Authored by: Mitchell LeBlanc.

David Smart, who goes by the handle Ryft Braeloch at The Aristophrenium has authored a response to my paper, “The Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God.” In his response he makes some criticisms which I wish to address. Smart’s title alludes that there may be more than one response forthcoming. I hope that Smart does not object to my authoring a response before his series is complete. I will title my subheadings the same as his, so that they correspond and make reading a bit easier.

Smart begins with an explanation of the formal TAG I’ve utilized in my paper. He does not seem too fond of my formal representation and offers one of his own. I do think that the form I have offered is more in line with the notion of Transcendental Arguments as they have traditionally been employed, as a tool for answering the skeptic.

The Critique of the TAG

Immediately, Smart charges me with having begged the question with my utilization of Fristianity. I find this charge puzzling. Smart states:

Just as Martin did, LeBlanc simply assumes the truth of the very thing he said he would prove, a feat that is neither impressive nor rational to any thinking person. He takes as his tool of analysis an hypothetical world view called Fristianity, which is supposedly identical to Christianity in every respect but one, viz. that God “is a quadrinity rather than a trinity.” The problem should be immediately obvious: the TAG argues that it is God as affirmed by Christian orthodoxy who is the necessary precondition for the reality and nature of logic. What LeBlanc did was simply beg the question on the first premise, asserting that God as such is not the necessary precondition thereof.

The introduction of Fristianity as a possible worldview which can account for the laws of logic does not, to me, seem question begging. Recall the TAG:

(1) There is a rational justification for the laws of logic

(2) It is necessary that: if Christian theism is false, then there is no rational justification for the laws of logic

(3) Christian theism is true

One possible way to analyze whether or not (2) is a sound premise is to explore possible defeaters. Fristianity was introduced as a defeater of (2) in that it shows a non-Christian theistic justification for the laws of logic and attempts to render the modal claim of (2) false. The falsehood of (2) is not assumed, it is demonstrated. Consider another example:

(1) There is a rational justification for the laws of logic

(2′) It is necessary that: if Fristian theism is false, then there is no rational justification for the laws of logic

(3′) Fristian theism is true

Would someone be begging the question if they utilized Christianity as an example of a worldview, which is not Fristianity, that accounts for logic? I don’t think so. Again, the falsehood of (2′) is not merely assumed, it is demonstrated. I hope that I have not missed the thrust of this objection, and I trust that I will be corrected if I have.

A Logical Euthyphro Dilemma

In his next objection, Smart identifies my dilemma as being a false one. He states:

In the same way that the Euthyphro dilemma commits the bifurcation fallacy on the moral question, so too does LeBlanc’s dilemma here because it fails to present or account for a third option, which may be stated in the following way: “Logical order is grounded in the very nature and character of God and expressed revelationally in his works and word”…

Oddly enough, it seems clear in my paper that I do address such a move:

A TAG defender might respond by saying that this dilemma is a false one, and advocate similar to Frame that logical principles have their basis in God’s nature and are thus neither external, nor arbitrary. Firstly, this seems to add some confusion: are logical principles based on God’s thinking, or on his nature? Frame’s above statement in response to Michael Martin seems to indicate that both are true: logical principles reflect the thinking of God and the thinking of God has its basis in God’s nature.

Frame essentially makes the claim that it is logically impossible for the nature of God to change. But the standard Frame is using to identify logical possibility is allegedly the nature of God. As such, his claim appears to be represented more accurately as:

(C)  Based on God’s nature it is logically impossible for God’s nature to be different because God is necessarily a rational God

I then go on to discuss what I feel are the shortcomings of such a move. As such, I think the claim that I’ve not presented a/the third option is clearly false.

The Asymmetric Relationship

I think that Smart may have misunderstood this section of my paper. He states:

LeBlanc draws upon a counterfactual semantic that he cites from Matthew Davidson which states that “any proposition is counterfactually implied by a necessarily false proposition.” But for some reason he interprets this to mean that since the proposition “logical principles do not exist” is necessarily false, this somehow “counterfactually implies any proposition whatsoever.”

This is the correct interpretation under Lewis’ counterfactual semantics. So when I say that a necessarily false proposition counterfactually implies any proposition I do actually mean:

(i) If 2+2=5, then the moon is made of cheese

(ii) If circles have four sides, fish are mammals

(iii) If logical principles do not exist, pigs can fly

(iv) If three does not exist, Mitch is a monkey’s uncle

and given that, as I’ve said in my paper:

Since “logical principles do not exist” is a necessarily false proposition, it counterfactually implies any proposition whatsoever. So it is also true that if logical principles did not exist, neither would God. Thus, God depends on logical principles for his existence.

And as such, we have what I propose is an asymmetrical relationship. Smart further states:

Incidentally, LeBlanc argues that “if logical principles did not exist, neither would God; thus, God depends on logical principles for his existence.” But that is a brutal straw man mistake, for the TAG argues that logical order is grounded in the very nature and character of God and expressed revelationally in his works and word. In other words, the reason why God would not exist if logical principles did not is because the latter is grounded in his very nature and character, making LeBlanc’s point here tantamount to arguing that “not identical to P” can somehow be “identical to P.”

If logical principles did not exist, then God would not exist, for logical principles are grounded in the very nature and character of God (without which God would be not-God); i.e., God depends on himself for his existence (cf. aseity).

But I have mentioned this objection in my paper as well:

Another possible solution is twofold. One must first accept that abstract objects are the thoughts of God. This is not problematic for the TAG proponent as they have already explicitly stated that this is the case. One must then further embrace the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity (DDS) and accept that God is identical with each of his attributes and thoughts. Under this view, the statements “God exists” and “Logical principles exist” express the same proposition. This eliminates the problem because any proposition is counterfactually dependent on itself.

I then go on to discuss what I feel are the shortcomings of this approach.

Conclusion

It seems to me that this round of objections already have their answers in the original paper. I trust that if I have misunderstood any of David’s points he will clear up my misunderstandings in his next post. I also would like to extend thanks to both David Smart and Chris Bolt for their interaction with the draft of my paper.