Authored by: Mitchell LeBlanc.

A couple of recent online conversations, one e-mail and a discussion with a classmate has provoked me to author a very simple of explanation of the doctrine of Molinism. Some discussions that I have seen on the topic, such as RazorsKiss’  (RK) discussion at ChoosingHats, seem to address strawmen of the issue. I will only be ‘defending’ Molinism insofar as doing so permits clarification or further explanation of some tenet. Of course, the mere idea of a defense implies that there be some criticism which Molinism needs to be defended against. While there are such criticisms (such as the grounding objection)I have not seen them invoked by any of the folks with whom I have had discussions. This is especially the case with RK, though he is not alone. Although my motivation for this article stems from my recent discussions, including my discussion with RK, it is not targeted at any specific individual but rather to anyone interested in understanding Molinism.

Molinism

Essentially, it is a doctrine which seeks to reconcile God’s omniscience with libertarian human free will.

God’s Knowledge

Non-molinists typically affirm two types of knowledge within God: Necessary Knowledge and Free Knowledge.

Necessary Knowledge is God’s knowledge of necessary truth. Such truths are true independently of the will of God and include propositions such as “2+2=4″ and “All bachelors are unmarried.” God’s Free Knowledge is God’s knowledge of contingent truths, truths which are dependent upon God’s will, that is – propositions which are true, but could have been false, such as: “Bob drives a Mercedes” and “Flowers smell nice.”

Molinists affirm both of these types of knowledge but propose another category known as Middle Knowledge under which God knows contingent truths that are independent of his will. To use a common example, in Matthew 11:23 we find a counterfactual, it reads:

And you, Capernaum, will not be exalted to heaven, will you? You will descend to Hades; for if the miracles had occurred in Sodom which occurred in you, it would have remained to this day. (NASB)

A counterfactual is any statement with the form “If it were the case that P, then it would be the case that Q.” In the above verse we find: “…If the miracles had occurred in Sodom which occurred in you, it would have remained to this day.” This is an example of a counterfactual. Jesus is saying that if Sodom and Gomorrah had some experience similar to that of Jesus’ generation of Israel, then they would have repented. Jesus is expressing knowledge of what the Sodomites would have done under a different set of circumstances. There are various other examples of counterfactual statements in the Bible, but this brief illustration should suffice.

Counterfactuals of Freedom

Given God’s knowledge of counterfactuals, it follows that insofar as counterfactuals of freedom are possible, God knows them. This is to say that God knows, for example, that “If Bob wins the lottery, he would freely buy a sportscar.” This counterfactual, if true, is true even if Bob never wins the lottery. It is also a counterfactual of freedom because the latter portion of the conditional pertains to some free action. God can then know what every agent would freely do under some circumstance.

Logical Ordering

Molinists affirm that God’s middle knowledge is logically prior to his creation of the world. That is to say, the logical ordering of events is:

1. God’s knowledge of necessary truths

2. God’s middle knowledge

-Creation-

3. God’s free knowledge

This ordering is of the utmost importance to the Molinist for if middle knowledge falls logically posterior to Creation, libertarian freedom cannot obtain since all counterfactuals would be actively caused by God. Since God’s middle knowledge (and counterfactuals in general) falls logically prior to the creation event, libertarian freedom is possible. This is because logically prior to God’s creative action, it would still be true that “If Bob wins the lottery, he would freely buy a sportscar.” In having this knowledge, God can make a free choice as to which type of world to create.

RK has taken issue with the notion of logical priority altogether. He has failed to account for the differences.

Consider the example where Bob wakes up in the morning, goes to work and then goes to the gym. It is true for this situation that temporally prior to Bob’s going to work, he woke up in the morning. And it is true that temporally posterior to Bob’s going to work, he goes to the gym. We are applying temporal priority to this circumstance because it is a sequence of events that takes place in time. What does it mean, then, to say that something is logically prior, or logically posterior to some other thing?

Consider the following set of numbers:

{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}

In this set, the number 3 is logically prior to the number 4 and the number 5 is logically posterior to the number 4. It is not true, however, that 4 obtains, happens or exists before 5. Because we are talking about ordering that is necessarily timeless, such as would be many facets of God (logically) before the creation of time, we must speak of logical priority and not temporal priority. RK also makes a category error when he attemps to apply the notion of succession to logical orders. In our first example, it is true that Bob wakes up and then goes to work and then goes to the gym, this is coherent because the set is a temporally ordered set of propositions. However, when applied to the numbered set above it is an incoherent idea to say, 1 and then 2 and then 3. The word “then” is a temporal adverb and applying it to a non-temporal set is a clear category mistake (it might be used analogically, but the usage should be noted as purely analogical). Perhaps RK simply means that in reading some members of the set we must read them one by one. But this is not a matter of succession on the part of the set, it is a matter of temporal succession on the part of human perception/understanding! The set simply is, absolutely complete and without any “becoming.”

We can say that some X has logical priority over some Y if  the latter is logically dependent on the former. Again, no temporality involved since there could be presumably an infinite number of dependencies that occur simultaneously. So with regard to the logical ordering of God’s creative decree, for example, the Molinist purports that God’s free knowledge is logically posterior to his creation of the world. That is, God cannot have knowledge of the actual state of affairs until there is an actual state of affairs. As such, God’s knowledge of the actual state of affairs is dependent on there being an actual state of affairs – thus, Creation is logically prior to God’s free knowledge.

If one is still not convinced and wants to continue to assert that the notion of logical priority is incoherent (or merely temporal), the following argument reveals a devastating conclusion:

(1) God created the Universe

(2) The Universe marks the creation of time

(3) Therefore, God created time (from 1, 2)

(4) God is atemporal

(5) God could not have willed the beginning of the universe temporally (from 4)

(6) God must have willed the beginning of the universe atemporally (from 5)

(7) God’s will to create the universe is not temporally prior to the actualization of the universe (from 4, 5, 6)

(8) God’s willing of the universe is logically prior to the actualization of the universe

(9) Logical priority is incoherent (assumptive premise)

(10) God’s willing of the universe is not temporally or logically prior to the actualization of the universe (from 4, 5, 6, 7, 9)

(11) God did not will the actualization of the universe (from 10)

(12) God did not create the Universe

To this argument, RK has responded:

(11) fails by assuming your own categories for (10) as the only possible ones…

He never offered any alternative method of priority that is neither temporal, nor logical. Given that there is no present reason to accept his criticism, if one rejects logical priority it is clear that they reject God’s creation of the universe altogether.

Middle Knowledge and Creation

How, then, might God’s middle knowledge influence his creative decree? William Lane Craig states²:

[God] knows, for example, that in some possible world Peter freely denies Christ three times and that in another possible world Peter freely affirms Christ under identical circumstances, for both are possible.

God’s middle knowledge is His knowledge of all contingently true conditional propositions in the subjunctive mood, including propositions about creaturely free actions. For example, logically prior to His creative decree, God knew that if Peter were in circumstances C, he would freely deny Christ three times. Such subjunctive conditionals are often called counterfactuals. These counterfactuals serve to delimit the range of possible worlds to worlds which are feasible for God to actualize. For example, there is an intrinsically possible world in which Peter freely affirms Christ in precisely the same circumstances in which he in fact denied him; but given the counterfactual truth that if Peter were in precisely those circumstances he would freely deny Christ, then the possible world in which Peter freely affirms Christ in those circumstances is not feasible for God. God could force Peter to affirm Christ in those circumstances, but then his confession would not be free. By means of His middle knowledge, God knows what is the proper subset of possible worlds which are feasible for Him, given the counterfactuals that are true.

God then decrees to create certain free creatures in certain circumstances and, thus, on the basis of his middle knowledge and His knowledge of His own decree, God has foreknowledge of everything that will happen (His free knowledge). In that way, He knows, simply on the basis of His own internal states and without any need of any sort of perception of the external world, that Peter will freely deny Christ three times.

… So there are worlds which are intrinsically possible but which God, given the counterfactuals that happen to be true, is not capable of actualizing and which are therefore, in Flint’s terminology, infeasible for God. Notice that because counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are contingently true, which worlds are feasible for God and which are infeasible is also a contingent matter. It all depends on how creatures would freely behave in various circumstances, which is beyond God’s control.

The explanation is pretty clear but it is important to note that when Craig says that how creatures freely act is beyond God’s control, he is merely asserting that it is logically impossible that God make an agent freely do X. This seems to be a contradiction in terms comparable to 2+2=5.

Theology

The biggest theological implication of the view is perhaps that God is able to maintain his sovereignty without preventing man’s freedom. Imagine the state of affairs in which God knows that if Bob wins the lottery, he will freely donate to a Haiti relief fund. So, if God wants Bob to freely donate to a Haiti relief fund, all he has to do in this example is place Bob in a circumstance where he wins the lottery. God retains sovereignty by having his purposes/desires obtain and Bob retains his freedom.

With regard to Christian salvation, Molinism asserts that God knows logically prior to the creation of the world the worlds in which certain people would freely choose him. Let us again look at Bob, imagine that God knows that if Bob were placed in circumstance C, he would freely believe in Christ. God then actualizes a world in which Bob finds himself in C and thus believes in Christ. Thus, God’s sovereignty is upheld by his actualization of some world, and Bob’s free will is upheld by his freely choosing to believe in Christ. Note: This is not to say that Bob comes to believe in Christ without Christ’s assistance (see: “simultaneous concurrence”)

Conclusion

While I have not attempted to defend Molinism against coherent objections, I have tried to outline specifically what Molinism is stating in an effort to quell what seems to be a growing number of strawmen on the topic.

__________________________

¹RK has constantly objected that he does not misunderstand, but if this is true, I can’t help but feel that RK is simply being dishonest in his representation of these issues. I would hope that he is not being willfully dishonest, so I will presume that he is simply mistaken.

²http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5633