Authored by: Mitchell LeBlanc.

What follows is a brief (and by no means exhaustive) run through of J.L. Schellenberg’s Argument from Horrors. Those interested in picking up a more thorough defense are encouraged to pick up this book and turn to the relevant chapter.

The Argument

Let us start by defining a term:

Horrific Suffering (def.) = that most awe-full form of suffering that gives the victim and/or the perpetrator a prima facie reason to think that his or her life is not worth living.

Now, the argument as Schellenberg formulates:

(1) Necessarily, if God exists, finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God realize their deepest good.

(2) Necessarily, if God exists, the prevention of horrific suffering does not prevent there being finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God.

(3) Necessarily, if God exists, the prevention of horrific suffering does not prevent there being finite persons who realize their deepest good. (from 1, 2)

(4) Necessarily, if God exists, there is horrific suffering only if its prevention would prevent there being finite persons who realize their deepest good.

(5) Necessarily, if God exists, there is no horrific suffering. (from 3, 4)

(6) There is horrific suffering.

(7) God does not exist (from 5, 6)

As you can see, the argument is pretty straightforward. Premise (1) is developed out of the idea that there can be no deepest good (where a deepest good is a greatest good for a particular individual) that is superior to the experiencing of God’s reality. What could be superior to the experience of the perfectly good, merciful, loving, just, and wise creator of everything? Premise (2) is motivated in part by the existence of persons in the actual world who attest to experiencing the reality of God in some way and who, themselves, have not gone through the horrific suffering defined at the beginning. Such suffering then cannot be a necessary condition of finite persons realizing their deepest goods and so, the prevention of such suffering would not prevent that realization from occurring. Premise (3) is a simple deduction. Premise (4) is motivated by a typical theistic response to the traditional problems of evil. That is, many theists maintain that a perfectly good God would justifiably cause/permit some person A to suffer, if that suffering were necessary for bringing about some greater good for A. Premise (4) reason then that there are instances of horrific suffering only if preventing this suffering prevents the realization of the deepest good for finite persons. We’ve already seen that it does not, however, and so from (3) and (4) we may reason (5). There obviously are cases of horrific suffering in the world, and (6) is proffered. From (5) and (6) we may deduce that God does not exist.

Free-Will Theodicy

One possible response to the argument would be to suggest that individuals need to be able to cause (or remove) this type of suffering in order to have a world that is serious enough for the virtues of soul-making and choices of destiny. But it is difficult to see how such a condition cannot be satisfied by a world where choices leading to or resulting from the horrific suffering outlined above would not suffice. Taking our actual world as an example, one is tempted to ask “How free are we really?” As we are no doubt exposed to, there exist instances where the occurrence of murder, rape or other such crimes seem to be better explained by the prior states of the world than by the free action of the individual. That is, those who are raised terribly such that their actions seem plausibly explained in sociopsychological terms properly considered an unfreedom. But more interestingly, there are a great many people who do not engage in bringing about horrific suffering who do not even seem able[1]. There seem to be good evidences that a great many people are simply incapable of performing actions which lead to horrific suffering. There are those who, no matter how hard they tried, could not bring themselves right now to rape, murder or launch nuclear bombs at some populated area. Is there really a relevant sense in which we are free?

Freedom in the actual world, thus, does not seem ‘bound up’ with the capacity to cause horrific suffering. But perhaps our reasoning is incorrect, perhaps this is not the case. At least, God could ensure that through the relevant stages, creatures are incapable of performing actions leading to horrific suffering without rendering them less free than they actually are. But even if this is misguided as well, surely we can think of a world where such horrific suffering is absent and note that this world still contains freedom and responsibility. Persons, even if unable to bring about horrific suffering, could have the ability to bring about many nonhorrific evils. This seems to satisfy the relevant concerns as in this world there is much for us to work on improving: emotional pain still exists, we are afraid of death, we have political disputes that may result in war, etc. Such instances are occasions ripe with the ability to produce, in the relevant creatures, choices moral/spiritual significance. We seem able, then, to detach horrific suffering from the development of our selves in this way.

Free-Will Defense

Schellenberg makes use of Peter Van InWagen’s outline of a defense (page 262). Schellenberg notes that the defense, which I will not produce here, makes the following assumptions (keep in mind that InWagen is a Christian):

(1) That love might essentially involve free will.

(2) That creatures gifted with the beatific vision might nonetheless rebel against God and leave Eden.

(3) That what it means to be separate from God might be to live in a world of horrors.

(4) That seeing the horror of life without God might provided the most effective motive of cooperation and return.

(5) That if a reconciliation plan involving horrors was implemented when the rebellion first occurred, many millennia ago, that plan might nonetheless not yet have proved successful.

(6) That those who experience horrors might all know of the existence and nature of God and of God’s call to return.

(7) That if God’s plan is thus, the number and distribution of horrors today might be great and wide enough.

These are assumptions which I want to flag for the purposes of introducing Schellenberg’s argument and a couple of responses, but for a full outline and criticism of InWagen’s Christian Story consult the primary source already named at the beginning of the article. Suffice for the purposes of this brief overview is to note the assumptions above as being assumptions which are anything but obviously (or perhaps even plausibly) true. A brief interesting question to note in passing, re (1), is “What really happens to what we know of love if we find out that we cannot have done otherwise?”

Lastly, one other type of defense would suggest that it is logically possible that God, when contemplating her creation of the world, saw that for each world she would create without horrific suffering in which free creatures achieve their deepest good in freely chosen relationship with her, the attempt to actualize it would be disrupted by uncooperative free agents. Thus, since it’s possible that God cannot achieve her goal of freely chosen relationship with persons without permitting horrific suffering, then any claim that God would necessarily prevent horrific suffering is, at best, unjustified. However, this, Schellenberg suggests, is the wrong conclusion to draw. That God would necessarily prevent horrific suffering becomes unjustified only if freely chosen relationship with God is entailed by possession of the deepest good for creatures. But, it seems clearly not. Taking God’s options in creation and the infinite number of modes of relationship with her, there must be many ways in which our deepest good can be achieved in the absence of freely chosen relationship. It could be the case that God’s glory is made so clear to creatures that our desires to oppose her simply fade away. That is simply one example out of an infinite number. 

Surely God would give consideration to the modes of relationship other than freely-chosen relationship. Alternatives to permitting horrific suffering that are still compatible with finite creatures realizing their deepest good. Any such alternative, since these worlds are equally (as Schellenberg says) splendid is always going to seem preferable to a world where horrific suffering occurs, even if the world in question is a world with freely chosen relationship. Simply consider, as Schellenberg invites, “…if a perfectly good, and loving, and empathetic, and wise God is able to choose between a scenario whose goodness is very great but requires the permission of horrific suffering and a scenario with goodness equally great and no need for such suffering, how does one think the divine would choose?”

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[1] As Schellenberg notes, where capability in this context is hashed out by my rejecting the idea of perpetrating horrors at one time, and at the same time being able to choose to do otherwise.