noen, I'm sorry that I didn't state sir or ma'am.
Yes, we rationalists need not use the all,except to hoist theists and others. Burton Porter notes that there could be good but less evil as a contrast or better still good, better and best. He further states that humans and Nature take away the free will of millions. And some superrtogate- go beyond their duties even without themselves suffering.
I suggest that theists and others do not fully comprehend the logic of the problem of Heaven.This demand for consistency is no hobgoblin of little minds!
In contrast to Richard Swinburne who finds that we atheists overrate evil and underrate free will, I find that pointless evil overcomes omnipotent or limited God.
So, the Imao Deo would be for us to be like His putative nature. Ah, but theists beg the question of that Nature! One cannot define or postulate Him into existence! That is the problem of the ontological argument also.
They cannot thus overcome the Euthyphro in adducing that nature that Aquinas himself uses as well as he begs other questions. That bane.
Thus, this anthropic argument holds seas! One indeed should study our arguments and vice versus, I 'm a fallibilitst and evidentialist. I'm a Huxleyan agnotic then as he defines the term. Then there are the Spncerian ones, who hold after Herbert Spencer, that no one can know the Unknowable, and He is such. And then there are the weak agnostics who hold that they themselves cannot know. Agnosticism is epistemological whilst atheism is metaphysical
Thus ,atheists can be agnostics- soft atheists,at least. And then there are the theistic ones, who don't know His nature.
Western theologians are generally apopathists: they describe Him positively whilst the Orthodox Christians are generally katapahthists, who ever state He is not such and such.
I find that both bespeak of ignosticism! Anon on that. Google the ignostic-Ockham,please.
Thus as an ignostic, I'm a gnostic atheist!,
I call Carneades the first ignostic.
noen, thanks for setting me right! Again, ma'sam [respectfully], my apologies.
And I 'm a man also.

noen, I'm sorry that I didn't state sir or ma'am.
Yes, we rationalists need not use the all,except to hoist theists and others. Burton Porter notes that there could be good but less evil as a contrast or better still good, better and best. He further states that humans and Nature take away the free will of millions. And some superrtogate- go beyond their duties even without themselves suffering.
I suggest that theists and others do not fully comprehend the logic of the problem of Heaven.This demand for consistency is no hobgoblin of little minds!
In contrast to Richard Swinburne who finds that we atheists overrate evil and underrate free will, I find that pointless evil overcomes omnipotent or limited God.
So, the Imao Deo would be for us to be like His putative nature. Ah, but theists beg the question of that Nature! One cannot define or postulate Him into existence! That is the problem of the ontological argument also.
They cannot thus overcome the Euthyphro in adducing that nature that Aquinas himself uses as well as he begs other questions. That bane.
Thus, this anthropic argument holds seas! One indeed should study our arguments and vice versus, I 'm a fallibilitst and evidentialist. I'm a Huxleyan agnotic then as he defines the term. Then there are the Spncerian ones, who hold after Herbert Spencer, that no one can know the Unknowable, and He is such. And then there are the weak agnostics who hold that they themselves cannot know. Agnosticism is epistemological whilst atheism is metaphysical
Thus ,atheists can be agnostics- soft atheists,at least. And then there are the theistic ones, who don't know His nature.
Western theologians are generally apopathists: they describe Him positively whilst the Orthodox Christians are generally katapahthists, who ever state He is not such and such.
I find that both bespeak of ignosticism! Anon on that. Google the ignostic-Ockham,please.
Thus as an ignostic, I'm a gnostic atheist!,
I call Carneades the first ignostic.
noen, thanks for setting me right! Again, ma'sam [respectfully], my apologies.
And I 'm a man also.

To simply take Adam’s point and say that it is wrong to breed goldfish seems to be very absurd. In matter of fact, if pressed, I can proffer a reducto ad absurdum.

You state that there is “a disanalogy given the intelligence of the beings we are speaking of in the Anthropic argument” however, I don't think intelligence here matters at all. The man can be well aware of the fact that he could have bred dolphins or have sex with a woman to produce other persons, nevertheless, it is still not obvious by choosing to not breed dolphins or to not have sex with a woman, that the man is doing something morally wrong by breeding goldfish, instead.

You then respond by saying “At least, I'm inclined to say that while I may not share such a prima facie position of wrongness with regard to the Goldfish breeder, I do with regard to God” but, if my analogy works, then this would apply to God too. The only differences between God and the breeder is that God is; omnipotent, omniscient and God is morally perfect, and the breeder is not. However both God and the breeder have strength, knowledge, and are capable of acting morally. However, we may ask, “what immoral action did the man do by breeding goldfish as opposed to breeding dolphins or having sex with a woman?” It seems that he has not done anything wrong according to contemporary normative ethics. So Q is false because there is a counter example to it, and since it is false, God can not be blamed for not bringing S into existence (assuming that creating S is feasible for God). We would not expect a morally perfect person nor a non-perfect person to be obligated to follow a moral principle that is false.

You then state, “(8) isn't false if it is true that creating members of S is the best action. If you'd want to argue that not creating any beings at all is the best action, you are welcome to do so, but I would think this antithetical to your position.”

This is not the point I was trying to make at all. I’m not concerned with morality with this point. All I am concerned with is the consequent of the conditional statement of 8, which states, “every world in which God exists is a member of S.” This is patently false. There is a possible world where God is the only being that exist sans time, sans space, and sans any creatures. Think of God’s state logically prior to the creation of time. This is the type of world I am talking about. So it is false that in “every world in which God exists is a member of S” because there is a possible world where only God exist, and this shows that premise 8 is false.

–PhilosopherP8819