Ryft on “A Possible Disproof of God’s Existence”

Ryft on “A Possible Disproof of God’s Existence” 19/12/09

David Smart has offered a brief objection. Oddly enough, his objection merely shows that he actually agrees with the argument.

Authored by: Mitchell LeBlanc.


David Smart, who goes by the handle Ryft Braeloch at The Aristophrenium has published a very brief response to my article entitled “A Possible Disproof of God’s Existence.” In his response, he concludes that “…that it is not God who vanishes in a puff of contradiction but rather LeBlanc’s argument.” I have been amazed at the misunderstanding which has followed my posting of the argument, and I hope to clear up Dave’s by the end of this article.

The Argument

I will reintroduce the argument of which we are speaking:

(1) If God exists, then God is necessarily omnipotent and necessarily triune.

(2) If God is necessarily omnipotent, then God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs.

(3) If God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs, then God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune.

(4) If God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune, then God is not necessarily triune.

(5) Therefore, God does not and cannot exist

The Objection

I will quote the objection in full, since it is quite short:

Given the first two premises (which must be given, as we are confronting orthodox Christian theism), his third premise ought never obtain; i.e., in order to obtain (3) LeBlanc is forced to contradict (1) and (2)!

How so? Consider what it is that (3) asserts: that God necessarily can bring about some X such that it was brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune. But given (2) which defines omnipotence as being able to “bring about any logically possible state of affairs,” and given (1) which defines God as “necessarily triune” (it is not logically possible for God to not be triune), we therefore observe that (3) contradicts these very premises…

The Reply

I must wonder whether or not this is an objection or a defense of my argument. Let us analyze:

(3) If God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs, then God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune.

This premise garners support from the following:

(A) The state of affairs in which Toronto’s being flooded is brought about directly or indirectly by a being that has never been triune is a logically possible state of affairs

Imagine we have Bob who works at the city dam, who for some reason makes a computer error or falls asleep and as a result of such an action (or inaction) brings about that the city of Toronto is flooded. There is nothing logically impossible about this notion. Let it also be true that Bob is not triune. There is still nothing logically impossible about this notion. Given this, it is clear that (A) is true.

Now, let us assume (2):

(2) If God is necessarily omnipotent, then God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs.

This is a standard definition of omnipotence. Now let us bring in (1) and compile the premises with which we are currently working:

(1) If God exists, then God is necessarily omnipotent and necessarily triune.

(2) If God is necessarily omnipotent, then God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs.

(3) If God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs, then God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune.

Now, we have seen that (A) is true, and that it meets the criteria for a “logically possible state of affairs.” As such, if (1) and (2) obtain (which David grants), (3) must obtain. But what does David say about this?

Given the first two premises (which must be given, as we are confronting orthodox Christian theism), his third premise ought never obtain; i.e., in order to obtain (3) LeBlanc is forced to contradict (1) and (2)!

Exactly! That is to say, the validity of (3) as a conditional shows that either (1) or (2) must be false! This is precisely what the argument is intending to show, and instead of this being an objection, David has agreed with the argument.

To elaborate, if (3) is to fail to obtain as a conditional, it must be due to the falsehood of either (1) or (2), not their truth. Indeed the truth of (1) and (2) (and of (A)) lead to the validity of (3) as a conditional.

Again, David states:

Consider what it is that (3) asserts: that God necessarily can bring about some X such that it was brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune. But given (2) which defines omnipotence as being able to “bring about any logically possible state of affairs,” and given (1) which defines God as “necessarily triune” (it is not logically possible for God to not be triune), we therefore observe that (3) contradicts these very premises…

It seems that David is stating that the “then” portion of the conditional can only obtain if God is contingently triune. I would agree, it is indeed by virtue of the fact that God is necessarily triune that he cannot bring about the logically possible state of affairs mentioned. God could bring about the state of affairs if he were contingently triune (that is, not necessarily triune) but I strain to think of how any Christian would make this idea of a contingently triune God comprehensible. In fact, David’s observation is made in my own argument:

(4) If God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune, then God is not necessarily triune.

But God is necessarily triune and necessarily omnipotent so:

(5) Therefore, God does not and cannot exist

Conclusion

I am indeed confused by David’s objection, because based on what he says, he actually agrees with the argument.

You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.

  • I have no idea why anyone would think Mitch is talking about free will and omnipotence. Where on earth are we getting this idea?

    I'm not impressed with the fourth premise, and I'd love to hear Mitch's proof of it. I don't see why it would be true at all.
  • Josh
    You might want to check out "Maximal Power" by Flint and Fredosso (if you haven't already), as it deals with sort of problem you are raising.http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/papers/mp.htm. (Your argument, btw, is clever; the article I linked will take issue with premise (2).)
  • Thanks Josh! I checked that out shorty thereafter and later went on to read Weilenberg's paper on the topic. I wrote a later article saying that given the modified definitions, the argument fails. See:http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/a-possible-...

    Thanks for commenting!
  • Thanks Josh! I checked that out shorty thereafter and later went on to read Weilenberg's paper on the topic. I wrote a later article saying that given the modified definitions, the argument fails. See:http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/a-possible-...

    Thanks for commenting!
  • Josh
  • Molzahn
    "If God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune"

    You're going to have to unpack this one a little further. It isn't clear whether you are talking about a clash between freewill and omnipotence, or the non-necessity for God to bring forth the state of affairs.

    You are likely aiming for an internal inconsistency in the God concept, so I will assume for the moment that you are referring to the simple and uncomplicated philosophical dilemma of freewill versus omnipotence (hopefully I am closer to what you mean to convey, this time).

    Something as simple as substance dualism removes the problem of omnipotence because then power is only in terms of what is changeable (something presiding in the natural world). To use a metaphor, God is a programmer who has absolute control over the system, and even initiates some of the programs to set up his desired state of affairs. He has unlimited control over how much and in what way he wants to change the system. The programs themselves only have a localized and limited influence on the system, but the programmer can change anything in a direct way (a method incomprehensible to the programs) as he pleases. His triune identity would be maintained, and omnipotence is simply limited to the scope of 'physical reality.'

    If omnipotence is limited to the direct, 'physical' universe, this would also solve the problem of why God could not destroy Satan or any other heavenly host (including himself), because they are not part of the changeable system.

    Under these conditions, all 3 points could be obtained, and A would be falsified. Provided that we rephrase A to established the necessity for initialization of a transition into a state of affairs rather than merely the act of "bringing about" a state of affairs; as a non-triune entity and a triune entity could equally share the task of bringing about a state of affairs. (The non-triune entity in this case would be contingent to the existence and initial action of God).

    You covered the idea that if God is limited by nature (as all identities are), that all entities should be considered omnipotent because they are acting in the highest possible power relative to their subjective restrictions. But from an objective perspective (within terms of the 'physical' realm) we see that not all entities can operate up to the objective maximum potential, despite their subjective achievements.

    Another angle which hasn't been explored is the idea of a metamorphic omnipotent entity. Something which chooses to present itself as a triune to some (therefore conditionally triune), it would necessarily have the triune identity to those it choses, and necessarily have an entirely different identity to others as it choses. It would become both necessarily triune and not necessarily triune depending on the subjective analysis. The Christian God would be necessarily one correct interpretation of the many faced god.
  • The focus is not on free will either. I'm simply presenting a state of affairs which has the property of being brought about by a non-triune being. So long as this state of affairs is logically possible, we have a logically possible state of affairs which a triune being cannot bring about.

    Now, if God is able to turn on and off his triunity he is not necessarily triune, he is contingently triune. If God is contingently triune, then he can bring about the state of affairs but Christianity does not assert that God is contingently triune.
  • Molzahn
    "I'm simply presenting a state of affairs which has the property of being brought about by a non-triune being... we have a logically possible state of affairs which a triune being cannot bring about."
    The being that brought forth the state of affairs would be a proxy to His power.

    "Now, if God is able to turn on and off his triunity he is not necessarily triune, he is contingently triune."
    That's a fair analysis.

    I agree with the conclusion that God does not necessarily exist, but I don't see how you jumped to "God cannot and does not exist" from this line of logic. Anyway, I'll leave this alone. It was an interesting argument.
  • That deduction comes based from the preceding premises. So long as the God defined is the God outlined as per the conditionals in (1) and (2) then the conclusion holds.
  • If the non-triune being that brought about the flooding of Toronto is Bob, then how does it follow that God is not necessarily triune by bringing about that state of affairs?
  • I will await to find out who LeBlanc identifies as the non-triune being who flooded Toronto before composing a reply. If that non-triune being is God, then (3) is an illegitimate premise by contradicting (1) and (2), as my rebuttal indicated. If that non-triune being is Bob, then (4) does not follow from (3) and (5) does not obtain.
  • Do you disagree with my analysis of your position in this article? The contradiction of (1) or (2) is precisely what is intended. You have me quite confused.
  • As I said, if the non-triune being who brought about the flooding of Toronto is God, then (3) is an illegitimate premise by contradicting (1) and (2), as indicated in my published rebuttal—for (1) defines God as “necessarily triune” and (2) defines omnipotence as being able to “bring about any logically possible state of affairs.” If God is necessarily triune (defined at premise 1), then his being not-triune is by definition NOT a “logically possible state of affairs” available to omnipotence (defined at premise 2), by which your (3) does not follow from (1) and (2). Given the first two defining premises, (3) would have to be: “If God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs, then God necessarily CANNOT bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune.” As such, both (4) and (5) no longer follow.

    If the non-triune being who brought about the flooding of Toronto is Bob the city worker, then (4) does not follow from (3) because God being not-triune does not follow from Bob being not-triune. They are not only different beings but different orders of being entirely. Consequently, (5) does not obtain.
  • Your analysis is simply false. The logical impossibility of God being not-triune is what hinders his omnipotence. Since (A) is clearly possible, it follows then that an ability to do so is a violation of either (2) or (1) in that either Omnipotence means something other than what I've defined, or God is contingently triune... or he cannot exist. If we go with your modified version of (3):

    (3*): If God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs, then God necessarily CANNOT bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune.

    The next premise merely has to state that a state of affairs which is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune is logically possible and we reach the same conclusion.
  • 1. So is the non-triune being who brought about the flooding of Toronto "God" or "Bob"?

    2. You say that "God being not-triune is what hinders his omnipotence." Okay, how?
  • 1. Bob. God is purportedly necessarily triune.

    2. That's not what I said, I said: "The logical impossibility of God being not-triune is what hinders his omnipotence." The "why" is above.
  • "God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune."

    Are you saying that the being that is not necessarily triune would in this case be not the human, but God, since He brought about the state of affairs?
  • Yes.

    I'm saying that since (A) is true, and (1) and (2) are true it follows that (3) is a valid conditional, but since if (3) obtains, (4) is true either (1) or (2) must be false.

    More directly, if the conditional of (3) can be satisfied then (4) is true, entailing that if God brings about such a state of affairs, he is not necessarily triune.

    (I hope I typed that right, it's 2:15am)
  • Ah, that makes a little more sense. (1) and (2) appear to me to be true, while (A), (3), (4) and (5) do not appear to me to be true, and the support for (A) appears to beg the question.
  • Care to elaborate?
  • Sure.

    Take (A) to be false.

    (~A) The state of affairs in which Toronto’s being flooded is brought about directly or indirectly by a being that has never been triune is not a logically possible state of affairs

    Now imagine "we have Bob who works at the city dam, who for some reason makes a computer error or falls asleep and as a result of such an action (or inaction) brings about that the city of Toronto is flooded. Let it also be true that Bob is not triune". Well and good, but this tells us very little about the alleged falsehood of (~A) which the argument appears to ride upon. You assert twice in your support for (A), "There is still nothing logically impossible about this notion", but this is the very thing you are intending to show.
  • You're more than welcome to change the example to something you have done in your life, perhaps fallen of a bike or something...

    If there is some sort of contradiction in (A), I am not aware of it. I do not see any contradiction in:

    (1) There existing a being named Bob who is not triune
    (2) There being a city named Toronto which has a dam
    (3) That Bob should be employed there
    (4) That Bob screw up
    (5) That Bob's screw-up leads to a malfunctioning of the dam which leads to Toronto being flooded.

    Indeed if I phoned you up one day to tell you this story about Bob, you'd not chew me out for logical absurdity (though perhaps for implausbility). I think that (A) has prima facie support.

    We can of course replace my example:

    (B) The state of affairs in which the spilling of someone's hot chocolate is brought about directly or indirectly by a being that has never been triune

    This is a logically possible state of affairs evident from the fact that a few days ago, I directly or indirectly brought about the spilling of someone's hot chocolate while being not-triune.

    As such, if you do object to (A) you are more than welcome to replace it with (B). I do not however think this is necessary since I see no reason to reject (A). In the absence of such reason to do so, I fall back on the prima facie plausibility of the state of affairs.
  • ...off a bike...*
  • Your example is fine, but God works all things according to the counsel of his will. (Ephesians 1.11)
  • Are you saying that the verse forms an objection? If so, could you articulate the objection further?
  • Yes. Triune God brings about all things. If this is true then the state of affairs in which Toronto’s being flooded is brought about directly or indirectly by a being that has never been triune is not a logically possible state of affairs.
  • I'm going to incorporate this objection into my next post on the topic rather than comment at length here.
  • I think you may be equivocating, but maybe your next post will clarify.
  • Where do you think I might be equivocating? I'll make a point to address it.
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