The Anthropic Argument Against the Existence of God

The Anthropic Argument Against the Existence of God 18/11/09

A very brief introduction to a relatively new argument against the existence of God. The argument attempts to show that the mere existence of human beings shows that God does not exist.

Authored by: Mitchell LeBlanc.


Mark Walker, a philosophy professor from the New Mexico State University has a forthcoming paper in Sophia in which he outlines a new argument against the existence of God he names the ‘Anthropic Argument’. The goal of this very brief article is to just present his argument in a simplistic manner. I will not be dealing with any of the objections he defends against in his paper.

The argument is related to the classic Argument from Evil but may very well overtake it in terms of ‘interestingness’.

The Idea

The following is taken from the abstract of the paper:

If God is morally perfect then He must perform the morally best actions, but creating humans is not the morally best action. If this line of reasoning can be maintained then the mere fact that humans exist contradicts the claim that God exists. This is the ‘anthropic argument’. The anthropic argument, is related to, but distinct from, the traditional argument from evil. The anthropic argument forces us to consider the ‘creation question’: why did God not create other gods rather than humans? That is, if God is omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect then why didn’t He create a world populated exclusively by beings that are perfect in the same way that He is—ontological equivalents— rather than choosing to create humans with finite natures and all the suffering that this entails?

To illustrate, Walker proposes an example wherein the world government implements an edict which states that all children being born outside of the capital city will be of a new species. “Chumans”, as he calls them are human-chimpanzee hybrids. They are both mentally and physically challenged in comparison to humans and they have a strong propensity to violent outbursts (and they wish they did not). Walker states that such an edict would be morally wrong for any number of reasons.

He parallels this with God’s decision to create human beings, who are at least as inferior to God as the Chumans would be to humans, if not more. As such, Walker suggests that God is morally culpable for creating human beings with defective natures (defective in comparison to God’s).

As such, if God is morally perfect then He must perform the morally best actions, but creating human beings is not the morally best action. It would indeed be better for God to create ‘ontological equivalents’, that is, other gods.

Moral Scale

Assume we can rank moral beings on a scale from 1-10 with 10 being reserved for morally perfect (God) natures and 0 for perfectly evil (Satan, for example) natures. Suppose further that human beings are ranked at 5, neither perfectly good nor perfectly evil.

The Argument

Let S represent the set of worlds comprised of being with morally better agents than humans, that is, S is a composite of all those worlds in which all moral agents score higher on the moral continuum than humans do in the actual world:

(1) God is omnipotent

(2) So, it is possible for God to actualize a member of S

(3) God is omniscient

(4) So, if it is possible for God to actualize a member of S, then God knows that He can actualize a member of S

(5) So, God knows that He can actualize a member of S

(6) God is morally perfect

(7) So, a morally perfect being should attempt to maximize the likelihood of moral  goodness and minimize the likelihood of moral evil in the world

(8) If God knows He can actualize a member of S, then every world in which God exists is a member of S

(9) Therefore, every world in which God exists is a member of S

(10) Therefore, if God exists in the actual world then the actual world is a member of S

(11) The actual world is not a member of S

(12) Therefore, God does not exist

Free Will?

What about Plantinga’s free will defense, which states that in every possible world, God must permit some moral evil to maintain free will? Walker proposes that this problem is resolvable by proposing a possible world in God creates an ontologically equivalent being who is free to sin, but would never do so because of their moral nature (in the same way God would never sin).

Conclusion

What I have offered is nowhere near the in depth discussion that Walker offers in his own article, but it offers, at the very least, some familiarity with the argument.

You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.

  • PhilosopherP8819
    To simply take Adam’s point and say that it is wrong to breed goldfish seems to be very absurd. In matter of fact, if pressed, I can proffer a reducto ad absurdum.

    You state that there is “a disanalogy given the intelligence of the beings we are speaking of in the Anthropic argument” however, I don't think intelligence here matters at all. The man can be well aware of the fact that he could have bred dolphins or have sex with a woman to produce other persons, nevertheless, it is still not obvious by choosing to not breed dolphins or to not have sex with a woman, that the man is doing something morally wrong by breeding goldfish, instead.

    You then respond by saying “At least, I'm inclined to say that while I may not share such a prima facie position of wrongness with regard to the Goldfish breeder, I do with regard to God” but, if my analogy works, then this would apply to God too. The only differences between God and the breeder is that God is; omnipotent, omniscient and God is morally perfect, and the breeder is not. However both God and the breeder have strength, knowledge, and are capable of acting morally. However, we may ask, “what immoral action did the man do by breeding goldfish as opposed to breeding dolphins or having sex with a woman?” It seems that he has not done anything wrong according to contemporary normative ethics. So Q is false because there is a counter example to it, and since it is false, God can not be blamed for not bringing S into existence (assuming that creating S is feasible for God). We would not expect a morally perfect person nor a non-perfect person to be obligated to follow a moral principle that is false.

    You then state, “(8) isn't false if it is true that creating members of S is the best action. If you'd want to argue that not creating any beings at all is the best action, you are welcome to do so, but I would think this antithetical to your position.”

    This is not the point I was trying to make at all. I’m not concerned with morality with this point. All I am concerned with is the consequent of the conditional statement of 8, which states, “every world in which God exists is a member of S.” This is patently false. There is a possible world where God is the only being that exist sans time, sans space, and sans any creatures. Think of God’s state logically prior to the creation of time. This is the type of world I am talking about. So it is false that in “every world in which God exists is a member of S” because there is a possible world where only God exist, and this shows that premise 8 is false.

    --PhilosopherP8819
  • I think there is still some disanalogy because I think the matter of intelligence is much more important than you are realizing. The goldfish is not an intelligent being, whereas the Chuman (per hypothesis) would be one that would "suffer" unnecessarily (given that there is the Human alternative).

    (8) follows from (5) and (7), that seems clear to me. There is not a possible world in which God exists alone if (5) and (7) are true, right?
  • PhilosopherP9919
    Hello Mitchell LeBlanc,

    I really enjoyed reading this argument; however I think it is false.

    The arguments main line is (7).

    This premise is implied by a moral general principle suggested by the philosopher; Robert Merrihew Adams; “(Q) It is wrong to bring into existence, knowingly, a being less excellent than one could have brought into existence (Adams 103).”

    But is Q true? No. Adams provides two counter examples, but I will quote part of one;

    “A man breeds a goldfish, thereby bringing about their existence. We do not normally think it is wrong, or even prima facie wrong, for a man to do this, even though he could have equally well have brought about the existence of more excellent beings, more intelligent and capable of higher satisfactions (Adams 103).”

    This case can be altered to apply to God and S. Even though it’s the case that God creates humans, we don’t think that it is wrong, for God to do this, even if He could create some greater entity (be it an alien that’s morally greater than humans, or some alien* that is morally greater than the prior aliens, and so on, on the moral scale until we reach 10 which is the status of S and God).

    Also, line (8) is patently false.

    Line (8) states, “(8) If God knows He can actualize a member of S, then every world in which God exists is a member of S”

    The consequent of the conditional is false, thus making the conditional statement false. Here is why; there is a possible world in which God chooses not to create and thus, there is at least one possible world in which God exist and S does not, and this is sufficient to refute the universal quantification of line (8) thus rendering the conditional false.

    Similar criticism can be said of line (9).

    Since 8 and 9 are false, the conclusion obviously does not follow rendering the argument unsound.

    --PhilosopherP8819

    __________________________________________________________________________________________
    Works Cited

    Adams, Robert Merrihew “Must God Create the Best?” The Concept of God. First Edition. Thomas V. Morris. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987 91-106. Print
  • Hello,

    Perhaps we can simply take Adam's point and say that it is wrong for the man to breed Goldfish. Or we might say that there is a disanalogy given the intelligence of the beings we are speaking of in the Anthropic argument. At least, I'm inclined to say that while I may not share such a prima facie position of wrongness with regard to the Goldfish breeder, I do with regard to God.

    (8) isn't false if it is true that creating members of S is the best action. If you'd want to argue that not creating any beings at all is the best action, you are welcome to do so, but I would think this antithetical to your position.
  • --PhilosopherP8819
    To simply take Adam’s point and say that it is wrong to breed goldfish seems to be very absurd. In matter of fact, if pressed, I can proffer a reducto ad absurdum.

    You state that there is “a disanalogy given the intelligence of the beings we are speaking of in the Anthropic argument” however, I don't think intelligence here matters at all. The man can be well aware of the fact that he could have bred dolphins or have sex with a woman to produce other persons, nevertheless, it is still not obvious by choosing to not breed dolphins or to not have sex with a woman, that the man is doing something morally wrong by breeding goldfish, instead.

    You then respond by saying “At least, I'm inclined to say that while I may not share such a prima facie position of wrongness with regard to the Goldfish breeder, I do with regard to God” but, if my analogy works, then this would apply to God too. The only differences between God and the breeder is that God is; omnipotent, omniscient and God is morally perfect, and the breeder is not. However both God and the breeder have strength, knowledge, and are capable of acting morally. However, we may ask, “what immoral action did the man do by breeding goldfish as opposed to breeding dolphins or having sex with a woman?” It seems that he has not done anything wrong according to contemporary normative ethics. So Q is false because there is a counter example to it, and since it is false, God can not be blamed for not bringing S into existence (assuming that creating S is feasible for God). We would not expect a morally perfect person nor a non-perfect person to be obligated to follow a moral principle that is false.

    You then state, “(8) isn't false if it is true that creating members of S is the best action. If you'd want to argue that not creating any beings at all is the best action, you are welcome to do so, but I would think this antithetical to your position.”

    This is not the point I was trying to make at all. I’m not concerned with morality with this point. All I am concerned with is the consequent of the conditional statement of 8, which states, “every world in which God exists is a member of S.” This is patently false. There is a possible world where God is the only being that exist sans time, sans space, and sans any creatures. Think of God’s state logically prior to the creation of time. This is the type of world I am talking about. So it is false that in “every world in which God exists is a member of S” because there is a possible world where only God exist, and this shows that premise 8 is false.

    --PhilosopherP8819
  • Mitchell this is the problem of Heaven that Graham Robert Oppy in 'Arguments about God,",,David Ramsay Steele in
    Atheism Explained: from Folly to Philosophy, Tad Clements in Science versus Religion" and I @ many sites use effectively as what I had called the definitive refutation of free will as a defense of evil. Michael Martin adumbrates on it in ' Morality, Meaning and Atheism."
    Yes, noen, just like we cannot fly but still can effectively exist. Thus I contend theists -John Hick, in particular,- have a boomerang argument: Hick himself guesses there will be paradise in Heaven whilst he uses the all or nothing and the slippery slope arguments for his straw man , noted in Edward H. Madden and Peter H. Hare's "Evil and the Concept of God," "as we naturalists can contend that we object to pointless evils, not all, but we can then take his notion of Heaven to hoist him on his own petard- that boomerang!
    I find that theists ever beg questions:' Logic is the bane of theists."
    Carneades, eons ago demolished theism as I find from "The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,"
    Carneades Morgan-LynnGriggs Lamberth
  • noen
    Morgan, One) I'm a woman not a man, please don't assume. Two) Please don't group me in with theists, I'm agnostic. just don't think Mitchell's argument holds much water. It would be greatly appreciated if in future you tried not projecting your own issues and assumptions onto me and just try rational debate.
  • noen, I'm sorry that I didn't state sir or ma'am.
    Yes, we rationalists need not use the all,except to hoist theists and others. Burton Porter notes that there could be good but less evil as a contrast or better still good, better and best. He further states that humans and Nature take away the free will of millions. And some superrtogate- go beyond their duties even without themselves suffering.
    I suggest that theists and others do not fully comprehend the logic of the problem of Heaven.This demand for consistency is no hobgoblin of little minds!
    In contrast to Richard Swinburne who finds that we atheists overrate evil and underrate free will, I find that pointless evil overcomes omnipotent or limited God.
    So, the Imao Deo would be for us to be like His putative nature. Ah, but theists beg the question of that Nature! One cannot define or postulate Him into existence! That is the problem of the ontological argument also.
    They cannot thus overcome the Euthyphro in adducing that nature that Aquinas himself uses as well as he begs other questions. That bane.
    Thus, this anthropic argument holds seas! One indeed should study our arguments and vice versus, I 'm a fallibilitst and evidentialist. I'm a Huxleyan agnotic then as he defines the term. Then there are the Spncerian ones, who hold after Herbert Spencer, that no one can know the Unknowable, and He is such. And then there are the weak agnostics who hold that they themselves cannot know. Agnosticism is epistemological whilst atheism is metaphysical
    Thus ,atheists can be agnostics- soft atheists,at least. And then there are the theistic ones, who don't know His nature.
    Western theologians are generally apopathists: they describe Him positively whilst the Orthodox Christians are generally katapahthists, who ever state He is not such and such.
    I find that both bespeak of ignosticism! Anon on that. Google the ignostic-Ockham,please.
    Thus as an ignostic, I'm a gnostic atheist!,
    I call Carneades the first ignostic.
    noen, thanks for setting me right! Again, ma'sam [respectfully], my apologies.
    And I 'm a man also.
  • noen
    This is gibberish.
  • noen
    It seems to rely on the idea that moral determinism is superior to having a free moral choice. That is, you hypothesize that beings exist on a moral scale and that one's place on that scale is predetermined.

    I think that having the ability to freely rationally choose to behave morally is superior to having your moral code predetermined for you. Hence your argument fails. Nice try.
  • Give me a break
    Chumans? I feel philosophers are just pulling shit out of their ass now to defend the idiocy of believing in nothing.
  • Nocterro
    How about you show us where the error lies?

    If you're not going to contribute anything productive, kindly refrain from commenting.
  • So you're against thought experiments?
  • Jamie
    Mark is at New Mexico State, not UNM.
  • Thanks!
  • Sam Pierce
    Step 8 does not necessarily flow over into Step 9. Just because God knows He can actualize a world full of members of S doesn't mean that He necessarily will. This may seem to contradict the assumption of Step 6, but it doesn't. As humans, being in the middle of the scale, we can't know what perfect morality is. Maybe there is more morality in creating a race that can choose for itself how to live than there is in creating a race that has no choice
  • GKC
    Agreed.
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