, then God can terminate any such thing at will.

Perhaps the simplest way in which I can differentiate A and C is that in A God can do everything which is logically possible, whereas in  C there remain some logically possible things that God still cannot do (i.e shave his chest, poke himself in the belly), rather God can make to be whatever can genuinely be. It is not logically impossible to create an object that the maker cannot then destroy, but it is logically impossible that a stone too heavy for God to lift, exist. God can only bring about what, in itself, can be thought to exist without contradiction.

Aquinas states that there are restrictions on God’s omnipotence. God’s actions are limited by that which is logically possible, AND that which is consistent with having been done by God.

With the above definitions established, we may proceed to our goal of addressing the question: “Can God Sin?”

Out of the aforementioned definitions C seems to be the most reasonable (assuming that God is the maker of everything other than himself).

Should the religious connotation of the question bother some, we can simply ask “Can God do wrong?”

The following dilemma is proposed to us by Anselm:

“How are You [God] omnipotent if You cannot do all things? But how can You do all things if You cannot be corrupted, or tell lies?”

The dilemma is as follows: If God is all powerful, surely he can do wrong. If God is all good, surely he cannot.

We can of course escape the dilemma by denying either God’s omnipotence of omnibenevolence. It seems that the easiest way out of this problem is to argue that God can indeed do wrong, but does not. But if we are arguing that God is essentially good, can we still say this?

When it is said that God is essentially good, it is not to say that he is mostly good, such as saying “Jimbob is an essentially good fellow, but he drinks too much…” We are saying, rather, that God’s essence is good. Essentially, in this connotation means “of its very essence”. Is God unable to do wrong (by being essentially good) as a human being is unable to be a reptile (by being essentially mammal)?

With our definitions of omnipotence, A and B, there does not seem to be an issue here. With both of those definitions God could do wrong, however, those definitions do not seem as reasonable as C.

Perhaps something being “wrong” is of no consequence to the definition provided in C as God can still make something be, even if doing so would be wrong. But if God is essentially good then it seems illogical that he can do wrong at all. How, then, can an essentially good God wrongly bring about that something exists? Aquinas’ definition of omnipotence requires that respect must be given insofar as that which is contradictory, cannot be the case.

Though, even if it were established that God could not do wrong, this surely would not be a denail of his omnipotence. We have already established that there are some things which God cannot do (shave his chest). Therefore, God can remain omnipotent even though his nature prevents him from doing wrong.

For the sake of argument it can also be said that the ability to do wrong is a sign of flawed character, and that the possession of the ability is in fact not a sign of success, but rather, failure.  As Anselm further states:

“He who can do these things can do what is not good for himself and what he ought not to do. And the more he can do these things, the more power adversity and perversity have over him and the less he has against them. He, therefore, who can do these things can do them not by power but by impotence… When someone is said to have the ‘power’ of doing or suffering something which is not to his advantage or which he ought not to do, then by ‘power’ here we mean ‘impotence’.”

Anselm makes the claim that doing wrong always harms the wrong-doer. If this is not the case, it seems that Anselms argument fails. However, if Anselm is correct in saying that doing wrong is to “fall short” of something, the he may very well be correct in his conclusion.

Aquinas goes on to say that:

“To be able to sin is to be able to fail in doing, which cannot be reconciled with omnipotence. It is because God is omnipotent that he cannot sin.”

As such, in response to the question “Can God Sin?” or “Can God do wrong?” the answer depends on two issues in particular:

1. What does it mean to say that God is omnipotent?
2. Is the act of doing wrong, a falling short of doing good?

Insofar as God exists and:

1. To say that God is omnipotent is to say that God may bring about any state of affairs that can genuinely be. (C)
2. The act of doing wrong is a falling short of doing good.

…it can be established that God cannot sin as to do so is to fail at acting in the opposite manner, and such a failing is irreconcilable with omnipotence.