A Thomistic Cosmological Argument

A Thomistic Cosmological Argument 08/04/10

A brief presentation of a Thomistic cosmological argument.


Authored by: .


An article originally written in July 2009 for the Society Of Christian Apologetic Enthusiasts now Rational Theism at http://philapologia.org

The cosmological argument is one of the oldest arguments for the existence of God. It has its roots in the work of the Greek philosophers Aristotle (384–322 BCE) and Plato (427–347 BCE). Today, we have two popular versions of the argument: theKalam and the Leibnizian arguments. Both attempt to show that there must have been a first cause or sufficient reason for the universe to exit. However, one seldom hears of the original cosmological argument as it was made famous by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). Aquinas’s argument is handy if one wants to avoid heavy debates on the philosophy of time and the principal of sufficient reason that other cosmological arguments bring to the table.

The simplest statement one can find of Aquinas’s argument is found in his Summa Contra Gentiles:

We see things in the world that can exist and can also not exist. Now everything that can exist has a cause. But one cannot go on ad infinitum in causes… Therefore one must posit something existing of which is necessary. (Summa Contra Gentiles 15.124)

We can see that this argument, rather than focusing solely on cause and effect as Kalam does, or on sufficient reason as the Leibnizian does, attempts to combine the two by examining causal chains and their modal status. David Beck, a modern day defender of the TCA, gives the example of a train. If we visualize a train being pulled, we ask ourselves “What is the cause of the cart in front of us being pulled?” The answer is of course the cart in front of it, but what is pulling that cart? Well the cart in front of it. The problem is that we see that all the carts are dependent on the one in front of it to move, but this cannot go on forever otherwise the carts would never be in motion. We can break the causal chain by positing a being which depends on nothing for its movement; the engine which by its very nature is able to move. This illustration is clearly an analogy for existence. The contingent beings are the carts, and God is the engine: the thing of which by its very nature exists and does not depend upon another thing for its existence.

We can summarize our reasoning thus far in the following way:

P1. A contingent being exists.
P2. What explains this being’s existence must be in a set that contains either only contingent beings or contains at least one necessary (non-contingent) being.
P3. A set that contains only contingent beings cannot cause this contingent being to exist.
C1. Therefore this set contains at least one necessary being.
C2. Therefore a necessary being exists.

Premises one and two are not at question. The third premise is true due to the fact that if there was ever a time when nothing existed, then nothing currently exists, since contingent beings are finite in temporal duration and cannot cause themselves to exist. It follows then that if even one contingent thing exists, whether it be the universe as a whole, a chair, or my best friend Steve, then there exists a necessary entity.

What then can we deduce about then nature of this necessary entity? Firstly, Occam’s Razor eliminates the possibility of there being more then one necessary being, since positing a plurality of beings does not seem to be necessary for the explanation. From this, we can conclude that monotheism is true. Secondly, since this necessary being is the cause of space and time, the necessary being must transcend space and time, and therefore exist non-temporally and non-spatially (at least without the universe). This necessary being must therefore be changeless. The cause must also be immaterial since something can only be timeless if it is unchanging, and something can only be changeless if it is immaterial. It must also be unimaginably powerful, since it created all of space, matter, and time. Finally and most remarkably, such a transcendent cause must be personal, for how else could a timeless cause give rise to a temporal effect (like the universe)?1 The only entities that we know of which can be timeless and immaterial are minds and abstract objects (numbers, sets, laws, theories, colors, etc). But abstract objects can’t cause anything. Therefore the being which exists, must be an unembodied mind. If the cause were just a mechanically operating set of necessary and sufficient conditions, then the cause could never exist without the effect. If the cause were timelessly present, the the effect would be timelessly present too. The only way for the effect to be timeless and the effect to be in time would be for the cause to be a personal agent with free choice. Thispersonal agent chooses to create an effect in time without any prior determining conditions.

Thus we are brought not only to a transcendent cause of the universe, but to its creator. So, from the Thomistic cosmological argument alone we can may conclude that a personal creator exists, and is uncaused, necessary2, unique, beginningless,changeless, timeless, immaterial, very powerful, and personal. From this, it is reasonable to conclude that God exists.”

  1. This deviates from Aquinas’s original presentation of the argument and presumes the past duration of the universe to be finite. Though there are good reasons for believing the past duration of the universe to be finite (The Kalam cosmological argument takes this approach), Aquinas’s goal was more modest: his argument is compatible with a universe whose past duration was infinite. However, I wish to extend the force of Aquinas’s argument, and hence I do not assume the eternality of the universe in this essay. []
  2. In the factual sense. []

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  • http://www.choosinghats.com/ C.L. Bolt

    “Now everything that can exist has a cause.” Prove it.
    “But one cannot go on ad infinitum in causes” Prove it.
    “ A set that contains only contingent beings cannot cause this contingent being to exist.” Why not?
    I am not seeing a problem with an infinite chain of contingent beings.

    • Isaacf

      Cite for me one example of something beginning to exist with out having been caused.

      If it were possible for causal chains to extend in to the infinite passed we would never have reached this moment because there it still an infinite number of things that need to happen before we get here.

      Read up on the principal of causation. I really have nothing more I can tell you.

  • http://www.choosinghats.com C.L. Bolt

    “Now everything that can exist has a cause.” Prove it.
    “But one cannot go on ad infinitum in causes” Prove it.
    “ A set that contains only contingent beings cannot cause this contingent being to exist.” Why not?
    I am not seeing a problem with an infinite chain of contingent beings.

    • Isaacf

      Cite for me one example of something beginning to exist with out having been caused.

      If it were possible for causal chains to extend in to the infinite passed we would never have reached this moment because there it still an infinite number of things that need to happen before we get here.

      Read up on the principal of causation. I really have nothing more I can tell you.

  • noen

    "The only entities that we know of which can be timeless and immaterial are minds and abstract objects (numbers, sets, laws, theories, colors, etc). But abstract objects can’t cause anything. Therefore the being which exists, must be an unembodied mind."

    You are begging the question. Unembodied minds do not exist but you assume that they do which is what allows you to assume god into existence.

    • Isaacf

      Minds which we know of are attached to matter somehow.
      A mind is the only personal timeless force that could account for the universe to began to exist.
      Matter began to exist with the universe.
      Therefore it was an embodied mind.

      The reasoning seems clear to me. But to be fare this is only a presentation I was asked to write and I don't care one way or the other if the argument ends up being right.

      • noen

        It may seem clear to you but it is fallacious nonetheless. "Minds which we know of are attached to matter somehow." You begin with dualistic assumptions in order to prove your dualism. This is a fallacy known as begging the question.

        There is no more reason to assume that minds are "attached" to matter than there is to assume that "wet" is attached to water. As wet is to water so mind is to brain. "Mind" is the higher level description of what brains do. "Wet" is a higher level description of what water molecules do. There is no need to propose a separate ontology for mindstuff. As a phenomenon it is fully accounted for by material brains.

        • http://facebook.com/mexichinksunite isaacf

          And just as you say I am presupposing dualism, are you not also presupposing property dualism?

  • noen

    "The only entities that we know of which can be timeless and immaterial are minds and abstract objects (numbers, sets, laws, theories, colors, etc). But abstract objects can’t cause anything. Therefore the being which exists, must be an unembodied mind."

    You are begging the question. Unembodied minds do not exist but you assume that they do which is what allows you to assume god into existence.

    • Isaacf

      Minds which we know of are attached to matter somehow.
      A mind is the only personal timeless force that could account for the universe to began to exist.
      Matter began to exist with the universe.
      Therefore it was an embodied mind.

      The reasoning seems clear to me. But to be fare this is only a presentation I was asked to write and I don't care one way or the other if the argument ends up being right.

      • noen

        It may seem clear to you but it is fallacious nonetheless. "Minds which we know of are attached to matter somehow." You begin with dualistic assumptions in order to prove your dualism. This is a fallacy known as begging the question.

        There is no more reason to assume that minds are "attached" to matter than there is to assume that "wet" is attached to water. As wet is to water so mind is to brain. "Mind" is the higher level description of what brains do. "Wet" is a higher level description of what water molecules do. There is no need to propose a separate ontology for mindstuff. As a phenomenon it is fully accounted for by material brains.

        • http://facebook.com/mexichinksunite isaacf

          And just as you say I am presupposing dualism, are you not also presupposing property dualism?

  • Zach Blaesi

    Neon, I don't believe it matters. Everyone should agree, I think, that immaterial minds exist in some possible worlds.

    • noen

      No, I don't agree that immaterial minds might exist in some possible worlds. "Immaterial" is incoherent. I also reject your belief that it would even be possible for an unembodied mind to exist.

      • http://www.highschoolapologetics.wordpress.com/ Payton

        Incoherence is immaterial.

        • noen

          Good luck with that.

          • Isaacf

            I think Payton brings up a very good point. The concepts we use everyday are immaterial aspects of reality and you are still capable of understanding them. (Ironic that I just failed a math quiz I suppose.)

          • noen

            The concept of "immaterial material" is self contradictory and therefore incoherent. Mathematical statements are not immaterial, they are symbolic. Higher level descriptions of things like tables and chairs are just that and do not require a separate ontology in order to account for them.

          • http://facebook.com/mexichinksunite isaacf

            I don't that think that anywhere I am positing a concept like immaterial matter but rather immaterial substance, which may effect the direction we'd like to take the discussion next.

  • Zach Blaesi

    Neon, I don't believe it matters. Everyone should agree, I think, that immaterial minds exist in some possible worlds.

    • noen

      No, I don't agree that immaterial minds might exist in some possible worlds. "Immaterial" is incoherent. I also reject your belief that it would even be possible for an unembodied mind to exist.

      • http://www.highschoolapologetics.wordpress.com Payton

        Incoherence is immaterial.

        • noen

          Good luck with that.

          • Isaacf

            I think Payton brings up a very good point. The concepts we use everyday are immaterial aspects of reality and you are still capable of understanding them. (Ironic that I just failed a math quiz I suppose.)

          • noen

            The concept of "immaterial material" is self contradictory and therefore incoherent. Mathematical statements are not immaterial, they are symbolic. Higher level descriptions of things like tables and chairs are just that and do not require a separate ontology in order to account for them.

          • http://facebook.com/mexichinksunite isaacf

            I don't that think that anywhere I am positing a concept like immaterial matter but rather immaterial substance, which may effect the direction we'd like to take the discussion next.

  • Thrasymachus

    The support for premise 3 is confused. At least, it confuses me.

    Contingent entities don't need to be temporally finite. Our universe might go on forever. Further, I don't see any need for contingent entities to be temporal at all. If you temporally index causes, fine, but then the necessary entity itself is in a bind.

    More crucially, you haven't given much reason to reject (for example) endless chains of causes. It mightn't be hugely plausible for cars and trains, but so what? These intuitions shouldn't be trusted near the cosmic singularity. Why not pick a more hospitable analogy such as some converging series. For any term you pick, you can find one closer to this value: and you can do this ad infinitum. Take the convergence to be the start of the universe, and viola, hypertask.

    I'm also not seeing the persuasive power for the concerns you raise for this necessary entity: the TCA isn't an inference to best explanation, so citing explanatory grounds to rule out (for example) polytheism won't work: different arguments are needed. I also simply don't see the argumentative force for transcendence etc. etc. – it seems more like trying to squeeze these things on the side.

    • http://www.highschoolapologetics.wordpress.com/ Payton

      I don't think your analogy to a converging series is really hospitable at all. How exactly could it work out in your favor? See, I don't think existence is a question analogical to value, which your analogy depends on. Existence is a kind of binary phenomenon, for lack of a better word; it is ones and zeroes, either/or, nothing/something. Yet the value you use in your analogy to a converging series is continuous, and infinitely divisible to a zero-limit. Existence is akin to the motion or stillness of boxcars, which is binary. They are either moving or stopped. They cannot be moving at different speeds. Imagine a train where each car is moving at half the speed of the car right ahead of it, as in a converging series like yours. The very front car is moving at 50mph, the second at 25mph, the third at 12.5mph, the fourth at 6.25mph, and so on lim x –> 0, where the succession of cars is quickly approaching a dead stop. Surely you see that this cannot be the case, as all the cars (which are states of affairs in a line of causal relations) are hitched up together (causation), so they cannot be moving (existing) in a continuum of speeds. There is no 'almost existing', just as there the cars cannot be moving at different speeds from each other, so this convergent series analogy is not appropriate.

      But I wholly agree with your point about the TCA's very significant limitations. He does seem to be trying to squeeze things in on the side.

      • Thrasymachus

        I think you might be misunderstanding what I'm gunning for with my series example. That is probably because I explained it poorly.

        I'm definitely not suggesting a load of fractionally existing objects. Rather I mean the terms of the series to be events, and their 'value' to be the moment in time in which they occur. The idea is that for a given event you can find a preceding event, and for that event another preceding event, and so on. The point of the converging series example is that we can keep doing this without traversing an infinite length of time, in the same way we can pack as many terms of this series as we care to in a given interval.

        Now, it seems weird to say there are an endless series of boxcars, but it isn't that weird (as far as I can tell) to have endless series and asymptotic limits. If we want to wax physics, perhaps the universe is a suitably complex dynamical system, and the big bang just represents it's asymptotic limit at t=0. Now that's more Kalam, but it can be translated back into the argument given for (3): because there was no time at which 'nothing existed'. At any point in time, there was the universe. So it seems we could plausibly take a set of contingent things (namely, the set of states of the universe), and yet say it's okay for them all to be contingent. For a weirder (although, so far as I can tell, possible) couple of counter-examples, consider either negative causation (if A does not exist, B exists if B does not exist, A exists) or looping causation (A causes B causes A causes B…) The sets in either of these cases don't have any necessary beings in, yet they seem to pass the test. But I'm probably wrong.

  • Thrasymachus

    The support for premise 3 is confused. At least, it confuses me.

    Contingent entities don't need to be temporally finite. Our universe might go on forever. Further, I don't see any need for contingent entities to be temporal at all. If you temporally index causes, fine, but then the necessary entity itself is in a bind.

    More crucially, you haven't given much reason to reject (for example) endless chains of causes. It mightn't be hugely plausible for cars and trains, but so what? These intuitions shouldn't be trusted near the cosmic singularity. Why not pick a more hospitable analogy such as some converging series. For any term you pick, you can find one closer to this value: and you can do this ad infinitum. Take the convergence to be the start of the universe, and viola, hypertask.

    I'm also not seeing the persuasive power for the concerns you raise for this necessary entity: the TCA isn't an inference to best explanation, so citing explanatory grounds to rule out (for example) polytheism won't work: different arguments are needed. I also simply don't see the argumentative force for transcendence etc. etc. – it seems more like trying to squeeze these things on the side.

    • http://www.highschoolapologetics.wordpress.com Payton

      I don't think your analogy to a converging series is really hospitable at all. How exactly could it work out in your favor? See, I don't think existence is a question analogical to value, which your analogy depends on. Existence is a kind of binary phenomenon, for lack of a better word; it is ones and zeroes, either/or, nothing/something. Yet the value you use in your analogy to a converging series is continuous, and infinitely divisible to a zero-limit. Existence is akin to the motion or stillness of boxcars, which is binary. They are either moving or stopped. They cannot be moving at different speeds. Imagine a train where each car is moving at half the speed of the car right ahead of it, as in a converging series like yours. The very front car is moving at 50mph, the second at 25mph, the third at 12.5mph, the fourth at 6.25mph, and so on lim x –> 0, where the succession of cars is quickly approaching a dead stop. Surely you see that this cannot be the case, as all the cars (which are states of affairs in a line of causal relations) are hitched up together (causation), so they cannot be moving (existing) in a continuum of speeds. There is no 'almost existing', just as there the cars cannot be moving at different speeds from each other, so this convergent series analogy is not appropriate.

      But I wholly agree with your point about the TCA's very significant limitations. He does seem to be trying to squeeze things in on the side.

      • Thrasymachus

        I think you might be misunderstanding what I'm gunning for with my series example. That is probably because I explained it poorly.

        I'm definitely not suggesting a load of fractionally existing objects. Rather I mean the terms of the series to be events, and their 'value' to be the moment in time in which they occur. The idea is that for a given event you can find a preceding event, and for that event another preceding event, and so on. The point of the converging series example is that we can keep doing this without traversing an infinite length of time, in the same way we can pack as many terms of this series as we care to in a given interval.

        Now, it seems weird to say there are an endless series of boxcars, but it isn't that weird (as far as I can tell) to have endless series and asymptotic limits. If we want to wax physics, perhaps the universe is a suitably complex dynamical system, and the big bang just represents it's asymptotic limit at t=0. Now that's more Kalam, but it can be translated back into the argument given for (3): because there was no time at which 'nothing existed'. At any point in time, there was the universe. So it seems we could plausibly take a set of contingent things (namely, the set of states of the universe), and yet say it's okay for them all to be contingent. For a weirder (although, so far as I can tell, possible) couple of counter-examples, consider either negative causation (if A does not exist, B exists if B does not exist, A exists) or looping causation (A causes B causes A causes B…) The sets in either of these cases don't have any necessary beings in, yet they seem to pass the test. But I'm probably wrong.

  • http://www.highschoolapologetics.wordpress.com/ Payton

    I was about to object, but yes it would seem like you can have an infinite regress of causes without an infinite regress of time.

    But then again, can limits work backwards like that? Or must they go forwards, so that they never reach something. It is silly to go further and further, yet not quite reaching all the way back. Try to imagine that the way it happened, going forward.

    And the forward and backward terms I'm using are relevant, forward is in our direction, relative to earlier times, and backwards is away from us, in the opposite direction we're going. I say this so you won't fault me for this forward backward nonsense I'm making.

    But yes, I see where you're going with your argument. That does make sense. I misunderstood.

  • http://www.highschoolapologetics.wordpress.com Payton

    I was about to object, but yes it would seem like you can have an infinite regress of causes without an infinite regress of time.

    But then again, can limits work backwards like that? Or must they go forwards, so that they never reach something. It is silly to go further and further, yet not quite reaching all the way back. Try to imagine that the way it happened, going forward.

    And the forward and backward terms I'm using are relevant, forward is in our direction, relative to earlier times, and backwards is away from us, in the opposite direction we're going. I say this so you won't fault me for this forward backward nonsense I'm making.

    But yes, I see where you're going with your argument. That does make sense. I misunderstood.

  • noen

    Huny, there are no actual infinities. If in the course of arguing you get an infinite regress that's how you know you've made an error.

    Also, it's difficult to know how you are replying to because you don't thread your replies.

  • noen

    Huny, there are no actual infinities. If in the course of arguing you get an infinite regress that's how you know you've made an error.

    Also, it's difficult to know how you are replying to because you don't thread your replies.

  • Fishpasta

    >>>>Neon, I don't believe it matters. Everyone should agree, I think, that immaterial minds exist in some possible worlds.<<<<

    Lol wut?

    Emergentists be damned.

  • Fishpasta

    >>>>Neon, I don't believe it matters. Everyone should agree, I think, that immaterial minds exist in some possible worlds.<<<<

    Lol wut?

    Emergentists be damned.

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