Authored by: Mitchell LeBlanc.

Chris Bolt from Choosing Hats has authored a response to my post, “The Case Against Presuppositionalism: Part III.” As expected, he is not impressed. What follows will be an attempt to answer his objections. In doing so, I will cite the arguments to which he is responding so that one need not move back and forth between posts.

Argument #1: That logical principles are not contingent on God

(1)    If logical principles are dependent on God, they are not logically necessary

(2)    But logical principles are logically necessary

(3)    Therefore, logical principles are not dependent on God

Chris stated:

Unfortunately, Mitch constantly employs this strawman and thinks he has thereby refuted presuppositionalism. God is a necessary being. Logic does not depend upon the existence of God; it is not contingent. Logic is necessary. Presuppositionalism is thus immune to the first argument Mitch makes.

Chris wants us to accept that God exists necessarily.  He may hold that belief as properly basic, but if he should wish to convince anyone else of this claim he’d be best served to present some type of an argument. He can either defend an Ontological Argument, or a modal formulation of the TAG. Why is it the case that God exists necessarily? If this reason finds its basis at all in the existence of logical principles and their dependence on God, he will have begged the question in affirming such a conclusion. But Chris has said that logic does not depend on the existence of God. From this, it is difficult to understand what the relationship between the propositions “Logic exists” and “God exists”, if the relationship is not one of dependence, then what precisely is the TAG stating? Without a dependence relationship, why is it that only X can account for Y? Further, without such a relationship there is no problem in affirming the existence of logical principles and denying the existence of God.

Argument #2: That logical principles are not contingent on God (and that presuppositionalism presumes an Ontological Argument)

(4)    If logic depends on God, then if God possibly doesn’t exist, then some law of logic possibly fails

(5)    No law of logic can possibly fail

(6)    So God necessarily exists

(7)    But there is a possible world in which God does not exist

(8)    Therefore, logic is not dependent on God

I fear that Chris may have misunderstood the argument here. Firstly, let me first say that there is no problem with a later premise contradicting a previous one if the premise being contradicted was established via deduction within the argument (or is an assumptive premise). An example of this is the logical problem of evil, which begins with the premise that God exists and concludes with the premise that God does not.

The purpose of this argument is twofold, it brings out the question of the dependence relationship between logical principles and the existence of God, and it questions the assertion that God not only exists, but exists necessarily. Premise (7), if even possibly true shows an obvious absurdity in the previous deductions. Of course, what I’m trying to elucidate is that the sub-conclusion of a modal ontological argument is being smuggled into the game by the presuppositionalist. One cannot merely affirm that God exists necessarily, it must be shown with an ontological argument. It could possible be shown with a modal version of the TAG as well, but it of course, could not be assumed within that argument. If that were the case, the argument would be question-begging. Chris might just flat out disagree with me on this point, but at any rate, this argument might be properly entitled Argument #1.5 as it is supplemental to the previous.

Impossibility of the Contrary

This portion of my post is too long to paste here so I will simply paste the entirety of Bolt’s criticism:

Mitch immediately gives chase to a rabbit and asks his readers to consider four “worldviews”: Christianity, Christianity without the incarnation (C1), Christianity with four persons in God (C2), and Christianity with an extra disciple of Jesus (C3). Mitch writes that these, “are, in effect, non-Christian worldviews that match Christianity point for point in every regard, save for one difference”. Unfortunately for Mitch this assertion is false, as may be easily demonstrated. If there is no incarnation, then Jesus has not been raised from the dead. If there are four persons in God, then baptism is to be performed in the name of more than just Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. If there is an “extra” disciple of Jesus, then the risen Christ was seen by more than “the Twelve” as the term was understood. Thus C1, C2, and C3 are not non-Christian worldviews that match Christianity point for point in every regard save for one difference and the statement Mitch makes is false. It is therefore doubtful that the rest of whatever Mitch argues in this regard makes sense. Sunday School teachers refute these kind of “worldviews” all the time, especially in cases where the class is made up of children. Since C1, C2, and C3 accept the authority of Scripture but contradict what Scripture teaches they are to be rejected as incoherent. Now I suspect that Mitch might change his argument, but really none of this should be of any concern anyway as will be seen in a moment.

This largely misses the point and I’ve addressed this issue in the previous post.

I stated:

It’s the job of TAG to show that all worldviews (actual and possible) incompatible with Christian theism are incoherent. If TAG is successful there should be a guarantee that [C1-4] (and every other possible worldview) will be incoherent. The proponent of TAG must show that all possible ways of tinkering with the contents of Christian theism, to create [any other view] are bound to fail, and must fail, necessarily.

As such, the objector to TAG needs not provide a positive proof for the coherence of [C1-4] as all that is needed to defeat TAG is to argue that for all we have reason to believe, a fully developed Fristianity seems coherent. Of course, it may sound odd and bizarre but judgments about oddness and such are governed by one’s presuppositions and are not reliable indicators of incoherence.

Clearly it is the job of the TAG defender to show us why the worldview must fail necessarily.

Bolt further states:

To begin with, Mitch is not entirely clear concerning what he believes about logic. Mitch writes that it “is clear and evident that logical principles exist as logically necessary abstractions…” but elsewhere writes in a self-contradictory fashion that logic “isn’t a thing, it’s a referrer to things” and argues that logic cannot be referred to as it is not an abstract object or entity.

As has usually been the case, Bolt charges me with being contradictory. Unfortunately for him, there is no contradiction here. Saying that logic exists as a necessary abstraction is not the same as saying that it’s a thing; why does Bolt think this? Logic may not be an abstract object or entity, but they certainly seem to be abstractions. I was not making a claim about the ontological status of abstractions. Surely, just as justice is an example of an abstraction, one must not be immediately understood to be saying that “Tennis exists, out there!”

To clarify any future misunderstanding, my position on logic falls under the heading of conventionalism.

Bolt further criticizes the notion of “Fristianity” (see above linked post):

What is Mitch standing on when he raises the Fristianity objection? What would Mitch have us to believe concerning the laws of logic, and how are they at all consistent with his worldview? How can such immaterial entities exist in a materialist universe? Why does logic continue to apply in a contingent realm of experience? How is logic imposed upon the world? Why should anyone care about adhering to the laws of logic? How is the universal and absolute nature of such laws consistent with the existence of only particular and finite minds? Such questions are only the beginning of an internal critique.

Presumably, Bolt is asking about my position rather than the hypothetical Fristian position. All of the questions which he has asked have been answered in various places throughout conventionalist literature.

Conclusion

It should be noted that Bolt did not address the last argument in the post which he criticizes. I’m not entirely sure what Bolt’s post accomplishes, perhaps it’s merely to satisfy those who have requested that he reply to me. I am, however, puzzled when Bolt states:

Mitch may continue to parrot old arguments against TAG, but what has been offered in reply is a TA in defense of TAG. I, for one, do not think Mitch is quite able to answer it. This may be the reason for the prolonged discussions concerning apologetic method as well as the search for anything on the Internet which might be used against the presuppositionalist method.

Is Bolt honestly saying that my discussion regarding apologetic method comes out of some insecurity with regard to the TAG? I don’t see any reason to make this claim, but perhaps it’s merely a joke.

I have been relatively silent on the TAG as of late, not because I am ignoring it, but rather because I am preparing a paper for submission. The topic is indeed the TAG, and I will post the paper once it has gone through the review process. Until that time, I can only say that it would be interesting to hear Bolt offer his own analysis of the relationship between logical principles and God.