Authored by: Mitchell LeBlanc.

I am grateful to Chris Bolt for clearing up some misunderstandings with his most recent post. In my following, I would like to further clear up some confusion that has been espoused during our recent back-and-forth on inductive reasoning.

In pointing out that the “problem of induction” possesses debate on it’s proposed status as a “problem”, I was not intending to “wave a wand”, as Bolt puts it. In pointing out such I simply mean to suggest that one should be as skeptical about the problem of induction as the problem is skeptical of inductive reasoning itself. The assertion of the problem, is of course, that it is not rational to use inductive reasoning. As a precursor to such a discussion, one must be sure to identify what the “term” rational is defined as in this context. From this point, and only this point, can we really reach a conclusion.

Bolt expresses some confusions on my position, and while the intent of my post(s) is not to convey my personal position but rather to show the inability of Christianity to offer any type of solution to the proposed problem, I will for the sake of clarity (and perhaps to satisfy Bolt’s curiosity) outline my own position. I will attempt to do this in a manner which is both concise and accessible:

Is there a problem of induction?

Yes, I think there is an inability to justify our extrapolations of past events into the future. Admittedly, I am still making my way through Reichenbach’s writings on probability theorem but I agree with him that if there are any true inductions our consistent use of induction will eventually discover them. This justification is pragmatic in nature but certainly a reason for it’s continued use.

Can Science establish the truth of a theory?

Briefly speaking, no. I believe it was Popper himself who said that the scope of scientific theories is infinite and no finite amount of evidence can establish the truth of any. Scientific theories cannot be supported, but they can be corroborated by virtue of their falsifiability. That is to say, the better of two theories will be the one which has been subjected to more falsification attempts and has not yet been falsified.

That’s great for science, but what about other areas of our life?

Popper’s falsificationism works very well for science, but we do not have the luxury of being able to extrapolate it to our everyday lives (at least, if we do I’m unaware of such a way). As such, the justification for the use of induction in our everyday lives falls onto that of pragmatism. We should continue to use induction because if there are true inductions, we will discover them by our continued use of induction. I do not think Bolt will find this very convincing, but this leads into my next point.

What about Christianity, doesn’t it solve the problem of induction?

This was the main thrust of my initial post and it is perhaps my own fault that it’s taken this long to convey it accurately. What I am attempting to convey is that if there is a problem of induction the Christians are in the same boat as everyone else, they do not have a way out of the problem (contrary to what they assert).

The presuppositionalist asserts that they have a way out of the problem of induction by virtue of the Uniformity of Nature (UON) as guaranteed to them by God. But I think this is flawed reasoning. There seem to be three main problems with this assertion:

1. The trusting of God’s proposed assurance of the UON presupposes the honesty of God (I’ve outlined the problem with this here and am still awaiting a full response from Bolt: http://urbanphilosophy.net/index.php/philosophy/a-response-to-chris-bolt-on-presuppositionalism-and-gods-honesty/ )

2. The trusting of God’s promise presupposes the justification of induction. Therefore, to use God’s word to justify inductive reasoning is to beg the question.

3. The Uniformity of Nature does not provide justification for induction.

I will forgo dealing with the first issue as the article I linked does so sufficiently. I will then begin with the second (although it draws on matters from the first):

Trusting God
Why does the Christian trust God’s word rather than not? Forgoing the issues raised in the first point and insofar as God’s reliability is determined on the basis of the honesty God has shown in the past, we are faced with a vicious circularity. Such an argument would state:

God has never lied to me in the past, therefore God won’t lie to me in the future

The problem here should be obvious as this statement utilizes the very thing which it seeks to justify: inductive reasoning. But what of the claim that God cannot lie by his very nature? While I have touched upon this issue more in depth in the post I linked above it seems that such a statement again presupposes the validity of inductive reasoning:

It has been against God’s nature to lie in the past, therefore it will be against God’s nature to lie in the future

The Christian will undoubtedly assert that God’s nature is necessarily unchanging, but in doing so they seem to be appealing to knowledge which has yet to be justified (re: the same aforementioned linked post) or another instance of inductive reasoning:

God’s nature has not changed in the past, therefore it will not change in the future

Insofar as it is the case that God’s nature is necessarily unchanging by virtue of X, I am interested to hear a defense.

Why the Uniformity of Nature doesn’t save the Christian

When the Christian proposes that the UON somehow relieves them of the burden set forth from the problem of induction they are simply deluded.

Even if one KNOWS that nature is uniform, this doesn’t seem to provide a justification for inductive reasoning. It would only act as such a justification if the Christian were omnipotent. Consider the following example:

John is a Christian and John has had it revealed to him from God that nature is uniform. Is John any more justified than a non-Christian in concluding that because all of the swans he has seen are white therefore all swans are white? Surely, when John were to come across a Black Swan his proposed justification of induction would fail.

There are obviously things we do not know about the Universe and as such we can hold no certainty as to our inductive inferences. Perhaps the next time you throw a ball in the air it will cease to fall, not because of any violation in the UON but rather because of a previously unknown factor of the UON.

So what?

Well it seems then insofar as there is a problem of induction the Christian and the non-believer are in the same boat and must either abandon inductive reasoning or utilize it on a pragmatic basis. The Christian inherits no benefits by virtue of their belief in God in relation to induction than the non-believer.