Authored by: Mitchell LeBlanc.

In what I think will become a common occurrence, I am responding to presuppositionalist Chris Bolt from the Choosing Hats blog. While my previous article was also a response to Bolt, he has not yet completed responding to it and as such I will not be addressing those issues until he has completed his response.

This article is a response to an article by Bolt, which was a direct response to Dawson Bethrick. I am not addressing the post specifically, but rather the assertion that inductive reasoning must presuppose the Christian God.

This is an assertion based upon Chris Bolt’s presuppositionalist worldview and makes the claim that non-Christian worldviews cannot account for the uniformity of nature and as such, cannot justify their use of inductive reasoning. For those unfamiliar, the uniformity of nature (or rather the principle of the uniformity of nature) states that “the future will resemble the past” and is used in inductive reasoning to make statements such as “The Sun will rise tomorrow”.

Before I move on, I should outline for those who are unfamilar, the differences between Deductive and Inductive reasoning.

A deductive argument is that where the truth of the conclusion follows necessarily from previous premises.

Example:

1. All men are mortal

2. Mitch is a man

3. Therefore, Mitch is a mortal

(3) follows logically and inescapably from (1) and (2).

An inductive argument is probabilistic:

(1) Almost all men from Canada speak English

(2) Mitch is from Canada

(3) Therefore, Mitch speaks English

Whereas in a deductive argument it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false (provided the argument is valid/sound), in an inductive argument the premises may be correct and the conclusion false.

It is proposed that scientific reasoning is largely inductive in nature, moving from specifics (observing white swans repeatedly) and drawing conclusion for the whole (there are no black swans). In doing so, Science would invoke the principle of the uniformity of nature, presuming that in certain circumstances the future will resemble the past. For example, because the sun has risen everyday in the past, it is probable that it will rise tomorrow. Though it is, of course, possible that the sun may not.

Bolt, and all presuppositionalists seems to be very skeptical of inductive reasoning (or at least, Godless inductive reasoning) and they owe this skepticism to the likes of Bertrand Russell and David Hume as both of these philosophers raised important skeptical questions about the usage of inductive reasoning. But since they have raised such issues, there has been ample response to the so called “problems of induction” from the philosophical community.

Someone skeptical of inductive reasoning might state that there are no strong inductive arguments or go even further to suggest that all inductive arguments are equal and none are “better/stronger” than any other. For example, an inductive skeptic might say that it is no more probable that the sun will rise tomorrow because it has in the past, than that it will not. Blanket claims may be made further, stating that inductive reasoning is actually irrational!

Many inductive skeptics in the past have agreed that if we can make certain assumptions about the world, such as the uniformity of nature), then inductive reasoning could be justified. However, these same skeptics assert that these assumptions cannot be made without justification and to justify them would assume inductive reasoning outright.

According to philosopher Michael Martin:

On the standard interpretation of Hume that Bahnsen [a presuppositionalist scholar] accepted, Hume is supposed to have shown that probabilistic arguments — what I characterized above as inductive arguments– are unjustified. However, it is open to question that Hume held this modern view. A detailed analysis of Hume’s works has shown that by “probabilistic argument” Hume meant a certain type of deductive argument. Hume believed that all such arguments presuppose the uniformity of nature, but he did not attempt to show that probabilistic arguments in the modern sense are unjustified. Thus, appeals to Hume prove very little about whether inductive, that is, probabilistic arguments, are justified.

To claim that inductive reasoning is outright irrational, largely depends on what one defines as “rational”. Indeed, many philosophers have argued that the “problem of induction” is to simply be done away with, not requiring a solution. Philosophers such as Strawson and Edwards have further argued that the problem of induction rests on linguistic confusions rather than a sound philosophical basis. Further, as Martin states, philosophers Gemes goes on to say that inductive skepticism can be reduced into absurdity and that the position of inductive skepticism cannot be coherently formulated and should not be taken seriously.

Presuppositionalist literature, specifically the writings of Bahnsen, do not directly answer any of the above criticisms of inductive skepticism. Though, to his credit, Bahnsen cites many writings of Russell on the subject, but the very passages he cites have been pointed out to be confusion on Russell’s part by philosopher Frederick Wills in his “Will the Future be like Past?”

Of course there is even debate in the philosophical community as to whether or not science does actually presuppose a justification of induction and whether or not in doing so, there can be a pragmatic vindication. As Reichenbach says, “If there are any true inductive generalizations, the consistent use of induction will discover them in the long run.”

The point is made further, that one should simply continue to use induction until it refutes itself by E. H. Madden, “One uses induction because it makes getting through life easier and although we don’t know whether induction will continue to have this effect, the only way to discover if it will is to continue to use it.”

As such, it is clear and evident that unlike Bahnsen and most presuppositionalists would have you believe, the issue of inductive skepticism is far from settled. As philosopher Michael Martin suggests, it’s still an open question in philosophy and until the issue of inductive skepticism has been settled (on either side of the issue), the assertion that induction is somehow clearly open to challenge and that science is impossible without it remain completely in doubt.

But of course, if inductive skepticism is valid, it effects not only a non-Christian worldview but the Christian worldview as well! Christianity must provide a justification for the use of inductive reasoning just as any other worldview must.

Christianity claims to have a guarantee to the uniformity of nature. But how can this be when Christian apologists themselves says that it is possible that God may have morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil in the world. Can we not then conclude, for example, that God may have morally sufficient reason for allowing a hurricane or other natural disaster and we are just in the dark as to the justification?

Now suppose further that the very uniformities of nature will fail to hold in the future. As Martin illustrates, imagine that after the year 1998 all the emeralds in the world will be blue and all rubies will be green. Insofar as God could have morally sufficient reasons for a natural disaster, he could have sufficient reasons for causing such a departure from the normal. Just as we can account for all the evil in the world by appealing to God’s sufficient reasons, so too could the same apply for any departure from a preconceived uniformity of nature!

Simply because we do not know of any such departures God has made in the past, does not necessitate he will not do them in the future. This wouldn’t even be a deception on the part of God (as Bolt might protest) as he never assured us that our expectations about the future would be true.

In response to the above point, Greg Bahnsen (and presumably most other presuppositionalists) appeal to passages in their Scriptures to justify belief in the uniformity of nature. One such being Gen. 8. 20-22 wherein God said to Noah that He would continue the seasons. In response, Martin outlines four basic problems with scriptural appeals such as this.

Firstly, why suppose that the passages are true? Why suppose that Noah was even real, and why suppose that he made a covenant with God to continue the seasons?

Secondly, what of the interpretation of the passage? Should we interpret it to mean that nature will be uniform in the usual sense? Surely all the seasons can be continued with huge changes in the uniformity of nature. Winter may come and snow could be green, in Spring flowers could have no smell and Summer could bring us some pink grass! God does not say in detail how he would continue the seasons.

Third, Martin presses further, God’s promise is compatible with inductive chaos in most of the Universe. God says “that while the earth remains, seed time and harvest, cold and heat, summer and winter, day and night, shall not cease” (Gen 8. 22) and this passage shows no incompatibility with a state of affairs in which the present laws of nature do not hold outside of the Earth. So while the Earth may remain as God said, what of elsewhere in the Universe?

Lastly, why must we suppose that God would keep his covenant with Noah? There is no inconsistency with God breaking a promise so long as he has morally sufficient reason to do so. Furthermore, what if God is not responsible for the failure of the uniformity of nature but rather Satan is! Perhaps Satan decided to work his evil by bringing inductive chaos into the world, and God does not interfere because he does not want to deprive Satan of his free will.

So with inductive skepticism still an issue that is hotly debated and for all intents, “up in the air”, why should we presume the issue settled at all, much less settled with a Christian worldview. It is evident that even if we are to accept that there is an inherent problem in inductive reasoning, it does not follow that a Christian worldview allows us to leave this problem behind. Furthermore, as is the case with many presuppositionalist assertions, even if the Christian worldview must be assumed to make sense of X it does not follow that it is true.