Authored by: Mitchell LeBlanc.

Recently, at the Richard Dawkins Forum, there was a debate between a user under the name ChristopherGWeaver and ‘Hackenslash’, a former UP.net member. Weaver to my knowledge, is best defined as a theist where Hackenslash is best defined as a ‘New Atheist’. I think this debate outlined precisely what is wrong with the ‘New Atheist’ community. I hope to offer a review of the debate, though I will avoid becoming very technical as I’d like this to be as accessible as possible. Also, my concern is not over who actually won or did not win the debate but rather some underlying issues.

It should first be noted that Weaver was indeed disqualified for failing to reply within the time limit. Hackenslash did technically win the debate though not, in my opinion, due to any coherent reasoning.

Prior to beginning my review, there is a matter of some relevance I wish to address:

“I don’t believe there is no God, I just lack belief that God exists”

For anyone who is conversant on the topic of theism vs. atheism, I am sure they have come across such a statement. At one point in my life I held this position as well (thanks to my girlfriend for reminding me, she is always there to make fun of my past faults). I have come to see now that this position is incoherent. It seems to me that some issues that will be dealt with in this discussion have been dealt with in a previous article of mine. I will not assume that one has read that article though, and given the date of its publication I might now be more concise in my explanations.

I propose, in line with the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, that the definition of an atheist is one who denies the existence of God. With that said, I acknowledge that there do seem to be a growing number of people who support the definition of atheism which states “a lack of belief in God”. I think that this can be attributed since Flew, to the propensity of the New Atheists.

What precisely does it mean to “lack belief in God?” Given that theism is the acceptance of the proposition “God Exists” either probabilistically or with certainty, it seems to be fairly obvious that atheism would be the rejection of the proposition “God Exists” either probabilistically or with certainty. However, proponents of the definition which states that atheism is simply a lack of belief, also state that they do not believe there is no God. Let’s call this definition of atheism simply NA. As such, the proponent of NA is attempting to take a wholly negative approach to the question, making absolutely no positive claims whatsoever. But is it not still true that they reject the proposition “God Exists?”

The NA proponent seems to want to reject both “God exists” and “God does not exist.” It seems to me that one can only do so if they accept a strong position of agnosticism or ignosticism, stating that knowledge of the existence of God is impossible in either regard. For if knowledge of God is even possible, rejecting the proposition “God exists” entails an acceptance of “God does not exist” since “God does not exist” is a negation of “God exists”. The NA proponent wants to erect some sort of middle ground where none exists.

Call the proposition “God Exists”, x. “God does not exist” is a clear negation of x so that it is not-x. As such we have two positions, x and not-x. Now, we can invoke the law of the excluded middle to see the clear consistency of this analysis: Either God exists or he does not exist. Further if God lacked existence he would simply not exist.

Now, consider Bob. We have two propositions, “Bob believes that God exists”, y, and “Bob does not believe that God exists”, not-y. Clearly, according to the law of the excluded middle it is the case that either y or not-y. That is to say, if y is false, not-y must be true. But might there still be room to squeeze in NA? I think not, in rejecting one horn of a dichotomy such as this, one immediately accepts the alternate horn. Might it mean something different, though, to say “Bob does not believe that God exists”, A, and “Bob believes that God does not exist?”, A*. If there is a difference, it lies in the motivations of the position. That is to say, I think one can only accept A while denying A* if A is following from a position of strong agnosticism/ignosticism. If a definition of God is coherent enough to converse about, ignosticism is rejected. Further, if one believes that knowledge of the existence of God is possible, then strong agnosticism is rejected. It follows then that if Bob believes that there is a definition of God coherent enough to converse about, and that knowledge about whether or not such a being exists is possible, then he cannot accept A as true while denying A*.

Why? Because rejecting the proposition that “God exists” as Bob would have to do to maintain A in the absence of either an agnostic or ignostic justification entails A* for if A* were false, A could not be true.

To simplify, I am proposing that the follow propositions lead to contradiction if taken as a set:

(1) Bob believes that the concept of God is coherent enough for discussion

(2) Bob believes that knowledge of the existence of God is possible

(3) Bob neither believes that God does or does not exist

That is, for (3) to be true, either (1) or (2) must be false. If (1) and (2) are true, (3) is untenable. So when Bob is faced with the proposition “God exists”, accepting it renders him a theist, rejecting it, if he rejects it on the basis of the falsehood of (1) makes him an ignostic. If he rejects it on the basis of the falsehood of (2) he is an agnostic. If he rejects it with the truth of (1) or (2) maintained he is an atheist and has thereby accepted both A and A*.

As such, I think that it is unfair that the atheist attempt to define themselves in this way so that they may be relieved of any burden of providing argument for their position while waiting for arguments to be presented from the other side. Even if all the arguments for the existence of God failed, we would not arrive at atheism.

Hackenslash’s Epistemology

I found Weaver’s opening case for the existence of God very strong. It is far too lengthy and technical to post, however one can simply click the link above to read it on their own. Weaver outlined his logical and metaphysical assumptions in a very clear manner so that if there were any disagreements regarding them, they could be addressed. With that said, much of my focus will be on Hackenslash’s statements.

In his opening, in response to Weaver’s claim that he will “… defend the claim that there exists a metaphysically necessary being”, Hack responds:

Sorry, but even were I to grant the metaphysical necessity of this entity, that would not equal existence. Many things can be described as necessary without actually existing.

It should be clear to even a first year philosophy student that this statement is absurd. It is logically impossible that something be both necessary and non-existent. Hack’s statement is as incoherent as stating that 2+2=9.

Next, Hack quotes the logical assumptions outlined by Weaver and actually presumes that he makes no such assumptions. He states that under his empiricism the only assumption made is that “we can know.” Surely this is incoherent, for even the proposition that “we can know” brings into question the “how” of one’s knowing, an issue perhaps even more important than our ability in the context of his discussion.

In regard to one of Weaver’s arguments, Hack states:

And here we slip into an assumption, which means it must be supported by empirical evidence before we can accept it as axiomatic. In order to support this, one would require omniscience.

From this, Weaver accurately (based on his writing in this debate) outlines Hack’s epistemology as follows:

(H) For any cognizer C, and any superdefinitely true proposition P, C can know that P, just in case, C believes that P, P is true, and C has appropriate empirical epistemic justification for believing that P.

That is to say that according to Hack’s epistemology, if Bob knows P it is the case that he only knows P because he has appropriate empirical justification for believing the proposition which happens to be true. As Hack’s previous statement outlines, he even thinks this true of axioms. Amidst the myriad of problems with Hack’s view, one is perhaps the easiest to understand. Hack cannot know his own epistemology by his own critiera unless there is some empirical evidence which serves as justification. But what possible empirical evidence could justify Hack’s epistemology? A further problem is that (H) is attempting to specify the conditions of knowledge, but if it is truly a precondition to such knowledge then its own criteria must be assumed in any attempt to provide justification. Such that, as Weaver accurately notes, if Hack is asked for justification of (H) he only knows what kind of justification to give. That is, as Weaver states:

So, here we have a fundamental assumption which Hackenslash cannot throw off. He’s got to admit that all knowledge conducive beliefs meet the conditions specified by HJEP, even if the object of knowledge is HJEP itself. So we have an epistemic justificatory circle around HJEP on Hackenslash’s view….a circle he can’t get rid of.

What is even more troubling is that Hack sees this as some sort of attack on empiricism as a whole. That’s just false, it’s an attack on Hack’s specific type of empiricism. In fact, I don’t see any reason to suspect that Weaver himself is not an empiricist! It’s clear at this point, when Hack states in regard to Weaver’s analysis of his epistemology:

Oooh, that sounds all intellectual. I see my opponent is out to get empiricism. How predictable. Well, bring it on, because it will stand against any attack. While I largely accept the above, there are some problems with it. Firstly, unlike my opponent’s sky-hook concept, which is top-down and about as circular as it can possibly get, rendering this whole line of argumentation hypocritical, empiricism is bottom-up, and it is supported by the simple fact thatit works.

It almost seems as if Hackenslash does not understand the criticism that has been laid against him. He also attempts to invoke a pragmatic justification of (H) stating that “it works”. But this surely is of no use to him for not only would a pragmatic epistemic justification contradict the very epistemology he’s espoused, it might even force him to accept theism should it be successfully shown that theism is a superior explanation that “works better.” It should be obvious to any rational thinking individual that the epistemology Hackenslash has espoused in his discussion with Weaver is absurd, demonstrably false and wholly incoherent.

Modality

Hack also seems to lay a charge against modal logic as well. Weaver presents Yablo’s account of modal knowledge:

(Yablo-Conceivability) p is conceivable for me, if I can imagine a world that I take to verify p.

This is merely stating that some proposition is conceivable if there is some possible world in which it is true – that is, p is conceivable if an attempt to think it would not entail a logical contradiction.

But Hackenslash takes this to mean something wholly other, he seems to assume that Weaver is stating that if p can be imagined, then p is true in the actual world. Weaver is not saying this and it’s a horrible strawman to make.

Now, immediately we should put away the notion that these possible worlds must exist actually. This would be the position of the modal realist, but we are in no way committed to this idea. In fact, possible worlds can be thought of as concepts, abstracta or merely propositions.

Hack states:

Possibility is not reality.

Which is absolutely false. Perhaps what he means to say is that what is true in some possible world need not be true in ours. This much is true insofar as what is true is a contingent truth. But for necessary truths, they must be true in our world insofar as our world, the actual world, is one such possible world (an obvious fact).

Hack further states:

‘Metaphysically possible worlds’ are, unless you can demonstrate otherwise in a critically robust manner, functionally equivalent to ‘making stuff up’.

Of course, he offers no argument for this. Nor is it clear that even if possible worlds met the criteria of “making stuff up” that necessary truths still would not apply. It is even further exemplified that Hack has no idea as to what he is arguing against:

OK, where is the evidence that these possible worlds exist. Where is the evidence that any of this made-up nonsense applies to this world?

Of course one must wonder whether or not Hack is asking “where is the evidence that these possible worlds actually exist”, something that to anyone other than a modal realist is completely irrelevant and riddled with a lack of comprehension. Briefly put, possible worlds are conceivable states of affairs and modal logic is our logic of possibility. If there is some basis for rejecting a system which has been shown to be complete, Hack has not provided any such reason. One can only assume that Hack rejects it because he fails to understand it. Just because I can conceive of a possible world in which I am blue, does not mean that I am blue, obviously. Hack seems to think that this is what modal propositions are stating. Of course, if some proposition is true in every possible world and we discover this through the use of modal logic then it indeed follows that such a proposition is true in our world as well. That is, as per axiom s5, if something is merely possible it need not be true in our world, but if something is possibly necessary then it follows logically and inescapably that such a proposition is true in our world (see: Axiom S5).

Debate Resolution

Due to the fact that Weaver did not respond Hackenslash won by default, but oddly enough the moderator awarded him a victory on debating points as well. It seems that the misunderstandings which Hack espoused were even shared by the moderator at RDF, and perhaps by even more of the community. Such is the folly of the ‘New Atheism’, they constantly proclaim themselves as being the intellectually elite, the reasoned, and the freethinking. This debate, and the many other examples of the ‘New Atheistic’ failure, stand as testaments to the falsity of these claims. While many of the ‘New Atheists’ may excel in the science, they falter when they presume the sciences as the be-all and end-all. While they proclaim themselves the reasoned they continually fail to demonstrate an understanding of anything outside of their respective fields. While they claim to be freethinking, the ‘New Atheist’ movement resembles a religion moreso than some religions!

There are objections to be made with regards to Weaver’s argument, but they would not be the espousal of a self-refuting epistemology coupled with a misunderstanding of basic philosophy presented to us by Hackenslash.

In my personal conversations with Hackenslash, he’s repeatedly expressed the idea that the existence of God is a scientific matter. This thinking is in line with Dawkins’ writing in The God Delusion but seems absolutely absurd. Surely the question of the existence of a being who’s mere possibility is ruled out methodologically by science, cannot be a scientific question. For if it is such a question, science has begged the question against the existence of God since the beginning.

A Plea

I would ask that atheists who currently have their atheistic justifications on a scientific basis critically rethink their positions. I am not convinced that science provides a firm justification of atheism, at least, not science devoid of philosophy (I think of Quentin Smith here as someone who couples science and philosophy to make his case for atheism). Philosophy is the only means by which one can reach a reasoned position on the existence of God whether it be theism or atheism. I would also urge any theistic readers to not be intimidated by the claims that a science devoid of philosophy has disproven the existence of God. It is in fact, impossible for science to do given it’s methodological restrictions. I am not saying that one should ignore our known scientific facts (since often they might make good cases for God) but rather that one be very skeptical of claims that science has pronounced atheism victorious, because this is not the case at all.

As should be evident from the debate between Weaver and Hackenslash, the New Atheists are not the intellectual heroes of our modern world. And while Hackenslash has called me an “ignoramus” it is perhaps yet another irrational outburst from a scientistic individual, though oddly this time, aimed towards another atheist.