I am going to have to take the time to read through it again a few times much more carefully, and then get back to you.

BK

I am going to have to take the time to read through it again a few times much more carefully, and then get back to you.

BK

I’m going to cite the author of the article here, as he asks himself this very question!

“Perhaps, however, it is not fair to model the non-inferential knowledge of a being who is supposedly omniscient upon ours. There is still reason for suspicion about claims that Todd has non-inferential knowledge of the impossibility of hiders, if nothing else is provided. This derives from the nature of the case. We are speaking of whether hiders are intrinsically or extrinsically impossible. If hiders are intrinsically impossible, there are no hiders in any logically possible world. If hiders are extrinsically impossible in some world, then that has some hider-excluding feature. That is, it is not logically possible for there to be a hider in that world, given some other fact that obtains there. If hiders are logically impossible in either way, that will be the kind of thing that can be set out in an explicit argument, and if Todd is omniscient, that argument will be available to him. Whether or not he is somehow capable of non-inferentially reaching the conclusion that hiders are impossible, there will be available, in principle, an explicit proof of their impossibility, and so, the non-inferential access to the truth that hiders are impossible will not be necessary for Todd’s knowledge”

Given that, it doesn’t seem that the assumption has that big of an effect.

I’m going to cite the author of the article here, as he asks himself this very question!

“Perhaps, however, it is not fair to model the non-inferential knowledge of a being who is supposedly omniscient upon ours. There is still reason for suspicion about claims that Todd has non-inferential knowledge of the impossibility of hiders, if nothing else is provided. This derives from the nature of the case. We are speaking of whether hiders are intrinsically or extrinsically impossible. If hiders are intrinsically impossible, there are no hiders in any logically possible world. If hiders are extrinsically impossible in some world, then that has some hider-excluding feature. That is, it is not logically possible for there to be a hider in that world, given some other fact that obtains there. If hiders are logically impossible in either way, that will be the kind of thing that can be set out in an explicit argument, and if Todd is omniscient, that argument will be available to him. Whether or not he is somehow capable of non-inferentially reaching the conclusion that hiders are impossible, there will be available, in principle, an explicit proof of their impossibility, and so, the non-inferential access to the truth that hiders are impossible will not be necessary for Todd’s knowledge”

Given that, it doesn’t seem that the assumption has that big of an effect.

Just wondering – have you considered what effect the assumption “so far as Todd’s non-inferential knowledge is being modeled upon ours” has on the conclusion stated as “Therefore, no being is omniscient”?

BK

Just wondering – have you considered what effect the assumption “so far as Todd’s non-inferential knowledge is being modeled upon ours” has on the conclusion stated as “Therefore, no being is omniscient”?

BK