Authored by: Mitchell LeBlanc.

I recently authored an article regarding William Lane Craig’s Kalam Cosmological Argument. In retrospect, my dealings were quite superficial and perhaps all things which Craig has heard and dealt with prior.

I write again on the topic of the Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA) in an attempt to summarize and simplify the position of philosopher Quentin Smith. Smith and Craig have been long time correspondents and have shared two extremely interesting discussions.

In these discussions the KCA has largely been the focus. In their 1996 debate, Quentin Smith during his positive period argued not only that God did not create the Universe, but rather, the suggestion is logically impossible.

Smith begins by outlining the difference between a continuing cause and an originating cause.

Continuing cause: Something is a continuing cause of the universe only if it causes each state of the Universe.

Originating cause: Something is an originating cause of the universe only if it causes the earliest state of the universe.

Thus, he states that:

If the universe began with the Big Bang and has no originating cause, it has no continuing cause. For the origin of the universe is a state of the universe, and if it is not caused the criteria for a continuing cause (causing each state of x) cannot be satisfied.

Smith’s thesis: It is logically impossible that there be a first state of the Universe caused by God, and furthermore that every cosmological argument for the existence of God are actually arguments for his non-existence.

Smith attempts to prove this by showing that Craig’s thesis that the universe has an originating divine cause is logically inconsistent with all permissible definitions of causality.

He undertakes this by beginning with an explanation that he is speaking of the cause of the universe’s beginning, not the cause of God’s act of willing that the universe. The purpose of this clarification is to note that we are not talking about agent causality. Agent causality would by the type associated with action. The relationship between myself and my willing my arm to move would be such an example. The notion of causation that is up for discussion is that of event causation. He is specifically speaking of the relation between God’s act of willing (which is an event) and the beginning of the universe (also an event).

Smith operates under the presumption of Big Bang cosmology (as does Craig) and holds that the universe and time began to exist with the Big Bang. He says that from this, one can rule out an originating cause according to ALL definitions of causality which include temporal priority as a logically necessary condition.

He is making the claim that in every definition of causality that affirms that the cause is earlier in time to the effect rules out any notion of an originating cause.

He begins with Hume’s definition of causality.

Hume’s definition of causality: Something, c, is a cause of something, e, if and only if these three conditions are met: (1) c is spatially and temporally associated with e, (2) c is earlier in time than e, and (3) every particular like c is always conjoined with a particular like e.

Perhaps we can simplify with a focus on the specific point Smith makes:

God is the cause of the universe at the earliest time only if God is earlier than the earliest time.

We have a clear logical contradiction; nothing can be earlier than the earliest time.

Ergo, for any system of causality which is derived from Hume’s where a cause is earlier than the effect,  cannot affirm God as the cause of the beginning of the Universe.

Smith then moves on to discuss what he calls “Nomological definitions of cause”. Nomos is a Greek word meaning the law, so any Nomological definitions of causation are definitions which include a law of nature.

He proposes the following definition of causation:

Nomological definition of causality: c is a cause of e if and only if there’s a law of nature, called the law of nature L, that enables a statement that e occurs to be deduced from the premise that c occurs and another premise asserting the law L.

An example of something which meets this criteria is the following:

Let’s first propose our law of nature. Let us say, gravity. Let us also suppose that I, Mitch, throw a ball in the air and it falls to the ground.

Throwing a ball in the air (c) is a cause of the ball falling (e) if and only if there is gravity (L).

This enables us to state that e occurs via deduction of c and L:

Mitch throws a ball up into the air, (C)

What goes up must come down (simple statement of gravity) (L)

Therefore, the ball that Mitch has thrown will fall. (E)

Unfortunately for theists, the nomological definition is logically inconsistent with a divine cause of the Big Bang because God, by definition is supernatural and not governed by the laws of nature.

Thus far, Smith has shown that God cannot be the cause of the Universe when analyzed with any definition of causation which places a cause before an effect, and that God cannot be cause of the Universe when analyzed with any definition of causation which allows a deduction of effect from a combination of cause and natural law.

Should one still want to posit God as the originating cause of the universe, than one would have to do so according to a definition of causation which does not include time or natural law. These are known as atemporal and singularist definitions of causality.

An atemporal cause is called atemporal because it does not mention time or allows simultaneous causation (an effect occurring at the same time as the cause).

A singular cause is a cause which allows one event to cause an effect in a single case.

Smith notes that there are not many definitions of causality like this, but points to David Lewis’

Lewis’ definition imports conditions that are contrary to the ones that happen. It is a hypothesis of imaginary situations.

David Lewis’ definition of cause: c causes e if and only if (1) c and e are events and both occur, and (2) it is the case that either if (i) c had not occurred, e would not have occurred (if the cause did not occur, the effect would not occur) or, as an alternative to that, (ii) if there is a causal chain linking c and e and each link d in the chain is such that if d had not occurred, then e would not have occurred.

To simplify: God’s willing(c) causes the beginning of the universe(e) if and only if (1) God’s willing and the beginning of the universe both occur (God wills the beginning of the universe and the universe begins), and (2) it is the case that either if (i) God’s willing had not occurred, the beginning of the Universe would not have occurred or as an alternative to that, (ii) there is a causal chain linking God’s willing and the beginning of the universe and each link of this chain is such that if d (a link) had not occurred, then the universe would not have began.

Smith states that there is no causal chain between divine will and the Big Bang so (ii) is inapplicable, so we can concentrate on condition (i).

Condition (i) states: if c had not occurred, e would not have occurred

We can understand (i) in context to state that if God did not will the universe to begin, it would not have begun.

Smith states then that from (i) it stands that if (e) had not occurred, then (c) would not have occurred. We can state this because this definition of causality has no notion of time associated with it.

Hence where (i) states: if c had not occurred, e would not have occurred

We can reverse the predicates to state:

(i2) If e had not occurred, c would not have occurred

Now, where c is God’s willing and e is the universe beginning:

(i) states that if God’s willing had not occurred, then the beginning of the universe would not have occurred

And (i2) states that if the beginning of the universe had not occurred, then God’s willing would not have occurred.

In (i2), the Big Bang is effectively the cause of God’s willing! But, this is absurd.

Lewis addressed this problem in saying we have “a reverse causal dependence of c on e, contradicting our supposition that e did not cause c”. He also solves the problem by denying the statement of (i2) (that if e had not occurred, c would not have occurred). He says that instead, it is true that “c would have occurred just as it did, but would have failed to cause e.”

So, it becomes possible that the cause could occur, or the event which was the cause could occur but the effect would never have happened.

We have the following propositions then, when working with this definition of causation that is atemporal:

(i) if God’s willing had not occurred, the beginning of the universe would not have occurred

(i2) if the beginning of the universe had not occurred, God’s willing would not have occurred.

Because (i2) is absurd, we must use Lewis’ solution to the problem:

(i3) God’s willing occurs, but fails to cause the universe to begin to exist.

It should be evident then, that Lewis’ definition cannot be applied to the matter of God willing the Big Bang because how can an omnipotent being fail at doing what it sets out to do? It is logically impossible that an omnipotent being will the Big Bang to occur, and yet the Big Bang does not occur.

To those who are wondering why we cannot simply work with (i), without reversing the predicates, the answer is simple. If we are going to disallow a reversal of the predicates, we are stating that the cause MUST come BEFORE the effect, and we would be utilizing a temporal definition of causation to do so (as in the Humean example). Because Lewis’ definition is atemporal, we cannot invoke such.

Smith also outlines “Necessary and Sufficient Conditions”, with the following three definitions of causality:

Necessary and Sufficient Conditions:

1. x is a cause of y if and only if x is a sufficient condition of y – Sufficient Condition
2. x is a cause of y if and only if x is a necessary condition of y – Necessary Condition
3. x is a cause of y if and only if x is a necessary and sufficient condition of y – Combined

To clarify, the difference between a necessary and sufficient condition is the following:

A necessary condition for some state of affairs S is a condition that must be satisfied in order for S to obtain.

Example: A necessary condition for getting an A in philosophy class is to hand in your term paper. If you do not hand in the paper, you will not get an A and if you get an A, you obviously have handed in the paper.

A sufficient condition for some state of affairs S is a condition that, if satisfied, guarantees that S obtains.

Example:  A sufficient condition for getting an A in philosophy class is getting an A on every piece of graded work. If a student gets an A on every piece of work, then the student gets an A overall.

Handing in the essay is not a SUFFICIENT condition for getting an A in the course, since you can hand in the paper and not get an A overall.

Getting an A on every piece of work is not a NECESSARY condition for getting an A in the course. It is possible to get an A even if one fails to get an A on some piece of work.

Smith’s contention is that none of the three aforementioned definitions can apply to God.

God’s willing the Big Bang is a sufficient condition of the Big Bang, so (1) appears to be satisfied by God’s creation of the Big Bang. But (1) fails as a definition of a cause because numerous things suffice the definition. As Smith states, a thermostat reading 65 degrees is a sufficient condition under normal circumstances of the temperature being 65 degrees, but this reading is not the cause of the temperature.

Then, we can move on to (2) and propose that it is necessary that the Big Bang be caused by God, if it is to occur at all. From this, it seems that God’s willing can satisfy (2), but (2) is not the definition of a cause since there are many causes that are not necessary conditions and many necessary conditions that are not causes. As Smith further explains: “The movement of a feather on my desk is caused by my pushing the feather with my hand, but this pushing is not a necessary condition of the feather’s moving, since the feather may move by a gust of wind blowing. Further, air is a necessary condition of humans existing, but the air does not cause humans to exist.”

Moving on to (3), the condition which combines both Necessary and Sufficient notions may be satisfied by God’s willing the Big Bang, but again it is not a definition of a cause. There are many causes which are not both necessary and sufficient conditions of their effects (the example of the feather, and humans). Further, Smith suggests that this definition is violated by probably causes such as the radioactive decay of a uranium atom which requires a probabilistic definition of causality.

Smith entitles his next section “A Correct Formulation of Any Divine Relation to the Big Bang.” He also suggests that there is an argument that God is not the cause of the Big Bang, and that this argument remains sound regardless of which definition of causality is used.

He bases the argument on the premise: if something is a logically sufficient condition of something else, that doesn’t cause it.

More formally written as: for any x, if x is a logically sufficient condition of y, then x is not the cause of y.

He gives an example of a body being in motion. A body’s being in motion is a logically sufficient condition of the body’s existence, but the body’s being in motion is not the cause of the body’s existence.

God’s willing the Big Bang is a logically sufficient condition for the Big Bang, for “God wills the Big Bang and the Big Bang does not occur” are logically incompatible since he is omnipotent. If an all-powerful God wills x and x does not occur, the all-powerful God is not all-powerful . This is an obvious contradiction. God might be able to do everything that is logically possible but he cannot what is logically impossible.

Smith makes sure to point out that this conclusion does not mean we cannot speak intelligibly about God and his relation to the Big Bang. We may still say that a mental event in God’s mind is a logically sufficient condition of the Big Bang’s occurrence. Smith proposes, in fact, that we should say this rather than say that God causes the Big Bang.

Smith states that such can be proposed as:

There is a certain relation, R, in which God stands to the property F, F being the property of being the Big Bang such that by virtue of God’s standing in relation R, to the property of the Big Bang, it is logically necessary that the property or characteristic of being a Big Bang happens and thus, there is a Big Bang.

Simplified, this just means that while God is not the CAUSE of the Big Bang, there is some mysterious sufficient condition linking the two. Smith notes that one can still speculate about this.

Smith’s conclusion explains that proving that God cannot cause the Big Bang, does not necessitate that he does not exist or that the Big Bang is not logically necessitated by God but it does show that he could not have been the cause. The implications, he explains, are that arguments from necessary truth, a priori truth, or empirical truth of some causal principle CANNOT be a relevant premise to establish that the Big Bang is the logical result of God’s standing in relation R (some relationship that is not a causal one… an unknown relationship) to the property of being a Big Bang.

One such example is William Lane Craig’s Kalam Cosmological argument:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe begins to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

This argument does not support the thesis that God exists or is the cause of the universe’s beginning to exist. The very argument, in fact, entails that the Universe’s existence is NOT a consequence of any act by God, since God could not have caused the universe to exist.

Smith also explains that even inductive arguments, based on the fact that everything we observe has a cause, cannot be used to support that thesis that God caused the Big Bang since this would support a thesis incompatible with theism; namely, the Big Bang has a cause.

Furthermore, every cosmological and teleological argument for the existence of God are in fact arguments for God’s non-existence, since these arguments are arguments for the thesis that the universe has a cause.

Smith gives an example in the form of a teleological argument (argument from design):

1. Artifacts are caused to exist by intelligent beings.
2. The universe resembles an artefact.
3. Therefore, it’s probable that the universe was caused to exist by some intelligent being or beings, with some purpose in mind.

If this argument is a proper argument from analogy, then God probably does not exist, since God is not a cause but a logically sufficient condition of the universe’s existence.

Smith further asserts that since the cosmological and teleological arguments have thought to be the strongest arguments for God’s existence, and since they support atheism rather than theism he is essentially granting all the theistic arguments as being sound, especially the cosmological and the teleological. Now ask, “What does this prove?”

He concludes by saying that he is arguing that they prove that God doesn’t exist because their conclusion has got a God who causes the beginning of the universe, which is logically impossible! Smith states that the theist position is rather weak now as it’s hard to imagine how one could ever inductively or deductively establish, or find self-evident, that the Big Bang has a logically sufficient condition of its occurrence which requires that God brought it about. Therefore, the belief in the existence of God is less reasonable than even the “most cautious theologians have standardly supposed.”

Craig’s case:

The theistic case was not yet dead in the water, as William Lane Craig touches upon a few matters in his own speech period.

Craig restates Smith’s argument as follows:

1. If the claim that God caused the Big Bang cannot be analyzed in terms of extant definitions of causality, then God cannot have caused the Big Bang.
2. The claim that God caused the Big Bang cannot be analyzed in terms of extant definitions of causality.
3. Therefore, God cannot have caused the Big Bang.

Craig does not believe this argument to be sound.

Of premise (1), he states that he sees no reason to think that it is true. He says that in general, arguments that have some intuitively intelligible notion and cannot be analyzed in light of certain philosophical theories should make us reject the theories, not the common sense notion. Craig argues that God creating the universe is intuitively intelligible and if the present theories do not support this, than all the worse for them. It shows, he says, that the theories need revision. He also asserts the same for the definitions of causation and concludes that there is no good reason to think that (1) is true.

Diving deeper into the core subject matter, Craig analyzes (2). He says it is clearly false and that Smith himself admits it! He points to the fact that Smith in his discussion of necessary and sufficient conditions, does not deny that God’s willing the universe or the Big Bang is a case that satisfies the definitions proposed. Rather he attacks the adequacy of the definitions themselves. Craig claims that what Smith is really asserting is:

(2) The claim that God cause the Big Bang cannot be analyzed in terms of any adequate extant definitions of causality.

But, he says, this is problematic because it is generally acknowledged that there s no adequate definitions of causality to date.

Craig concludes by saying that even under the assumption that Smith’s definitions are adequate, God’s causing the universe satisfies at least some, so (2) is clearly false.

He points to Lewis’ analysis of causation:

Lewis’s definition of cause: c causes e if and only if c and e are both events, and both occur, and if c had not occurred e would not have occurred.

Craig says that God’s willing the Big Bang obviously satisfies the definition: God’s willing and the Big Bang are both events which occur and if God’s willing had not occurred, the Big Bang would not have occurred.

But, Smith rejoins with “if the Big Bang had not occurred, God’s willing would not have occurred,” implying that the Big Bang is the cause of God’s willing. This is obviously not the case says Craig, but this calls into question Lewis’ analysis not whether God satisfies it.

Craig also touches upon the notion of metaphysical time, stating that if we hold with Newton, Swinburne and others that God exists prior to the Big Bang in a metaphysical time then there is no objection to be had by adopting an analysis of causality which involves temporal priority of cause to effect.

Smith responds:

Smith is quick to point out that Craig’s claims about the lack of agreement on a correct definition of causality are true for ANY philosophical theory or subject. That is the very nature of philosophy, and once people agree upon certain things it moves on to become a science. Smith concludes that this point is then moot.

Smith then states that there is something common to every single definition of causality he gives that all philosophers agree upon, that of an event that does not logically entail the event that’s the effect. He proposes the following example:

“Take what every philosopher says, the sun shines on the stone, and the effect is the stone becoming warm, and I say, O.K., that’s a law of nature, but can we derive that just from pure logic? Is it a logical contradiction to say the sun shines on the stone, and the stone does not become warm? No. To have a logical contradiction, you have to say something like: the sun shines on the stone, and the sun does not shine on the stone. So all these definitions of causality, even though they differ in a number of respects, all agree in this very fundamental point, that the cause is not logically sufficient for the occurrence of the effect. And that’s precisely how they all differ from the relationship of God to the Big Bang.”

In response to Craig’s analysis of Lewis’ definition, Smith confesses he does not see the point:

“But I confess that I did not follow that argument very well because I couldn’t see how Lewis’ definition was satisfied by God and the Big Bang at all. For there’s a part of David Lewis’ definition that, if some event c is going to cause some even e, then Lewis holds that if the event e had not occurred (which would be the Big Bang), then c (God’s willing) would not have occurred. And that does not apply to the case of God and the Big Bang. Lewis holds that, in this case, if e had not occurred (the Big Bang had not occurred), then c (God’s willing) would have occurred just as it did, but have failed to cause e (the Big Bang). But that’s inconsistent with the notion of theism, which implies that if God’s willing occurs, it is a logically sufficient condition of the Big Bang.”

Lastly, in conclusion to the entire discussion Smith mentions that if one is to accept a concept of metaphysical time they must do so by rejecting physical cosmology. That would include a rejection of Einstein’s Relativity and Big Bang cosmology. He says that even if one supposes that there was a time before the Big Bang, this does not solve the problem! The crucial issue, he says, is that God’s willing the Big Bang is a logically sufficient condition of the Big Bang and once we have that condition, we violate every existent definition of causality.

Craig says that maybe these definitions are false, how is this different than stating that we should redefine causality so that it allows God’s willing of the Universe?

As would be evident at this point, this discussion offers a much greater critique of cosmological arguments than my own and even goes further to state that they are atheistic arguments, not arguments for God.