But I am not done, as I have pointed out once or twice already.  I had originally intended to write an article about a certain verse in Paul’s letter to the Romans as my next article, but Machen has jumped the gun on me by bringing up Leviticus in his response to my original article about a week ago.  So, I have decided to write my article about Leviticus first.  It draws heavily from, defends, and explains the work of Justin Cannon and William Lindsey, so please bear with me on the extended quotations, and note that this article is any attempt of mine to “try my hand at Greek”.  As I already cleared in a comment with C. L. Bolt, “I have no hand at Greek!”

So, in this article here I will do two things;

1)    I will deal with Machen’s criticism independent of any interpretation of Leviticus.

2)    And, I will offer an interpretation of Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13, in the context of a rebuttal to Machen’s criticism of my interpretation of 1 Timothy.

Now, let’s begin with Machen’s criticism of my article.

His argument centers around the idea that in 1 Timothy, Paul is referring to the Septuagint translation of Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13.  In Leviticus, he claims, the phrase, “arsenos koites”, is used to mean, “lie with a man”.  Seeing as how the compound word, “arsenokoitai”, is used in 1 Timothy, it seems no real stretch to him to suggest that “Paul condemns what Leviticus condemns”.

Unfortunately, this can either help or destroy Machen’s case.  Extraordinary as it may sound, if it is indeed true that Paul is condemning what Leviticus condemns, then it is possible that Leviticus does not condemn homosexuality.  It can go either way. This is going to be the cornerstone of my first argument, though it is just a thought.

Having introduced that concept, let’s review what I said in my previous article with respect to the context of “arsenokoitai” in 1 Timothy.  Machen seems to think that I don’t think “koites” is a sexual term, and criticizes me for it.  Of course, this is completely false.  Not only did I never say any of that, but the sexual nature of “koites” is a fundamental assumption of Cannon’s argument.

Here is what Justin Cannon originally said about 1 Timothy:

Looking closely at 1 Timothy 1:9-10, we can see that there are what I will call ‘structural pairs’ that are reflected below in the English as well as in the Greek–the original language of the New Testament.

1 Timothy 1:9-10 (RSV) – Greek

Row A:	anomoi             kai                          anupotaktoi
Row B:	asebesin           kai                          amartwloi
Row C:	anosioi              kai                          bebhloi
Row D:	patralwai          mhtralwai                androfonoi
Row E:	pornoi              arsenokoitai            andrapodistai
Row F:	yeustai              epiorkoi

As you will notice there seems to be a relationship between the words in each row. The chart below illustrates that the words in each row are either synonyms or closely related in some manner:

Row A:	lawless & disobedient	=  two synonyms
Row B:	ungodly & sinners	=  two synonyms
Row C:	unholy & profane	=  two synonyms
Row D:	murderers of fathers, murderers of mothers, manslayers	= three types of murderers
Row F:	liars & perjurers	=  two synonyms

But what about row E? What do “immoral persons, sodomites, and kidnappers” have in common? To answer this question beyond a shadow of a doubt, we will need to explore the Greek. The three Greek words present in line E are: pornoi (pornoi), arsenokoitai (arsenokoitai), and andrapodistai (andrapodistai).

NOTE: Evidently, WordPress latinized the Greek characters above.

“Arsenokoitai” does not mean “prostitute”.  I never said this.  Row E should be translated like this: “Pornoi” means prostitutes, “arsenokoitai” means those who sleep with prostitutes, and “andrapodistai” refers to the people who kidnap the prostitutes.  this is the conclusion I presented in my previous article.

That pornoi and andrapodistai refer to prostitution is undeniable and near-universally believed.  We can assume, following Paul’s obvious pattern here, that whatever “arsenokoitai” means, it has something to do with prostitution.  I have concluded that it refers to the men who sleep with the prostitutes Paul is talking about here.

Even without having attacked my argument, Machen’s own argument regarding Leviticus is silly.

In my research for this article, I contacted William Lindsey about Machen’s argument via email.  Among other things, he had this to say (my notes are in brackets):

1. He emphasizes repeatedly that Paul’s intent is to condemn “homosexual practice.”  Yet he launches into an argument which focuses exclusively on forbidding male homosexual contact, as if “homosexual practice” is equivalent to male homosexual behavior.  Homosexual women: you have a free pass!

2. He dismisses the powerful and significant argument that Paul uses a neologism in this passage, when koine Greek of his period had specific and well-understood words to describe homosexuality.  And he does so by suggesting that Paul is trying to replicate in Greek a Hebrew phrase; when Paul is writing for and communicating with people who are culturally Greek and not Hebrews at all, for the most part!

This would imply that Paul’s intent is to equate the gospel with Jewish law and custom, something he vehemently works against in writings like Galatians.  Not to mention the fact that nobody would have noticed the reference at all.

But to point out the obvious–that koite often refers to sexual contact in Greek–is really to say nothing at all, nothing significant about this word for his argument.  He seems to think that by making this etymological point he proves that the word refers to homosexual sex when joined with the word “arsenos.”  [Of course, I have already shown what “arsenokoitai” means.  It is not in conflict with Machen’s etymological point here, either, as it definitely would have included homosexual sex.  What Machen does not realize is that it must have been homosexual sex in the context of prostitution, as I said earlier.]

He’s arguing that because Paul was intent on communicating clearly, he adopted a mysterious and totally undefined new word!  And that he did so while addressing a Greek audience, in order to play on an understanding of a Hebrew text with which they were not familiar, because they were culturally Greek and not Hebrew at all.

He’ll have to do far better to build a convincing argument.  If so much hinges on condemning homosexuality, why would the person who thinks that everything hinges on it resort to such intricate, unexpected verbal tactics to communicate a very plain point that could easily have been communicated in the plain Greek that the people to whom he was writing spoke?

But what if Paul really is acting unreasonably?  What if he is making a subtle, unexpected, and obscure reference to the Hebrew Scriptures to communicate a very simple point in his letter to a bunch of Greeks?

Even still, Cannon’s argument would still stand.  I mentioned earlier that Machen’s argument from the similarities between 1 Timothy and Leviticus could either help him or destroy him.  Having shown that they cannot help him, by saying that the meaning of arsenokoitai in 1 Timothy is already absolutely obvious, let’s count the ways it could destroy him.

To be clear, I don’t argue any of the following seriously. I only offer it as an overkill tactic designed to show that even if Machen’s argument is right, it is still useless.  I maintain what I wrote before; that there is probably no connection between Leviticus and 1 Timothy as Machen claims.  But if we were to assume that there is such a connection does exist, all that this shows is that either 1 Timothy means what Leviticus means, or Leviticus means what 1 Timothy means.  Since we can see from Cannon’s argument that Paul is referring to prostitution in 1 Timothy, we can assume that if he is also making a reference to Leviticus in that verse, he also thinks Leviticus refers to prostitution.

This is more than likely not the case, in my opinion.  There are few textual clues in Leviticus that could be construed to support such a conclusion.  However, Mr. Cannon provides an interpretation of Leviticus which may be more reasonable, yet also provide for a connection between it and 1 Timothy.  He says:

Even if we accept the NIV or KJV translations, (KJV: “Thou shalt not lie with a man as with a woman; it is an abomination.”) we still must understand the historical context of how a man laid with a woman, for this is the qualifier of the phrase. Some affirm that this law is quite straightforward. Clearly from the previous sixteen verses, we know that these laws are written to men. Thus, some may say, this law forbids men to “lie with”, or have sex with, other men. This interpretation is flawed as it entirely ignores the phrase “as with a woman.” These four words cannot simply be understood to refer to lying sexually, since that is already indicated in the Hebrew word translated “to lie with.” If the above interpretation were what the author means he could have just written, “Thou shalt not lie with a man; it is an abomination.” 

“As with a woman” must have been added for some reason, and we must understand the context of this law to understand it fully. The status of women in that time was much lower than that of men, and women were even considered property of the men. This belief regarding gender relations is rejected by most of the Christian church today, but in order to make sense of this specific Jewish law we must keep in mind this context in which it was written.

Rabbi Arthur Waskow explains, “The whole structure of sexuality in the Torah assumes a dominant male and a subordinate female.”⁴ In other words, women were obedient to men, and men in that time would have been dominating and controlling in sexual encounters. The woman did what the man wanted and how the man wanted it. For a man in a sexual encounter to be treated in that way, within the Jewish culture of the time, the man would have be taking a lower status, as well as being sexually dominated and controlled. To do so would have been reducing him to property and in effect defiling the image of God, which man was considered in that culture. This, however, is exactly how men would have treated the male temple prostitutes—in a controlling and abusive manner, and also is how individuals would have been treated in the sacred sexual orgies with which Baal was worshiped. They would have lied with other men “as with a woman.”

What I find valuable in this interpretation is that the manner in which a man would have sex with a male prostitute, as in 1 Timothy, is exactly how a man “lies with a woman”!  It is a controlling, aggressive, dominant sort of act; one which would reduce the male prostitute to the role of a woman.  So if we accept Justin Cannon’s interpretation of Leviticus, we should also be able to accept Machen’s argument by showing it to be the case in 1 Timothy as well.

In my completely unprofessional opinion, I might point to Cannon’s English translations of the original texts, and offer another possible interpretation:

“And with a male you shall not lay lyings of a woman.”

Right off the bat I think this is telling men not to submit themselves sexually to other men, i.e., don’t be the bottom guy in the relationship.  I can’t say for sure, as I have no formal education in Jewish cultural history, but I might think this was intended as a precaution for the men of Israel not to submit themselves in any way, simply for the sake of Israel.  This seems like an issue of national or tribal pride, which would make sense in the context of Leviticus, which is full of rituals and customs designed to separate Israel from the surrounding races, so as to set God’s own apart.  But that is just a thought.  I say it only as a suggestion.

And that concludes my rebuttal to Machen and my interpretations of Leviticus.  I have provided the really convincing argument that there is no realistic connection between 1 Timothy and Leviticus, and then offered a further argument just in case Machen continues to assert that there is such a connection.  I will clarify, at this point, that I have judged the initial “choice” on the question of whether or not there is a connection between 1 Timothy and Leviticus to be easily decided by logic.  I believe that there is no connection as I stated earlier.  My second major point, indeed, the second half of this paper, is really “just in case”.  In this way, I think I’ve thoroughly dealt with 1 Timothy, and Machen’s objection to my interpretation of it, but I have not given Leviticus the treatment it deserves.  I have offered nothing but a hypothetical interpretation of Leviticus, and so I may decide to write a more thorough article later on it to do it justice.  As for 1 Timothy, I will only say that I do not enjoy repeating myself.  Don’t make me.

On the contrary, were it not for these modern Christians and their homophobia, I would never have guessed that homosexuality was in any way wrong or “abominable”.  And if I spoke ancient Greek, I daresay I would not think it ‘obvious’ that these passages refer to homosexuality at all!

Now, the subject of homosexuality and the Bible is vast, and I could not hope to cover it in one simple post.  Here, I will be discussing homosexuality and 1 Timothy 1:9-10.  Practically speaking, I can develop a much more detailed and concrete idea of this topic if I spend an entire essay exploring just one verse.  Moreover, there is much to be said about this verse in particular, so I could not possibly be left at a loss for words. (NOTE: I make several references to a similar verse in 1 Corinthians in this paper. I will handle that verse later in an essay like this)

To begin, let’s read over the actual verse below, taken from the King James Version:

“Knowing this, that the law is not made for a righteous man, but for the lawless and disobedient, for the ungodly and for sinners, for unholy and profane, for murderers of fathers and murderers of mothers, for manslayers, For whoremongers, for them that defile themselves with mankind, for menstealers, for liars, for perjured persons, and if there be any other thing that is contrary to sound doctrine.”  1 Timothy 1:9-10

Now, the Greek word translated as, “them that defile themselves with mankind”, is “arsenokoitai”.

In English bibles, this word is usually translated as being a reference to homosexuals. However, this is far from clear.  (NOTE: It has not been given a Strong Number because it is a made-up word not found in the Greek language other than in 1 Timothy and 1 Corinthians.)

It is a compound word, formed from two well-known and well-precedented words; “arsen“, meaning “male”, and “koitai“, meaning “beds”. We might suspect, then, that Paul is not writing about “them that defile themselves with mankind”.  If he was, he would have used the word “paideraste“, which was the standard Greek word for people who engaged in any male-male sexual behavior.

Moreover, of all the ancient homoerotic Greek texts and stories, of which many thousands remain, “arsenokoitai” is never used (see here). From this, it is abundantly clear that Paul is not referring to homosexuality.  Instead, since he had to invent a word here, we can say that Paul is referring to something which had no name in the Greek language; so unless it can be shown that he had some overriding need to invent new words for something the Greeks already had a word for, we cannot assume this verse refers to homosexuals.

Yet while this understanding shows that Paul is not referring to homosexuality, it leaves the question open: What exactly is he referring to?

A scholar by the name of Justin Cannon has provided an interesting analysis of this passage. He noticed a syntactical pattern in this verse, composed of pairs or triads of related groups of people:

1. The lawless & disobedient: two near synonyms
2. The ungodly & sinners: also two near synonyms
3. The unholy & profane: two synonyms
4. The murderers of fathers & murderers of mothers & manslayers: three kinds of murderers
5. Whoremongers & “arsenokoitai” & menstealers: presumably, three related words.
6. Liars & perjurers etc.: again, two near synonyms.

From the repeated pairs or triads made up of synonyms or near synonyms, one might expect that whoremongers, “arsenokoitai” and meanstealers are either synonyms, or interconnected by a particular theme.  (Refer to Cannon’s actual study at the link above for a more academic analysis.)

In the original Greek, the first of the three words is “pornov.” An online Greek lexicon notes that this is Strong’s Number 4205, and was derived from the Greek word “pernemi” which means to sell. Its meanings are:

1. A man who prostitutes his body to another’s lust for hire.
2. A male prostitute.
3. A man who indulges in unlawful sexual intercourse, a fornicator.

The second term is “arsenokoitai” which is Strong’s Number 733, though it is a made-up word not found in the Greek language other than in 1 Timothy and 1 Corinthians.

The last of the three words is “andrapodistes,” the stem of the word “andrapodistai”. It is Strong’s Number 405, which means:

“A slave-dealer, kidnapper, man-stealer — one who unjustly reduces free men to slavery or who steals the slaves of others and sells them.”

If we assume that the three words are either (nearly) synonymous or particularly interconnected, as the other five groups are, then we have to look for some sense in which the words refer to a common theme. Cannon suggests:

1. “pornoi” refers to an enslaved male prostitute.
2. “arsenokoitai” refers to a man who sleeps with an enslaved male prostitute
3. “andrapodistes” refers to a person who enslaves men for said prostitution.

Cannon’s theory of structural pairs is exceptionally convincing, as the whole of scripture is full of patterned and easily memorized verses. The thing reeks of order and complexity, and right here we have an outstanding example of it!  From a literary standpoint, Cannon’s analysis is matchless.

Additionally, this passage in Timothy and its counterpart in Corinthians have only very recently been construed as denouncing homosexuality. It has traditionally, and universally, been thought to refer to masturbation. Even anti-homosexual bible scholars such as Martin Luther and John Calvin interpreted this word “arsenokoitai” in both Timothy and 1 Corinthians as referring to masturbators. Indeed, the Catholic Church too, actively preached that it referred to masturbation up until the 1970′s, when society generally began to accept masturbation as not sinful and this interpretation became hard to believe.

I suspect it might be a result of the practice of celibacy that the Catholic Church is so opposed to the idea that masturbators would go to Hell…

What I consider to be the greatest weakness of Fedora’s assessment is its shameless association of the Bible and God; this assumption that the God of the Bible and the God of reality (indeed, of history) are of one mind.  I’m not saying I don’t believe they’re one and the same, but it’s an important distinction to make, insofar as we are judging the strength of Fedora’s argument.  We can say, first of all, that;

1.) The God of the Bible may not be the God of history

Right off the bat, we can see one of these ‘presuppositions’ as he calls them, which greatly damages the utility of his argument.  See, it only applies to people who would associate the God of the Bible with the God of history so fundamentally as his argument does.

Allow me to make myself clearer; this argument might only shake your faith if you believe God “does many things which all sane humans consider immoral”.  Of course this is the case, as Fedora is arguing modus ponens, but I should like to point out that this is a very big ‘if’ indeed.  If I wanted to be extreme, I would say there are no Christians at all who believe this.  But that may or may not be true, so I leave it there.

Here is an example:

“In any modern society, the expectation of a parent is not to require a sacrifice from their children after a wrong doing (Jesus).”

Now, I’m not sure if Fedora is getting at something Jesus actually said or forbade, as I’m not familiar with the story (maybe it doesn’t exist! I’m skeptical), but that’s beside the point.  He blows his own argument out of the water when he mentions ‘modern society’.  If Jesus did say such a thing, then I could say He was making a suggestion or teaching relative to those times.  In those days, such things were perhaps more understandable, I would not know.  In any case, such things are silly now, so we should consider whether this particular teaching is relative.

Or — and maybe this is the right way to go — should we appraise our ‘modern society’ for its expectations, and decide for ourselves whether we are justified in not expecting children to make sacrifices for their wrongdoing?  Who is right, Jesus or ‘modern society’?  Who is right, the God of the Bible, or “all sane humans”? I make no answer, but Fedora’s argument actually hinges on such questions. (the trouble lies in his 4th premise)

If he answers ‘modern society’, or ‘all sane humans’, hasn’t he begged the question in his article?  He can’t assume God is already wrong in order to prove it to be so.

Now, to continue to our second point, let’s ask ourselves, “Why does the Bible contain seemingly-mythic tales of mankind’s encounters with a wrathful God?” Are these tales meant to be histories, or moral lessons?  Fedora addresses this point himself, when he considers a ‘metaphorical’ Garden of Eden.  But he makes it sound like the acceptance of just one or two things as metaphor will bring down the whole faith!  Let’s make a second point:

2.) One can accept the whole Bible as infallible even if one were to accept some parts as metaphor.

(I’m not going to address Fedora’s assumptions about original sin.  He has got it all wrong, and I don’t care to correct him.)

The whole question of “Fact VS Metaphor” isn’t blasphemy.  A lot of the stories of God’s wrath are intended to teach people not to disobey Him.  It hardly matters whether they actually happened or not, in my opinion.

God does not violate His own laws.  If you get to thinking this, you have misunderstood the moral of the story, which is to say, you do not understand God’s laws.

Indeed, having said that, we might as well get to the third and final weakness of Fedora’s argument:

3.)  There is a difference between goodness and justice.

Christians hold it as a matter of fact that we are all sinners.  Secondly, we believe that all sinners deserve death.

And that is the key.

Why would we even care about the times God gave us what we deserved?  In the story of the Flood, the Bible very clearly points out that people were wicked! And I believe it! God does not do what all sane humans consider to be immoral. Ever.  He has only given us the hellfire we deserve.

This has always been a matter of great personal annoyance for me.  Why is it that we complain that “bad things happen to good people”, when there are no good people?  Why don’t we complain when good things happen to bad people, which is to say, every one of us?  Clearly, this is not justice!

Indeed, when we think bad things happen to good people, we say God is horrible, but when good things happen to bad people, we call it mercy.  We should stop thinking that one is good and one is bad. They are both two sides of the same coin.

So to conclude, Fedora’s argument hinges on questions which he either leaves unanswered, or he only barely understands.  His argument only applies to people who read the Bible in such a way as to see God as a maniacal tyrant, i.e. Richard Dawkins and all the street-preachers of Canada.  Therefore, as I believe none of these things, Fedora’s argument does not apply to me.  It could be the case that the humans in his fourth premise are simply mistaken, or it could be that these supposed transgressions on the part of the divine are merely metaphor.  I would say both.  We are mistaken about a great many moral issues.  Not only do we behave immorally, but we believe and decide incorrectly.  We must always remember who is omniscient, and who is perfect, here.  Furthermore, God has not actually done all these things some might say He has.  He has adhered to His own ethical facts rather perfectly, I might say.  And that is enough to dismiss Fedora’s assessment.

This article is a response to an article by Bolt, which was a direct response to Dawson Bethrick. I am not addressing the post specifically, but rather the assertion that inductive reasoning must presuppose the Christian God.

This is an assertion based upon Chris Bolt’s presuppositionalist worldview and makes the claim that non-Christian worldviews cannot account for the uniformity of nature and as such, cannot justify their use of inductive reasoning. For those unfamiliar, the uniformity of nature (or rather the principle of the uniformity of nature) states that “the future will resemble the past” and is used in inductive reasoning to make statements such as “The Sun will rise tomorrow”.

Before I move on, I should outline for those who are unfamilar, the differences between Deductive and Inductive reasoning.

A deductive argument is that where the truth of the conclusion follows necessarily from previous premises.

Example:

1. All men are mortal

2. Mitch is a man

3. Therefore, Mitch is a mortal

(3) follows logically and inescapably from (1) and (2).

An inductive argument is probabilistic:

(1) Almost all men from Canada speak English

(2) Mitch is from Canada

(3) Therefore, Mitch speaks English

Whereas in a deductive argument it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false (provided the argument is valid/sound), in an inductive argument the premises may be correct and the conclusion false.

It is proposed that scientific reasoning is largely inductive in nature, moving from specifics (observing white swans repeatedly) and drawing conclusion for the whole (there are no black swans). In doing so, Science would invoke the principle of the uniformity of nature, presuming that in certain circumstances the future will resemble the past. For example, because the sun has risen everyday in the past, it is probable that it will rise tomorrow. Though it is, of course, possible that the sun may not.

Bolt, and all presuppositionalists seems to be very skeptical of inductive reasoning (or at least, Godless inductive reasoning) and they owe this skepticism to the likes of Bertrand Russell and David Hume as both of these philosophers raised important skeptical questions about the usage of inductive reasoning. But since they have raised such issues, there has been ample response to the so called “problems of induction” from the philosophical community.

Someone skeptical of inductive reasoning might state that there are no strong inductive arguments or go even further to suggest that all inductive arguments are equal and none are “better/stronger” than any other. For example, an inductive skeptic might say that it is no more probable that the sun will rise tomorrow because it has in the past, than that it will not. Blanket claims may be made further, stating that inductive reasoning is actually irrational!

Many inductive skeptics in the past have agreed that if we can make certain assumptions about the world, such as the uniformity of nature), then inductive reasoning could be justified. However, these same skeptics assert that these assumptions cannot be made without justification and to justify them would assume inductive reasoning outright.

According to philosopher Michael Martin:

On the standard interpretation of Hume that Bahnsen [a presuppositionalist scholar] accepted, Hume is supposed to have shown that probabilistic arguments — what I characterized above as inductive arguments– are unjustified. However, it is open to question that Hume held this modern view. A detailed analysis of Hume’s works has shown that by “probabilistic argument” Hume meant a certain type of deductive argument. Hume believed that all such arguments presuppose the uniformity of nature, but he did not attempt to show that probabilistic arguments in the modern sense are unjustified. Thus, appeals to Hume prove very little about whether inductive, that is, probabilistic arguments, are justified.

To claim that inductive reasoning is outright irrational, largely depends on what one defines as “rational”. Indeed, many philosophers have argued that the “problem of induction” is to simply be done away with, not requiring a solution. Philosophers such as Strawson and Edwards have further argued that the problem of induction rests on linguistic confusions rather than a sound philosophical basis. Further, as Martin states, philosophers Gemes goes on to say that inductive skepticism can be reduced into absurdity and that the position of inductive skepticism cannot be coherently formulated and should not be taken seriously.

Presuppositionalist literature, specifically the writings of Bahnsen, do not directly answer any of the above criticisms of inductive skepticism. Though, to his credit, Bahnsen cites many writings of Russell on the subject, but the very passages he cites have been pointed out to be confusion on Russell’s part by philosopher Frederick Wills in his “Will the Future be like Past?”

Of course there is even debate in the philosophical community as to whether or not science does actually presuppose a justification of induction and whether or not in doing so, there can be a pragmatic vindication. As Reichenbach says, “If there are any true inductive generalizations, the consistent use of induction will discover them in the long run.”

The point is made further, that one should simply continue to use induction until it refutes itself by E. H. Madden, “One uses induction because it makes getting through life easier and although we don’t know whether induction will continue to have this effect, the only way to discover if it will is to continue to use it.”

As such, it is clear and evident that unlike Bahnsen and most presuppositionalists would have you believe, the issue of inductive skepticism is far from settled. As philosopher Michael Martin suggests, it’s still an open question in philosophy and until the issue of inductive skepticism has been settled (on either side of the issue), the assertion that induction is somehow clearly open to challenge and that science is impossible without it remain completely in doubt.

But of course, if inductive skepticism is valid, it effects not only a non-Christian worldview but the Christian worldview as well! Christianity must provide a justification for the use of inductive reasoning just as any other worldview must.

Christianity claims to have a guarantee to the uniformity of nature. But how can this be when Christian apologists themselves says that it is possible that God may have morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil in the world. Can we not then conclude, for example, that God may have morally sufficient reason for allowing a hurricane or other natural disaster and we are just in the dark as to the justification?

Now suppose further that the very uniformities of nature will fail to hold in the future. As Martin illustrates, imagine that after the year 1998 all the emeralds in the world will be blue and all rubies will be green. Insofar as God could have morally sufficient reasons for a natural disaster, he could have sufficient reasons for causing such a departure from the normal. Just as we can account for all the evil in the world by appealing to God’s sufficient reasons, so too could the same apply for any departure from a preconceived uniformity of nature!

Simply because we do not know of any such departures God has made in the past, does not necessitate he will not do them in the future. This wouldn’t even be a deception on the part of God (as Bolt might protest) as he never assured us that our expectations about the future would be true.

In response to the above point, Greg Bahnsen (and presumably most other presuppositionalists) appeal to passages in their Scriptures to justify belief in the uniformity of nature. One such being Gen. 8. 20-22 wherein God said to Noah that He would continue the seasons. In response, Martin outlines four basic problems with scriptural appeals such as this.

Firstly, why suppose that the passages are true? Why suppose that Noah was even real, and why suppose that he made a covenant with God to continue the seasons?

Secondly, what of the interpretation of the passage? Should we interpret it to mean that nature will be uniform in the usual sense? Surely all the seasons can be continued with huge changes in the uniformity of nature. Winter may come and snow could be green, in Spring flowers could have no smell and Summer could bring us some pink grass! God does not say in detail how he would continue the seasons.

Third, Martin presses further, God’s promise is compatible with inductive chaos in most of the Universe. God says “that while the earth remains, seed time and harvest, cold and heat, summer and winter, day and night, shall not cease” (Gen 8. 22) and this passage shows no incompatibility with a state of affairs in which the present laws of nature do not hold outside of the Earth. So while the Earth may remain as God said, what of elsewhere in the Universe?

Lastly, why must we suppose that God would keep his covenant with Noah? There is no inconsistency with God breaking a promise so long as he has morally sufficient reason to do so. Furthermore, what if God is not responsible for the failure of the uniformity of nature but rather Satan is! Perhaps Satan decided to work his evil by bringing inductive chaos into the world, and God does not interfere because he does not want to deprive Satan of his free will.

So with inductive skepticism still an issue that is hotly debated and for all intents, “up in the air”, why should we presume the issue settled at all, much less settled with a Christian worldview. It is evident that even if we are to accept that there is an inherent problem in inductive reasoning, it does not follow that a Christian worldview allows us to leave this problem behind. Furthermore, as is the case with many presuppositionalist assertions, even if the Christian worldview must be assumed to make sense of X it does not follow that it is true.

Urbanphilosophy.net

Debate: Is the Triune God of the Scriptures the basis for knowledge?

Affirmative: RazorsKiss

Negative: MitchLeBlanc

RazorsKiss:

1. Introduction

• 1. I’d like to thank Mitch, and all the folks at Urban Philosophy, for hosting the debate this evening, and I’d like to compliment Mitch for his willingness to debate such vital issues. I am no sort of scholar – which I admit – but I would also be the first to tell anyone present that the pursuit of knowledge is something which every human being should be engaged. Where my opponent and I differ, I do believe, is how to properly go about doing just that! I hope and pray that those who watch this discussion will at least take in what they see, and examine it, as the Bereans did in Acts. My earnest desire is that those who watch this exchange will be edified, educated at some point, and perhaps able to more correctly understand where I, at least, am coming from.
• 2. First, the resolution. As I am the affirmative, I get the pleasure of the definition! “The Triune God of Scripture is the proper ground for all knowledge.” I firmly hold to the validity of this proposition, and further, to its ability to explain all of reality as an epistemological basis. For, you see, I’m a Christian. Christians, per their own Scripture, must be humble. They must not be proud, or haughty – or look down at others from their pedestal of superiority. As a Christian, I fully realize that of myself – I’m no different from any other man alive. I share the same Image, which I am created to reflect – and I share the same nature. A human nature. I am a creature – the product of the pinnacle of workmanship of the Creator of all things.
• 3. Since I am a creature, I do not need to be concerned about being my own basis. I need no such concern as a chair needs no such concern about its basis. It has a Creator, as do I! As a Christian, there is a fundamental difference in my thinking – and if I am correct, there is a fundamental problem with the way the entire world thinks about the basis for their own knowledge. I have heard the claim to “arrogance” before. If I ever state something on my own behalf, I will grant that such an accusation is justified. Should I comport myself rudely, as if I am superior, or as if I think myself to be who I am because I am somehow higher – I request that you point this out. However, as a creature – I claim to have a basis for my knowledge which is utterly higher, and transcendently greater than I, or any other human being can ever hope to be.
• 4. Since my claim is not based on myself, but upon a self-revelation from the Triune God described in Scripture – the claim in this case is on the behalf of another. It is conceivable I suppose, to call a perfect Being arrogant for claiming to be your Creator; to own you and the dust of the earth man was formed from It is another thing to assert that His claim to ownership is unwarranted. If what I say is true – God owns you. He owns me. He owns every particle of matter, every joule of energy; established every law we think in accordance with, and ordained every law which governs the world we exist in, at His good pleasure. In short, ladies and gentlemen; if I am correct – and God did do what His Word reveals Him to have accomplished – then every possible foundation for every way of thinking not in accordance with His perfect ordinance is utter, absolute folly.
• 5. My intent is to demonstrate that there is no other epistemological basis that can possibly compare to that possessed by a Christian holding the self-revelation of the Triune God. My goal is to show that any worldview attempting to argue from other than the Christian foundation is, in fact, borrowing from that foundation to do so. That any worldview asserting some sort of “objective” basis for the laws of logic specifically, but for nature and morality as well – is pure subjectivism wrapped up in an objective shell consisting of concepts stolen from their Creator. Concepts like universals. Universals which are abstract, binding, have inherent meaning, and apply to every person – whether they like them to, or WANT them to or not. They apply nonetheless.
• 6. Without the assumption of these universals, there is no coherent communication possible We assume that when we speak, there is a being we are speaking to, with corresponding cognitive processes, having the ability to reason, and possessing the capacity to make conclusions, based upon our communication with them. I have yet to see an epistemological basis which accounts for universals in any satisfying manner. I have a Guarantor which is self-existent, self-sufficient, able to communicate, omnipotent, omniscient, immutable, and sovereign. This grounds for our epistemology, I argue, is the only proper one.
• 2) Epistemology
• 1. When we encounter words like “epistemology”, there is a tendency to make them mysterious – to make it something only the initiated can truly understand. I disagree. Epistemology is the subject at hand every time a child asks you “why”. This endless chain of questions will eventually have a terminator. Where those questions end is where I think you’ll find your epistemological foundation. Why do we know what we know? How do we know? How is this knowledge acquired? What is this knowledge? On what basis do we know it? By what standard? On what (or whose) authority? Those questions are the realm of our discussion.
• 2. “The method of reasoning by presupposition may be said to be indirect, rather than direct. The issue between believers and nonbelievers in Christian theism cannot be settled by a direct appeal to “facts” or “laws” whose nature and significance is already agreed upon by both parties to the debate. The question is rather as to what the final reference point required to make the “facts” and “laws” intelligible. The question is as to what the “facts” and “laws” really are.’ (Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 122) As is said elsewhere, by the same author; “We cannot ask how we know without at the same time asking what we know.” (Van Til, Van Til’s Apologetic, 105) In other words – the question of epistemology is central to any consideration of rational discourse. What, how, and why do you know? To go elsewhere before this is addressed, is to beg the question in the favour of your own epistemology.
• 3. So, to answer that question, we are discussing the deep things of knowledge – in fact, we are discussing whether what we think we know, is truly knowledge at all. Still further, we are questioning everything we think is a justification for the knowledge we claim to hold. Since, as Scripture says, I have “the full assurance of understanding, {resulting} in a true knowledge of God’s mystery, {that is,} Christ {Himself,}in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge” – I can say, with perfect certainty, that the Triune God of Scripture is not only the proper grounds for all knowledge – but the only possible grounds for all knowledge! I will develop that further in my statement tonight, but my goal is to demonstrate that any epistemology not grounded in that self-existent, self-sufficient perfection of Being is utterly insufficient grounds for knowledge.
• 3) Proper Epistemology
• 1. First, let me remind my opponent, and my audience, that there are no brute facts. Facts are not neutral entities, and they cannot be interpreted in a neutral fashion. This is because facts can only exist in relation to other facts; further, without exception these are interpreted with reference to still other facts. This shows knowledge is interrelated and further shows that facts cannot be interpreted outside of your epistemology, which is a network of assumptions that the one holding that worldview considers to be true.
• 2. Therefore, as philosophers, we have to consider the meaning of the facts – or the concepts – we examine. Those meanings are inseparable from our epistemological foundation. When we think about anything, we are forced to place it into our interpretive grid. We judge all facts through the “prism of our epistemology”, in fact. Here is where I get to the heart of my position.
• 3. As a Christian, I have two axiomatic, interrelated foundations for my epistemology, and for everything else I encounter through the grid of that epistemology. The Triune God of Scripture – who created the universe and all it contains; who established and even now maintains the laws which govern that creation. That is foundation one.
• 4. The self-revelation of that self-existent, self-conscious, self-sufficient, omniscient, omnipotent, all-wise, immutable, eternal, and sovereign God; The Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, are the self-communication of the extent, nature, and specifics of His eternal properties – which are the guarantor of the laws and assumptions which we, as creatures in the image of that God, require to operate rationally and coherently. That is foundation 2.
• 5. From those two foundations, I am able to make a rational examination of the facts I encounter, while having warrant for the knowledge I possess. Christians have the privilege of certainty. A certainty based on the most fundamental guarantor of truth. Further, as a Christian, my claim is necessarily exclusive. By the same logical laws we all recognize to be applicable, for whatever reason, a proposition cannot be true when the contrary of that proposition is true. Given Christianity’s exclusive claim – its claim to a self-existent, self-sufficient, universal, and absolute standard – any claimant contrary to Christian epistemology is therefore denied by definition.
• 6. From the position of Christian epistemology, there is more than ample justification to hold the true beliefs we hold. There is self-existence, which then guarantees all contingent existence. There is omnipotence, which can guarantee the absolute authority of God over all His creation, including willing and thinking creatures. There is the omniscience and self-knowledge of God, which guarantees that what His creatures can know is intelligible – that creatures can, in fact, derivatively know the facts about His creation, and those facts that He reveals about Himself. There is the internal “sense”, that Calvin calls the “sensus divinitatus,” which all men possess, as image-bearers of their Creator – and which allow them to recognize the God that they even sometimes deny.
• 7. However, this leads us to a question. Can someone without the axioms that Christians hold “know” anything? As defined, no. They can’t. They do not have a justification for their beliefs. However, they themselves do have true beliefs – which do, in many cases, result in success. In a sense, they do have knowledge. Not because of their epistemology – but despite it. In these cases, they are simply creatures forced to admit that despite the incoherence of their epistemology, they do, in fact, know things anyway.
• 4) The Impossibility of the Contrary
• 1. So, now we get to where the rubber meets the road. If I claim that non-Christians can have knowledge at all, even if it is faulty knowledge – doesn’t my argument fall apart? I don’t think this is necessitated. What the Christian position alone can guarantee is any contribution to knowledge whatsoever. “However, the presuppositionalist maintains that the unbeliever can come to know certain things (despite his espoused rejection of God’s truth) for the simple reason that he does have revealed presuppositions – and cannot but have them as a creature made in God’s image and living in God’s created world. Although he outwardly and vehemently denies the truth of God, no unbeliever is inwardly and sincerely devoid of the knowledge of God. It is not a saving knowledge of God to be sure, but even as condemning knowledge natural revelation still provides a knowledge of God. Thus, according to Biblical epistemology, while men deny their Creator they nevertheless possess an inescapable knowledge of Him; and because they know God (even though they know Him in curse and reprobation) they are able to attain a limited understanding of the world.” (Bahnsen, Always Ready, pg38)
• 2. What my claim really entails is that an unbeliever, trying to start from a position of epistemic autonomy, is like a child who sits on his father’s lap – and uses that position for the purpose of slapping his father in the face. The fundamental disconnect I see in secular epistemology (and Christians who use that same epistemology) is the universal lack of a solution from unbelieving philosophy for problems like that of induction, the one and the many, whether the will is free, and the like. Christianity has an answer for these – provided the Christian answers them from Scriptural revelation, and does not adopt the same principles that unbelieving philosophy does. It is even more so a problem for the unbeliever – because he doesn’t even have (not always asserted, but always present to some degree) the epistemological foundation of the Christian. An unbelieving man has no justification for his predication. He has no basis for his use of logical laws. After all, wherefore and whence do these laws get their justification? There is no area in which his thoughts, ideas or concepts can be said to be properly grounded. With feet planted firmly in midair, he asserts his autonomy over his own thinking, and his self-sufficiency for the use of that thinking!
• 3. This thinking is dangerous – to the unbeliever, and to everyone else. It is little more than, as many assert, self-worship. If the unbeliever thinks he is the ultimate, not simply the immediate basis for epistemology – I see no possible way for that assertion to be justified. (The unbeliever) “thinks that his thinking process is normal. He thinks that his mind is the final court of appeal in all matters of knowledge. He takes himself to be the reference point for all interpretation of the facts. That is, he has epistemologically become a law unto himself: autonomous.” (Always Ready, 46) It is like the famous (and farcical) story of the scientists who discover how to create life from common dirt! Excited, they suddenly stop – A voice challenges them – “I doubt you can.” “All right, then” (say the scientists) – “we will!” As they pick up shovels, they stop again, as the voice says “No, no. Get your own dirt.” This is what reasoning is like without the foundation of God’s self-existence, known through His self-revelation. It is a man trying to justify his “own” knowledge – when everything he encounters – including himself, belongs to God. The very idea is utterly absurd. Since it is impossible to have knowledge on any other basis, save that of God’s intrinsic nature and self-communication of the properties of that nature – it is impossible for any human system of reasoning to have justification at all. In short, Christianity’s epistemology is the only epistemology possible – because it’s impossible to have any other coherent, true, and justified basis for thought, perception, knowledge, or understanding of ourselves, or the creation in which we dwell.

MitchLeBlanc:

Before I begin, I must tell you that I will be making use of philosophical arguments, in the form of syllogisms. This may be new for a few of you, in which case I invite you to follow along as best you can.

In our discussion this evening, RK will attempt to show that the very foundations of knowledge depend upon the Christian God and that any reasoning which does not presuppose the Christian God is arbitrary and descents into absurdity. RK’s position states that I enter into to reasoned discourse with my own set of presuppositions that exclude the Christian God. In doing so, the internal consistency of my logical system fails and as such does my ability to accept God’s existence, since my presuppositions limit what I will accept as evidence. Does this mean I cannot reason? No, presuppositionalists do not assert this, however, they do assert that my use of reason is contingent on their God and I am just wilfully ignorant to his existence.

First, as with any discussion of this type we need a solid definition of God. RK asserts that the Christian God is the basis for all knowledge, but what IS the Christian God? How can we define it?

There is a clear ontological error in the proposition of God. It is proposed that the Christian God is supernatural. I am unsure as to how one is supposed to interpret this description of God. This is not a positive definition, but a negative definition. “supernatural” or “immaterial” tells us what God is not (natural/material). Something that can only be explained in negative terms, is meaningless.  The very definition of “being” is to have attributes, this requires more than simply non-attributes. Furthermore, the proposed positive attributes of God fail in execution. The positive attributes we apply to God are simply attributes which apply to human beings, we just extrapolate them. Human beings can be loving, but god is all-loving. Human beings can know, but god is all-knowing. How can we know that God (whatever it may be) is even capable of love, or knowledge.

As the Philosopher George Smith explains:

“All of the supposedly positive qualities of God arise in a distinctively human context of finite existence, and when wrenched from this context to apply to a supernatural being, they cease to have meaning.”

 But the problem is direr than that, consider when I ask “What is a banana?”… giving me answers of the characteristics of the banana don’t do much to help me. Hearing that it is long, yellow, soft doesn’t do provide any cognitive meaning whatsoever. Smith again says (with unie representing a variable needing definition):

“To say that an ‘unie’ possesses wisdom in proportion to its nature-while stipulating that such wisdom is different in kind from man’s wisdom and that the nature of an ‘unie’ is unknowable-contributes nothing to our understanding of ‘unie’ or to the meaning

of the attributes when applied to an ‘unie.’

To say that God is ‘good’ or ‘wise’ is to say nothing more than some unknowable being possesses some unknown qualities in an unknowable way.”

It simply does not seem that there is any cognitive meaning associated with purporting the term “God”. To purport that god is infinite, limitless and immaterial tells us what God is not, and never verges on explaining what he is.

With this issue established and set aside for the sake of furthering the discussion, let me move on to the crux of issue. What will be henceforth be referred to as the “Transcendental Argument for God” or TAG.

While I do not consider the transcendental argument an actual argument in the form presented (it appears more as a bare assertion), we must understand precisely what is being said.

When it is said that logic presupposes God it is meant that A presupposes B in the sense that we could not reason A without assuming B. However, it is important to note that even if to make sense of A one must assume B, it does not follow that B is true.

The Philosopher Michael Martin gives the following example:

“if I am trying to communicate to an audience by speaking to them in English, my action makes no sense unless they understand English. But it does not follow that they do. They might only understand Chinese. Scientists listening to radio signals from outer space in order to make contact with extraterrestrial life presuppose that such life is possible. But it does not follow that it is. Similarly… if the Christian worldview is presupposed by the deductive validity, it does not follow that the Christian worldview is true. It might be the case that deductive validity is a myth. TAG would not establish the truth of the Christian worldview but only the inconsistency of atheists who presuppose deductive validity.”

I think the example is clear enough, but it should be noted once more. TAG cannot establish the truth of God’s existence, only the inconsistency of atheists who hold a presupposition regarding deductive logic.

There is another manner in which the TAG asserts presuppositionalism. We have seen the first, that A presupposes B in that one cannot make sense of A without B.. but consider:

A presupposes B meaning that A logically implies B. This means that if A presupposes B, one cannot assert the truth of A and deny B.

An example is: giving birth to a human child presupposes being a woman, meaning it is inconsistent to claim that someone is giving birth to a human child but not a woman.

So we currently have two possibilities regarding the manner of how logic presupposes the Christian God.

• 1. A presupposes B in that one cannot make sense of A without assuming B.
• 2. A presupposes B in that A logically implies B and thus it is inconsistent to assert A and deny B.

With regard to (1) I shall show that we can make sense of deductive validity without belief in the Christian God.

As for (2) I do not see any contradiction in denying that Christianity is true and affirming the validity of the law of non-contradiction.

The Law of non-contradiction states that something cannot be both P and not P at the same time. (your pants cannot be both on and off simultaneously. To apply this to the TAG would be as follows:

A presupposes B in that A logically implies B and thus it is inconsistent to assert A and deny B

=The law of non-contradiction(A) presupposes the Christian God(B) in that (A) logically implies(B) and thus it is inconsistent to assert (A) and deny (B).

I do not see any absurdity in denying God and affirming the law of non-contradiction. Cleary doing so is not the same as denying that one who bears a child is a woman. Perhaps RK can show how this is absurd.

To that point RK may argue that the logical principles are dependent on God. If this is true, logical principles are contingent and not necessary. To this effect, I am almost certain that a presuppositionalist would argue that the logic is an intrinsic part of God’s nature and as such, logic is necessary. From this, it would be stated that since the principles of Logic are necessarily part of God’s nature, if God did not exist there would be no logic and subsequently no Law of Non-Contradiction. Following this line of reasoning, it would be absurd for me to deny God’s existence and affirm the law of non-contradiction.

First, one should be aware of the claim that logic is part of God’s nature. What does it mean to say this? We must first remember that:

God is defined as being supernatural. That is to say “Supernatural” is defined as being beyond nature (not natural). This is a negative definition and a broken concept. There is a fallacy committed when it is stated that God is supernatural but has a nature. Something that is beyond nature, may not possess a nature. (Fallacy of the Stolen Concept)

I am sure RK will argue that Nature and having a nature are two different concepts. This raises more issues. To argue this, you would be begging the question that we can speak of nature devoid of nature. Furthermore, basic ontology tells us that to exist is to have positive attributes. To define something as beyond nature is to define something as beyond ability, something beyond ability or something beyond limits cannot exist by definition. Yet this is not the only time in which the fallacy of the stolen concept is committed:

If God does not presuppose logic, and rather the contrary is true, how can we identify God as being God? For should God not presuppose logic, he must deny the very law of identity (that says a thing is what it is). Hence, the very statement “God exists and logic is his very nature” commits the fallacy of the stolen concept.

Further, when it is stated that logic is a part of God’s nature, there is a category error of the first order being made. Logic is a referrer to entities, not the entities in themselves. What does it mean to say that the nature of God is logical when logic refers only to arguments? Perhaps RK means that God has an ontological character, but I have shown that God cannot by definition.

 Thus, the claim is made that it is incoherent to deny the existence of God because of his very nature. But what is this saying? It is merely a reformed version of the Ontological argument and concluding that God must exist necessarily because he is God.

If I am to accept this, RK must show the validity and soundness of one of the Ontological arguments. Otherwise, there is nothing incoherent about denying the existence of God.

However, there IS something incoherent about denying the law of non-contradiction. To further reiterate this point, consider the following:

• (1) It is not the case that it is not that P and not P (law of non-contradiction denied, meaning it would be possible for your pants to be both on and off simultaneously)

• (2) It is not the case that God exists.

From (1) we easily see a contradiction, but there is no such contradiction from (2) unless we apply a third premise stating that:

• (3) It is logically necessary that God exists.

Should RK want to make this claim, as I’ve said before, he will have to provide an Ontological argument showing that God’s existence is logically necessary.

 It should also be further noted that (3) is often confused for another premise. There is a difference between God necessarily existing and God (if existing) necessarily having no beginning or end.

Consider:

• (4) It is logically necessary that if at any time God existed, then at every time He existed.

While (4) is required in presumably every branch of Christianity, and with good philosophical warrant, (3) isn’t. In fact very few theologians assert (3).

Even Dr. Frame, an advocate of the TAG has stated there is nothing inconsistent about denying the existence of God and affirming the law of non-contradiction in an exchange between him and Michael Martin.

As stated before, if the Law of Non-Contradiction logically implies the existence of God, then denying the existence of God should fault the law of Non-Contradiction. But we have not been show that this is the case:

 Christian Philosopher Cornelius Van Til attempted to do so in his book “The Defense of the Faith” (pg 256-257) when he says:

“All predication presupposes the existence of God … while antitheism holds that predication is possible without any reference of God. This at once gives the terms ‘is’ and ‘is not’ quite different connotations. For the antitheist these terms play against the background of bare possibilities. Hence ‘is’ and ‘is not’ may very well be reversed. The antitheist has, if effect, denied the very Law of Non-contradiction, inasmuch as the Law of Non-contradiction, to operate at all, must have its foundation in God.”"

To make sense of this statement, it is helpful to reformulate into an argument (as per Michael Martin):

(1) If the Christian God did not exist, then predication would operate against a background of bare possibility.

(2) If predication operates against a background of bare possibility, the predication of P to x ( x is P) may be reversed and ~ P might be predicated of x ( x is ~ P)

(3) But if the predication of P to x ( x is P) is reversed and ~ P is be predicated of x ( x is ~ P), then the Law of Non-contradiction must be denied.
________________________________________________
(4) Therefore, If the Christian God did not exist, then the Law of Non-contradiction must be denied

There are several problems, however. In (1) Van Til uses the term “background of bare possibility”, referring to the realm of logical possibility. We can then grant that the Law of Non-contradiction MUST hold because without that holding, by definition, there is no logically possibility. That is to say, logical possibility is determined by the Law of Non-Contradiction.

(1) States that if predication operates via logical possibility, then we may reverse the predications completely. The suggestion is to say that we can have a blanket be orange at one time and not orange at another time. Granted, but this is no way necessitates that the blanket can be orange and not orange simultaneously. Henceforth, (3) is false. Reversing the predicate does not change the Law of Non-Contradiction. As such, the argument is unsound and we can reject (4).

In closing, I have shown that there are issues with the very presentation of the term “God”, the inability of the TAG to establish its conclusion, and lastly the failure of the claim that logic is dependent on God. As I’ve said, should this be so, one could not deny God and affirm logic, but one can. It would only be inconsistent to deny God, if his existence was logically necessary, and this is not the case (note that even if God existed, he need not necessarily be logically necessary). RK has, in effect, has purported (and assumed) the conclusion of the Ontological argument without defending it.

RazorsKiss (Rebuttal):

Having success in using the laws of logic is not the same as saying that you have a warrant to be using it.

The question is about whether we have warrant for considering logic as axiomatic.

It seems apparent to me that Mitch is not providing a justification for using the law that he is using – nor did I see a case that did anything to disprove mine.

He is simply saying that it is usable – the same problem Martin falls into, in his TANG

That is not the question. On what grounds can it be considered warranted to be using abstract universals which apply to all (created) thinking beings? I have a proper ground to be doing so.

Obviously, an atheist is able to /operate/ with success using the logical laws which his brain operates according to. In fact, they MUST do so.

The question at hand is not whether – but /why/ he is using them.

Another subject I’d like to address are what clearly seem to be equivocations on his part. First, his insistence that “supernatural” is a negative definition.

“Super” is not a negative, but a maximal descriptor, as he should well know.

Mitch, with his studies in religion, should also know that “immaterial” is not the only descriptor of that characteristic of God.

The typical term is “Spirit”. The reason “immaterial” is often used is to point out that it is antithetical to matter.

Antithesis does not require derivation from his preferred term.

God is Spirit, as Scripture plainly teaches. God is NOT “not material”. That is the distinction.

I am also amazed at his choice of terminology – as if his making this (seemingly arbitrary) distinction therefore means that there is no longer any conception of God being defined by His attributes in a positive fashion – as I clearly did in my opening statement.

Further, I found his discussion concerning “extrapolating” unconvincing.

God has given us positive statements of His own attributes in His Scriptures.

In fact, He specifically speaks about the Transcendence of His attributes!

“For [as] the heavens are higher than the earth, So are My ways higher than your ways And My thoughts than your thoughts.” (Isa 55:9)

Smith’s assertion to follow simply points more clearly toward the inherent assumption – that God’s self-descriptions are insufficient to be considered. They are passed over, walked by, as if they do not even exist.

While Mitch may agree with Smith – it remains a naked assertion.

When he says that: “To say that God is ‘good’ or ‘wise’ is to say nothing more than some unknowable being possesses some unknown qualities in an unknowable way;” this remains an assertion.

While Mitch may assert that there is no “cognitive meaning associated” – all this says is what we knew already. Unbelievers don’t believe, and think there is something inherently wrong with the concept.

While this may seem to follow from Mitch’s presupposed conception that there is something wrong with using the term “immaterial” – please note that I did not use the term, and that the term is being used in a very… “interesting” way.

I find it interesting that Mitch dismisses, due to an equivocation, the fact that God has many self-descriptions in Scripture – and there are many, many positive ones.

Since he was, I can’t help but think, insufficiently rigorous in that analysis, I will also turn toward his next point.

First, I have to point out that his analysis of TAG misses.. a lot of the “meat” to the argument.

I had to smile when I read this portion: “I think the example is clear enough, but it should be noted once more. TAG cannot establish the truth of God’s existence, only the inconsistency of atheists who hold a presupposition regarding deductive logic.”

The problem with saying this – is that this is precisely what I intend.

I’m not arguing for the existence of God.

That is not the point of the debate.

My intent, precisely, is what Mitch listed above.

If any worldview is inconsistent – incoherent – *especially* in epistemological terms – it cannot be proper grounds for all knowledge.

What also strikes me as interesting is that Mitch has apparently missed the central portion of the argument – it is epistemological. If your epistemology fails, it all fails. I tried to point out, in my opening statement, that the discussion was epistemological. The argument, throughout, save one small part, is completely to do with the existence of God.

What Mitch seems to be attempting is a defeater of the TAG argument. I’m not making the TAG argument for the existence of God. I’m making a case for the epistemological primacy, ultimacy, and sole sufficiency of the Triune God of Scripture. Instead, the reply is to TAG – and using primarily Martin’s work. That is not the context. It reminds me of Dr. Gordon Stein arguing against every possible theistic argument for the existence of God – except the one that Dr. Bahnsen argued for. Which happens to be the one he’s arguing against tonight!

In a similar way, Mitch’s argument was directed at God’s *existence*. The argument is not concerning God existence. The argument is concerning God’s self-asserted epistemological primacy – and the inability of any other epistemological claimant to provide knowledge in a warranted way.

He also mentions that I might argue that logical principles are dependent upon God. That is true, to an extent – but not to the extent he claims. I am going to argue that God is not only the ordainer, but creator of the logical laws we use – and that He transcends them, as we mentioned earlier, in Isaiah. The logical laws are the correlative, yet lesser reflection of God’s inherent order. So, while they are necessary in an immediate sense to created beings – they are NOT necessary, in an ultimate sense, to God. God is, as the Scriptures remind us, self-sufficient.

On that note, the rest of his argument concerning God and that claim is irrelevant – and I can move on.

In a similar vein, I certainly raised an eyebrow at this statement: “God is defined as being supernatural. That is to say “Supernatural” is defined as being beyond nature (not natural). This is a negative definition and a broken concept. There is a fallacy committed when it is stated that God is supernatural but has a nature. Something that is beyond nature, may not possess a nature. (Fallacy of the Stolen Concept) I am sure RK will argue that Nature and having a nature are two different concepts. This raises more issues. To argue this, you would be begging the question that we can speak of nature devoid of nature.”

My opponent, I’m afraid, has seriously equivocated here. Badly. To take one sense of a word, and insist that it means the same thing in every context is.. absurd.

There is a sense of the word “nature” which applies to the entirety of the created order, as “natural” entities. Physical. However, I’m sure he also knows that the “nature of” an object, person, or concept can be the “essence” of something. For instance. In the typical Trinitarian formula, God is one being – with three persons. I’m sure he has encountered this definition before, but just to help him, I’ll restate it – God is of one /nature/, with three distinct persons.

I think that this sufficiently points out the equivocation in question. Second, “(t)his raises more issues. To argue this, you would be begging the question that we can speak of nature devoid of nature” – seems an odd assertion. Are you suggesting that there are only material objects, and only they have properties? I was under the impression that you are not a materialist.

As I wrap this up, I sincerely hope that Mitch can rebut with something more suitable to the actual argument I made. When most of your argument is predicated upon equivocation (nature, immaterial), a point that is inapplicable (that I believe that the logic we are constrained by is also somehow binding upon God, and God must therefore be within the same limits, despite His transcendent nature) – it cannot succeed very far. The resolution is that the Triune God of Scripture is the proper grounds for all knowledge. Not that the Triune God of Scripture exists. Additionally, the argument is that any logical system without a warrant to justify its use is incoherent, and therefore unable to make consistent objections. Hopefully, we get back on the rails, and we can address the topics we came to discuss. Thank You.

MitchLeBlanc (Rebuttal):

RK criticizes me for arguing against the existence of God rather than his epistemology. Am I mistaken in understanding that RK’s epistemology IS the existence of God?

RK states that he is not arguing for the existence of God, and as such the point I made about the TAG being insufficient in regard to showing the existence of said deity is assumed. Surely, his utterance of “impossibility of the contrary” is an attempt to establish from his descriptor of my logical inability, to the truth of his claim. That would simply be a non-sequitur.

RK has argued that while I may have been successful in my use of the laws of logic, I am still without warrant. He also stated that he did not see a case showing that his is incorrect. Perhaps he did not see my explanation as to how the laws of logic can operate without God. According to RK, if God does not exist logic fails. If this is true, how can I affirm the use of logic with the negation of God?

Perhaps RK is thinking that I can’t, since it’s simply a self-evident fact that God exists and denying it is foolishness. Well, to him I say, show me the ontological argument you used to affirm this statement. Otherwise, it is bare unsubstantiated assertion.

If RK were perhaps to argue (as he says he is not) that since his worldview “makes sense” therefore God, that would be a form of petitio principii (begging the question):

Yahweh is the source of all knowledge

Knowledge exists.

Therefore Yahweh.

How can RK possibly argue that I did not address the claims of epistemology, when his claim that logic cannot operate independent of God was the largest focus of my statements? I have shown this very claim to be false.

I would point out that RK did not address my argument showing the laws of logic operating with a premise of denial of God’s existence, something that should be impossible for his worldview.

In regards to God as a spirit, the problem RK falls into is simply the inability to define what a spirit is, in positive terms. I have no doubt he can tell me what a spirit is not, but this gets us nowhere.

Rk also stated, with regard to logic as God’s nature that: “while they are necessary in an immediate sense to created beings – they are NOT necessary, in an ultimate sense, to God”. What does this mean? Logical principles are either necessary or contingent. He says God is self-sufficient, well precisely what is the “self” to which he suffices himself? Notice the clear personification of God, yet we seem to have had nothing with substance said to us. The laws are reflections of his order? So God’s nature is logical? We have not even established what that means! As I said, logic is a referrer to entities. So is God’s nature an argument?

RK criticized me, with regard to “speaking of nature devoid of nature”. I’m afraid he misunderstands. I am not taking one sense of the word and stating that it means the same. In fact, I predicted he would say this. The real issue at hand is an ontological one, “what does it mean to be?”, “what does it mean to possess characteristics”, “what does it mean to have a nature?”.

As for the basis of my own knowledge, it should again be noted that since RK’s claim may make sense of logic, it doesn’t follow that logic needs to be made sense of. I will use the remainder of my rebuttal to supplement my position. With that said, my epistemological declaration is perhaps best defined as that of Objectivism. First, I should define axioms:

An axiomatic concept is “is the identification of a primary fact of reality, which cannot be analyzed, i.e., reduced to other facts or broken into component parts. It is implicit in all facts and in all knowledge. It is the fundamentally given and directly perceived or experienced, which requires no proof or explanation, but on which all proofs and explanations rest” – Ayn Rand

And:

“The first and primary axiomatic concepts are “existence,” “identity” (which is a corollary of “existence”) and “consciousness.” One can study what exists and how consciousness functions; but one cannot analyze (or “prove”) existence as such, or consciousness as such. These are irreducible primaries.”

From these axioms, I establish that of existence, identity and consciousness. In the case of the existence axiom, I can state “existence exists”. In the case of the identity axiom, which is corollary of “existence”, I can say that “to exist is to be something specific, to have identity”. This leads me to my third axiom of “consciousness”, from which I can state that “consciousness is consciousness of something”.

We can, at all times, know with certainty that something must exist to be known, this something must have identity and our knowing reflects the fact that we are conscious.

The issue posed then, is how these axioms apply to metaphysics. We can move in either one of two direction. The primacy of existence or the primacy of consciousness.

The primacy of existence, that is, taking the existence axiom prior to that of consciousness recognizes that existence exists independent of consciousness. That is to say, reality does not conform to the contents of consciousness, things are simply existent regardless of people’s subjective wishes, desires, emotions, etc. And granted that existence exists, that which exists is that which exists (identity axiom). With this primacy, consciousness does not DETERMINE reality, but identifies it.

The primacy of consciousness states that existence is subordinate to consciousness and that things are not the way they are by virtue of the fact of their existence, but rather because of the desires of consciousness. By this primacy, one would be justified in the belief that willing flying cows to rise out of the water will result in flying cows rising out of the water.

We can reject the primacy of consciousness on the basis that it rejects the self-evident truth of the existence principle. But perhaps more importantly, it commits the fallacy of the stolen concept (we are seeing that a lot tonight). It attempts to assert consciousness PRIOR to existence. Insofar as consciousness is the being conscious of something, the notion of consciousness arising prior to existence asserts the concept why denying the precondition of existence. The primacy of consciousness violates the very hierarchy of objective knowledge, we can conclude that any philosophy that is build upon this primacy cannot be consistent with rational knowledge.

Unfortunately, Christianity is one such philosophy. Christianity asserts that some form of consciousness created everything. This simply cannot be true from the outright, as the very consciousness which is purported to have created existence must exist prior to doing any creating. Stating that the Universe was “created” attempts to explain the axiom “existence exists” by asserting something prior, specifically Yahweh, a form of consciousness that created through an act of will. We simply cannot assert anything prior to existence.

As such, any question with attempts to ask “Where did existence come from?” or “How did existence come to be?” will result in answers which commit the fallacy of the stolen concept. We can see that from the very beginning, the Christian worldview has denied the metaphysical primacy of existence.

But how does this relate to the TAG? We must analyze the effect that the assertion has on the law of identity. Christianity states that identity of objects is dependent upon the will or desires of God… identity is dependent on consciousness.

Christianity, then, by definition is a form of metaphysical subjectivism.

Bahnsen (an advocate of the TAG) does not hide this fact, he states:

“the very essence of created reality is its revelational character”

The Christian worldview in regards to reality asserts that reality is a creation of consciousness. Thus, reality cannot be absolute, by definition. What is said to have created reality in the first place is simultaneously the final authority. The ultimate standard for the Christian is then merely the whim of God.

RK might reply that “God is a rational God”, but notes how this begs the question and reduces to a fallacy of pure self-reference.

The standard of reason and logic is the law of identity, but if identity is merely a derivative of consciousness than on which basis can consciousness have identity itself? If reality is a creation, and its creator is consciousness, is consciousness real? If one is to claim that it is, why do we need to point to this God to explain reality in the first place? Merely uttering the instance of a “God created reality” is a stolen concept arising from the belief that God exists.

So when the TAG tells us that the Christian worldview is the only one that can make sense of reality, is this true? A being that is perfect and omniscient surely has no need for reason in the first place. If said being is consciousness, the purpose of said consciousness is to identify the facts of reality… but what need would this God have to “reason”, since it already knows all the facts. It should be evident at this point that the Christian worldview, and the “Primacy of consciousness” has certain epistemological ramifications. When an advocate is asked, “How does God know”, surely we’d hear that “he just does”.

By this token, and insofar as the TAG asserts that the Christian worldview is the very basis for reason it is obviously wrong. The primacy of consciousness destroys reason and knowledge, it does not enable it.

How can the TAG possibly accuse all non-Christian thought as being relative, when the assertion it makes itself is that of metaphysical relativism? The entire worldview is full of ‘stolen concepts’ and seeks to defend against what it commits itself.

RazorsKiss questions MitchLeBlanc:

RK: My first question: In Exodus 3:14, we read this: “God said to Moses, “I AM WHO I AM”; and He said, “Thus you shall say to the sons of Israel, ‘I AM has sent me to you.’” – Is this a positive statement concerning the essence, properties, or nature of God?

ML: It doesn’t tell us anything whatsoever, it’s neither positive nor negative.

RK: So, the sentence above: “God said to Moses, “I AM WHO I AM”; and He said, “Thus you shall say to the sons of Israel, ‘I AM has sent me to you.’” – has no content, whatsoever?

ML: Well, “I AM WHO I AM” seems to be cognitively meaningless. PIG IS PIG, DONKEY IS DONKEY, etc… it has not furthered understanding.

RK: Are you aware that this is considered to be the essential name of God in Scripture?

ML: Yes, but a name is not a description.

RK: What does the phrase “I am” mean, when in the following proposition: “I think, therefore I am”?

ML: It denotes existence.

RK: So, when God is saying “I AM” – and repeats it, this is implying self-existence, per Hebrew grammar. Are you aware that names in the Hebrew Old Testament are all intended to have meanings?

ML: I am aware now, thank you.

RK: Were you cognizant, prior to this debate, that the word “nature” has a distinct and historical meaning, when it pertains to theology?

ML: I am cognizant to the colloquial, scientific and philosophical meaning of the word. Perhaps these preclude the theological.

RK: That didn’t answer my question. Were you aware, as a student of the philosophy of religion, or any other capacity, that “nature” was used historically in a theological sense – such as in the definition of the council of Nicea, concerning the Trinity?

ML: I do recall there being an issue of difference between prior and post uses of the term. But I am unsure as to the specifics. (prior being the Arian usage)

RK: What is logic?

ML: As I said in my opening, logic is a referrer to entities.

RK: Do abstract objects exist?

ML: Yes, objects such as numbers exist.

RK: Does the abstract object “logic” exist?

ML: Logic isn’t a thing, it’s a referrer to things.

RK: Why did you just refer to it?

ML: I made a linguistical reference to logic, justified perhaps pragmatically.

RK: Do you agree that referring to “logic”, whether mentally or linguistically – as it is an abstract object – would be a reference to that object?

ML: No, I have not agreed that logic is an object.

RK: “Logic is logically necessary” – Why isn’t that definition circular?

ML: Well, to be logically necessary means that X can be applied in every possible world. You asked if Logic has any properties, so I have offered “necessity” as a property.

RK: What is the definition of an object?

ML: To be as an entity… though I think there is much debate over this very question in the community.

RK: Isn’t the most common definition for “object” – “Something that has properties”?

ML: I am not sure, I do know that Frege struggled in differentiating object from concept, as it seems that “something that has properties” would apply to concepts as well.

RK: Last question: Why are your axioms justified, as they seem to be predicated on the laws of logic; doesn’t this nullify their standing as axiomatic?

ML: Well, an axiom is “a primary fact of reality which cannot be analyzed (reduced into other facts or broken down). Are you asking why my axiom “existence exists” is justified?

RK: If they are not identical to the laws of logic, why are they thus considered justified, as axioms?

ML: Because they are undeniable.

MitchLeBlanc questions RazorsKiss:

ML: What makes the Christian God the sole basis for reason over all of the other Gods?

RK: First, all the other gods do not exist, as they do not possess the requisite properties, as I outlined in my opener. Second, the reason The Triune God of Scripture is that sole basis is because He is the self-existent, self-sufficient, eternal, omnipotent, omniscient, Creator of all things, who is both able to communicate the content of those properties, and has done so throughout history, as recorded in His self-revelatory Scriptures.

ML: All propositions of God assert him as self-existent, self-sufficient, etc… these are not unique to Christianity, what makes Christianity different?

RK: There is no other claimant for the title “God” who asserts the sum total of the properties in question, has demonstrated them throughout history, as well as communicating them to humanity with the sufficiency and perspicuity evident in the Christian Scriptures.

ML: It seems to me that your logical system is hierarchical in nature, with God forming the basis and the chain continuing on thuswards. Does the statement “God exists” logically necessitate that “God has a son”?

RK: No, as the Son is one of the eternally existent persons in the ontological Trinity. As it was famously stated at Nicea – there was never a time when the Son was not, in contraposition to Arius’ novel claim to the contrary.

ML: Since “every time I reason, I borrow from the Christian worldview”, am I to assume that I am accepting God’s existence, Jesus’ virgin birth, the 12 disciples, the betrayal of Jesus, etc as philosophical principles?

RK: Yes, as they are facts in the history of the earth that God created, and you inhabit. They are not dependent on your interpretation of them. When it comes to how you interpret /all/ facts you encounter, the noetic effects of sin will be in operation, and your denial of knowledge (as in justified knowledge) of those facts will follow of necessity.

ML: Why is it that the necessary preconditions for the intelligibly of human experience are contingent upon God being three persons and not four, the virgin birth rather than popping into existence, then 12 disciples rather than 13, etc?

RK: For the first question, because God is the one who created all things we are able to experience, and He has 3 persons. Second, the virgin birth was the means the Father ordained to accomplish Christ’s incarnation, due to the requirements of justice for payment of the penalty for sin, and 12 disciples were analogous to the 12 tribes of national Israel. To answer why they are necessary – because God is the one who determines possibilities, given that all possibilities are occurring in the realm of His exhaustive providence.

ML: That is not precisely the question. If I accept all of these factors are philosophical principles when reasoning, what effect would the 12 disciples being 13 disciples have on my reasoning? Surely, with a change in principle comes a change in reasoning altogether.

RK: Impossibilities have no effect on your reasoning. They do not exist. Dr. Craig would give you a different answer, perhaps – but I’m not Dr. Craig.

ML: So the existence of one more disciple would have no effect on my reasoning. It seems then that the manner in which the events occurred are arbitrary. I will not press this point. Does your knowledge of God arise from the scriptures that you believe he authored?

RK: No, there was no additional disciple in the 12 chosen by Christ, and following him throughout Galilee. Advancing impossibilities as arguments is not coherent. My knowledge of God is two-fold – first, through His Scriptures, which is His informational self-revelation, (despite your assertion that it lacked no coherent content earlier) and the natural revelation of His glory in the created order – which is only sufficient to convict a man, and render him without excuse for his sins of thought and action.

ML: And from your aforementioned sources, you derive the goodness, power, coherency, knowingness, etc of God?

RK: Yes, Scripture states that God is good, that He is Almighty, that He is a God of order, not confusion, and that He knows even the thoughts of men (as well as the entirety of His creation) when He “knows all things”. The Created order attests to these things as well, in a lesser, and more inferential way – but as I said, that is sufficient merely to condemn.

ML: What if God is deceiving you?

RK: “…in the hope of eternal life, which God, who cannot lie, promised long ages ago, but at the proper time manifested, [even] His word, in the proclamation with which I was entrusted according to the commandment of God our Savior…” (Titus 1:2-3) . God cannot lie.

ML: But God was the author (or inspiration) of those very words. If his intent was to deceive, he has just succeeded. I ask again, what if God is deceiving you?

RK: For if [the] dead do not rise, then Christ is not risen. And if Christ is not risen, your faith [is] futile; you are still in your sins! Then also those who have fallen asleep in Christ have perished. If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men the most pitiable. ~ 1 Cor 15:9

ML: Again, all scripture and proposed action of God are immediately discounted if the motivation in fact was to deceive. Can you show that God is not deceiving you in all your knowledge of him?

RK: If God intended to deceive, He would not be God. He would be Satan. Therefore, you would likely have to use the TANS argument. A God of that character is not God at all, and therefore, yet again, another impossible (redefinition) advanced as an argument. If we could win by redefining things, debates would be fairly short affairs :)

ML: “If God intended to deceive, He would not be God. He would be Satan.” – Is this statement not based off of information expedited to you from the same deity in question?

RK: A God who is evil instead of good, who is a liar rather than the truth, is mutable rather than immutable, and imperfect rather than perfect, unjust rather than just… we could go on. Your questions all seem to entail redefinitions. “if God had an impossible definition for any being claiming to be the God you believe in, or any god at all, could he do _X_”. To claim that the antithesis of the self-existent and omnipotent God that I believe in is possible – seems to be.. a stretch.

ML: I cannot help but feel you are being evasive at this point. Every bit of the knowledge of God you have, comes from his proposed self-revelation. If God’s intent was surely to deceive you, are you saying he could not? Would you know? Your argument is as follows: God does not deceive. Proposed being X deceives. Therefore X is not God. You are begging the question RK.

RK: Sir, I’m not going to change my answer because you continue to ask it. “God” entails the properties already outlined. If a being does not conform to those properties, as I answered in response to your very first question – that is no god at all. I’m not going to contradict myself so that you can continue your argument. Further, I’ve stated, multiple times, that God is axiomatic to all human reasoning. You’re asking me, on the basis of your presupposition, to overthrow everything I’ve said thus far, to answer a question the way you prefer.

ML: I forego the remainder of my questions to accelerate our brief conclusions and allow for the patient audience to submit questions of their own.

MitchLeBlanc (Conclusion):

In conclusion, I must say that I am disappointed that my arguments given in my introduction were not addressed. Insofar as it was proposed that if God did not exist, logic would fail. I have clearly shown that this is not the case. I am also disappointed that it was constantly asserted that I have no basis for a logical system, but never shown that I have no basis.

If logic truly is so dependent on God, why was my argument which showed the contrary not addressed? Furthermore, I must ask which reasons we have heard tonight that RK’s epistemological system should be preferred over my own. In that respect, on which basis has RK shown that the principles of logic even require justification! Creating questions for the sole purpose of answering them, isn’t an award winning tactic.

Lastly, with regards to the QandA. I proposed the question, “What if God is deceiving you?” Rk’s response that if this was the case, said being would not be God. This strikes me as very similar to the No True Scotsman fallacy. A man sits down and reads the newspaper, where it is said that a man murdered several people and he is believed to be Scottish. The man then replies, “No Scotsman would do that!” The next day, when he reads that it was indeed a Scotsman, he states… “well, no TRUE Scotsman would do that”.

I simply do not understand how it is possible to state, with certainty, that God does not (or cannot) deceive you, when such a statement is based off of only what God himself has revealed to you. RK repeatedly stated that a God who lies simply would not be God… the proper explanation perhaps is that “The God who lies would not meet my criteria for God, and my criteria is correct.” The very last point is curious, as should God indeed be deceptive, said criteria would falter immediately.

As I have said, I am saddened that several points of good discussion were dismissed haphazardly, but I am grateful to have had the chance to discuss this issue with RK.

Thank you for listening patiently.

RazorsKiss (Conclusion):

Along with Mitch, I’m disappointed that the arguments presented were not addressed. Also along with Mitch, I’m disappointed that it was mine that were unaddressed! When I rebutted Mitch, I pointed out that his conception of the necessity of created logic applying to God was at fault for the failure of his argument.

I said: “while they are necessary in an immediate sense to created beings – they are NOT necessary, in an ultimate sense, to God. God is, as the Scriptures remind us, self-sufficient.”

This seems to have been missed in the subsequent discussion, and as stated, was why I did not address his arguments along that line further. They were not against my position, but against the position he claimed I held.

I’d also like to point out that a large bulk of Mitch’s arguments rested on redefinition. I am the Christian, taking the affirmative. While he’s quite capable of considering God as other than He is – and of contemplating logical impossibilities – they are just that. Impossibilities.

When I take the affirmative, I bear the burden of definition. When Mitch rested the majority of his case on redefinition – of the terms for God, of the words I use to describe Him, and takes them out of both the historical and linguistic context which I can’t help but think he is aware of, given his field of study, it seems to indicate that he is indenting to conduct the debate on the grounds of redefinition. Nature DOES, and HAS applied to the essence and properties of the being of God. Immaterial, a word I did not use, was constructed as a straw man against my position.

Further, he also tried to build his case on another word I did not use – supernatural. I understand that he didn’t know what my opening statement was going to be – but using the terms in that way – then ignoring their context on the basis of his own (and I consider to be strange) definitions leaves me scratching my head.

We’ve heard from Mitch that I never made a case against his position. That is only partially true. As the affirmative, my primary places to “counter-attack” are in the rebuttals, and in the cross-ex. Since he did not give a positive statement of his position until the rebuttal, my only chance to reply, save right here, was in the cross-ex. A look at the cross-examination period, and the brevity of his answers leaves it clear to me that he intended to answer as little as possible. While that is his prerogative, stating that I didn’t argue sufficiently – when he knows that presuppositionalism is an indirect system, is a bit misleading.

So, I’m going to take this opportunity to expand my thoughts from the cross-ex. As I was trying to get Mitch to admit, his system is built on a presupposed absolutist logic. This absoluteness of logic itself is not stated in the axioms – it is effectively hidden beneath the 3 axioms he professes. “Existence exists”, for instance, while correlative to the law of identity, is not identical to it. To be identical, it would have to be… more similar to God’s statement in Exodus – I am that I am.

As he expresses it, in accordance with Rand, the reality is that two *distinct* concepts are presented. “Existence”, which is an abstract, and what it does – “exists”. Existence, therefore, has the property of existing. Yet another abstract – which *exists*. Further, saying that “to exist is to be something specific, to have identity” – you are once again not restating a law of logic. You are stating that to exist, you must have identity. This is, again, correlative, but not identical.

So, we have a system with axioms which use laws that require their existence. We still haven’t had a satisfying answer as to, as I asked him, why logic isn’t an abstract logic – but these other concepts are – like existence – and why they are justified. Further, they are based in nothing, whatsoever, which grants them justification. He can claim they are axioms – but objectivism has been widely criticized, as Mitch attempted to do concerning my position, for being utterly arbitrary. What objectivism assumes is that man’s existence, identity, and consciousness are autonomous, and “objective”. What is being objected to, as I stated in my opener, is a man standing with his feet firmly planted in midair, and claiming to be the standard for his own thinking.

While I applaud him for having the debate, I would have wished that he had redirected his argument to my own, that it would not have been so dependent on redefinitions, and that we could have had a more fruitful exchange in cross-examination. I was more than willing to be forthcoming. I wish he would have done me the courtesy as well. I thank you all for watching, I thank Mitch for his patience, and I thank our moderators for this evening’s debate.

[poll id="5"]

July 8, 2009

Debate Transcript

urbanphilosophy.net

Is The New Testament Reliable?

Affirmative: Fisher

Negative: Hackenslash

Fisher
I would like to begin my presentation with a quote from Drs. Norman Geisler and William Nix:
The influence of the Bible and its teaching in the Western world is clear for all who study history. And the influential role of the West in the course of world events is equally clear. Civilization has been influenced more by the Judeo-Christian Scriptures than by any other book or series of books in the world.
(Source: Norman Geisler and William Nix. General Introduction to the Bible. p. 196)

The Bible undoubtedly has its place in history. It is especially significant as it is a book that billions around the world place their faith in. In particular, the New Testament tells the story of the man Jesus Christ: A man whose influence in history has been so great that 2.2 billion people around the world profess to believe that He is the son of God.

But is this story true? In the past two centuries, there has been an intensified debate over whether it is right for us to put our faith in the scriptures. The question has been posed over and over again, with new arguments and new evidence being brought to the table as our knowledge increases. I would like to present the evidence that supports the Christian position. 

To show that these are well-documented and scholarly facts, I will include references to show where the information comes from, so that others may verify them for themselves, not to mention that I rely on well-trained and well-educated scholars and historians. I would contend that the facts as presented can only be explained by the Christian worldview.

First, I would like to go through the manuscript evidence. Some have suspected that the New Testament text is so far-removed from the events that they cannot be trusted as eyewitnesses. On the contrary, the manuscript attestation to the events of the Gospels is second to none. As biblical scholar K.A. Kitchen explains:

Among works of classical (Greek and Latin) literature, the writings of the New Testament–4 gospels, 21 letters, the history of Acts and visions of Revelation–have a manuscript attestation second to none, and superior to most. No one blinks an eyelid at depending for the Latin text of Julius Caesar’s Gallic Wars (Composed within 58-56 BC) upon manuscripts all of which are 900 years later than Caesar’s time, only nine or ten of the manuscripts being good textual copies. No-one doubts that we still read the real text of the works of Herodotus or Thucydides (450 BC), even though the oldest available full manuscripts (only eight or so) date from 1,300 years later!

For the New Testament, how different and how vastly superior is the manuscript evidence. Some 5,000 Greek MSS (whole or fragmentary) are known, not a mere eight or ten. The most notable MSS are the Codexes Vaticanus and Sinaiticus of c. 350 AD–only 250 years after the end of the New Testament period (100 AD), not 900 or 1,300 years! Older still are the Chester Beatty and Bodmer biblical papyri, including six new Testament MSS of the second and third centuries AD, only 150 years after the New Testament period.

Further back still, there is a Rylands fragment from a manuscript of John’s Gospel (18:31-33, 37f.) datable by its script to about 130 AD–little more than a generation after the New Testament period itself. As this fragment came from Egypt, it is evident that John’s gospel had been composed, recopied and begun to circulate well beyond Palestine before 130 AD. Hence, on this evidence alone, it must have been composed (at latest) by 90/100 AD, and more probably earlier.
(Source: Kenneth Anderson Kitchen. The Bible and Its World. p. 131.)

Also: The fidelity of the New Testament text rests on a multitude of manuscript evidence. Counting Greek copies alone, the New Testament is preserved in some 5,656 partial and complete manuscript portions that were copied by hand from the second through the fifteenth centuries. (Source: Norman Geisler. General Introduction to the Bible. p. 385.)

And if you add manuscripts that were translated in other languages (Latin, Coptic, Syriac and Armenian), then you would have between 25,000-30,000 manuscripts in total.
(Source: Daniel Wallace. The Case for the Real Jesus. p. 83.)

If you are going to cast doubt on the textual reliability of the New Testament, then you might as well be consistent and cast doubt on the reliability of every ancient writing prior to the invention of the printing press in the 15th century, since no other book is as well attested to in such a large number of manuscripts as the New Testament.

Next, I will head on to the subject of the New Testament canon, and I will only deal with this topic briefly, lest Dan Brown type conspiracies regarding the NT Canon start coming up. It is a common misconception that the Council of Nicea decided that the New Testament would have four gospels. On the contrary, the Nicene canons do not cover the topic of the canon at all. In fact, the fixed canon of four gospels has been recognized since the second century. Irenaeus, writing in 180 AD, attests to this when he writes:

It is not possible that the Gospels can be either more or fewer in number than they are. For, since there are four zones of the world in which we live, and four principal winds, while the Church is scattered throughout all the world, and the “pillar and ground” of the Church is the Gospel and the spirit of life; it is fitting that she should have four pillars, breathing out immortality on every side, and vivifying men afresh.
(Source: Irenaeus of Lyons. Adversus Haereses. Ch. XI.)

Renowned biblical scholar Bruce Metzger confirms this when he states:
When the pronouncement was made about the canon, it merely ratified what the general sensitivity of the church had already determined. You see, the canon is a list of authoritative books more than it is an authoritative list of books. These documents didn’t derive their authority from being selected; each one was authoritative before anyone gathered them together. The early church merely listened and sensed that these were authoritative accounts.

For someone now to say that the canon emerged only after councils and synods made these pronouncements would be like saying, ‘Let’s get several academies of musicians to make a pronouncement that the music of Bach and Beethoven is wonderful.’ I would say, ‘Thank you for nothing! We knew that before the pronouncement was made.’ We know it because of sensitivity to what is good music and what is not. The same with the canon. 0:54
(Source: Bruce Metzger. The Case for Christ. p. 68.)

Next, I will cover the extra-biblical corroboration for Jesus and His ministry. One must understand that due to the area that Jesus grew up in, it is not likely that that many would take not of Him. Yet, what we do have from non-Christian sources is in and of itself quote noteworthy.

For example, there is the testimony of Flavius Josephus, as found in book 18 of his “Antiquities of the Jews.” This passage has caused quite a lot of controversy over the decades, with some sceptics going so far as to declare the entire passage as a forgery, but I think this is going a bit too far. Anyway, here is the text from Josephus:

Now there was about this time Jesus, a wise man [, if it were lawful to call him a man], for he was a doer of wonderful works, a teacher of such men as receive the truth with pleasure. He drew over to him both many of the Jews, and many of the Gentiles. [He was the Christ,] and when Pilate, at the suggestion of the principal men among us, had condemned him to the cross, those that loved him at the first did not forsake him [;for he appeared to them alive again the third day; as the divine prophets had foretold these and ten thousand other wonderful things concerning him]. And the tribe of Christians so named from him are not extinct at this day.
(Source: Flavius Josephus. Antiquities. Book 18, chapter 3.)

Now, the bracketed portions are probably later interpolations, as they are not characteristic of Josephus’ writing. Besides that, however, the rest of the text is generally considered to be authentic. As scholars have said before:
“Few have doubted the genuineness of this passage.”
“Today there’s a remarkable consensus among both Jewish and Christian scholars that the passage as a whole is authentic, although there may be some interpolations.”
(Source: Dr. Edwin Yamauchi. The Case for Christ, p. 79.)

One thing is certain: The Testimonium cannot be dismissed as a late fabrication. The text is quoted in its entirety by fourth-century Church historian Eusebius in his History of the Church. Eusebius was a meticulous scholar, who thoroughly researched his sources. Despite his obvious enthusiasm for defending and furthering the Gospel, there is no evidence he wilfully used fraudulent source material to prove his point. 0:55
(Source: Timothy J. Dailey. Mysteries of the Bible: Exploring the Secrets of the Unexplained. p. 190)

Finally, it is noteworthy that there are no manuscripts of Josephus’ antiquities that do not have this passage. Thus we can be certain that truly does belong there. So here we have established the authenticity of the passage in general. What does that lead us to conclude? John Meier writes:
Read the Testimonium without the [bracketed] passages and you will see that the flow of thought is clear. Josephus calls Jesus by the generic title “wise man.” Josephus then proceeds to “unpack” that generic designation (wise man) with two of its main components in the Greco-Roman world: miracle working and effective teaching. This double display of “wisdom” wins Jesus a large following among both Jews and gentiles, and presumably—though no explicit reason is given—it is this huge success that moves the leading men to accuse Jesus before Pilate.

(Source: John Meier. The Testimonium: Evidence for Jesus Outside the Bible. p. 23.)
It is also noteworthy that elsewhere in his Antiquities, Josephus mentions James, the half-brother of Jesus:
..so he assembled the Sanhedrim of judges, and brought before them the brother of Jesus, who was called Christ, whose name was James, and some others, [or, some of his companions]; and when he had formed an accusation against them as breakers of the law, he delivered them to be stoned…

As far as I can tell, nobody doubts that the passage regarding him is authentic. Given this account of Josephus talking about “the brother of Jesus, who was called Christ,” it shouldn’t be surprising at all for him to refer to Jesus and the Christian movement.

And then there are these events, which reportedly took place during Jesus’ death:
It was now about the sixth hour, and there was darkness over the whole land until the ninth hour, while the sun’s light failed. And the curtain of the temple was torn in two. (Luke 23:44, ESV)

And behold, the curtain of the temple was torn in two, from top to bottom. And the earth shook, and the rocks were split. (Matthew 27:51, ESV)

Interestingly enough, these events are corroborated by pagan sources:
Phlegon, a Greek author from Caria writing a chronology soon after 137 A.D., reported that in the fourth year of the 202nd Olympiad (i.e., 33 A.D.) there was “the greatest eclipse of the sun” and that “it became night in the sixth hour of the day [i.e., noon] so that stars even appeared in the heavens. There was a great earthquake in Bithynia, and many things were overturned in Nicaea.”
(Source: Paul Maier. Pontius Pilate. p. 366.)

There is also a certain quote by a historian from 51 A.D. by the name of Thallus. Although the original copy of his work is lost, it is quoted in the writings of Julius Africanus in 221 A.D. Julius quotes:

On the whole world there pressed a most fearful darkness, and the rocks were rent down by an earthquake, and many places in Judea and other districts were thrown down. This darkness Thallus, in the third book of his History, calls, as appears to me without reason, an eclipse of the sun.
(Source: Julius Africanus. Chronography. Chapter XVIII, 1.)

Thus, we see that a significant event that occurs at the moment of the crucifixion is recorded for us in two different pagan sources. Surely this should be enough to convince even the most ardent sceptic that the events of the crucifixion are historically grounded

I would also like to bring up an interesting fact: The gospel of Luke and the book of Acts (both written by Luke) could not have been written later than 64 A.D. The reason for this is twofold:

oh wait
I’ll skip that part and head to the real important stuff

Now, there is then the testimony of Jesus’ burial in the tomb, and the fact that it had been found empty 3 days later: events which as far as I know are well-attested to by both Christian and Jewish witnesses, not to mention most recognized scholars and historians up until now. Paul Maier writes:

Where did Christianity first begin? To this the answer must be: “Only one spot on earth-the city of Jerusalem.” But this is the very last place it could have started if Jesus’ tomb had remained occupied, since anyone producing a dead Jesus would have driven a wooden stake through the heart of an incipient Christianity inflamed by His supposed resurrection.

What happened in Jerusalem seven weeks after the first Easter could have taken place only if Jesus’ body were somehow missing from Joseph’s tomb, for otherwise the Temple establishment, in its imbroglio with the Apostles, would simply have aborted the movement by making a brief trip over to the sepulchre of Joseph of Arimathea and unveiling Exhibit A. They did not do this, because they knew the tomb was empty. Their official explanation for it-that the disciples had stolen the body- was an admission that the sepulchre was indeed vacant. (Source: Paul Maier. “The Empty Tomb as History,” Christianity Today, vol. 19, March 28, 1975. p. 5.)

However, it is not the empty tomb that convinces the disciples of Jesus that He is risen (with the possible exception of John). This is where we arrive at the post-resurrection appearances. These are recorded by the apostle Paul in his first epistle to the Corinthians, where he writes:

For I delivered to you as of first importance what I also received: that Christ died for our sins in accordance with the Scriptures, that he was buried, that he was raised on the third day in accordance with the Scriptures, and that he appeared to Cephas, then to the twelve. Then he appeared to more than five hundred brothers at one time, most of whom are still alive, though some have fallen asleep. Then he appeared to James, then to all the apostles. Last of all, as to one untimely born, he appeared also to me. (1 Corinthians 5:3-8, ESV)

Now, sceptics often explain away this account by saying that everybody in question merely experienced hallucinations. This is the explanation championed by noted atheist philosopher Richard Carrier, who states this:
I believe the best explanation, consistent with both scientific findings and the surviving evidence…is that the first Christians experienced hallucinations of the risen Christ, of one form or another…In the ancient world, to experience supernatural manifestations of ghosts, gods and wonders was not only accepted, but often encouraged.
(Source: Richard Carrier. The Spiritual Body of Christ. p. 184.)

However, despite what Carrier would have you believe, the hallucination theory is not “consistent with both scientific findings and the surviving evidence.” The theory does not explain why the sceptical half-brother of Jesus or the anti-Christian Saul would experience hallucinations of that type. Moreover, it is extremely improbable that 500 people would simultaneously experience the same illusion. As renowned psychologist Gary Collins explains:

Hallucinations are individual occurrences. By their very nature only one person can see a given hallucination at a time. They certainly aren’t something which can be seen by a group of people. Neither is it possible that one person could somehow induce a hallucination in somebody else. Since a hallucination exists only in the subjective, personal sense, it is obvious that others cannot witness it.

Thus, I would conclude, along with Dr. Gary Habermas, “That these different individuals in each of these various circumstances would all be candidates for hallucinations really stretches the limits of credibility.”
(Source: Gary Habermas. Beyond Death. p. 120.)

Thus, we see this string of facts and evidence that taken as a whole, provide a solid testimony for the Christian faith. I do not think that the naturalist worldview can explain all of these facts with anywhere near the same level of clarity, consistency and persuasiveness as the biblical worldview. If the atheist chooses to balk and deny the faith that has been once for all delivered to the saints, he does so at his own risk, for in doing so he runs against the entire testimony of history.
Thank you.

Hackenslash

I am going to be arguing on one premise, and providing instances from the NT that show that, as a historical document, it cannot be relied upon. And then I will briefly rebut Fisher’s opening. Is that OK?

Clock on.

I would argue that any source, without independent corroboration of specific statements, cannot be relied upon as a historical source.

So, in order to present my case, I figured I’d go straight for the jugular. In order to show that the NT is an unreliable source without critically robust independent support, it becomes suspect in terms of its actual veracity.

I only need find one instance of contradiction to cast doubt on the veracity of the stories.
So, we’ll start with genealogy
Matthew Chapter 1 V. 6-16. 29 Generations from David to Jesus. Luke C 3 v. 23-31, 43 generations. Between those two lists, only three names are in concurrence.

When Christ tells his disciples where to go after the resurrection: Matthew 28:10 and Mark 16:7 say Galilee, while Luke 24:49 and Acts 1:4 say he tells them to stay in Jerusalem.

In the book of John alone, between only two chapters, John flat out contradicts himself, saying in 3:22 that Jesus was performing Baptisms, while in 4:2 he says it was only the disciples who were performing them

I have done a quick sketch in bullets to rebut your opening.

1. Your opening was a massive argumentum ad populum. The influence of a work is no guide to its veracity, so that’s a massive non-sequitur before you even begin.

2. No argument that the bible is a historic document, following on from that and through your opening. Historical, however, is not the same as historic.

3. Argument from manuscript. Contemporary sources only, please/

4, Josephus. Any interpolation renders the whole document suspect

5. Critically robust sources please for the suspension of the natural laws, i.e. miracles.

7. Argument from improbability re hallucinations. Group hallucinations are a known phenomenon.

Fisher
First off, I’m glad Hack pointed out the genealogies example

It’s one of the most famous arguments. In fact, I used it myself back in my agnostic days, but it can be quite easily explained.

Ben Witherington writes:
It has been traditional to assume that Matthew’s genealogy traces Jesus’ lineage through Joseph (his legal genealogy), whereas Luke’s genealogy traces his lineage through Mary (his natural genealogy). [This solution finds] support from the fact that the Matthean birth narrative focuses more on the role of Joseph than of Mary, while Luke’s narrative makes Mary the more central figure in the drama. It also comports with the ancient conjecture that Joseph is ultimately the source of much of the Matthean birth narratives, while Mary is the source for most of Luke’s material.
(Source: Witherington, Ben III. The Birth of Jesus. p. 65.)

Norman Geisler and Thomas Howe expand upon this in their book “When Critics Ask,” where they write:

[The genealogies] are two different lines of ancestors, one traced through His legal father, Joseph, and the other through His actual mother, Mary. Matthew gives the official line, since he addresses Jesus’ genealogy to Jewish concerns for the Jewish Messiah’s credentials which required that Messiah come from the seed of Abraham and the line of David (cf. Matt. 1:1). Luke, with a broader Greek audience in view, addresses himself to their interest in Jesus as the Perfect Man (which was the quest of Greek thought). Thus, he traces Jesus back to the first man, Adam (Luke 3:38)…
..Further, Luke does not say that he is giving Jesus’ genealogy through Joseph. Rather, he notes that Jesus was “as was supposed” (Luke 3:23) the son of Joseph, while He was actually the son of Mary. Also, that Luke would record Mary’s genealogy fits with his interest as a doctor in mothers and birth and with his emphasis on women in his Gospel which has been called “the Gospel for Women.”

(Source: Norman Geisler and Thomas Howe. When Critics Ask: A Popular Handbook on Bible Difficulties. p. 385-386)

Also, the John 3 and John 4 thing is not a contradiction either. It’s pretty easy to simply say that since Jesus works through His disciples, whatever the disciples are doing is attributed to them in general.

As for the Galilee/Jerusalem discrepancies: Is Jesus even talking to the same groups of disciples? Given the number of them, it’s most likely that some were stationed in Galilee, while others remain in Jerusalem.

Finally, I’d like to address this idea of “word-for-word” correspondence, as it is terribly anachronistic and misleading.

The inspired truth of Scripture does not depend on word-for-word agreement among all biblical manuscripts on or between parallel accounts of the same event.

In the first place, the notion of word-for-word agreement is a relatively recent historical development. “In times of antiquity it was not the practice to give a verbatim repetition every time something was written out.” To b e sure, I don’t believe that one passage of Scripture ever directly contradicts other passages. Yet, when someone asks, “Does everything in Scripture and in the biblical manuscripts agree word-for-word?” that person is asking the wrong question. The answer to that question will always be a resounding no.

(Source: Timothy Paul Jones. Misquoting Truth. p. 31-32.)

The variations in the resurrection narratives tend to support, rather than undermine, their authenticity. They demonstrate that there were several independent traditions stemming from some event that must indeed have happened to give rise to them.
(Source: Paul Maier. In the Fullness of Time. p. 180.)

If the gospels were too consistent, that in itself would invalidate them as independent witnesses. People would then say we really only have one testimony that everybody else is just parroting.
(Source: Craig L. Blomberg. The Case for Christ. p. 45.)

There is enough of a discrepancy to show that there could have been no previous concert among them; and at the same time such substantial agreement as to show that they all were independent narrators of the same great transaction.
(Source: Simon Greenleaf. The Testimony of the Evangelists. Vii.)

Interestingly, hack has not at all addressed the pagan corroboration for the eclipse

or the earthquake, for that matter

And he claims that the entire Josephus text is suspect, which brings me to my question:

Do you know of any manuscripts that do not contain the testimonium? If so, provide a source for this. If not, then explain why you think a partial interpolation is tantamount to a total one (which goes against responsible historical scholarship).

Hackenslash
I will answer your question first, then I have some issues with your rebuttal.

I never said it was tantamount to a total interpolation, only that any interpolation renders it suspect as a critically robust evidential source.

Now, then. Group hallucinations and what we really know. We now that the human brain is an illusion generator par excellence. It can provide us with complete sensory input where there is none. It is also clear that all of our sensory input is tainted by our preconceptions, and by stimuli that we are not even aware of. May I direct your attention to this video.http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i1OVhlRpwJc

You can watch it later, but it deals with the influences on us that we are not even aware of.

hallucinations are subject to the same principles, and confirmation bias is a well-understood phenomenon.

Galilee/Jerusalem. You are making that up on the spot. These are different accounts of what he’s supposed to have said, and any conjecture on your part about what circumstances MAY have surrounded it does not support your argument, it supports mine. I only need reasonable doubt, remember.

OK, my question: If the genealogies were traced through different lineages (which would be interesting in and of itself, since Judaic practice always traced through the father), why do they both lead back to David?

Fisher
David did not have just one son. He had plenty of them. If you look closely, one traces His lineage through Solomon, the other through Nathan (not to be confused with the prophet of the same name).

Also, the bid about Judaic practices is irrelevant for one reason: Luke, the one who is tracing through Mary, is Greek. He is also writing for a Gentile audience. Thus, your parenthesis about Judaic practice is a complete non-sequitur.

Now, I would like to talk about the bit about hallucination

Hackenslash
Excellent, because now you’re getting into science.

Fisher
Group hallucinations do sometimes happen. However, from what I understand, they generally don’t hallucinate the exact same thing, and a crowd of 500 is pretty hard to influence that way

Also, It does not explain why Saul, the great persecutor of Christians, and James, the sceptical half-brother of Jesus, saw Him as well. If anything, they would be primed -against- seeing such hallucinations.

So my question is this: How do you account for James’ and Paul’s visions?

Hackenslash
Right, but we don’t have testimonies to their accounts, we only have the assertion that they were there. Further, recent studies on eyewitness accounts have shown major discrepancies

Interestingly, when my brother died many years ago, I saw him everywhere for the first few months. This is well-documented, and coupled with what I was saying earlier about hallucinatory stimuli, renders your points entirely moot. Further, to take your argument seriously, it would have to be axiomatic that miracles are possible, and that the natural laws can be suspended. I believe I asked for critically robust evidence for this in my opening. Care to address that?

The problem with your question is that presuppositions make you rule out any possibility of suspension of natural laws. Thus, even if you were presented with the various such experiences that have been documented even up until recent decades (there’s a wide variety of examples: jewels falling from the sky, the Roman Catholic marian apparitions, Hindu statues drinking milk etc) you would dismiss them out of hand.

(Disclaimer: Just because I gave a certain example of a miracle doesn’t mean that I endorse it. Even if it is likely to be supernatural, I would disagree as to their origin, but that is an inter-theist debate, so I won’t go further into that.)

Also, arguing from a personal anecdote doesn’t count for much when a debate is in question, I think you know that. On that note, you may claim James and Paul are giving personal anecdotes. However, they, unlike you, had no motive or predisposition to hallucinate. It is also possible that they are lying, but why would they? Look what that got them: Nothing but persecution, humiliation and death

And now for my final question: I mentioned before that non-Christian sources documented the eclipse in Luke 23:44, not to mention the earthquake in Matthew 27:51. Do you dispute these corroborations? If so, why?

Hackenslash
No. No presuppositions. Here’s the thing, and this is the root of the scientific method. I investigate that which is evident. So, I see what is, and then I formulate a hypothesis, and then I test it. The rules of logic and science determine that I dismiss anything which a) has no explanatory power, b) is not supported by any critically robust evidence and c) constitutes any unnecessary assumption. There is no evidence, as far as I am aware, that such a suspension is possible, so it is discarded, until there is evidence to support the viability of such a hypothesis. This has not been forthcoming.

Further, your response constituted a complete evasion of my question. About that evidence…?

I will be happy to forego my last question, and give the floor to the audience, as long as I get an answer to my first question.

Fisher
Well, you can always look up the examples I gave you. The Jewels, the apparitions, the Hindu drinking statues.

I haven’t seen those things first-hand though, so I can’t speak for the ones who saw/heard them directly

Hackenslash
They can all be dismissed under the rubric of what I have presented, and the principle of the shaving implement of the late, lamented cleric of Norfolk

Fisher
Also, would you like to answer my final question as well?
I’d like to know what you think of Thallus and Phlegon
If you don’t feel like going through the transcripts, I can paste the quotes back up

Hackenslash
A tiny correlation. Further, I have made my case, because all I need is doubt to render your document suspect as a historical source. I leave it open to the judgement of the audience, since my objections were evaded, rather than answered, IMO.

ProoF
It’s like 3 parts
Hold on
Hack, is my understanding correct at you trying to argue that people were pretty much seeing things when Jesus appeared to them?
Or did I get that wrong
The 500

Hackenslash
I am arguing that it is one of many possible explanations that are not considered within the confines of the doctrine. Most of them have a degree of parsimony that far exceeds the biblical account.
So arguing for it against only one other is a false dichotomy.
There is a vast range of possible explanations, and most of the can be explained by group[ hallucination and the power of suggestion.
Does that answer your question?

ProoF
Okay. So my question is, would it be more plausible to argue that all of them were mistaken or seeing things, that includes sceptics. Or would it be more plausible that Jesus did really appear to them?

Hackenslash
False dichotomy. They could have seen someone who looked like Jesus. They could have been hallucinating. Some of them may WANT to have seen Jesus, which is a powerful suggestive force, and well documented.
The rest may be Chinese whisper, or broken telephone to our US cousins.
Parsimony is a valuable tool in discerning between hypotheses.

ProoF
That is fine. Thanks for answering. I came to my conclusion. Just needed to hear your input.

Hackenslash
So I can provide an explanatory example from multiple fields of science to support my contention. However, I have yet to see anything that would suggest that suspension of the natural laws is possible. Occam’s Razor wins

RazorsKiss
For both debaters: Hackenslash says that you only need a “reasonable doubt.” By what universal standard, applicable to another human being, and not merely to yourself, is something reasonable or unreasonable – such as a ‘reasonable’ doubt?

Fisher
Hack is arguing from a personal, subjective standard when he states things “reasonable doubt” and “absurdities.” Heck, even appealing to Occam’s Razor. All of this presupposes the Naturalistic worldview is true. However, I contend that Hack’s explanations for the evidence provided, rather than providing the most “reasonable” explanation, actually strains at the evidence.

For example

Hack says that a predisposition to want to see what the people who saw Jesus saw accounts for their hallucinations But, as I said before, Paul and James actually were predisposed AGAINST such hallucinations. Remember, the former was an opponent of Christianity before his conversion, and the latter was very sceptical of his own half-brother. Granted, they could have lied, but as I said, they have no reason to do so. It only resulted in their persecutions and death.

Hackenslash
You mean that they had motive for it not to have happened? This is precisely the thing I’m talking about. This gives enough stimuli to bring on a hallucination, and if you look at the study on witness testimony, you can see that these two combined can provide exactly the circumstances you describe. The working of the mind is increasingly well-understood.

They didn’t necessarily have to lie. They only had to believe. Argument from belief is just as fallacious as argument from popularity My first question has not been answered. I require critically robust, peer-reviewed material that suggests that miracles are possible. If that is not forthcoming, I think we’re done.

I would say that doubt is reasonable when a) the source is suspect in terms of i) veracity ii) tampering iii) corroborative contemporary evidence iv) provenance or b) i) source ii) motive.

The NT actually fails on most of these counts.

RazorsKiss
My question was: On what universal standard, applicable to any person, id something reasonable – such as doubt – the same question applies to each of your individual reasons listed. On what basis are those objective, not subjective?

Fisher
Well, if you want me to provide a quick answer to that
We have a set of facts and evidences.
Both sides have a set of presuppositions
My standard of reasonability would be which side’s presupposition can explain the facts better

Facts: I’ve mentioned the testimonies and statements of various persons, both biblical and extra-biblical, Christian as well as non-Christian.

Presuppositions: We both believe certain things about the world, even if those beliefs are non-religious or naturalistic.

So the question is whose worldview fits with the facts

Hackenslash
I have no beliefs of any description

Fisher
So……………………………………….. you’re a Nihilist?

Hackenslash
Nihilism, by the way, IS a belief. It is the belief that it’s all pointless.
I have a question:
What are these presuppositions I have, as per your earlier assertion?

Fisher
Hackenslash What are these presuppositions I have, as per your earlier assertion? <<< Your presupposition, based on what I gather from the way you speak, is that only what is natural and can be verified empirically is to be considered real.

RazorsKiss
No, my question is: what makes any of those listed reasons reasonable descriptors of whether something is, or is not, reasonable?

Hackenslash
That is not a presupposition. It is an evidentially supported position. There is no reason to suspect that it is otherwise, especially since the 
scientific method has provided us with the only real answers we have ever had.

RazorsKiss
in other words – how do you decide those are valid descriptors of “reasonable? by what standard?

Hackenslash
RK, by the standard that they it is the only standard which has provided us with real, usable information about how the world works. It is simply a matter of standard of evidence. In my opinion, the NT doesn’t stack up, and there is enough doubt concerning its veracity to render it useless as a historical source. This was the central point of my opening, and one which my opponent has singularly failed to address. The other thing he’s failed to address is my request for evidence that a suspension of the natural laws is in fact possible. He has also failed to do this. All I need is sufficient doubt in the source, and my argument is made.

RazorsKiss
So, you don’t have an objective basis. Thank you.

Hackenslash
That IS an objective basis. It deals with only that for which reasonable evidence can be provided.

nickels
You mentioned a few lines ago that only science (i.e. the scientific method) can provide for us knowledge? Have I understood you correctly or is this a straw man?

Hackenslash
Although, give me a second. I have drunk much wine, and I need to see to the animals.

I didn’t say that only science can provide knowledge, so in a sense, yes. What I said was that the scientific method has given us the only way of looking at the universe with clear eyes, and has provided for us the world in which we can discuss these things over so many miles.

In other words, it is a mechanism by which we can know, while all other worldviews that have so far been advanced have only provided guesses and conjecture.

That’s not to say that it’s infallible in the short term, but the long term is process of refinement and revision, so it’s self-correcting, in a way that no other system of thought is.

nickels
Science by its very nature can only produce results. Those results have to be interpreted by the preconceptions of the scientist. For example, physics, as far as I know, relies heavily upon the theorems about Calculus developed by mathematicians. Mathematics, as opposed to science, starts off with an axiomatic system and reasons deductively, not inductively.

Therefore, science itself is subject to preconceptions. That’s not really a question, I know, but how would you respond?

Hackenslash
Science has only one preconception, and that is that we can know, if we keep looking. I can respond thus. Mathematics is axiomatic precisely because we understand the system that describes it. Science is not the same, as it deals with no axia.

That is why the word ‘proof’ is only applicable in mathematics. A proof is an axiomatic construct, ‘proving’ the applicability of certain axia. Hence, the axiom is that the summing of two integers give the product. The proof of that would be 1+1=2 That is what a proof is.

nickels
Technically, 1+1=2 is not one of the Peano axioms but rather is derived from them.

Hackenslash
And that’s why proof is not applicable in science, and why the highest an idea can achieve is ‘theory’. It is a proof of the axiom Do you see what I’m getting at? Anybody else have a question, or can we wrap up?

nickels
I believe so. However, we are still left with the conclusion that science is not the beginning of knowledge. Proper mathematics and logic must known first.

EmpireOfZombies
1. Hack, why do you consider Fishers argument is not reasonable? Summarize it, if possible.
2. Hack, Fisher provided many testimonies to support his argument. Is there any reason these do not support him or are irrelevant?
3. Hack, final question. can you give us an example of evidence that would lift reasonable doubt (for you) from Fisher’s argument?

Hackenslash
1. Because it is circular, in that it relies on the occurrence of miracles. Unless one can provide evidence that such an occurrence is possible, I have to go with the parsimonious explanation for these events. The demands of parsimony dictate that I rule out anything which constitutes an unnecessary assumption or cannot be supported by critically robust evidence.

2. They all constitute hearsay. The nearest contemporary source is Josephus. His work was pretty good in many respects, but unfortunately all of it is rendered invalid by the least suspicion of interpolation or tampering. Further, his second entry constitutes hearsay, which has been shown to be an unreliable source of historical data.

EmpireOfZombies
2. Why do they constitute hearsay?

Hackenslash
3. I answered this in my initial post. Provide critically robust evidence that a suspension of the natural laws is even viable for the consideration of scientists to look at.

2. Because they only talked about what other people believed or said concerning the events.

EmpireOfZombies
3. I was hoping for something more specific.

Hackenslash
More specific than ‘there is no critically robust evidence to support your postulate’? I don’t know how I can be much more specific than that. I would require a robust correlation with reliable contemporary diarists or historians that concurred with the bible. I would also require some evidence to support the ridiculous notion that miracles can occur, and that magic man is responsible. Neither of these has been shown to my satisfaction, and further, my opponent has singularly failed to answer my questions and objections.

EmpireOfZombies
Fisher. What do you consider an objective basis for determining anything? What do you consider reasonable evidence?

Fisher
EoZ, one thing I would like to stress is that we -all- have a certain way of looking at the world. The question is whether this way of looking at the world is consistent, both with itself and the facts. I have mentioned various facts, such as that various 1st century witnesses corroborate the testimonies of the gospel writers, not to mention the testimony of the gospel writers themselves. Of course there is the possibility that they are lying, misinterpreted the facts or have merely imagined what they wrote down. But the question is whether these accusations are warranted. As far as I see, they are not.

Hackenslash
Good questions, BTW.
Again with the facts. Where is the critically robust evidence for these ‘facts’?

EmpireOfZombies
I don’t agree with calling witness testimony factual.
testimony is just that.
A recount of their perception of what happened.
Which is entirely subjective.
Which does not answer my question.
I asked what your basis for objective reasoning was.

Fisher
Like I said, internal consistency and corroboration. Unless I’m interpreting your question wrong

EmpireOfZombies
It was a general question.
If you were looking at anything.
Not this specifically.
Third question. How is Hack subjective if subjectivity refers to emotions, feelings, and predispositions?

Fisher
Not sure where I called Hack subjective. BUT, I would say that some of Hack’s statements are subjective, such as his stating “believability” as a criterion for accepting or rejecting a certain account as true. Remember, what is believable for one person may be completely incredulous to another.

EmpireOfZombies
You did during the questions.
Someone asked a question and you specifically stated he was subjective.

Hackenslash
Which is precisely why I don’t do belief

Fisher
Ahh right, now I remember
And Hack, everybody believes certain things
Doesn’t matter whether those things are considered “religious” or not.

Hackenslash
No, I believe nothing. I can give you the full set, if you like, and a justification for my assertion.

Fisher
The question is whether those beliefs (and yes, I’m using that term broadly) can be corroborated

EmpireOfZombies
Yes. It’s actually the first question I had, but I saved it for last because it’s not exactly important compared to my other two.

Hackenslash
I have no beliefs. It is that simple: Beliefs are the eyelids of the mind – David Zindell

Fisher
Hack, am I real person?Hackenslash
Ah, the argument from solipsism is about to rear its ugly head

Fisher
It’s not that. What I’m saying is
You take it for granted that you are debating a human being, though this could easily be an advanced AI or a well-trained chimpanzee.
So if you say I’m a real person, that would be considered a belief.

Hackenslash
I have no critically robust evidence to suggest otherwise, and all the evidence from my interaction, and the interaction of those I know, is only a construct. That fails the principles as well, for the simple fact is that my assumption about the rest of the world being out there is evidentially supported, and doesn’t exceed the demands of parsimony. We have only consistency.

Fisher
“Belief – something believed; an opinion or conviction: a belief that the earth is flat. ” -dictionary.com

Hackenslash
So to dismiss you as a real person, given your interaction, would fail the demands of parsimony, and leads only to solipsism, which can teach us nothing.

Hackenslash
You can quote definitions all you like. I did offer my justification, but you had already made your mind up that I was wrong.

Fisher
Gee, that’s one of the things right…
You constantly clamor for facts and evidence. Remember who it is that provided virtually all the references and sources during the course of this debate.

EmpireOfZombies
Fisher, there have been many psychological studies regarding the power of suggestion and hallucination. For example, if someone tells
you a house is haunted, you are more likely to see a ghost in that house. These studies would argue against your point
that scepticism provides a predisposition against seeing something not there. In regards to your original point that what they saw could NOT be hallucinations based solely on the fact of their scepticism, how would these studies stand?

Hackenslash
If you had taken me up on my offer of an explanation, you would have been more enlightened. Instead, you chose to decide what it means.
When we have hard evidence from reality, belief is superfluous.
You may have provided sources, but I had no need to provide much supporting evidence, because my point was entirely in the realm of logic, and required no support. Where it was required, I provided video evidence in support of my postulates. Your sources were all non-contemporary and hearsay, apart from the one source I focused on. And you singularly failed to answer my questions. In fact, you didn’t answer my first question, and you haven’t.

Fisher
Well, if merely seeing something is insufficient for you, Paul also went blind for three whole days after seeing what he saw. Can hallucinations cause blindness? Also, I’m not well-versed in psychology. From what I understand though, even if you can induce a large crowd to experience mass hallucinations, it is highly unlikely that they’ll see the exact same thing.

Hack, do you want to continue, or conclude?

Hackenslash
Blindness is a known trigger of hallucination. Perhaps there is a more parsimonious explanation…
I think we’re done.