Authored by: Mitchell LeBlanc.

The discussion of morality is very common in discussions about religion. Most of the time, the existence of objective morality is used to defend the existence of God. The suggestion is that if there is no God, then there is no objective morality. Rather than challenge this idea, it seems that many atheists have simply accepted it and thereby deny objective morality when they deny the existence of God, as some sort of ‘package deal’. It does not seem clear that a denial of objective morality is coherent, and it also does not seem clear that there cannot be objective morality without the existence of God. In a defense of what Erik J. Wielenberg calls “Non-Natural, Non-Theistic Moral Realism” he attempts to outline what an objective moral system sans God looks like¹. His view holds the following:

• Objective ethical facts exist
• Ethical facts are not reducible to natural facts and properties
• Ethical facts do not require an external foundation

The view, therefore, is compatible with Theism and is not atheistic, but merely (as presented) non-theistic.

In this article, I will attempt to present the system in a simple manner.

Preliminary Definitions

A state of affair is a necessarily existing abstract entity. It can either obtain or fail to obtain. States of affairs which obtain are called facts and some facts are contingently true in that they exist only in some possible world as opposed to those which are necessarily true, and obtain in all. The state of affairs in which Bob is a firefighter is contingent since there are some possible worlds where Bob is not a firefighter. Further, the state of affairs in which Bob is not identical to the number two is a necessary state of affairs: there is no possible world where Bob is identical to the number two.

Many necessary states of affairs are expressed in terms of mathematical truths or trivial propositions such as “All bachelors are married.” Necessary states of affairs do not have to be so trivial, however, since some theists assert that God exists in all possible worlds, that is, God exists necessarily.

Further, there are some states of affairs which obtain because of other states. One example is the state of affairs in which Bob is hurt; this state of affairs being brought about by the fact that Lucy kicked a soccer ball at his head. States of affairs which are not brought about by other states are called brute facts. An example of one possible brute fact is that God exists. Typically, the theist will assert that there is nothing causing, grounding or being a reason for God’s existence – his existence is just a brute fact.

Ethical States of Affairs

Some states of affairs concern matters of ethics, involving notions of moral rightness, wrongness, goodness, evil, etc. Such properties are sui generis properties. That is, they are distinct from both natural, empirically testable properties and supernatural properties (thus, neither naturalism, nor supernaturalism but non-naturalism).

As discussed in a previous article some ethical states of affairs obtain necessarily, such as that it is wrong to torture the innocent for fun and that pain is intrinsically bad. Some other states obtain only contingently, such as that pushing a red button is morally wrong because it will cause Bob some pain. However, there are worlds in which pushing this button would not cause Bob some pain and therefore can only be a contingent fact.

Ethical Facts

That ‘pain is intrinsically bad’ obtains necessarily is evident in that it is not explained by some other state of affairs, it is not entailed but rather it is a brute fact. Ethical facts which are not entailed or explained by some other state of affairs are called basic ethical facts. These basic facts serve as the foundation of all further objective morality and rest on no foundation themselves. Some may be tempted to ask, “where do they come from?” but as Weilenberg notes:

To ask of such facts, “where do they come from?” or “on what foundation do they rest?” is misguided in much the way that, according to many theists, it is misguided to ask of God, “where does He come from?” or “on what foundation does HE rest”? The answer is the same in both cases: They come from nowhere, and nothing external to themselves grounds their existence; rather they are fundamental features of the universe that ground other truths.

Supervenience

The common view of moral properties is that if they are exemplified, they supervene on non-moral properties. That is to say, if there are two possible entities with identical non-moral properties, they will have identical moral properties: rightness supervenes on instances of truth-telling, goodness supervenes on certain character types in a necessary way.

What, then, is the connection between the natural fact that “Lucie is torturing Bob for fun” and the moral fact that it is wrong? Presumably, it is wrong because it is an act of torture, but how do we make sense of this ‘because’? Weilenberg states:

The answer, I think, is that ‘because’ here indicates metaphysical necessity. It is true in all metaphysically possible worlds that causing pain just for fun is wrong. This is the sense in which a given action is wrong because it is [an example of torturing for fun].

Theistic philosopher William Wainwright thinks that such supervenience is more ‘at home’ in a theistic universe than in a non-theistic one:

[T]he connection between the [natural fact] and the [moral property] can seem mysterious. For, in the absence of further explanations, the (necessary connection between these radically different sorts of properties… is just an inexplicable brute fact. (modifications are mine)

Under Weilenberg’s view, the relationships are equivalent to certain basic ethical facts. The claim that the property of “being intrinsically bad” supervenes on the property of pain is equivalent to the claim that necessarily, pain is intrinsically bad. Is such a ‘brute-fact-supervenience’ a problem? Might this supervenience give reason to prefer a theistic account, as Wainwright seems to think?

It seems only to be a problem if non-trivial necessary truths require explanations. But, there seems to be no reason to accept this. Especially for the theist, who posits one non-trivial necessary truth that does not require an explanation: that God exists. It sees that the proposed brute fact of ‘pain is intrinsically bad’ needs no more explanation. It seems, prima facie, to even be in less need of explanation than the existence of a perfect creator.

Perhaps it is true, however, that there is an explanation to God’s existence that is a ‘self-explanation’. Wainwright states that “if we could grasp [God's] nature we would see why it exists.” Wainwright is stating that even if we don’t know the explanation of God’s existence, it is there anyway. If this is true, then the existence of God is not a brute fact after all. Supposing that a self-explanatory being is a coherent notion (there is a lot of literature on this question), it seems that there is still some reliance on brute fact. To suggest that God’s existence is self-explanatory introduces another non-trivial necessary truth: that God’s nature possesses some feature which explains His existence. But, then, what is the explanation for this seemingly brute fact? Even under theism, it seems that one is committed to the coherence of brute fact.

“Mysterious, Floating Values”

Christian philosophers William Lane Craig and J.P Moreland define and criticize this view as follows:

Atheistic moral realists affirm that objective moral values and duties do exist and are not dependent on evolution or human opinion, but they also insist that they are not grounded in God. Indeed, moral values have no further foundation. They just exist.

… It is difficult, however, even to comprehend this view. What does it mean to say, for example, that the moral value justice just exists? It is hard to know what to make of this. I tis clear what is meant when it is said that a person is just; but it is bewildering when it is said that in the absence of any people, justice itself exists. Moral values seem to exist as properties of persons, not as mere abstractions – or at any rate, it is hard to know what it is for a moral value to exist as a mere abstraction. Atheistic moral realists seem to lack any adequate foundation in reality for moral values but just leave them floating in an unintelligible way.

On Weilenberg’s view, among the entities that “just exist” are states of affairs and properties which are accepted to “just exist” by a great number of contemporary philosophers. There are various states of affairs concerning justice, so when some person has the property of being just it is in virtue (partially) of the obtaining of precisely these states of affairs. Weilenberg explains:

For instance, I hold that it is just to give people what they deserve; thus, anyone who gives others what they deserve thereby instantiates the property of justice. The state of affairs that it is just to give people what they deserve obtains whether or not any people actually exist, just as various states of affairs about dinosaurs obtain even though there are no longer any dinosaurs. In this way, my approach cashes out the idea of justice “just existing” in terms of facts about justice. This approach is perfectly intelligible and coherent and no more posits mysterious, floating entities than does any view committed to the existence of properties and states of affairs.

“But You’re Just An Animal!”

A further criticism is that without a Creator, human beings lack moral rights altogether. As Craig states in his debate with Walter Sinnott-Armstrong:

[I]f there is no God, then what’s so special about human beings? They’re just accidental by-products of nature that have evolved relatively recently on an infinitesimal spec of dust lost somewhere in a hostile and mindless universe and that are doomed to perish individually and collectively in a relatively short time. On the atheistic view, some action, say, rape, may not be socially advantageous, and so in the course of human development has become taboo; but that does absolutely nothing to prove that rape is really wrong. On the atheist view, there’s nothing really wrong with your raping someone.

Arguments such as these take the form: If God does not exist, then human beings are just Xs and Xs don’t have moral rights or duties. But this is dubious, just because we may be Xs does not mean that we are nothing more than Xs. That is, human beings are animals, but are we really nothing more than animals? This doesn’t seem any more plausible then the claim that God is a necessarily existing being, and nothing more. It is true, according to theism, that God is necessarily existent but he is more than this, much more. So too, for human beings. We can suffer, love, strive for goals, etc. At any rate, Craig provides no argument for his claim that human beings are just animals, and nothing more.

As for the issue of rape, Sinnott-Armstrong replies, “[w]hat makes rape immoral is that it harms the victim in terrible ways. The victim feels pain, loses freedom, is subordinates, and so on. These harms are not justified by any benefits to anyone.” Essentially, he explains the wrongness of rape by appealing to a moral principle, namely that: any action that involves knowingly inflicting suffering, subordination, and a loss of freedom on another without producing any outweighing benefits is morally wrong. At the very least, we would need to see an argument suggesting that this proposed moral principle fails, but it seems quite plausible.

External Foundation?

Objections of this grade constantly ask for a foundation to be provided and this reveals the assumption that objective morality requires a foundation external to itself. Without any sound argument to suggest that this is true, why should one abandon the view that all non-brute ethical facts rest in part on a set of basic facts which serve as the axioms of morality and do not have an external foundation but are the foundation.

But further, the theist seems to offer nothing better. Craig states that “our moral duties are grounded in the commands of a holy and loving God… His nature expresses itself toward us in the form of moral commands which issuing from the Good, become moral duties for us.” Under this view, our moral duties still rely on some ungrounded ethical fact, namely that if the Good commands you to do something, then you are morally obligated to do it. What is the grounding for this claim? Does it simply “float mysteriously in an unintelligible way?”

Conlusion

At the very least, it is evident that the issue of morality in the absence of God is not as black and white as many people suppose that it is, theists and atheists alike. It has long been supposed that atheism leads to an abandonment of morality, but that doesn’t seem to be the case necessarily. In fact, it seems that a view such as Weilenberg’s is very similar to what the theist requires to escape the Euthyphro dilemma.

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¹All further quotations are from this paper unless otherwise noted.