Yet Another Response to Chris Bolt 19/09/09
Mitchell LeBlanc clears up some of the misunderstandings espoused in Chris Bolt's reply.
Authored by: Mitchell LeBlanc.
I’m afraid that in Chris Bolt’s latest article, he largely misses the point. His article, as a response to my previous article on inductive reasoning, shows a misunderstanding in the very title: “Mitch LeBlanc’s Proposed Solution to the Problem of Induction”
Nowhere in my article did I attempt to provide a solution for the problem, but rather echo the fact that even the idea that there IS such a problem is still debated. As it stands then, presuppositionalists are simply bending the evidence when they present this idea that there certainly is a problem of induction and even moreso when they assert that they have the solution.
It also seems that Bolt has quoted me out of context. He writes:
Mitch apparently grants that scientific reasoning is “largely inductive in nature” and even grants the possibility that the sun might not rise tomorrow. He writes, “Science would invoke the principle of the uniformity of nature, presuming that in certain circumstances the future will resemble the past. For example, because the sun has risen everyday in the past, it is probable that it will rise tomorrow. Though [sic] it is, of course, possible that the sun may not.
I did not grant any such thing, if he would simply read the sentence directly before the portion he quoted, he would have read:
It is proposed that scientific reasoning is largely inductive in nature, moving from specifics (observing white swans repeatedly) and drawing conclusion for the whole (there are no black swans).
The key portion being, “It is proposed…”, identifies that people proposes that science is inductive. This is a vastly different statement than what Bolt would have you believe I’ve said. In fact, with regard to Science I agree with Popper’s falsifiability criterion and his conclusion that science relies primarily on deductive reasoning.
Later in his response Bolt criticizes me for my extensive sourcing of philosopher Michael Martin. I suppose it should be noted that I disagree with Martin on many things, but I find myself often in agreement when it comes to his critiques of presuppositionalism, hence my extensive sourcing.
With that said, the relevance of quoting Martin on his analysis of Hume was specifically because Hume is the primary source of Bahnsen’s critique on induction. It stands to reason then that if Bahnsen is quoting Hume and misunderstanding what Hume meant, then either Bahnsen must abandon his advocacy of Hume’s “problem of induction”, appeal to another philosopher or reformulate the problem himself.
Bolt then accuses me of gratuitous name dropping, but surely this is not malicious in nature. Though Bolt did misunderstand my thesis, the citing of various names is to show that the specific philosophical area we’re speaking of is still hotly debated! He could certainly add names of his own to my list, but this only further proves to validate my point.
Following these portions, Bolt finally moves to the critique of the Christian solution for the “problem”. I am disappointed with Bolt’s treatment here, it is largely superficial.
Bolt states:
Could God have a sufficient reason for causing a departure from the normal? Depending on what we mean by “normal”, the answer is, “Yes, and in fact He has caused departures from the normal”.
How is this not in direct contradiction with the entire idea of the principle of uniformity?
Further, he states:
Could we appeal to God’s sufficient reasons for any departure from the uniformity of nature? Of course; in fact, I do. It does not follow that we cannot expect uniformity in nature. Mitch is grasping for problems that are not there.
This is patent silliness! His argument here seems to be that though God has sufficient reasons to violate the uniformity of nature and further that he does violate the uniformity of nature, Bolt is still justified in expecting uniformity in nature. I simply don’t see how this could be the case. Is Bolt talking about a type of segregated uniformity? If so, he has departed from the principle of uniformity and should perhaps define his own.
As for my “grasping for problems that are not there”, I’d simply contend that presuppositionalism has a monopoly on this point and I dare not attempt to take share away from the stockholders.
Bolt foregoes a defense against the point of scripture made by Martin in my previous post stating that it need not be refuted there. I’d like to ask that in any further response he address the argument, as if there are any responses I remain entirely ignorant of them. The point regarding “why should we assume that the Bible is true” ties into some of the issues I raised in another post to which I am still awaiting a response.
He also finds trouble with the following point by Martin, which I wholeheartedly endorse:
…even if the Christian worldview must be assumed to make sense of X it does not follow that it is true
Bolt responds:
The trouble here is that one cannot “assume the Christian worldview” without accepting that it is true, as the claim to truth is itself a necessary constituent of the Christian worldview
Apparently, Bolt thinks that one cannot assume the truth of the Christian worldview without accepting that it is true? I suppose this depends on what he means by ‘accepting’, for an assumption is, in effect, a provisional acceptance. In assuming the Christian worldview, I can certainly agree, by virtue of provisional acceptance that it is true. The very definition of “assume” is to “suppose that something is true”, so I’m afraid I do not see the problem.
Perhaps Bolt is suggesting that an assumption of the Christian worldview would result in the acceptance of the assertion that it is the only worldview which offers an account for X, since such is a part of the set which is being assumed. But why is this a problem? It’s provisional acceptance on the grounds of an initial assumption, and it does not seem inconsistent that such can make sense of X without it being true. That is to say, it could be the case that all intelligibility requires the Christian worldview but this does not lead to the conclusion that God exists, Jesus was His son, etc…
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