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	<title>Comments on: A Chat with a TAGer</title>
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	<description>Your Thoughts, Everyone&#039;s Wisdom</description>
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		<title>By: C.L. Bolt</title>
		<link>http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/conversations-with-a-presuppositionalist/comment-page-1/#comment-1051</link>
		<dc:creator>C.L. Bolt</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 28 Jan 2010 02:24:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://urbanphilosophy.net/?p=1043#comment-1051</guid>
		<description>Joshua you wrote: &quot;Well, you&#8217;re begging the question that an evolutionary world view can even account for the recognition of logical absolutes. If evolution is in fact true, there is no real foundation by which we deem our senses to be ultimately reliable and we therefore can&#8217;t really be sure that we know the truth about anything, at least not in an absolute sense. This reliability of our senses is also presupposed but not accounted for in the atheistic/ evolutionary world view.&quot; 
 
This is only true if you assume an empirical approach to knowledge. So, how would you show a rationalist that his atheistic or evolutionary worldview fails to account for logic? 
 
Or to set it up another way. Why cannot a Christian justify logic in the same manner that Mitch attempts to? 
 </description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Joshua you wrote: &quot;Well, you&rsquo;re begging the question that an evolutionary world view can even account for the recognition of logical absolutes. If evolution is in fact true, there is no real foundation by which we deem our senses to be ultimately reliable and we therefore can&rsquo;t really be sure that we know the truth about anything, at least not in an absolute sense. This reliability of our senses is also presupposed but not accounted for in the atheistic/ evolutionary world view.&quot; </p>
<p>This is only true if you assume an empirical approach to knowledge. So, how would you show a rationalist that his atheistic or evolutionary worldview fails to account for logic? </p>
<p>Or to set it up another way. Why cannot a Christian justify logic in the same manner that Mitch attempts to?</p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: C.L. Bolt</title>
		<link>http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/conversations-with-a-presuppositionalist/comment-page-1/#comment-10137</link>
		<dc:creator>C.L. Bolt</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 28 Jan 2010 02:24:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://urbanphilosophy.net/?p=1043#comment-10137</guid>
		<description>Joshua you wrote: &quot;Well, you&#8217;re begging the question that an evolutionary world view can even account for the recognition of logical absolutes. If evolution is in fact true, there is no real foundation by which we deem our senses to be ultimately reliable and we therefore can&#8217;t really be sure that we know the truth about anything, at least not in an absolute sense. This reliability of our senses is also presupposed but not accounted for in the atheistic/ evolutionary world view.&quot; 
 
This is only true if you assume an empirical approach to knowledge. So, how would you show a rationalist that his atheistic or evolutionary worldview fails to account for logic? 
 
Or to set it up another way. Why cannot a Christian justify logic in the same manner that Mitch attempts to?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Joshua you wrote: &quot;Well, you&rsquo;re begging the question that an evolutionary world view can even account for the recognition of logical absolutes. If evolution is in fact true, there is no real foundation by which we deem our senses to be ultimately reliable and we therefore can&rsquo;t really be sure that we know the truth about anything, at least not in an absolute sense. This reliability of our senses is also presupposed but not accounted for in the atheistic/ evolutionary world view.&quot; </p>
<p>This is only true if you assume an empirical approach to knowledge. So, how would you show a rationalist that his atheistic or evolutionary worldview fails to account for logic? </p>
<p>Or to set it up another way. Why cannot a Christian justify logic in the same manner that Mitch attempts to?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: C.L. Bolt</title>
		<link>http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/conversations-with-a-presuppositionalist/comment-page-1/#comment-1050</link>
		<dc:creator>C.L. Bolt</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 28 Jan 2010 02:19:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://urbanphilosophy.net/?p=1043#comment-1050</guid>
		<description>I wrote: &#8220;Other presuppositionalists have assured me that logic *itself* (Note Joshua: Not the senses, morality, etc.) is likewise outside the scope of atheistic or evolutionary explanation. Are you abandoning this position?&#8221; 
 
You responded: &#8220;No, I am not abandoning this position.&#8221; 
 
However, you still have not explained yet how logic *itself* is outside the scope of atheistic or evolutionary explanation. Your argument is that *sense experience* itself is outside of atheistic or evolutionary explanation, which is not the same thing. This is why your last post did not answer my question. *Logic* and *sense experience* are not the same thing. I understand that one may be contingent on the other (though in an allegedly a priori or rationalistic system this would need to be shown). You do not have to keep repeating your argument ad nauseum to me; I have been doing this for some time now and I understand it just fine.  
 
I am satisfied that you have not shown that logic *itself* is outside of the scope of atheistic or evolutionary explanation. 
 </description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I wrote: &ldquo;Other presuppositionalists have assured me that logic *itself* (Note Joshua: Not the senses, morality, etc.) is likewise outside the scope of atheistic or evolutionary explanation. Are you abandoning this position?&rdquo; </p>
<p>You responded: &ldquo;No, I am not abandoning this position.&rdquo; </p>
<p>However, you still have not explained yet how logic *itself* is outside the scope of atheistic or evolutionary explanation. Your argument is that *sense experience* itself is outside of atheistic or evolutionary explanation, which is not the same thing. This is why your last post did not answer my question. *Logic* and *sense experience* are not the same thing. I understand that one may be contingent on the other (though in an allegedly a priori or rationalistic system this would need to be shown). You do not have to keep repeating your argument ad nauseum to me; I have been doing this for some time now and I understand it just fine.  </p>
<p>I am satisfied that you have not shown that logic *itself* is outside of the scope of atheistic or evolutionary explanation.</p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: C.L. Bolt</title>
		<link>http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/conversations-with-a-presuppositionalist/comment-page-1/#comment-10136</link>
		<dc:creator>C.L. Bolt</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 28 Jan 2010 02:19:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://urbanphilosophy.net/?p=1043#comment-10136</guid>
		<description>I wrote: &#8220;Other presuppositionalists have assured me that logic *itself* (Note Joshua: Not the senses, morality, etc.) is likewise outside the scope of atheistic or evolutionary explanation. Are you abandoning this position?&#8221; 
 
You responded: &#8220;No, I am not abandoning this position.&#8221; 
 
However, you still have not explained yet how logic *itself* is outside the scope of atheistic or evolutionary explanation. Your argument is that *sense experience* itself is outside of atheistic or evolutionary explanation, which is not the same thing. This is why your last post did not answer my question. *Logic* and *sense experience* are not the same thing. I understand that one may be contingent on the other (though in an allegedly a priori or rationalistic system this would need to be shown). You do not have to keep repeating your argument ad nauseum to me; I have been doing this for some time now and I understand it just fine.  
 
I am satisfied that you have not shown that logic *itself* is outside of the scope of atheistic or evolutionary explanation.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I wrote: &ldquo;Other presuppositionalists have assured me that logic *itself* (Note Joshua: Not the senses, morality, etc.) is likewise outside the scope of atheistic or evolutionary explanation. Are you abandoning this position?&rdquo; </p>
<p>You responded: &ldquo;No, I am not abandoning this position.&rdquo; </p>
<p>However, you still have not explained yet how logic *itself* is outside the scope of atheistic or evolutionary explanation. Your argument is that *sense experience* itself is outside of atheistic or evolutionary explanation, which is not the same thing. This is why your last post did not answer my question. *Logic* and *sense experience* are not the same thing. I understand that one may be contingent on the other (though in an allegedly a priori or rationalistic system this would need to be shown). You do not have to keep repeating your argument ad nauseum to me; I have been doing this for some time now and I understand it just fine.  </p>
<p>I am satisfied that you have not shown that logic *itself* is outside of the scope of atheistic or evolutionary explanation.</p>
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		<title>By: noen</title>
		<link>http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/conversations-with-a-presuppositionalist/comment-page-1/#comment-1048</link>
		<dc:creator>noen</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 Jan 2010 21:18:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://urbanphilosophy.net/?p=1043#comment-1048</guid>
		<description>The preconditions of intelligibility are generally taken to be the laws of logic themselves so your request that people justify the preconditions of intelligibility before they can justify logic is circular. 
 
Logic is descriptive not prescriptive. They are created by man to do work, to represent the world to ourselves. There is not one kind of logic, there are many and they all have their uses in the areas for which they were created. In a deep sense, the world is fundamentally unintelligible and we impose our meaning on it rather than the other way around. 
 
This was all decided about 100 years ago. There is no single edifice that is math or logic. Mathematics is not Nature&#039;s or God&#039;s own language. It is our own. </description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The preconditions of intelligibility are generally taken to be the laws of logic themselves so your request that people justify the preconditions of intelligibility before they can justify logic is circular. </p>
<p>Logic is descriptive not prescriptive. They are created by man to do work, to represent the world to ourselves. There is not one kind of logic, there are many and they all have their uses in the areas for which they were created. In a deep sense, the world is fundamentally unintelligible and we impose our meaning on it rather than the other way around. </p>
<p>This was all decided about 100 years ago. There is no single edifice that is math or logic. Mathematics is not Nature&#039;s or God&#039;s own language. It is our own.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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	<item>
		<title>By: noen</title>
		<link>http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/conversations-with-a-presuppositionalist/comment-page-1/#comment-10135</link>
		<dc:creator>noen</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 Jan 2010 21:18:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://urbanphilosophy.net/?p=1043#comment-10135</guid>
		<description>The preconditions of intelligibility are generally taken to be the laws of logic themselves so your request that people justify the preconditions of intelligibility before they can justify logic is circular. 
 
Logic is descriptive not prescriptive. They are created by man to do work, to represent the world to ourselves. There is not one kind of logic, there are many and they all have their uses in the areas for which they were created. In a deep sense, the world is fundamentally unintelligible and we impose our meaning on it rather than the other way around. 
 
This was all decided about 100 years ago. There is no single edifice that is math or logic. Mathematics is not Nature&#039;s or God&#039;s own language. It is our own.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The preconditions of intelligibility are generally taken to be the laws of logic themselves so your request that people justify the preconditions of intelligibility before they can justify logic is circular. </p>
<p>Logic is descriptive not prescriptive. They are created by man to do work, to represent the world to ourselves. There is not one kind of logic, there are many and they all have their uses in the areas for which they were created. In a deep sense, the world is fundamentally unintelligible and we impose our meaning on it rather than the other way around. </p>
<p>This was all decided about 100 years ago. There is no single edifice that is math or logic. Mathematics is not Nature&#039;s or God&#039;s own language. It is our own.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: MitchLeBlanc</title>
		<link>http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/conversations-with-a-presuppositionalist/comment-page-1/#comment-1046</link>
		<dc:creator>MitchLeBlanc</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 Jan 2010 19:43:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://urbanphilosophy.net/?p=1043#comment-1046</guid>
		<description>Are you admitting then that there is no internal inconsistency with my presentation of conventionalism but rather any incoherence must arise from some external, though allegedly interdependent, precondition? </description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Are you admitting then that there is no internal inconsistency with my presentation of conventionalism but rather any incoherence must arise from some external, though allegedly interdependent, precondition?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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	<item>
		<title>By: MitchLeBlanc</title>
		<link>http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/conversations-with-a-presuppositionalist/comment-page-1/#comment-1047</link>
		<dc:creator>MitchLeBlanc</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 Jan 2010 19:43:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://urbanphilosophy.net/?p=1043#comment-1047</guid>
		<description>Are you admitting then that there is no internal inconsistency with my presentation of conventionalism but rather any incoherence must arise from some external, though allegedly interdependent, precondition? </description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Are you admitting then that there is no internal inconsistency with my presentation of conventionalism but rather any incoherence must arise from some external, though allegedly interdependent, precondition?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: MitchLeBlanc</title>
		<link>http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/conversations-with-a-presuppositionalist/comment-page-1/#comment-10133</link>
		<dc:creator>MitchLeBlanc</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 Jan 2010 19:43:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://urbanphilosophy.net/?p=1043#comment-10133</guid>
		<description>Are you admitting then that there is no internal inconsistency with my presentation of conventionalism but rather any incoherence must arise from some external, though allegedly interdependent, precondition?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Are you admitting then that there is no internal inconsistency with my presentation of conventionalism but rather any incoherence must arise from some external, though allegedly interdependent, precondition?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: MitchLeBlanc</title>
		<link>http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/conversations-with-a-presuppositionalist/comment-page-1/#comment-10134</link>
		<dc:creator>MitchLeBlanc</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 Jan 2010 19:43:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://urbanphilosophy.net/?p=1043#comment-10134</guid>
		<description>Are you admitting then that there is no internal inconsistency with my presentation of conventionalism but rather any incoherence must arise from some external, though allegedly interdependent, precondition?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Are you admitting then that there is no internal inconsistency with my presentation of conventionalism but rather any incoherence must arise from some external, though allegedly interdependent, precondition?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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