Suppose there is some controversial issue. Also suppose you have a particular view on this issue. Which one of the following two options should you choose?

1. Learn more about the controversial issue.
2. Learn how to better argue for your view on the controversial issue, and argue against those views in conflict with yours.

I think most of us have a hunch that option 1 (which we’ll call free thinking[1]) is somehow better than option 2 (which we’ll call apologetics).

Is Apologetics fairly described by option 2? Yes: almost all apologetics is covered by stuff like “here are some arguments you can use to persuade your non-Christian friends”, “this is how you knock down argument X against Christianity”, “this is why X, who wrote a book attacking Christianity, is wrong”, “tactics for persuasively arguing your case” and so on and so forth. Take a sample of the articles at an apologetics website like bethinking, or STR, or Reasonable Faith, or the titles of speeches given at a recent Apologetics conference. You probably don’t even need to do that: most apologists, apologetics organisations, etc. make it clear they are ‘providing a defence of Christianity’, ‘equipping you to defend the faith’ or something along similar lines. So describing Apologetics as apologetics is accurate.

Why is Apologetics irrational? Because apologetics is an exceptionally bad epistemic strategy. Given religious beliefs are highly diverse, mutually contradictory, and many seem at least superficially plausible (many can attract agents of considerable epistemic virtue, and there is no great trend of the epistemically virtuous to one religion or another), making it your business to convince others of the belief find yourself with is epistemic suicide. The odds are stacked against you (no matter how epsitemically virtuous you are, the cohort of those with similar or greater virtue will be widely divided, and so most of them are wrong – so probably you are too). Yet, in the probable event that your belief is false, practising apologetics is unlikely to get one to realise the falseness of your view and prompt you to change your mind if it is false. If anything, spending your time trying to enhance the plausibility of your belief is likely to make you stick to this belief despite its falseness.[2]

Free thinking is a strategy that has a far better track record. You may still get it wrong, but the idea of learning about the evidence untrammelled by the aim of spinning it to serve your prior ideology should make you track the evidence far better. If the evidence is slanted against your point of view, our free thinker seems far more likely to notice this and revise their belief, and the apologist more likely to rationalise it away and try and convince others (and themselves ) it is not so.

Why you shouldn’t be an apologist

Engaging in apologetics is always irrational. This is because free thinking is strictly superior to apologetics, regardless of how much you know. Worse than that, apologetics is plausibly worse than simply learning nothing.[3]

Why is that? Why would it not be reasonable for someone to carefully consider the matter, come to a conclusion, and then devote themselves to defending it (per many apologist self-portrayals, such as Lee Strobel). It is rational to be persuaded by a given view in the face of disagreement, even if some of these people are epistemically more virtuous than you. It is also rational to argue for your view, or to try and persuade others towards it. However, is never rational to take the evidence with an agenda to vindicating your view. No matter how much one knows, or how carefully one has considered the issue, one never wants to compromise a clear view of the data. For the fact there are people even more epistemically virtuous than you who disagree completely should raise the fear a rational person’s mind that there is some evidence or argument that refutes them that they are not aware. Consequently, they should want to keep as wide and clear a survey of the data as they can. Apologetics runs counter to this reasonable aim.

Of course, apologetics has some benefits. Given equal time invested, an apologist for Christianity is likely to provide a better case for Christianity than a free thinker who comes to believe Christianity[4].  If Christianity is true, and that it is important for others to know Christianity is true, then it is better to do apologetics: although it is not rational, the prudential consequences of convincing more people outweigh this. The problem, of course, is that this all hinges on Christianity being true. If Christianity is false, doing apologetics for it is bad. So rational people will want to be confident of Christianity being true, but that means free thinking, not apologetics. We can add a lack of epistemic humility to the rational sins an apologist commits.

Does this mean anyone who tries to argue for Christianity is irrational (why stop there, anyone who argues for anything is irrational?) Not at all. If someone, after free thinking on religion finds themselves convinced by Christianity, and further tries to argue in its favour too, they are not being irrational.  They only become irrational if they lock themselves in a Christian ideological echo chamber and spend their time trying to defend Christianity and attack other beliefs ranged against it. What one should do instead is carry on as they did before: continue free thinking about the issues, and if that happens to supply one with further reasons in support of ones view, so much the better – if not, one should be grateful for the correction.

Dealing with apologetics, dealing with apologists

Most of us lapse into apologetics without realising it: we do so when we go looking for evidence that confirms our beliefs instead of evidence in general, when we treat countervailing evidence as an enemy (‘but this means I am wrong!’) rather than a friend (‘this is not what I expected, maybe I should change my mind’), or when, when presented with an argument ‘against’ our position, our first impulse is not to seriously entertain it, but rather look for ways to undermine or defeat it. This identification of our beliefs as some object to be valued and protected rather than an estimate to be revised in the light of new information is one of the most persistent and recalcitrant cognitive biases, and almost all of us are guilty of it to some extent or another. It certainly is not unique to Christian Theism[5]. Whatever you believe, you should avoid lapsing into apologetics, and so training oneself to free thinking, and developing insight as to when you are practicing apologetics are very good ideas to keeping rational.

Apologists are prevalent (in part because apologetics can be seen as an intermediate level exploit of human rationality). How should you interact with them? How do you know someone is in thrall to apologetics: everyone will profess that they are merely following where the evidence leads. Yet not all who profess they do really are, and you shall know them by their fruits. If someone claims to be a free thinker, and yet their entire intellectual diet is devoted to material that defends, that attacks opposing beliefs, and so on, then it is a pretty fair bet they are doing apologetics instead.

Apologists are neither epistemic peers, nor are they competent judges of good arguments (it is hard to think of a worse strategy to assess argumentative worth than apologetics). Consequently, their attitudes about the truth of Christianity, or the merit of the arguments in favour and against, do not track the truth. Further, it seems unlikely that they are likely to change their mind (even if they should), and any case they present will likely appear more convincing that it should be taken to be – because their craft is devoted precisely to enhancing the plausibility of their case.

This does not mean that their arguments must be false (straightforward ad hominem), but it does give good reason not to take them seriously, and indeed to neglect to interact with them save in very special circumstances. Although apologists can be useful to provide their ‘side’ of the story, their assessment of the argumentative terrain is worthless, and at worst the arguments they present you need to be checked (as apologists are likely to selectively cite authorities sympathetic to them and other biases that need to be corrected to get a clear view of the evidence). If you are also in the business of presenting arguments to others which you think should convince them to your side, apologists are slightly more recommended – again, though, they are strictly inferior dialogue or debate partners than a free thinker on the other side. In most circumstances, therefore, they are better off ignored and avoided.

[5] That said, modern Christianity, particularly the more evangelical wing, seems to emphasize Apologetics (and thus apologetics) a lot, so it is one of the worse offenders at propagating this anti-epistemology.

Before addressing Chris’ latest concerns, I will take a few moments to respond to a guest post that was made on ChoosingHats by ‘ZaoThanatoo’.

On Zao’s Thoughts:

I mentioned in several places throughout my posts in this series that there must be real caution taken by the theist with regard to arguments such as these, to not assume the conclusion false to show the conclusion false. Let’s quickly recap the argument in question:

Horrific Suffering (def.) = that most awe-full form of suffering that gives the victim and/or the perpetrator a prima facie reason to think that his or her life is not worth living.

(1) Necessarily, if God exists, finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God realize their deepest good.

(2) Necessarily, if God exists, the prevention of horrific suffering does not prevent there being finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God.

(3) Necessarily, if God exists, the prevention of horrific suffering does not prevent there being finite persons who realize their deepest good. (from 1, 2)

(4) Necessarily, if God exists, there is horrific suffering only if its prevention would prevent there being finite persons who realize their deepest good.

(5) Necessarily, if God exists, there is no horrific suffering. (from 3, 4)

(6) There is horrific suffering.

(7) God does not exist (from 5, 6)

Now, it should be obvious that any objection to the argument which has as a component the denial of (7) is going to be fallacious. One cannot respond to this argument solely by saying, “God exists and he has morally sufficient reasons for permitting horrific suffering.’ Zao, however, extends my cautionary point into his own further analysis when he says:

Mitch contends that one must not assume that God exists (A) in order to disprove the above conclusion that God does not exist (~A).  This, he asserts, is question-begging.  However, for anyone wishing to criticize the conclusion, the alternative is to assume that God does not exist in order to argue that he does.  This is self-contradictory.  We must either assume God exists or God does not exist (A or ~A, Excluded Middle) in presenting our reasoning.  But assuming ~A to prove A is self-contradictory and assuming A to prove ~~A Mitch asserts is question-begging.

These are some strange assertions. If it’s the case that assuming that God does not exist in order to argue that he does is self-contradictory there is a real problem for argumentation in general, as assuming the negation of some proposition to prove that proposition is simply what is meant by “proof via contradiction” or reductio ad absurdum and it would be highly controversial for Zao to claim that instances of reductio are self-contradictory, yet that seems to be his suggestion. Further, it’s not clear why one need either assume that God exists or that she does not in analyzing the argument. This seems to entail that nobody who is agnostic with regards to the existence of God could ever analyze the argument, or that agnostics are committed to the claim that God does not exist, which is false. He appears to cite the “Law of Excluded Middle” as justification for this claim, but this seems confused. It may be the case that “God exists” is either true or false but this does not entail that one has to regard it as so. For example, the “Law of Excluded Middle” tells us that the proposition “Some man named Johnathan will ride a bicycle on November 21, 2014 and crash it into an Ice Cream Stand” is either true or false,  but this in no way entails that I must assume that the proposition is true nor assume that it is false. In short, nothing about the above argument begs the question. This should be clear, but it can be made clearer by formalizing the argument, if one wishes. If such is done, it will be evident that no premise is, nor has as a premise in its justification, the conclusion.

Zao also states:

I’m attempting to elevate the conversation by recognizing the epistemic role which properly basic beliefs or ultimate presuppositions (call them what you like) play in dealing with issues such as the problem of horrific suffering.

The talk about properly basic beliefs is quite confusing as it’s not relevant to the argument at all. I can only assume that when Zao speaks of “assuming” he’s not speaking of “assuming” in the logical sense, but rather in the epistemic sense. Of course, the fallacy of begging the question is a logical fallacy and so whatever might be going on with my epistemology it does not impact the logic of the argument. That is, even if I do believe that God does not exist, that does not make my giving the above argument question begging. Also, I have noticed a general trend amongst presuppositionalists to not only assume a sort of foundationalist epistemology, but to even assume others are foundationalists! How can I have properly basic beliefs or ultimate presuppositions if I think foundationalism is false? This isn’t an immediately relevant thought, but it’s interesting enough to flag.

Zao continues:

In Premise 1 we are told “Necessarily, if God exists, finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God realize their deepest good.”  Let’s break this down quickly for definitional purposes.  We’ll take “finite persons” to be, well, finite persons.  Finite persons who “ever more fully experience the reality of God” are people living life.  Every day every finite person existing ever more fully experiences the reality of God in various ways and to varying degrees, but every aspect of life is an experience of God in one way or another.  “Realizing their deepest good” means simply that they glorify God; and one may glorify God through either salvation or judgment.

So while Mitch’s definition is good, it is incomplete, as he stated: “…Indeed such an experience of God’s reality might manifest itself in different ways to different persons.”  Indeed, some people may realize their “deepest good” (glorifying God) through horrific suffering under the judgment of God for their sins.  So, given the above definitions, Premise 2 is false since certain persons glorify God most fully by suffering horrifically under judgment for their sins; and preventing that category of people from suffering would prevent them from “realizing their deepest good.”

Here, unfortunately, Zao misconstrues the argument. The finite persons who “ever more fully experience the reality of God” are not people living life simpliciter. They are the people who believe they are in a mutually interactive relationship with God of the sort to which theists commonly attest. This is a stipulative definition and I could have perhaps made it clearer, but this is one example of why I dislike long discussions pertaining to a brief survey article of some argument, there are things which get left out or overlooked that aren’t so left out or overlooked in the primary source. But, moving on, Zao is also mistaken about what it means to “realize one’s deepest good.” If you note premise (1) it’s explicitly defining what it means to realize one’s deepest good, and it means to ever more fully experience the reality of God. The rest of Zao’s response in its current form can be overlooked since it’s simply not relevant. Zao has, perhaps unintentionally, strawmanned the argument from Horrific Suffering.

On Chris’ Thoughts:

In Chris’ recent response he begins to steer the discussion in a different direction. He states:

Mitch claims that, “In the background of the argument is the question ‘What would a perfect being do?’” However, the argument pertains to God and not necessarily a “perfect being,” thus insofar as a question like this is in the background of the argument, the question is, “What would God do?” If the Christian concept of God is in view then it is the Christian concept of God which must be evaluated in terms of what the Christian God would do. Otherwise the argument simply does not pertain to the Christian God.

The argument does take the term God to refer to a perfect personal being and insofar as Chris might propose that the Christian God is not a perfect personal being, his conception of God evades the force of the argument. I didn’t make this fact explicit in the opening post for a few reasons: the first post was never intended to be exhaustive and the position that God is not a perfect being is a minority position in the philosophy of religion, to the best of my knowledge. With that said, I do know of a recently published paper which seeks to argue against the claim that “If God exists, God is perfect” though the title escapes me at the time of writing (e-mail me if you really want to know). With that said, there are a couple of options (at least that I can foresee at this very moment) along this road of objection. One can argue against any argumentation which seeks to establish that fact, obviously. Or one can argue for the proposition, “If God exists, God is imperfect.” Also, one claim that the attributes which I’ve argued would belong to a perfect being in fact would not. We can explore Chris’ article to see which, if any, of these routes are explored.

Firstly, it’s important to note that Chris presents some citations which seek to argue against the Ontological Argument. They don’t accurately address this argument however since no appeal has been made to God being that which none greater can be conceived. For that reason, a lot of what follows will be slightly misdirected but I will respond to what I think can be redirected appropriately. Chris first cites Van Til:

[W]e should be careful when we say that God is the being than whom none higher can be thought. If we take the highest being of which we can think, in the sense of have a concept of, and attribute to it actual existence, we do not have the biblical notion of God. God is not the reality that corresponds to the highest concept that man, considered as an independent being, can think. Man cannot think an absolute self-contained being; that is, he cannot have a concept of it in the ordinary sense of the term. God is infinitely higher than the highest being of which he can form a concept…When we speak of our concept or notion of God, we should be fully aware that by that concept we have an analogical reproduction of the notion that God has of himself. (Quoted in Bahnsen, Analysis, 634)

This quotation particularly misses the mark, but it can be illustrative. Van Til is arguing against the claim that God is the greatest conceivable being on the basis that no matter how great a being human persons can conceive, God is infinitely greater. Based on this quotation, one might want to respond to Van Til by saying that God is at least the greatest conceivable being or God is no lesser than the greatest conceivable being. Both of these options satisfy the above criticisms of Van Til and allow for one to still run an Ontological Argument, albeit of a different flavor. How is this relevant to the Argument from Horrific Suffering? Well, if the objection is that no matter how many great things I think being perfect would entail my list will never be exhaustive, we can absorb the objection by simply replying that while this may be true, being perfect could not be anything less. That is, perhaps my reflections lead me to say of God that, as a perfect being, she is perfectly loving and perfectly compassionate. I should not claim to therefore have exhausted God’s attributes, but what I can claim is that any further property ascribed to God such that God’s perfection increases will add to and not take away from those about which I have managed to think. Perhaps Bahnsen is in agreement when he states:

However, God has also revealed that He is much greater than anything that we can finitely imagine. His thoughts are higher than our thoughts (without our thoughts being false or misleading). (Bahnsen, Analysis, 634, n.163)

The key thing to notice here is that it is said God is much greater than anything we imagine. Greater, not worse.

Chris continues:

Recall that [Van Til] claims, “When we speak of our concept or notion of God, we should be fully aware that by that concept we have an analogical reproduction of the notion that God has of himself.” What Van Til is saying is that our concept of God  is God’s concept of God. Now this in and of itself is rather interesting, for surely no one should expect a Christian, which I would at the moment say that I am, to accept a man’s concept of God over God’s concept of God, but that is precisely what Mitch is asking us to do.

Let us keep in mind that Chris can only non-question-beggingly assert that God has a concept of God if it is non-question-begging to assert that God exists. In order for this assertion to be non-question begging, he has to mean by God something other than what the argument means by God; something other than a perfect personal being, since he has not yet argued that any of my ascriptions are false. He has suggested that my ascriptions are inexhaustive but that is of no consequence to the argument unless there is a necessary property of God such that its existence renders the operation of some other property limited. It’s yet to be seen if a suggestion such as this is even coherent, or if coherent, can apply to the ascriptions made in the previous articles.

Chris goes on to cite a previous quote of mine, I will quote the relevant portion:

Many of my discussions with Christians have resulted in their looking at the Christian story and saying that particular conceptual analyses don’t line up with the Biblical conception of God. As I’ve said before, so long as our conceptual analyses are reasonable, so much the worse for the Biblical conception of God; if a God did exist, it would not be that one.

This follows from taking the proposition “If God exists, God is a perfect personal being” to be true. If that is indeed true (and I hope to present my argumentation for this in a future article), and if the Christian story presents a depiction of God that is not a perfect personal being, so much the worse for that depiction. I hope my statement is clearer now, in light of what’s been discussed so far.

Towards the end of his response, Chris calls into question some of the ascriptions I’ve made and while I don’t see an argument against them in what he’s written, there are some questions worth answering. Chris says:

Any problems with Mitch applying his concept of “compassion” to the Christian God are now apparent as well. He writes, “Granting that there can exist no being more compassionate than God, if she exists, this perfect compassion coupled with perfect knowledge of what it is to undergo Horrific Suffering entails that God is, as Schellenberg puts it, maximally opposed to these sufferings.” But why does Mitch grant that God is compassionate at all? Perhaps some god is the very opposite of compassionate even in Mitch’s understanding of the matter. How would the argument then apply to that god?

Taking God to be a perfect personal being, we can reason as to the properties such a being would have by analyzing out the great-making properties of human persons; the great-making properties of personhood. That is, human beings possess the properties of being loving, being compassionate and being generous. These properties differ in quality from, say, the property of being deceptive or the property of being violent such that the properties of being loving, compassionate and generous can be called great-making properties. There are a lot of ways in which we can hash out this idea, but for the purposes of this article we can say that they are the properties which are intrinsically better to have than not, the properties we regard as great-making in that the more of these a person has, the more we speak of their excellence as a person in the positive sense. Now God, if the perfect personal being, will possess all the great-making properties of human persons to their maximal (highest possible) degree and probably possess some great-making properties that human persons do not. It is because of this that we can perform a conceptual analysis of what love means, what compassion means and so on, and reason (even if inexhaustively) as to which properties a perfect personal being would have. Such reasoning in this case has led us to the conclusion that because of God’s perfect knowledge and compassion which entails a profound awareness and opposition (compassion is sympathetic opposition), she will know what it is to suffer horrifically and not permit such a state if unnecessary for the deepest good of human persons. Again, since it is unnecessary for the deepest good of human persons, the existence of horrific suffering shows us there is no God.

So, in summation, and to be precise, the argument demonstrates that there exists no perfect personal being. It may turn out that this argument does not impact Chris in any way because as a Calvinist, he already agrees that there exists no perfect personal being. If this is the case, so be it, as the argument was never addressed to Chris directly (though his responses are always welcome). Certainly many people do believe in a perfect personal being and this argument has much discussion to provide amongst them. Alternatively, Chris might argue against the properties I’ve associated with perfection; arguments which I imagine will be quite interesting given how obvious the analyses seem upon reflection. At any rate, having the discussion head in this direction (if it continues) could serve to be very beneficial in understanding not only this argument, but other important issues in the philosophy of religion.

Note: For those who may not know, the article image is a reference to the old Christian poem entitled “Footsteps” which tells the story of a person told by God that they never walk alone, when God is asked then why at times there is only one set of footprints she remarks that those are the times in which she carried the person. I think this, though a story, can help to demonstrate what perfect compassion might look like.

At this point, Chris is still challenging premise (4) of the following argument:

Horrific Suffering (def.) = that most awe-full form of suffering that gives the victim and/or the perpetrator a prima facie reason to think that his or her life is not worth living.

(1) Necessarily, if God exists, finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God realize their deepest good.

(2) Necessarily, if God exists, the prevention of horrific suffering does not prevent there being finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God.

(3) Necessarily, if God exists, the prevention of horrific suffering does not prevent there being finite persons who realize their deepest good. (from 1, 2)

(4) Necessarily, if God exists, there is horrific suffering only if its prevention would prevent there being finite persons who realize their deepest good.

(5) Necessarily, if God exists, there is no horrific suffering. (from 3, 4)

(6) There is horrific suffering.

(7) God does not exist (from 5, 6)

In my most recent article I outlined reasons for thinking (4) is true. I want to bring out some underlying strands of the debate, that will simultaneously address Chris’ concerns.

In the background of the argument is the question “What would a perfect being do?” In answering this question, one engages in conceptual analysis (not just this question, practically all of Western philosophy involves conceptual analysis). In analyzing concepts, we take something like the concept of perfect love, for example, and ask the stereotypical philosopher question of what it means to be perfectly loving. It is the hope of the philosopher that such analysis leads to deeper understandings of the concepts in question. In my last article, I presented a series of considerations for thinking that a perfect being would only permit the existence of horrific suffering if it’s prevention would prevent finite persons from realizing their deepest goods. Forgive me for quoting at length:

Let us delve further, take the state in question, that of Horrific Suffering, defined as being “that most awe-full form of suffering that gives the victim and/or the perpetrator a prima facie reason to think that his or her life is not worth living.” States such as this are often the most difficult times in people’s lives, one need only speak with someone who has gone through such turmoil to realize this fact. God, however, would not even need to speak with these persons. The perfection of God surely entails an omniscience that encompasses all kinds of knowledge. This includes a perfect knowledge of how particular states feel to her created beings and thus, complete insider knowledge of the experiences of every created being. Granting that there can exist no being more compassionate than God, if she exists, this perfect compassion coupled with perfect knowledge of what it is to undergo Horrific Suffering entails that God is, as Schellenberg puts it, maximally opposed to these sufferings. Granting that God stands in maximal opposition to the experience of Horrific Suffering it is surely the case, entailed by our aforementioned analyses, that God allows persons to suffer horrifically only if such suffering is a necessary condition of these persons realizing their deepest good; a relationship with the Creator that will unfold throughout all of eternity, the only thing that God’s perfect nature will deem enough. In fact, even if the existence of Horrific Suffering were a necessary condition of some very-good-other-goods such that they, perhaps in quantity, “outweighed” the non-good state of Horrific Suffering, our above analyses entail that permitting such suffering is still inconsistent with the divine nature!

Given the analysis of the concepts in question, the conclusion to which we are led certainly seems to be that (4) is true. That is, reasoning about what these particular things mean leads us to a conclusion about what a being with those properties would do.

Thus, when Chris suggests that God has morally sufficient reasons for causing or permitting horrific suffering, a few things are occurring. Firstly, he begs the question against the conclusion drawn from the conceptual analysis. He assumes that there can be a reason such that in light of this reason God would permit the existence of horrific suffering even in cases where the deepest good of persons does not have such suffering as a necessary condition. But, our conceptual analysis leads us to the conclusion that there is no such reason; God would not do such a thing. Chris cannot merely assume the failure of the conceptual analysis, he has to argue for it.

The most relevant portion of Chris’ response, is, I think the following:

Is the thought that one’s life is not worth living really something which God is “maximally opposed to?” Many of us have in fact had such thoughts and have subsequently gotten over it. Some people do not get over it. If it is true that Hitler committed suicide then it is likely the case that he did not get over it. But is God “maximally opposed” to Hitler’s horrific suffering or the possible result of him taking his own life? What about the well-to-do millionaire who decides after losing a few million that his life is no longer worth living by virtue of the fact of him losing those few million?

Well, if our conceptual analysis is reasonable (which I contend it is) then the affirmative is a reasonable conclusion to draw. I’m not sure if Chris has ever gone through such a period, but at the very least he probably knows of someone who has gone through such a period and even many who have “gotten over it” regard it as the worst point in their lives. The relevant portion of the analysis is the feeling involved with horrific suffering, not the antecedent conditions. We are reasoning about a being that is perfectly compassionate and because of her omniscience shares in our experience. Whether Hitler, a millionaire, or whomever, the experience of Horrific Suffering does not change in content. Chris has even admitted this to an extent, in pointing out that it may have led to Hitler taking his life. It is easy for us, I think, to scoff at people like Hitler and say that they deserve it or what not, but we should not assume that a perfect being, if she exists, shares our shortcomings in this respect; we many not be perfectly compassionate, but surely she is.

So, has Chris offered any reasons to think that the above conceptual analysis is in some way misguided? Not directly. Directly, he’s only begged the question against it by speaking of “morally sufficient reasons for God to permit horrific suffering.” There are hints of a better reply in his responses however, namely, that of “skeptical theism.” A treatment of that topic would require another article, so for now I will only flag it as a possible course of objection for Chris.

Something that I’ve mentioned before seems relevant yet again. Whereas I am asking the question, “What would a perfect being do?” Chris seems to be asking the question, “What has a perfect being done?” The difference is subtle, yet illuminating in how both of us approach this, and probably many other issues in the philosophy of religion. There is some initial question as to whether or not the being Bolt calls “God” possesses the properties of perfection I’ve ascribed to the term. There is a tendency that I have experienced in my many discussions with Christian people to assume that this world is the type of world that God would create, since God did create it. But if our conceptual analyses lead us to discover that this world is not the world that a God would create as I think is the case here, we are left with the conclusion that there is no such being. Many of my discussions with Christians have resulted in their looking at the Christian story and saying that particular conceptual analyses don’t line up with the Biblical conception of God. As I’ve said before, so long as our conceptual analyses are reasonable, so much the worse for the Biblical conception of God; if a God did exist, it would not be that one. While I think there are hints of this confusion occurring in Chris’ thought, I would like to thank him for not, as many confusedly and amateurishly have, done something like throw the book of Job at me or cite various parables from the Bible. It should be clear how to do so in this context, would only be to beg the question even further.

So, our conceptual analysis seems to lead us to the conclusion that this world, with it’s occurrences of horrific suffering, is not the world that a perfect being would create and thus, there is no God.

Chris’ most recent response chooses to set aside his initial two objections and focus in on premise (4) of the argument:

(4) Necessarily, if God exists, there is horrific suffering only if its prevention would prevent there being finite persons who realize their deepest good.

His main complaint is that no reason is given for accepting the premise. This isn’t true, in my response I provided one such justification:

Looking at an analogous instance, it seems obvious that something has gone wrong when we are saying of the parent that they are acting in accordance with anything we might remotely pick out as being “good” when they cause or permit their beloved child to suffer horrifically when the prevention of that suffering would occur at no loss to the beloved!

This is a piece of prima facie justification and whether or not Chris finds it persuasive, it is there. I will, however, take this opportunity to say much more. If there is anything that perfect goodness is not, it is the causing or permitting of non-good states to obtain for the sake of their being non-good states. What might it mean to say of some person that they are perfectly good and without repercussion can avoid the causing or permitting of some other person their experience of pain (for example), but causes or permits such pain anyhow? It is difficult to make sense of in the same way it is difficult to make sense of there being some person such that they are omniscient, and yet they do not know my name. Whatever is a property of the person in question, it surely isn’t omniscience, and in our previous example, it surely isn’t anything close to perfect goodness. We can reason then that if a perfectly good being causes or permits the obtaining of some non-good states, her doing so must in some way be necessary for some greater good state. Surely a perfectly good being, if bringing about non-good states, does so reluctantly, takes no pleasure in doing so, and would avoid doing so if at all possible without sacrificing one of the greater goods.

Good parents exemplify this in their interactions with their children. They may take their child to the dentist, permitting the obtaining of the non-good state of painful tooth extraction, taking no pleasure in the non-good state obtaining, but permitting it because it leads to the good state of having a healthy mouth. In the above example, the parents seem justified in their permitting their child to suffer because of the upcoming greater good for the child. As Chris notes, if God exists, her being our creator grants her a particular set of rights over our lives that exceeds even that of parent and child. Given such authority, however, we are not to neglect God’s perfect goodness which would ensure that the instances of non-good states are justified in some way. Let us delve further, take the state in question, that of Horrific Suffering, defined as being “that most awe-full form of suffering that gives the victim and/or the perpetrator a prima facie reason to think that his or her life is not worth living.” States such as this are often the most difficult times in people’s lives, one need only speak with someone who has gone through such turmoil to realize this fact. God, however, would not even need to speak with these persons. The perfection of God surely entails an omniscience that encompasses all kinds of knowledge. This includes a perfect knowledge of how particular states feel to her created beings and thus, complete insider knowledge of the experiences of every created being. Granting that there can exist no being more compassionate than God, if she exists, this perfect compassion coupled with perfect knowledge of what it is to undergo Horrific Suffering entails that God is, as Schellenberg puts it, maximally opposed to these sufferings. Granting that God stands in maximal opposition to the experience of Horrific Suffering it is surely the case, entailed by our aforementioned analyses, that God allows persons to suffer horrifically only if such suffering is a necessary condition of these persons realizing their deepest good; a relationship with the Creator that will unfold throughout all of eternity, the only thing that God’s perfect nature will deem enough. In fact, even if the existence of Horrific Suffering were a necessary condition of some very-good-other-goods such that they, perhaps in quantity, “outweighed” the non-good state of Horrific Suffering, our above analyses entail that permitting such suffering is still inconsistent with the divine nature!

Premise (4) is thus established and since, as argued in the earlier articles, Horrific Suffering exists and is not a necessary condition in the relevant way, it follows that God does not exist.

Horrific Suffering (def.) = that most awe-full form of suffering that gives the victim and/or the perpetrator a prima facie reason to think that his or her life is not worth living.

(1) Necessarily, if God exists, finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God realize their deepest good.

(2) Necessarily, if God exists, the prevention of horrific suffering does not prevent there being finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God.

(3) Necessarily, if God exists, the prevention of horrific suffering does not prevent there being finite persons who realize their deepest good. (from 1, 2)

(4) Necessarily, if God exists, there is horrific suffering only if its prevention would prevent there being finite persons who realize their deepest good.

(5) Necessarily, if God exists, there is no horrific suffering. (from 3, 4)

(6) There is horrific suffering.

(7) God does not exist (from 5, 6)

Chris’ first objection takes aim at premise (2) of the argument. The premise is motivated by the existence of persons in the actual world who attest to experiencing the reality of God and who, themselves, have not gone through horrific suffering. Chris mentions that we must assume that these people are not “lying, deceived, forgetful, or otherwise confused about their alleged lack of horrific suffering.” He rightly notes the extraordinary implausibility of defending such a position, and I add that it would be a most uncharitable interpretation of those in question. However, he does suggest that such a question can be asked of their experiencing the reality of God. That is, of those who attest to experiencing the reality of God and not having gone through horrific suffering, how do we know that they are not lying, deceived or confused with respect to experiencing the reality of God? Chris says:

Now we need not take so strong a position as to deny that these people have experienced the reality of God in order to plant this objection. Rather, we may point out that the subjective nature of experiencing the reality of God is sufficient to raise our suspicions about these people who claim to have had the experience of God without the experience of horrific suffering. How do we know that what one non-suffering person believes is an experience of the reality of God is anything at all like what some suffering person believes is an experience of the reality of God?

To experience the reality of God, in the context of this argument, is to be in a personal relationship with the creator of the cosmos. A relationship of the type theists mention often. It is a being as aware of the existence of God as a child is aware of his or her loving mother. That such an experience occurs in the “ever more fully” sense is to simply point out that given the infinite complexity of God, there will always be more about God for some finite human person to know. That is, if God exists and is as awesome as theists often claim, it is difficult to see how any finite human person can exhaust the things there are to know about God, or exhaust the feelings there are to be had about God, or exhaust the myriad of forms a personal relationship with her might take. It is indeed doubtful that these things can be exhausted in the context of human-to-human relationships, let alone human-to-divine relationships.  Indeed such an experience of God’s reality might manifest itself in different ways to different persons; perhaps we should even expect such a thing given God’s infinite resourcefulness, creativity, and the existence of unique individuals. Chris’ question then seems misguided. Why should we have to know that what one non-suffering person believes to be an experience of God’s reality is what a suffering person believes to be an experience of God’s reality? What is it about the subjective nature of experiencing God’s reality that should lead us to, as Chris suggests, be suspicious of those who claim to experience God, having never suffered horrifically? I fear I must have misunderstood Chris here, as I cannot bring out the objection.

Chris’ next objection is also misguided, but I fear the fault is mine for not taking the time in the initial article to outline the meaning of “ever more fully experiencing the reality of God”.  Chris says that even granting that there exists one person who has not experienced horrific suffering and has experienced the reality of God, it does not follow that the individual is in a position to “ever more fully experience” the reality of God. I hope my paragraph above clarifies what is meant by that term. I am speaking here of, in many ways, an experience of God that unfolds throughout eternity and is such that, given God’s infinite resourcefulness and creativity, the fruits of which are inexhaustible by the finite human person. Now, as Chris continues there is an important distinction to be made. Chris says that:

It could be the case that the non-suffering individual experiences the reality of God in an increasingly fuller sense but that the individual will never experience the reality of God to the degree that she could have had she of endured horrific suffering.

But this is no objection to the argument. No matter which “level of experience” the finite human person initially finds themselves at, there will be an infinite amount of unfolding left to occur. This effectively diffuses Chris’ objection as the value is placed not in the degree at which the divine experience occurs, but in its unfolding nature, the “ever more fully experiencing.” But even setting this point aside, what would be preventing the experience of the non-sufferer from reaching the heights of the sufferer? Is it God, the nature of horrific suffering, or something else? And further, why think that such prevention is necessary? Thus, assuming Chris does not want to object to (2) by taking the strong position of denying that those who claim to experience the reality of God without having suffered horrifically have actually experienced such a reality, the premise seems to survive this round of scrutiny.

Chris’ next target is (4). The denial of (4) seems quite the denial indeed. To deny the premise suggests that if God exists, there can be instances of persons who undergo horrific suffering even though their doing so is unnecessary for the realization of their deepest good. Chris, being the good Calvinist that he is, writes:

It is conceivable that a perfectly good God would “justifiably cause/permit some person A to suffer” even if that suffering were not necessary for bringing about some greater good for A. God not only owns that person, but is Himself the standard of what is just. God does no man wrong by taking his life from him immediately and without any cause known to us, and the same might just as easily be said with respect to “horrific suffering.” Herein lies a serious difficulty with reasoning through atheists’ arguments; the assumption throughout this particular argument is that humanity is the main focus of God’s dealings rather than God being the main focus of God’s dealings as Scripture describes.

It would be fruitful to understand to which particular flavor of Divine Command Theory Chris adheres, if he does possess such a view. I think Chris owes us some argumentation as to how the existence of a perfectly good God is compatible with the existence of human persons unnecessarily undergoing horrific suffering. Looking at an analogous instance, it seems obvious that something has gone wrong when we are saying of the parent that they are acting in accordance with anything we might remotely pick out as being “good” when they cause or permit their beloved child to suffer horrifically when the prevention of that suffering would occur at no loss to the beloved! Chris hints that the analysis may be too narrow, assuming that humanity is the main focus of God’s dealings. The lurking suggestion might be that God causes or permits the existence of horrific suffering for her own “deepest good.” It’s difficult to see how this might work out. This does suggest, however, that there is some good-for-God which only obtains if finite persons exist. But goods in this category seem to be, for example, instances of personal relationship between God and the created. Certainly I do not want to limit the category to those things, but I want to note the prima facie implausibility of there being, as a good in that category, that finite beings suffer horrifically. What is it about the existence of horrific suffering that makes it a necessary condition for the realization of God’s deepest good?

But these considerations aside, Chris’ objection simply begs the question. Recall, he says: “It is conceivable that a perfectly good God would justifiably cause/permit some person A to suffer even if that suffering were not necessary for bringing about some greater good for A.” Temporarily ignoring the debate of whether or not conceivability is a suitable modal epistemology, that is, whether or not it is a suitable guide to possibility, the argument from horrific suffering seeks to demonstrate that such a thing is not possible. Thus, unless Chris is just assuming from the outset that this argument is unsound, the objection does not work. Chris needs to argue (in a non question-begging way) against any justification of that premise, rather than merely assuming the premise false!

It is also important to note that when Chris says, “… the assumption throughout this particular argument is that humanity is the main focus of God’s dealings rather than God being the main focus of God’s dealings as Scripture describes,” it seems he is taking it to be the case that if God creates a world, God creates this world. That is, he is taking the data presented by the argument and attempting to make sense of how it “fits” in this “Christian-God created world.” The argument, however, has as its conclusion that there is no God, so Chris must be careful not to beg the question against the argument by reasoning in a manner that assumes the conclusion false, to show the conclusion false. An appeal to Scripture to show that the existence of horrific suffering is consistent with the Christian story may easily yield to us the conclusion that “If God creates a world, God does not create this world.” More precisely, we must be careful in looking upon the actual world as being created by God when attempting to reason about the type of world God would create and the types of worlds she would not/could not! Argumentation may lead us to say, “So, Scripture claims that God made a world with unnecessary horrific suffering… so much the worse for Scripture.“

Given these considerations, Bolt’s objections to the argument in their current form fail, and we may successfully conclude that God does not exist.

Preliminary Discussion

                It is useful to begin by saying a brief bit on logic. Logic concerns itself with consequence, which has been referred to as truth-preservation. An analysis of consequence is performed by demonstrating the validity of arguments such that:

(Logical Consequence) Some conclusion C is a consequence[4] of a set of premises P iff in a case where all the premises of P are true, it is a case where C is true.

The “cases” referred to above are laid out by truth-conditions. Systems of logic provide truth-conditions for that which will be parsed through them[5], or rather, what will be a consequence of what. For example, I might provide the following condition (Where P and Q are the ‘things’[6] being parsed):

P ^ Q is true in some case iff P is true and Q is true in the same case.

In providing such a truth-condition I have enabled the system to demonstrate the validity of the following:

P ^ Q

_____

P

If P ^ Q is true then P is true, or in other words, P is a consequence of P ^ Q. The question is whether or not there are multiple ways to understand, or lay out, the aforementioned cases. Logical pluralism rejects the position[7] that there is only one way to determine whether or not some argument is formally valid, or put differently, that there is but one true logic[8].  It proposes instead that there are multiple ways of specifying cases (truth-conditions), all of which are true. If you were to ask the logical particularist whether some argument were valid he or she would maintain that there is only one answer to that question. The logical pluralist would reject that statement.

The Presuppositionalist’s Logical Laws[9]

                In much of the literature I have come across and in my discussions with presuppositionalists as they defend their thesis re logic they state that the non-believer cannot account[10] for the truth of the so-called Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC), Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM) and the Law of Identity (LI). These titles denote particular propositions found in, at least, Classical Logic (let the following ‘P’s stand for any sentence letter or compound sentence:

LNC: ~(P ^ ~P)

LEM: (P v ~P)

LI: A <-> A

These propositions are tautologies under Classical Logic and while their being named “laws” by some; they possess no special status over any other tautology under Classical Logic, such as:

((A v B) ^ (A -> C) ^ (B -> C)) -> C

Tautologies are formulae which are always true in their systems by virtue of the logical rules, regardless of the truth-value assignment of some sentence letter or compound sentence. That is to say, the mere syntax of the system is sufficient for the truth of tautologies. As an example, take the LEM: (P v ~P) is always true because the logical rules for Classical Logic state that a disjunction is only false when both disjuncts are false and whatever truth-value assignment we give to P, one of the disjuncts in the LEM will be true (Classical Logic only has two truth values: T/F) and that is sufficient for the truth of the entire disjunction.

I suspect that the presuppositionalist will want to disagree with my statement above, that the logical rules of a system are sufficient for the truth of that system’s tautologies. The presuppositionalist will claim that the existence of God stands in some truth-making relation to the tautologies (and everything other truth the system parses). It seems abundantly clear, however, that the logical rules are enough. I suspect the presuppositionalist would posit God as a necessary and sufficient condition, in some fashion, to the truth of the LEM (for example, and to remain consistent).

I have heard two common expositions of the truth-making relationship between the existence of God and the LEM (or any other logical truth). One maintains that the LEM is a reflection of God’s nature. I do not know precisely what is meant by this particular suggestion. What does it mean to be a ‘reflection’ in this context? How is the LEM a reflection? What is it about God’s nature that causes the LEM to be reflected? The questions are numerous. The other suggestion is that the LEM (or any other logical truth) is a reflection of the way God thinks. Similar questions arise to this suggestion as well. In order to move the discussion forward, we can at least concede that both suggestions suggest that there is something about God that makes (in some way) the LEM true.

Concerns

                Now, recall logical pluralism once more and consider some ternary logic (a three-valued logic) in which the LEM comes out false. The LEM essentially states “either true or false” but ternary logic introduces some third value (depending on the system that value might be: indeterminate, irrelevant, unknown, etc.) and so regards the LEM false. This system of logic will have a different logical rules than Classical Logic, in many ways it is a different language as French is different to English. The logical pluralist wants to maintain that this system is fundamentally no ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than Classical Logic (though different systems may in different contexts be more ‘useful’). This system will also have tautologies which differ from those of Classical Logic and the pluralist will maintain that they are true tautologies, given the particular ternary system.

Let us assume, though it may be difficult to do, that the logical rules of this system are not sufficient conditions for the truth of some proposition which entails the falsehood of the LEM, and that the existence of God is a necessary and sufficient condition of the truth[11]. If we take the relationship between the existence of God and the truth of the proposition to have something to do with his nature or thinking, then it seems that there is something about God’s nature or thinking that is making the LEM true in one instance and making the LEM false in the other. That is, where under Classic Logic God is making (a) (P v ~P) true, under some ternary logic he is making (b) ~(P v ~P) true.

The two propositions initially seem to be contradictions of each other, but because they are arising out of different logics, they are essentially arising out of different languages. If no translator were present, I think it obvious that “I am hungry” does not contradict “Je n’ai pas faim.” A contradiction only seems to arise when we parse one sentence from some other language into whichever one we are using. So, if I translate “Je n’ai pas faim” and I see that it is the negation of “I am hungry”, now I have some contradiction where prior to the translation/integration, I merely had foreign symbols. So where (P v ~P) and ~(P v ~P) seem to be contradictory, I suggest that this is only the case if taken into a common language where both are expressed and where the rules of that language determine them to be in contradiction. We should not be misled, in our example of (a) and (b) both instances use the same symbols but essentially arise from different languages. So, (a) as expressed in Classical Logic is only contradicted by (b) if it too is expressed in Classical Logic and so on.

Now, continuing along with our assumption that the existence of God (in some way) is a necessary and sufficient condition of the truth of the aforementioned propositions in their respective systems if they are to be non-contradictory, it seems that they must be non-translated. But, focusing on God’s thoughts, what might it mean to say that God’s thoughts (or thinking) act as the truth-maker for the truth of both statements, but that he thinks them in a manner analogous to thinking a statement in French and thinking a statement in English and not knowing the translation[12]? Surely if the statement is translatable, God knows the translation. Put in another way, God in some way makes (a) true in Classical Logic and (b) true in some ternary logic. Assume that by translating (a) into the system of (b), (a) is rendered false and by translating (b) into the system of (a), (b) is rendered false. Something about God (presumably an unchangeable something, according to the Reformed tradition) in this example makes (a) true and makes it false, and likewise with (b). How is one to make sense of this?

Perhaps it is the case that God possesses a system of logic which he translates both (a) and (b) into, and this logic is such that the contradiction yielded by the aforementioned translation “does not matter”. This would be to suggest that God-Logic[13] is dialtheist in some sense, permitting of contradictions in a non-explosive manner. This God-Logic however will of course have its own logical rules, but continuing with our assumption these are insufficient for any of the truths yielded, the truth-maker will have to be something about God. Now we also have something about God that makes the LNC, after translation into God-Logic, both true and false. If this is true then the presuppositionalist explanation regarding what logic is, or how the existence of God relates (in a necessary way) to logic, becomes quite unparsimonious, on one hand leaving being quite mysterious and barely serving as an explanation, and on the other having to invoke a God-Logic which all ‘subsidiary’ logics depend on for coherence.

It renders the position far less plausible, I think, than accepting that the logical rules of various logic systems are the necessary and sufficient conditions for their respective logical truths and that each system generating propositions which may conflict only when translated into another system where the logical rules generate the confliction is not a problem.

Though, at this point, the presuppositionalist may just want to rid themselves of logical pluralism. They may admit to the existence of these other logical systems but deny that they are the one true logic. In this case, as presuppositional logical particularists it seems that they would suggest there exists only one system of logic that is true and something about God stands in a necessary and sufficient truth-making relation to the truths of this system. They might further suggest then that all of this talk about other logics generating contradictions when translated is simply not a problem because that is what we should expect if the other systems are wrong. The problem with this route, I think, is that we do not appear to have any way of knowing which system of logic is the one true logic! From the various presuppositional writings it sounds like the consensus amongst them would be that Classical Logic is the one true logic, but why must one accept this? It would seem then that all of the talk about the “laws” of logic, which are just tautologies of a particular system, is quite possibly irrelevant and incorrect if there exists one true logic. We are in an uncomfortable epistemic position, the very thing from which presuppositionalism promised us deliverance.

                Thusly, the common presuppositionalist argumentation regarding logic and God’s necessity hitherto has, I think, some explanatory work to undertake. It is currently far from convincing that one should reject the sufficiency of a system’s logical rules regarding the truth of some proposition arising from that system in favor of adopting the presuppositionalist view on the matter.

[2] ‘Experience’ should be taken very loosely.

[3] This list is not exhaustive, but is indicative of the usual discussions as per my experience.

[4] One can also make sense of the principle by replacing ‘consequence’ with ‘follows from’.

[5] Provided that what is parsed is capable of being expressed given the system.

[6] Most commonly a claim of some type

[7] Hereby referred to as logical-particularism

[8] The particularist will not deny the existence of other systems of logic any more than the religious particularist denies other religions; he or she will merely deny their truth.

[9] I find it a source of confusion that presuppositionalists only seem to refer to three particular tautologies of a particular system. I do not understand the restriction, but perhaps sake of simplicity plays a role.

[10] I cannot find a conceptual analysis of their usage of ‘account’ though it seems to mean a type of explanation.

[11] Again, that is to say it stands in some type of truth-making relation

[12] Assuming the translation will yield a contradiction.

[13] Thought of as an overarching logical system.

Before I begin, I would like to make the point that the claims in my paper do not need to be true for the TAG to be defeated (with regard to logic, in this circumstance). The TAG fails due to the fact that logical conventionalism is coherent. Zao briefly touches upon this point, which I will address later, but I want to make it clear that my paper attempts to go beyond the mere claim that “logic does not presuppose God” and suggest something closer to the idea that it cannot.

The Criticisms

In my paper, I remark:

It seems to me that some hybridization of any of the mentioned means of justification may bring about a new means of justification. For example, a hybridization of an a priori and conventionalist system may succeed in providing the justification of logic sought by Bahnsen, but in a manner wherein the new system may be thought of as unique to both previous a priori systems, and forms of conventionalism.

Zao takes issue with this, stating:

Mitch starts off on the wrong foot immediately by proposing a hypothetical “hybridization” of two positions which is also “unique” to those other positions. So, is it a “hybrid” or is it “unique”?

I don’t think that one needs to choose between something being a hybrid, or unique. It’s doesn’t seem to be an either/or situation. For example, take gas-powered automobiles  and electric automobiles and combine the two concepts so that we create a gas-electric hybrid. In this circumstance we have a car that is unique in that there is a property that members of the previous categories do not have, namely, the property of being both gas and electric powered. Must we agree with Zao’s criteria that because this car is a hybrid, it cannot be unique or vice versa? I don’t think so, in fact it seems to me that it may be unique by being a hybrid!

Zao suggests that if there is such a system, I should present it rather than bringing it up as a hypothetical because it isn’t an objection. I think, however, if Zao understood me correctly he(?) would see that I merely rely on the possibility of a system and that this possibility is enough to make the point I wanted to make.

He also takes issue with the formal presentation of the TAG I’ve included in my paper which I’ve borrowed from Sean Choi. Zao states:

…advances have been made in presuppositionalism which have shown Choi’s position to be mistaken. Don Collett has argued effectively (in Revelation and Reason edited by K. Scott Oliphint) that Van Til’s conception of presuppositional semantics is identical to the Strawson/Van Fraasen semantics, which makes a clear distinction between “presupposition” and “implication.” (Even John Frame has accepted Collett’s argumentation in this respect.)

Choi presents his formulation of the TAG as a traditional transcendental argument (a la Kant) which would suggest (in this context) that the existence of logic implies the existence of God. Strawson in attempting to formalize a sufficient theory of presupposition proposes something similar to the following:

P presupposes Q if and only if Q is true provided P is true or P is false.

Where P is logic and Q is God, if one is to use this formulation instead of the previous, we would not say that the existence of logic implies God but that even the denial of the existence of logic also presupposes God. But what real difference does this make to our discussion? If I’m missing something then I wait to be informed, but it seems to me that even under this view the claim that “Both the truth of P or falisity of P presupposes Q” will reduce, in our discussion, to the claim that “logic presupposes the existence of God” since I am not denying the existence of logic. In other words, what difference does this make to any of my subsequent criticisms insofar as they pertain to the presuppositionalist ideas I mention?

This much can be said about the entire section of my paper where I introduce Choi’s formalism. It is of course nice to have something with which to work, but I am not dependent on this formulation. The arguments in my paper can be extended and applied to any (as I can conceive) assertion that amounts to “logic presupposes God.”

I go on to criticize Bahnsen’s idea of the “impossibility of the contrary” stating:

But what might this mean for our discussion? If Bahnsen is permitted to carry on with his criteria, then if any a priori, a posteriori or conventionalist justifications of logic are shown to be false (and subsequently, the worldviews that house and depend on them) all other formulations which properly fall under those headings will also be false (worldviews included) since they employ the same proposition, namely, ‘Christianity is false’. Of course, this is not sound reasoning unless the shared proposition is what is causing the justification to be false. Bahnsen needs to show that ‘Christianity is false’ is the ‘false-making’ proposition of all non-Christian worldviews, and it doesn’t seem that this is possible by any means other than (i) showing that all possible non-Christian justifications will have ‘Christianity is false’ as the onlyproposition in common (for if there is even one other proposition shared by these worldviews, how might one disqualify that proposition as possibly being the ‘false-maker’?), and (ii) showing that Christianity is not false. The obvious problem is that if (ii) is shown, the TAG becomes superfluous as it is no longer needed; one has already arrived at the truth of Christian theism, and for (i) to be shown, one still has to have an awareness of “every single variation of unbelieving philosophy.”

Zao replies that the false-maker of the proposition is its axiomatic nature. But I cannot see any reason to accept the claim that every worldview which has the proposition “Christianity is false” has that proposition as an axiom.

He states:

If the most basic presupposition of a non-Christian worldview is “not Christianity” (which appears to be definitional, given the above framework), then it is the basic nature of the presupposition which exerts a rational controlling influence on all other worldview content. It is not merely one proposition among many, floating loose and free in a certain worldview, but is rather foundational.

Again, why is this true? It seems to me that the only reason for claiming that “Christianity is false” is the most basic presupposition of non-Christian worldviews lies simply in identifying them as non-Christian worldviews. That is to say, I might identify some worldview as being non-Mitchist because I see that their worldview does not utilize what I utilize as my axiomatic foundation but I cannot see how this entails that “Mitchism is false” becomes their foundational axiom. It also seems that depending on who is looking at Bob’s worldview, he has several other axioms! For instance, what if a Muslim is looking at Bob’s worldview, does he now have as a foundational axiom that “Islam is false?” If a Hindu is looking at his worldview, does he now have as foundational the axiom that “Hinduism is false?” It even seems that atheists can analyze Zao’s worldview under his own criteria and suggest that he has as a foundational axiom that “Atheism is false” as his most basic presupposition.

Further, imagine Bob the Buddhist who has as his foundational axiom “Buddhism is true.” If we take Zao’s criteria, then since Bob the Buddhist can be identified as possessing a non-Christian worldview it follows that he has, also as a foundational axiom that “Christianity is false.” We can say that he’d also have as foundational axioms, under Zao’s criteria, propositions such as “Islam is false,” “Confucianism is false,” and “Scientology is false.” It seems more proper to say that Bob merely has the axiom “Buddhism is true” (if even this), and that he deduces from this postulate all of the other aforementioned propositions. That is to say, “Christianity is false” is not an axiom for Bob, it’s a deduction and so like other deductions it is “floating loose and free”. If we are to follow Zao’s criteria, it seems we render the term “axiom” meaningless. In fact Bob would have possibly an infinite number of axioms about religions of which he has not even heard! I see no reason to accept such absurdity.

In further response to my mention of Fristianity, Zao responds:

Being quite thoroughly familiar with various Fristianity objections, I had to chuckle at this one. I apologize for it, but I did. Let’s be perfectly clear here: an atheist can get zero cash value out of the Fristianity objection in debate with a Christian. Are you planning on being baptized in the name of the Father, Son, Holy Spirit and “Fred” anytime soon, Mitch?

The Fristianity objection, if sound, merely shows that the central claim of presuppositionalism is false. That is, if the Fristianity objection holds then it is false that no non-Christian theistic methods can possibly justify X, Y, Z. This is all I was intending to show.

Moving right along we come to my application of a Euthyphro-like dilemma to the laws of logic. Similar to many Christians with regard to the actual Euthyphro dilemma, Zao takes the route of stating:

The Christian’s argument is that logical laws are a reflection of God’s thought which is in accordance with God’s nature, which are all necessary.

But analyze what I said in the section, as Zao even quoted himself:

Frame essentially makes the claim that it is logically impossible for the nature of God to change. But the standard Frame is using to identify logical possibility is allegedly the nature of God. As such, his claim appears to be represented more accurately as:

(C)  Based on God’s nature it is logically impossible for God’s nature to be different because God is necessarily a rational God

This does not seem to assist in any regard as what is rational is allegedly determined by God’s nature. So to argue that God’s nature must be the way it is because God is necessarily rational seems to only appeal to a standard of rationality that is separate from God, otherwise it is clearly circular.

In what manner would it be the case that God’s nature was not rational? It does not seem that a God who forms the basis of logical principles and thereby is the standard of rationality can ever be irrational (though he may certainly appear irrational when judged by a foreign standard). That is to say, if one wants to state that the Christian God forms the basis of rationality and the logical principles thereby in effect cannot be anything other than what they are, they must be appealing to a standard of logic that is separate from God’s nature as to appeal solely to God’s nature does not sufficiently answer the question; it is a non-answer.

If Zao does not think that (C) is circular, I suggest he read a bit closer. He says that my dilemma is circular in itself because the first horn “…asserts that there is a meaningful sense in which logic is independent of the thought of God.” What is the implication of the aforementioned circularity in basing them on God? It seems to me that, as a direct implication, we must conclude that the necessary principles of logic indeed are external to God just as is the case with necessary moral principles and the original Euthyphro dilemma. I have not, as Zao has suggested, assumed that they are independent to show they are independent, I’ve formulated a dilemma and shown that given the alternatives are incoherent we have no choice but to accept that logical principles exist independently of God.

We might even supplement this by raising a point that was conveyed to me by a fellow UP.net member. Zao stated that the logical laws are a reflection of God’s thought and that God thinks logically. Moving over the seemingly obvious incoherence in such a statement, one might want to ask what it even means to say that God thinks logically? Logic permits us to deduce from premises, distinguish conclusions and so on. But God, if he is omniscient, surely does not have to do any of these things to have knowledge. God does not “reason” to his conclusions, he simply knows them. To say that the logical laws are reflections of God’s logical thinking stands in opposition to the idea that God knows all there is to know. Truly omniscient beings do not require logic, because they do not require a means to apprehend knowledge. This, I think, just adds to the incoherence of stating that logical principles reflect God’s rational thought.

In my section entitled “God and the Abstract” I offered an argument which is basically as follows:

The dependence relationship between “God exists” and “logical principles exist” seems problematic. If God is the source of all things other than himself, and he depends on nothing for his existence, surely the relationship must be asymmetrical (with primacy granted to God), but it appears not to be. It can be shown, in fact, that God depends on logical principles for his existence.

Lewis’ counterfactual semantics tell us that ‘any proposition is counterfactually implied by a necessarily false proposition’. Since “logical principles do not exist” is a necessarily false proposition, it counterfactually implies any proposition whatsoever.[21] So it is also true that if logical principles did not exist, neither would God. Thus, God depends on logical principles for his existence.

The relationship between the existence of logical principles and the existence of God would be asymmetrical iff God depended on nothing for his being and logical principles depended wholly on him. In this regard, the relationship of dependence is one-way; logical principles depend on God but not vice versa. If dependence is asymmetrical, then logic cannot depend on God as it has been shown that God depends on logic.

The asymmetrical relationship can be depicted further: where P refers to logical principles and Q refers to God. If P depends on Q asymmetrically, then the worlds in which P is true must be a proper subset of the worlds in which Q is true. Since it is the case that the principles of logic hold in every world, and the set of all worlds is not a proper subset of any other set of worlds, the laws of logic cannot depend on anything, including God.

Zao responds:

Given the nature of the points under contention (the existence of God and the relationship between God and logic), to argue that “logical principles do not exist” counterfactually implies that God depends on logical principles for his existence is to beg the question in a rather bald and obvious sort of way. How about, “God does not exist” is a necessarily false statement? Given that TAG is intended to argue for the necessary existence of God, to assume the contingency of God’s existence upon logic in order to prove God is contingent upon logic is, well, unpersuasive (to put it mildly).

I might be mistaken, but it seems to me that Zao interprets my argument as an argument against the existence of God. This is not the case, however. I can accept both the necessary existence of God and the necessary existence of logical principles, and still deny the type of relationship that the presuppositionalist is proposing. It’s not the necessary existence of either of these things that is the issue, it’s the proposed asymmetrical relationship between God and logic. I think Zao has really misunderstood the thrust of my argument here.

After a point about my brief treatment of divine simplicity and Trinitarianism (I agree, that could be a paper unto itself!) Zao closes with a very brief criticism of logical conventionalism. Zao states:

Finally, we have a section where logic is said to be both conventional while necessary and universal. This is rather fun. It’s like something from Alice in Wonderland. “Sentence first – verdict afterwards!

This is a claim that is thrown around a lot, and it is a claim that is just simply false. There simply is no problem with logic being conventional, while having its principles be necessarily true. Zao is welcome to either read the literature cited in my paper, the brief treatment here or wait for an upcoming article I’m expecting authored by a logician.

Conclusion

Again, the arguments in my paper are not needed to show that the TAG fails, the mere coherence of Conventionalism serves as a defeater for the endeavor. What my arguments seek to show is that logic cannot be based on God in any such implied way. I can only say that Zao’s brief treatment of Conventionalism towards the end of his post seems to violate his own suggestion of “… [understanding] the matter for [one's self] before attempting to criticize…”

P.S: I’d like to politely ask that in the future Zao link to my articles rather than pasting them in full. I’d also like to ask that he adds a hyperlink to the specific post he’s writing about. Thanks!

In response to Bolt’s opening post, I replied and Bolt has since authored his rebuttal. What follows will be a response to the issues he raises therein.

Liangzhi, Proper Function, and Selflessness

First, I will explain some more about li, qi, and liangzhi. To quote directly from Tien’s paper:

For most Neo-Confucians, li describes the way a thing or state of affairs ought to be. So when things or states of affairs are in accord with li, they are deemed “natural,” and when they are not, they are deemed “deviant.” All things possess all the li of the universe within them. In human beings, the li exist complete in the mind (xin). For Wang, though, the mind not only contains li, the mind is itself li.

The liangzhi is the mechanism by which one can come to know the li or the principle of all things. Liangzhi is both a cognitive and affective (thinking and feeling) faculty. The li serves as the principle which describes the way things ought to be. Every existing thing contains all of the li within and so li is completely existent within the mind and while the mind contains li it is also, itself, li. Birth endows all human beings with a perfect mind or xinzhibenti. The perfect mind does not come to knowing by thinking, but simply knows. Liangzhi is a faculty of this mind which discerns “flawlessly, naturally and spontaneously between right and wrong,” thus forming correct beliefs and correct affective responses. However, there is a problem of qi:

All things in the universe are a combination of li and qi. Qi is the stuff of which the universe is made. It exists in various grades of purity. Although all things possess all the li of the universe within them, because of the impurity of the qi of which they are composed, some li are obstructed, thereby accounting for the differences between things.

Just as all things possess all of the li of the universe, because of the qi that forms their composition some li are obstructed. However, human beings have the ability to purify the levels of qi within and in turn allow the li to “shine forth”. Internal manifestations of qi within human beings are self-centered desires. It is these desires, or subsequent states of mind that cause us to lose touch with our pure mind and liangzhi. That liangzhi is to operate effectively requires that the self-centered desires are eliminated. Thus, our minds while li, are corrupted by qi. But how then can we come to know things? Regarding proper function, one can be said to be able to discern knowledge when one is employing liangzhi at some time; that is, our beliefs are warranted when we come to them while employing liangzhi. But how may we do this when qi “blocks” the liangzhi?

The proper functioning of the mind is acquired through selflessness or the absence of self-centered desires. Self-centered in this context does not mean selfish, but is translated from si meaning “to make oneself the center of one’s world.” It can be said that being in a state of selflessness in order to employ liangzhi equates to being unselfconscious of personal agency. To form an analogy, we can say that in order for our beliefs to be warranted, we must polish (liangzhi) the dust (qi) off of a mirror, in order to see the reflection (li) clearly. This “polishing of the dust” is a cumulative process, we must first rid ourselves of self-centered thoughts one at a time; and each time we do, we become better equipped to do so with other self-centered thoughts in the future. Second, we must extend liangzhi to our everyday lives.

The means by which one achieves a state of selflessness is firstly through the rectification of thoughts. This is simply to purge one of the impurities of self-centeredness to permit the second stage of the extension of knowledge, which results in the attainment of warranted belief.  The rectification of thoughts or gewu explains that the mind is li and the proper place to discover li is in the mind and not in any outside world. In eliminating incorrect thoughts, one’s mind can function freely and being to operate properly. Gewu entails that once a single self-centered thought begins to stir, it must be cast out. As it is a continual effort, each individual success allows the liangzhi to operate more freely and the more freely the liangzhi is the more easily it can identify incorrect thoughts and eliminate them. As such, when one eliminates some self-centered desire relevant to a particular belief, one attains an affective state of selflessness in relation to that belief and the liangzhi constitutes a properly functioning cognitive-affective faculty relative to that belief. This is, in effect, polishing the mirror to reflect the images before it.

Further, there is the additional criterion of the extension of knowledge. Succinctly, this is to extend the liangzhi to matters of everyday life. It is the difference between knowing “how” and knowing “that.” One cannot extend the liangzhi if they are not in an affective state of selflessness to some specific belief which would prevent one from attaining an affective state of action which stands as a necessary condition for true belief to constitute warranted knowledge. In some instances self-centered desires hinder the liangzhi from extending and the effective way of unearthing one’s incorrect thoughts are by attempts at such extension. “When the attempted extension fails, the subject will then be in a much better position to identify the relevant self-centered desires, and when they are identifies, she will be forced to confront them.” Upon doing so, extension of the liangzhi will be possible. That is, failure to extend one’s liangzhi reveals the relevant self-centered desires that need overcoming. As such, the rectification of thoughts and the extension of knowledge is a cyclical process. “The rectification of thoughts is the effort to extend knowledge. As one knows how to extend his knowledge, he also knows how to rectify thoughts. If he does not know how to rectify thoughts, it means he does not yet know how to extend his knowledge.” For those who have already eliminated all the self-centered desires and still cannot extend the liangzhi the issue of unity between knowledge and action arises. That is to say, the extension of liangzhi is merely acting upon the deliverances of the properly functioning liangzhi. Is it possible to know that filial piety involves caring for one’s parents in both winter and summer without actually doing so? One might have right beliefs about such but until one extends this otherwise lesser kind of knowledge, one will never truly “know.” Knowledge is the beginning of action, and action is the completion of knowledge.

And so, we can identify the Neo-Confucian theory of warrant as:

A belief p will have real warrant for a person S if and only if S is in an affective state appropriate to belief p, and p is produced in S by properly functioning cognitive-affective faculties in an appropriate cognitive affective environment for S’s kind of cognitive-affective faculties, according to a function successfully aimed at truth, and the degree of warrant p enjoys for S is directly proportional to the firmness with which S holds p.

Bolt’s Lack of Clarity

Bolt writes:

Recall that the reason atheistic epistemic justifications fail is because atheism does not provide for objective epistemic normativity which is required for propositional knowledge.

As evidenced by the italics in the above quote, Bolt clearly considers justification and normativity to be two different things. This statement seems counter to some things Bolt has said in his opening statement:

“Something like justification or warrant is required in order for someone to have propositional knowledge.”

“What is required for propositional knowledge is some sort of objective epistemic normativity.”

“Some type of epistemic warrant must be accounted for in Nocterro’s view of the world because of the need for warrant in knowledge.”

“The character and command of God and His having created us in His image and obligated us toward Him provides for the epistemic normativity necessary to right belief.”

“Epistemic warrant is in some sense necessary for human intelligibility yet it is foreign to an atheistic worldview while the Christian worldview provides for epistemic warrant. “

Bolt, in his most recent response, claims that atheistic epistemic justifications fail because atheism does not provide for objective epistemic normativity. However, as evidenced by the quotes above from his opening post, he uses the terms “justification”, “warrant”, and “normativity” interchangeably. So I must wonder, what is he asking the atheist to provide? In fact, I must wonder this same thing overall. I do not think Chris has been at all detailed enough in describing his worldview and how it provides warrant/normativity, or in stating what it is the atheist needs to do in order to effectively argue against his position. Furthermore, Bolt states in his response that:

Nocterro allegedly provides a brief summary of Plantinga’s position on epistemic justification which I do not adhere to and did not bring up in my opening statement.

Firstly, I am not sure what Bolt means here by “allegedly”; I must ask him to clarify his choice of words. Bolt thinks I am assuming that Plantinga’s position is his position as well. However, this is not the case. There are two reasons why I chose to discuss Plantinga’s view on warrant. The first is that Bolt, in his opening statement, never went into detail on what the concept of warrant entailed. I was thus forced to go with the leading view in order to discuss the topic:

Perhaps the most prevalent view of warrant in contemporary philosophy is that of proper function, as employed comprehensively and famously by Alvin Plantinga.

The second reason has nothing to do with Bolt’s (as yet explained) account for warrant, but a possible atheistic account for warrant. I merely presented Plantinga’s view as background information, going on to quote Plantinga himself in defense of atheistic warrant:

Even if [the atheist] doesn’t think we human beings have been designed and created by a powerful and highly competent being who proposed to endow us with the ability to achieve true beliefs, he may nonetheless think of this idea as a convenient and useful fiction [...] he may say that our cognitive faculties are working properly when they are working in the way they would work if the theistic story were true. He may therefore treat this story the way corresponding stories are treated by some who accept ideal observer theories in ethics…

Perhaps in response to this, he writes, in the section previous to his quote above:

Finally, Nocterro believes that he can presuppose God in his reasoning without believing that God exists. Not only does the argument presented show that epistemic normativity is impossible on a view where God does not exist, but it is impossible to “presuppose God” without believing that God exists, so Nocterro fails in his attempt to escape the conclusion of the argument given the soundness of the argument.

I agree that it is impossible to presuppose God without believing that God exists. Plantinga’s quote above states that the atheist does *not* presuppose God (which would entail belief that He exists), but rather that he may take the idea to be “a convenient and useful fiction”. That is, the atheist may use the concept of God as a thought experiment, and nothing more. To conclude, I must ask Chris to clarify his views on a few things before this discussion can proceed any further:

1) What is warrant?

2) What is justification?

3) What is epistemic normativity?

Bolt’s Objections to Neo-Confucian Warrant

Bolt states:

Nocterro has not provided any explanation of how the liangzhi may have been designed to function as it is held to function as opposed to any other way.

This, however, strikes me as similar to asking why God is the way he is rather than other way. Do questions such as these really have answers? Surely they are brute facts that are unexplained by any external states of affairs.

Bolt further states:

The liangzhi must be the result of unintentional, undirected, non-human, non-divine, non-intelligent processes by which the liangzhi came to be or comes to be.

Or simply not a result of anything at all, similar to how God is not a result of any non-God thing. If what Bolt is hinting at here is a sort of evolutionary objection in that it seems odd that evolution would develop liangzhi, I think we can agree with him. Of course, under Neo-Confucianism the existence of a mind necessarily entails the existence of liangzhi so that insofar as we have an explanation as for why evolution would bring about a mind, we have thereby explained why there is liangzhi. That liangzhi is the type of faculty that it is seems to be merely a brute fact.

Bolt states:

Further, he implies through his use of terms like “ought” that li, while only a descriptive concept, is somehow normative. Indeed he states this outright but without any reason for doing so.

But the li is not only a descriptive concept, it is both descriptive and normative as outlined above: “…when things or states of affairs are in accord with li, they are deemed ‘natural,’ and when they are not, they are deemed ‘deviant.’” Bolt states:

… the question remains as to why the li should be preferred over qi anyway. Again, epistemic normativity is lacking in this view and there is no apparent reason why one is obligated to conform one’s thoughts to li to begin with.

This seems no different than asking why one would prefer or adjust their lives towards God over Satan? Bolt might answer that we should do so because God created us, but where is the principle that says if one creates another, we should adjust our lives towards them? Even if there were such a principle, why should one follow it rather than not? Perhaps Bolt would state that because God commands us to do so, but why should we listen to his commands rather than not? Bolt might state that we’ll be punished if we don’t, but why should we prefer non-punishment over punishment?  Of course, perhaps there is no obligation under Neo-Confucianism to conform to the li, or perhaps one should prefer the li because of the better lives that result in ridding one’s self of self-centered desires. The question seems to be importing standards from Bolt’s own view in examining Neo-Confucianism but he must not judge this system by his presuppositions to determine internal incoherence he must examine my system from within and there does not seem to be any necessity for this idea of “preference” that Bolt is introducing. Bolt states:

Some may think that I have already given Nocterro too much, for while Christianity is a revelatory worldview, Neo-Confucianism is not. There are questions concerning how anyone comes to know these sort of claims concerning liangzhi and li and qi to begin with. Has Nocterro ‘discovered’ and ‘reached’ the liangzhi? If he has not, then he cannot claim to have come to know the liangzhi apart from the ‘authority’ of Wang (given that Wang reached it himself), but this is not bringing even one’s most basic thoughts into conformity with li because Wang was just another human being.

Given the discussion on the role of action, it would actually be impossible to count claims based on authority as knowledge. There must be that role of personal experience and affective states. This doesn’t, then, seem to be a problem. He further states:

The world of li and qi is not an appropriate cognitive environment for the operation of liangzhi since qi obstructs the operation of the liangzhi so that it does not function properly.

Of course the same might be said for his worldview as well, that the noetic influence of sin prevents any knowledge whatsoever. However, Bolt has the faculties of the so-called sensus divinatus as an alleged “way-out” of this problem, and so too has the Neo-Confucian a “way out” in the criteria previously outlined.

Conclusion

It does seem that Neo-Confucianism epistemology permits the ideas of warrant, proper function and normativity (as understood by traditional definitions, I now assume that Bolt is using them as such). Indeed, since this is true Bolt’s claim that only Christianity could do so is clearly false. Since this also forms the basis of his argument for the truth of Christianity, one is not required to accept his conclusion that Christianity is true and one need not accept on this basis that scripture is true, or that I presuppose God. If Bolt’s key argument for the Christian position has indeed failed, one must wonder by which means is he now establishing the truth of Christianity.

Molinism

Essentially, it is a doctrine which seeks to reconcile God’s omniscience with libertarian human free will.

God’s Knowledge

Non-molinists typically affirm two types of knowledge within God: Necessary Knowledge and Free Knowledge.

Necessary Knowledge is God’s knowledge of necessary truth. Such truths are true independently of the will of God and include propositions such as “2+2=4″ and “All bachelors are unmarried.” God’s Free Knowledge is God’s knowledge of contingent truths, truths which are dependent upon God’s will, that is – propositions which are true, but could have been false, such as: “Bob drives a Mercedes” and “Flowers smell nice.”

Molinists affirm both of these types of knowledge but propose another category known as Middle Knowledge under which God knows contingent truths that are independent of his will. To use a common example, in Matthew 11:23 we find a counterfactual, it reads:

And you, Capernaum, will not be exalted to heaven, will you? You will descend to Hades; for if the miracles had occurred in Sodom which occurred in you, it would have remained to this day. (NASB)

A counterfactual is any statement with the form “If it were the case that P, then it would be the case that Q.” In the above verse we find: “…If the miracles had occurred in Sodom which occurred in you, it would have remained to this day.” This is an example of a counterfactual. Jesus is saying that if Sodom and Gomorrah had some experience similar to that of Jesus’ generation of Israel, then they would have repented. Jesus is expressing knowledge of what the Sodomites would have done under a different set of circumstances. There are various other examples of counterfactual statements in the Bible, but this brief illustration should suffice.

Counterfactuals of Freedom

Given God’s knowledge of counterfactuals, it follows that insofar as counterfactuals of freedom are possible, God knows them. This is to say that God knows, for example, that “If Bob wins the lottery, he would freely buy a sportscar.” This counterfactual, if true, is true even if Bob never wins the lottery. It is also a counterfactual of freedom because the latter portion of the conditional pertains to some free action. God can then know what every agent would freely do under some circumstance.

Logical Ordering

Molinists affirm that God’s middle knowledge is logically prior to his creation of the world. That is to say, the logical ordering of events is:

1. God’s knowledge of necessary truths

2. God’s middle knowledge

-Creation-

3. God’s free knowledge

This ordering is of the utmost importance to the Molinist for if middle knowledge falls logically posterior to Creation, libertarian freedom cannot obtain since all counterfactuals would be actively caused by God. Since God’s middle knowledge (and counterfactuals in general) falls logically prior to the creation event, libertarian freedom is possible. This is because logically prior to God’s creative action, it would still be true that “If Bob wins the lottery, he would freely buy a sportscar.” In having this knowledge, God can make a free choice as to which type of world to create.

RK has taken issue with the notion of logical priority altogether. He has failed to account for the differences.

Consider the example where Bob wakes up in the morning, goes to work and then goes to the gym. It is true for this situation that temporally prior to Bob’s going to work, he woke up in the morning. And it is true that temporally posterior to Bob’s going to work, he goes to the gym. We are applying temporal priority to this circumstance because it is a sequence of events that takes place in time. What does it mean, then, to say that something is logically prior, or logically posterior to some other thing?

Consider the following set of numbers:

{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}

In this set, the number 3 is logically prior to the number 4 and the number 5 is logically posterior to the number 4. It is not true, however, that 4 obtains, happens or exists before 5. Because we are talking about ordering that is necessarily timeless, such as would be many facets of God (logically) before the creation of time, we must speak of logical priority and not temporal priority. RK also makes a category error when he attemps to apply the notion of succession to logical orders. In our first example, it is true that Bob wakes up and then goes to work and then goes to the gym, this is coherent because the set is a temporally ordered set of propositions. However, when applied to the numbered set above it is an incoherent idea to say, 1 and then 2 and then 3. The word “then” is a temporal adverb and applying it to a non-temporal set is a clear category mistake (it might be used analogically, but the usage should be noted as purely analogical). Perhaps RK simply means that in reading some members of the set we must read them one by one. But this is not a matter of succession on the part of the set, it is a matter of temporal succession on the part of human perception/understanding! The set simply is, absolutely complete and without any “becoming.”

We can say that some X has logical priority over some Y if  the latter is logically dependent on the former. Again, no temporality involved since there could be presumably an infinite number of dependencies that occur simultaneously. So with regard to the logical ordering of God’s creative decree, for example, the Molinist purports that God’s free knowledge is logically posterior to his creation of the world. That is, God cannot have knowledge of the actual state of affairs until there is an actual state of affairs. As such, God’s knowledge of the actual state of affairs is dependent on there being an actual state of affairs – thus, Creation is logically prior to God’s free knowledge.

If one is still not convinced and wants to continue to assert that the notion of logical priority is incoherent (or merely temporal), the following argument reveals a devastating conclusion:

(1) God created the Universe

(2) The Universe marks the creation of time

(3) Therefore, God created time (from 1, 2)

(4) God is atemporal

(5) God could not have willed the beginning of the universe temporally (from 4)

(6) God must have willed the beginning of the universe atemporally (from 5)

(7) God’s will to create the universe is not temporally prior to the actualization of the universe (from 4, 5, 6)

(8) God’s willing of the universe is logically prior to the actualization of the universe

(9) Logical priority is incoherent (assumptive premise)

(10) God’s willing of the universe is not temporally or logically prior to the actualization of the universe (from 4, 5, 6, 7, 9)

(11) God did not will the actualization of the universe (from 10)

(12) God did not create the Universe

To this argument, RK has responded:

(11) fails by assuming your own categories for (10) as the only possible ones…

He never offered any alternative method of priority that is neither temporal, nor logical. Given that there is no present reason to accept his criticism, if one rejects logical priority it is clear that they reject God’s creation of the universe altogether.

Middle Knowledge and Creation

How, then, might God’s middle knowledge influence his creative decree? William Lane Craig states²:

[God] knows, for example, that in some possible world Peter freely denies Christ three times and that in another possible world Peter freely affirms Christ under identical circumstances, for both are possible.

God’s middle knowledge is His knowledge of all contingently true conditional propositions in the subjunctive mood, including propositions about creaturely free actions. For example, logically prior to His creative decree, God knew that if Peter were in circumstances C, he would freely deny Christ three times. Such subjunctive conditionals are often called counterfactuals. These counterfactuals serve to delimit the range of possible worlds to worlds which are feasible for God to actualize. For example, there is an intrinsically possible world in which Peter freely affirms Christ in precisely the same circumstances in which he in fact denied him; but given the counterfactual truth that if Peter were in precisely those circumstances he would freely deny Christ, then the possible world in which Peter freely affirms Christ in those circumstances is not feasible for God. God could force Peter to affirm Christ in those circumstances, but then his confession would not be free. By means of His middle knowledge, God knows what is the proper subset of possible worlds which are feasible for Him, given the counterfactuals that are true.

God then decrees to create certain free creatures in certain circumstances and, thus, on the basis of his middle knowledge and His knowledge of His own decree, God has foreknowledge of everything that will happen (His free knowledge). In that way, He knows, simply on the basis of His own internal states and without any need of any sort of perception of the external world, that Peter will freely deny Christ three times.

… So there are worlds which are intrinsically possible but which God, given the counterfactuals that happen to be true, is not capable of actualizing and which are therefore, in Flint’s terminology, infeasible for God. Notice that because counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are contingently true, which worlds are feasible for God and which are infeasible is also a contingent matter. It all depends on how creatures would freely behave in various circumstances, which is beyond God’s control.

The explanation is pretty clear but it is important to note that when Craig says that how creatures freely act is beyond God’s control, he is merely asserting that it is logically impossible that God make an agent freely do X. This seems to be a contradiction in terms comparable to 2+2=5.

Theology

The biggest theological implication of the view is perhaps that God is able to maintain his sovereignty without preventing man’s freedom. Imagine the state of affairs in which God knows that if Bob wins the lottery, he will freely donate to a Haiti relief fund. So, if God wants Bob to freely donate to a Haiti relief fund, all he has to do in this example is place Bob in a circumstance where he wins the lottery. God retains sovereignty by having his purposes/desires obtain and Bob retains his freedom.

With regard to Christian salvation, Molinism asserts that God knows logically prior to the creation of the world the worlds in which certain people would freely choose him. Let us again look at Bob, imagine that God knows that if Bob were placed in circumstance C, he would freely believe in Christ. God then actualizes a world in which Bob finds himself in C and thus believes in Christ. Thus, God’s sovereignty is upheld by his actualization of some world, and Bob’s free will is upheld by his freely choosing to believe in Christ. Note: This is not to say that Bob comes to believe in Christ without Christ’s assistance (see: “simultaneous concurrence”)

Conclusion

While I have not attempted to defend Molinism against coherent objections, I have tried to outline specifically what Molinism is stating in an effort to quell what seems to be a growing number of strawmen on the topic.

__________________________

¹RK has constantly objected that he does not misunderstand, but if this is true, I can’t help but feel that RK is simply being dishonest in his representation of these issues. I would hope that he is not being willfully dishonest, so I will presume that he is simply mistaken.

²http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5633

The Discussion

Posts by myself will be colored in blue while Olson’s will be colored in green. I will only be modifying the conversation to correct spelling and grammar. Any comments I make will be indicated within the quotation by “[...]”

My initial comment was on a Facebook post by Olson in which he linked a video of Greg Bahnsen offering a criticism of Naturalism.

Mitch:

That’s quite a primitive understanding of naturalism as related to cognitive activity. The best argument of this type is Plantinga’s EAAN. Bahnsen is employing the same fallacy as Craig does when speaking about morality, that is, human beings are animals therefore human beings are JUST animals. By this same token, the physicalist might assert that brain states or chemical reactions but it does not follow that they are then JUST chemical reactions.

Joshua:

I thought you would comment on this one. But how do you account for the logic you used to determine that a fallacy was committed? That is, how do you account for it from within your world view?

Mitch:

We’ve already talked about this… in fact, I’ll post something on UrbanPhilosophy later tonight that outlines precisely how logic is justified without reference to God [this is the previously linked paper on conventionalism]… of course the paper I submitted already showed that your position is logically impossible.

Joshua:

Like I said before, you are arguing against a straw man. The explanation you offered in your paper fails to account for the preconditions of intelligibility.

You are simply making an attempt at showing how an atheistic/evolutionary world view accounts for the preconditions of intelligibility, but the fact that these preconditions exist demands that the Christian world view be true.

But anyway, I will be happy to look over your new article. And if its alright with you I’d like to submit it to a few people I know for further critique…

Mitch:

I’m not really sure why what I’ve said continually regarding this matter is going ignored. You can simply take the argument and run a reductio through your own worldview! The argument, if sound, will be sound regardless of which worldview it is uttered from. If the conclusion of the arguments truly are that the Christian worldview cannot account for logic, then that obtains even in your own worldview rendering it incoherent from the inside. You can’t simply beg the question in favor of your own worldview, not when faced with the conclusion of my argument.

The conclusion of your argument is based on your ignorance of the very foundation for the Christian world view. There were certain aspects of the Christian world view that you simply ignored, and the ones that you documented were misrepresented. Now, if its that important to you, I will go ahead and sift through your article one paragraph at a time. and comment on the ones that are faulty.The issue I have with doing this is simply the fact that you wouldn’t rethink your world view regardless of my counter arguments. You will simply formulate another strawman to argue against. But anyway, I will send you a copy of my review within a few days.

Conventionalism? I suppose I should have stopped reading when I saw the word “truthhood,” but nevertheless, Mitchell, aside from the question begging contained within the article, why ought anyone absolutely be logical?

I’m sorry Sye but you’re not going to get away with that so easily, where is the question-begging?

Well, you’re begging the question that an evolutionary world view can even account for the recognition of logical absolutes. If evolution is in fact true, there is no real foundation by which we deem our senses to be ultimately reliable and we therefore can’t really be sure that we know the truth about anything, at least not in an absolute sense. This reliability of our senses is also presupposed but not accounted for in the atheistic/ evolutionary world view.

You’re not giving the TAG anymore, you’re giving a form of EAAN which is largely besides the point. Conventionalism need not be embraced solely on an evolutionary basis, it would hold if evolution were false.

Well, the only alternative to evolution is creation, so if evolution were false and your argument holds despite the theistic world view or the atheistic world view, then what’s the point of making the argument?

The point is that even if intelligent design is true this does not immediately lead to Christian Theism. It certainly does not satisfy the criteria laid out by that TAG, that Christian theism be the ONLY worldview which accounts for logic. Our discussion shouldn’t be focused on evolution vs. Christianity since the real issue here is the coherence of conventionalism. One only needs that conventionalism be possibly true and the TAG, as formulated by Bahnsen, fails.

Sure, but I think you’re missing my point. That being that if evolution were true, and that natural/material realities are all that exist, we can have no ultimate standard for truth, nor would we have any real reason to adopt an ultimate standard so that truth can be known. Afterall, how can a system of complex chemical reactions really know anything?So, with that said, if you are in fact consistent within your atheistic world view, you should understand that you are limited to naturalism, which renders you utterly incapable of making any claims on the metaphysical aspects of life since those claims are by nature outside the scope of naturalistic explanation, and therefore outside of your world view (at least not without borrowing from Christian principles, which is what you are guilty of doing.)

If you really want to subject your article to tough scrutiny I would suggest submitting to Dr. Jason Lisle at Answers in Genesis or Matt Slick from carm.org.

You’re committing the same fallacy I outlined earlier, just because X is Y it does not follow that X is ONLY Y. Again you bring in this idea of “ultimate standard of truth” but I’ve just outlined an entire system that shows your conception to be in error. Your question “how can a system of complex chemical reactions really know anything?” is not an argument against complex chemical reactions knowing things.I am also not restricted to naturalism as an atheist, that is clearly false. People can be (and in fact are) atheists without being naturalists, namely, there are mind/body dualists who are atheists! Why should I accept your dichotomy as being true? Of course, if I were a naturalist you’d have to show that there are even “metaphysical aspects of life” that I should even care about, otherwise you’re just begging the question against the naturalist.

I have already attempted to speak with Slick but received no response (and his version of TAG is subject to even more problems than Bahnsen’s). I’ve also read Lisle’s book and he is clearly no philosopher, when he talks about epistemology I feel as I imagine many theists feel when Dawkins talks about religion.

Now let’s not diverge from the issue here Joshua, it’s a very simple one. The TAG asserts that no non-Christian theistic system can possibly account for the laws of logic. I have presented a version of conventionalism to which you have not objected to directly. You’ve attempted to invoke a form of the EAAN, but to maintain the coherence of your argument you need my position to be NECESSARILY false (that is, not even POSSIBLY true). The EAAN, even if it succeeded, would not provide you with this! You might show that I have no reason to accept conventionalism (though I don’t think you would), but that is clearly not the same as showing that conventionalism is incoherent. So what you must do, it seems, is find some incoherence in the system of conventionalism I’ve outlined or as you presuppositionalists say, “subject it to an internal critique.”

Until then, even though I don’t think it was necessary to provide, I’ve given you a justification for the laws of logic that does not depend on the Christian God. Now, with this system (again, even though it was not necessary), you can go back and review the articles in my paper. If they are sound, which I’m entitled to think until you show otherwise, not only does your system NOT account for the laws of logic, it CANNOT. So why shouldn’t I just say that it is you who are borrowing from my system?

Answer me this: Is it or is it not true that you must presuppose the reliability of your senses in order to make an argument about anything, or even to recognize and implement logical laws for that matter? If you agree that the reliability of your senses must be presupposed, could you explain why and how these presuppositions are justified from within the atheistic world view, and thereby establishing that your argument for conventionalism is rational to begin with?

Senses and the reliability thereof have absolutely nothing to do with the conventionalist justification of logic. The justification is not a posteriori, why do you think this is? I’ve outlined precisely how conventionalism is explained so I don’t see where you got this idea from.Also, again, the reliability of my cognitive faculties is not the issue here. That is – if we pursue that avenue instead of the TAG, it seems that you are implicitly conceding that the TAG fails to establish its conclusion and that you now have to attempt to undermine my epistemic reliability.

Nope, I believe you’re ducking the questions, just as I thought you would. The point is this, if you cannot account for the reliability of your senses (which you presuppose), you don’t really know the truth about anything, much less the rationality of your argument for conventionalism.The reliability of your senses is another precondition of intelligibility that simply must be assumed in the atheistic world view, but cannot be accounted for, so since it’s just an assumption, how do you know that you really know the things that you know? So, whether you realize it or not, my questions are very relevant to your argument, and also to your position itself, not directly, but they are relevant none the less.You see, a good world view is internally consistent, a rational world view must be able to account for the preconditions of intelligibility, including the reliability of your senses. As for your argument, I’ve already submitted your articles to Dr. Lisle for further review. I’ll let you know if I get a response.

I’ve not ducked your question, I’ve answered it. You’re attempting to shift the goalposts, we WERE discussing the justification for logic but now you want discuss the reliability of senses. Firstly, It is NOT true that I must presuppose the reliability of my senses before conventionalism can be justified. That is to say, the justification of conventionalism is an a priori justification (no senses involved). And again, the point that I seem to have to keep repeating is that if conventionalism possibly accounts for the laws of logic (you have to show that it can’t!) then the TAG fails. It’s really that simple.I am actually surprised that given my article on conventionalism you would ask something like: “Is it or is it not true that you must presuppose the reliability of your senses in order… to recognize and implement logical laws…” That seems to me to have a rather obvious answer.

On the matter of reliability, if you’re going to ask what constitutes knowledge then you really should define what you mean when you say ‘knowledge’. This issue is going to get quite convoluted, the reliability of the senses has a justification in (1) the existence of an external reality (2) evolution. That is, if an external reality exists, natural selection will favor those creatures which can better navigate their environments. The result is that we have senses which are generally reliable in navigating the external world. So when you say that reliability of senses *cannot* be accounted for by an atheist, that’s just plainly false.

Your paragraph is also kind of diluted, you want to talk about the reliability of my senses and then about things that I know. There is only a connection here if we’re speaking about things I might know in virtue of my senses, that is, facts about the external world. As I’ve said, my senses are not involved in my justification of logic. So it’s clear that the reliability of my senses is not a precondition for ALL types of knowledge, only some. It is not clear, however, that I am in err for relying on them.

I suspect that what you mean to argue is something in line with Plantinga, that if I accept both naturalism and evolution then I have some defeater for my position. You need to make this case though, I won’t make it for you.

No; the reliability of your senses must be presupposed. To state that evolution can somehow account for this is a speculation derived from the presupposition that evolution is true. Also, to even perceive an external reality is done with the presupposition that your ability to perceive is in fact reliable. If you cannot account for the reliability of your senses from within your world view, than you don’t know with certainty that you can actually recognize and implement logical laws.It is true that you must assume the reliability of your senses to even contemplate any argument, and your ability to account for that reliability is foundational to the rationality of your world view.

I also never attempted to define knowledge as the definition of knowledge is not the primary issue; the issue is the justification of your senses actually being reliable enough so that you can in fact really KNOW what you know. It’s also not clear that your NOT in err for relying on them. That’s my point; you don’t really KNOW that you can.

You also made a statement about naturalism, so are you a naturalist or not? If so, I would be glad to explain what I feel is a defeater of that position.

Why must the reliability of my senses be presupposed before I consider a priori matters? This is incoherent.I also fail to see any argument for the fact that my evolutionary explanation of the reliability of the senses is ‘speculation’. I don’t want to turn this into a scientific discussion. I also don’t appreciate you just labeling every claim I make as a presupposition. I made a conditional statement:

” … if an external reality exists, natural selection will favor those creatures which can better navigate their environments. The result is that we have senses which are generally reliable in navigating the external world”

Do you disagree that IF an external reality exists and IF evolution by natural selection occurs, it would favor creatures that can better navigate their environments?

You said: “… to even perceive an external reality is done with the presupposition that your ability to perceive is in fact reliable…”

Why is this true? To perceive an external reality is simply to perceive an external reality. I can perceive an external reality without supposing that my perceptions are reliable. I would a belief similar to “…it seems that I am perceiving X”… while “I am perceiving X” can be false, I cannot see how “… it seems that I am perceiving X” can be false.

You NEED to define what you mean by knowledge because you make statements such as: “…the issue is the justification of your senses actually being reliable enough so that you can in fact really KNOW what you know…”

What do you mean by “knowing?” That is a very important issue.

You have not shown that ALL knowledge relies upon sense experience, in fact, that assertion is just blatantly wrong. Why, then, is this discussion about the reliability of my senses relevant to the justification of conventionalism given that such justification is not an a posteriori manner?

” … if an external reality exists, natural selection will favor those creatures which can better navigate their environments. The result is that we have senses which are generally reliable in navigating the external world”-MitchellLike I said, this statement is made with the presupposition that evolution is true. But even if it were true, that doesn’t mean that having reliable senses equates to a survival value that natural selection would preserve. Things like bacteria and plants have no senses or perceptions; and they manage to survive very well without them. If your claim is that these things evolved as well, than you bear the burden of proof that they in fact did, but then of course we’ll have to get into the discussion of irreducible complexity and irreversible complexity for both, and also how photosynthesis evolved. We then would have to get into how your evidences actually relates to the scientific method. But, you already said that you don’t want to turn this into a scientific discussion.

“Do you disagree that IF an external reality exists and IF evolution by natural selection occurs, it would favor creatures that can better navigate their environments?”-Mitchell.

Yes sir, I disagree.

Also, if evolution were true, we wouldn’t have any reason to believe that our perceptions of the external world actually DO reflect reality, this therefore renders your very argument for conventionalism a non sequitur at best.

What I mean by knowing is simply knowledge gained by use of the senses, two of the most implemented in learning being sight and sound. I think it to be foolish to claim that the attainment of knowledge is accomplished without at least some of your senses. If this can be done, the burden of proof is on you to at least explain how this is possible.

My conditional statement is not made with the presupposition that either the ‘if’ or a ‘then’ is true. I think you need to read up on the nature of conditionals.Further, I am not a scientist nor is my job to tackle the “creationist problems” that have been tackled time and time again by various experts in various scientific fields.

You said: “Also, if evolution were true, we wouldn’t have any reason to believe that our perceptions of the external world actually DO reflect reality, this therefore renders your very argument for conventionalism a non sequitur at best.”

Again, you have not given ANY argument for this statement and for the third time I am now repeating that the conventionalist justification is an A PRIORI justification, sense experience is absolutely irrelevant!

Your definition of knowledge also seem inept for it denies knowledge of ALL a priori truths. The burden is not on me to show that there are a priori truths, it’s on you to show that the “a priori”truths are actually a posteriori. That is absolutely incoherent…

So, I feel the need to focus the conversation yet again. Since it is not the case that the justification of conventionalism requires any empirical support whatsoever, and since you have also not provided any argument showing that my cognitive faculties are unreliable, and further since you’ve only attempted to offer an irrelevant argument regarding knowledge acquired through the senses (of which conventionalism is no such knowledge), why should I accept your claim that conventionalism is incoherent?

Dude, just forget it. It is obvious that you either do not understand the argument, or your avoiding it all together. I also think that we’re operating on two different levels here, you’re aiming to defend your argument, and I’m aiming at your ability to make the argument to begin with by pointing out that your world view cannot account for the other preconditions of intelligibility, and I still don’t believe that you accounted for logical laws, it sounds like all guess work to me, you have also failed to address a lot of my core arguments. So I believe its best to call it quits now before I have 200 posts on my profile over a topic that we’ll never agree on. If you wish to discuss other topics, I’m for it; and I will glad to show you Lisle’s review of your articles if I do in fact get a response from him.

(a) I have authored a paper outlining my criticism against presuppositionalism in such a manner that if my criticisms are sound then Christian Theism cannot possibly account for the laws of logic

(b) I have been challenged, after posting the paper, to account for my preconditions lest my arguments be cast aside

(c) I strongly feel that if my arguments are utilized by the Christian presuppositionalist within the Christian presuppositionalist worldview, and if they are sound, they render the worldview internally incoherent

(d) I strongly feel that if the arguments are utilized in such a manner outlined by (c) and they do establish the conclusion that Christian Theism cannot account for the laws of logic, this conclusion may not be simply dismissed by a statement  that amounts to “Well, yes it does…”

(e) I have, in response to being asked, outlined the conventionalist justification of logic such that even without my first paper, if the justification is internally coherent (and possibly true) the TAG is defeated

(f) I do feel that the conventionalist justification of logic is internally coherent and by proxy, I do believe the TAG to be unsound