Authored by: Nocterro.

Philosopher of Religion Theodore Drange presents the following lesser-known argument against the existence of the Christian God¹:

(A) If the God of evangelical Christianity were to exist, then:

1. He would love all Christians and want a personal relationship with them.
2. People would need to have G-beliefs (among other things) in order to have the sort of relationship with God that he would want them to have.

(B) Therefore, if the God of evangelical Christianity were to exist, then he would want all Christians to have G-beliefs.

(C) Thus, if the God of evangelical Christianity were to exist, then he would probably prevent Christians from becoming confused or conflicted about matters that are the subject of G-beliefs.

(D) But some Christians are confused about such matters.

(E) And many Christians disagree with one another about such matters.

(F) Therefore [from D & E], Christians have not been prevented from becoming confused or conflicted about matters that are the subject of G-beliefs.

(G) Hence [from C & F], probably the God of evangelical Christianity does not exist.

He writes:

According to evangelical Christianity, there are matters about which it would be very beneficial for people on earth to be knowledgeable. Included among them would be God’s nature, God’s laws, the nature of the afterlife, the requirements for salvation, God’s church and sacraments, and the status of the Bible. Let us call true beliefs about such matters “G-beliefs.”

Examples of G-beliefs would include:

“I believe with a reasonable degree of certainty that faith alone is required to enter heaven.”

“I believe with a reasonable degree of certainty that I will retain my free will in heaven.”

“I believe with a reasonable degree of certainty that God is omnipotent, with the definition of omnipotence being X”

The “reasonable degree of certainty” in question would be a level of certainty which Christians have about other theological matters, such as “Jesus Christ was the Son of God”.
However, there is a high degree of confusion among Christians about theological details – details which seem quite important to salvation. For example, the debate regarding Calvinism/Molinism/Arminianism is quite complex, with adherents of all three seemingly able to make a strong biblical case for each. This points to the apparent fact that the bible is not nearly as clear on such matters as it could be. Drange defines two types of confusion regarding doctrine:

1) Individual confusion – confusion within one’s own mind about which view of a theological matter is biblically correct.

2) Group confusion – there are two or more groups who hold different stances on a theological matter; while each member of group A may not be individually confused, if group B is correct, then group A as a whole is confused.

This argument is similar to the divine hiddenness argument in that God has not made it clear which view of a theological matter is correct. Furthermore, it is important to note that confusion regarding some of these matters may have grave consequences, such as whether God hate homosexuals or abortion doctors. So, confusion on at least some of these issues is not trivial.

Drage then goes on to discuss three possible objections to this argument:

The Free Will Defense

Drange writes,

God permits Christians to be confused about important doctrinal issues because if he were to clarify matters for them and thereby cause them all to have G-beliefs, it would interfere with their free will, which he does not want to do. It is more important to him that they retain their free will than that they have G-beliefs.

He then points out that enhancing humanity’s knowledge would enhance their free will, not restrict it. Even the bible agrees, in John 8:32, “…and the truth shall set you free”. Another objection can be made in that God has already provided some G-beliefs, such as the belief that Jesus is Lord. So it is apparent that God would not think that causing G-beliefs would interfere with free will.

The Afterlife Defense

This defense admits that while there is confusion here, in this life; it will be rectified in the afterlife. One problem with this defense is that it tends to make light of confusion in this life, and thus make light of this life itself. Another objection would be that this view itself, that confusion will be rectified in the afterlife, is itself a source of confusion which should be a G-belief.

The Unknown-Purpose Defense

This defense states that while God may desire for humans to have G-beliefs in this life, He has another desire which conflicts with this desire – similar to God not being able to eliminate evil, even though He desires to, because He also desires us to have free will. However, what would this desire possibly be? This defense seems to have little, if any, explanatory power. In addition, there seem to be many verses in the Bible which conflict with this defense, including John 18:37, Matthew 28:19-20, and 2 Timothy 3:16. Drange states that this defense would “make much of the Bible incomprehensible” and that the Bible seems to indicate that “acquisition of the truth is a top priority with [God]“. In fact, he postulates that this defense clashes with the Bible so greatly, that anyone espousing this objection would be forced to retreat to a type of deism!

Drange concludes:

Any Christian who is not willing to give up the idea of God as omnipotent, all-loving, and greatly concerned about humanity and desiring some close personal relationship with it, would have great difficulty in overcoming the Argument from Confusion.

This argument is coupled with another argument entitled “The Argument from Biblical Defects”, which may be discussed in a later article.

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¹http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/confusion.html