Before addressing Chris’ latest concerns, I will take a few moments to respond to a guest post that was made on ChoosingHats by ‘ZaoThanatoo’.

On Zao’s Thoughts:

I mentioned in several places throughout my posts in this series that there must be real caution taken by the theist with regard to arguments such as these, to not assume the conclusion false to show the conclusion false. Let’s quickly recap the argument in question:

Horrific Suffering (def.) = that most awe-full form of suffering that gives the victim and/or the perpetrator a prima facie reason to think that his or her life is not worth living.

(1) Necessarily, if God exists, finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God realize their deepest good.

(2) Necessarily, if God exists, the prevention of horrific suffering does not prevent there being finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God.

(3) Necessarily, if God exists, the prevention of horrific suffering does not prevent there being finite persons who realize their deepest good. (from 1, 2)

(4) Necessarily, if God exists, there is horrific suffering only if its prevention would prevent there being finite persons who realize their deepest good.

(5) Necessarily, if God exists, there is no horrific suffering. (from 3, 4)

(6) There is horrific suffering.

(7) God does not exist (from 5, 6)

Now, it should be obvious that any objection to the argument which has as a component the denial of (7) is going to be fallacious. One cannot respond to this argument solely by saying, “God exists and he has morally sufficient reasons for permitting horrific suffering.’ Zao, however, extends my cautionary point into his own further analysis when he says:

Mitch contends that one must not assume that God exists (A) in order to disprove the above conclusion that God does not exist (~A).  This, he asserts, is question-begging.  However, for anyone wishing to criticize the conclusion, the alternative is to assume that God does not exist in order to argue that he does.  This is self-contradictory.  We must either assume God exists or God does not exist (A or ~A, Excluded Middle) in presenting our reasoning.  But assuming ~A to prove A is self-contradictory and assuming A to prove ~~A Mitch asserts is question-begging.

These are some strange assertions. If it’s the case that assuming that God does not exist in order to argue that he does is self-contradictory there is a real problem for argumentation in general, as assuming the negation of some proposition to prove that proposition is simply what is meant by “proof via contradiction” or reductio ad absurdum and it would be highly controversial for Zao to claim that instances of reductio are self-contradictory, yet that seems to be his suggestion. Further, it’s not clear why one need either assume that God exists or that she does not in analyzing the argument. This seems to entail that nobody who is agnostic with regards to the existence of God could ever analyze the argument, or that agnostics are committed to the claim that God does not exist, which is false. He appears to cite the “Law of Excluded Middle” as justification for this claim, but this seems confused. It may be the case that “God exists” is either true or false but this does not entail that one has to regard it as so. For example, the “Law of Excluded Middle” tells us that the proposition “Some man named Johnathan will ride a bicycle on November 21, 2014 and crash it into an Ice Cream Stand” is either true or false,  but this in no way entails that I must assume that the proposition is true nor assume that it is false. In short, nothing about the above argument begs the question. This should be clear, but it can be made clearer by formalizing the argument, if one wishes. If such is done, it will be evident that no premise is, nor has as a premise in its justification, the conclusion.

Zao also states:

I’m attempting to elevate the conversation by recognizing the epistemic role which properly basic beliefs or ultimate presuppositions (call them what you like) play in dealing with issues such as the problem of horrific suffering.

The talk about properly basic beliefs is quite confusing as it’s not relevant to the argument at all. I can only assume that when Zao speaks of “assuming” he’s not speaking of “assuming” in the logical sense, but rather in the epistemic sense. Of course, the fallacy of begging the question is a logical fallacy and so whatever might be going on with my epistemology it does not impact the logic of the argument. That is, even if I do believe that God does not exist, that does not make my giving the above argument question begging. Also, I have noticed a general trend amongst presuppositionalists to not only assume a sort of foundationalist epistemology, but to even assume others are foundationalists! How can I have properly basic beliefs or ultimate presuppositions if I think foundationalism is false? This isn’t an immediately relevant thought, but it’s interesting enough to flag.

Zao continues:

In Premise 1 we are told “Necessarily, if God exists, finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God realize their deepest good.”  Let’s break this down quickly for definitional purposes.  We’ll take “finite persons” to be, well, finite persons.  Finite persons who “ever more fully experience the reality of God” are people living life.  Every day every finite person existing ever more fully experiences the reality of God in various ways and to varying degrees, but every aspect of life is an experience of God in one way or another.  “Realizing their deepest good” means simply that they glorify God; and one may glorify God through either salvation or judgment.

So while Mitch’s definition is good, it is incomplete, as he stated: “…Indeed such an experience of God’s reality might manifest itself in different ways to different persons.”  Indeed, some people may realize their “deepest good” (glorifying God) through horrific suffering under the judgment of God for their sins.  So, given the above definitions, Premise 2 is false since certain persons glorify God most fully by suffering horrifically under judgment for their sins; and preventing that category of people from suffering would prevent them from “realizing their deepest good.”

Here, unfortunately, Zao misconstrues the argument. The finite persons who “ever more fully experience the reality of God” are not people living life simpliciter. They are the people who believe they are in a mutually interactive relationship with God of the sort to which theists commonly attest. This is a stipulative definition and I could have perhaps made it clearer, but this is one example of why I dislike long discussions pertaining to a brief survey article of some argument, there are things which get left out or overlooked that aren’t so left out or overlooked in the primary source. But, moving on, Zao is also mistaken about what it means to “realize one’s deepest good.” If you note premise (1) it’s explicitly defining what it means to realize one’s deepest good, and it means to ever more fully experience the reality of God. The rest of Zao’s response in its current form can be overlooked since it’s simply not relevant. Zao has, perhaps unintentionally, strawmanned the argument from Horrific Suffering.

On Chris’ Thoughts:

In Chris’ recent response he begins to steer the discussion in a different direction. He states:

Mitch claims that, “In the background of the argument is the question ‘What would a perfect being do?’” However, the argument pertains to God and not necessarily a “perfect being,” thus insofar as a question like this is in the background of the argument, the question is, “What would God do?” If the Christian concept of God is in view then it is the Christian concept of God which must be evaluated in terms of what the Christian God would do. Otherwise the argument simply does not pertain to the Christian God.

The argument does take the term God to refer to a perfect personal being and insofar as Chris might propose that the Christian God is not a perfect personal being, his conception of God evades the force of the argument. I didn’t make this fact explicit in the opening post for a few reasons: the first post was never intended to be exhaustive and the position that God is not a perfect being is a minority position in the philosophy of religion, to the best of my knowledge. With that said, I do know of a recently published paper which seeks to argue against the claim that “If God exists, God is perfect” though the title escapes me at the time of writing (e-mail me if you really want to know). With that said, there are a couple of options (at least that I can foresee at this very moment) along this road of objection. One can argue against any argumentation which seeks to establish that fact, obviously. Or one can argue for the proposition, “If God exists, God is imperfect.” Also, one claim that the attributes which I’ve argued would belong to a perfect being in fact would not. We can explore Chris’ article to see which, if any, of these routes are explored.

Firstly, it’s important to note that Chris presents some citations which seek to argue against the Ontological Argument. They don’t accurately address this argument however since no appeal has been made to God being that which none greater can be conceived. For that reason, a lot of what follows will be slightly misdirected but I will respond to what I think can be redirected appropriately. Chris first cites Van Til:

[W]e should be careful when we say that God is the being than whom none higher can be thought. If we take the highest being of which we can think, in the sense of have a concept of, and attribute to it actual existence, we do not have the biblical notion of God. God is not the reality that corresponds to the highest concept that man, considered as an independent being, can think. Man cannot think an absolute self-contained being; that is, he cannot have a concept of it in the ordinary sense of the term. God is infinitely higher than the highest being of which he can form a concept…When we speak of our concept or notion of God, we should be fully aware that by that concept we have an analogical reproduction of the notion that God has of himself. (Quoted in Bahnsen, Analysis, 634)

This quotation particularly misses the mark, but it can be illustrative. Van Til is arguing against the claim that God is the greatest conceivable being on the basis that no matter how great a being human persons can conceive, God is infinitely greater. Based on this quotation, one might want to respond to Van Til by saying that God is at least the greatest conceivable being or God is no lesser than the greatest conceivable being. Both of these options satisfy the above criticisms of Van Til and allow for one to still run an Ontological Argument, albeit of a different flavor. How is this relevant to the Argument from Horrific Suffering? Well, if the objection is that no matter how many great things I think being perfect would entail my list will never be exhaustive, we can absorb the objection by simply replying that while this may be true, being perfect could not be anything less. That is, perhaps my reflections lead me to say of God that, as a perfect being, she is perfectly loving and perfectly compassionate. I should not claim to therefore have exhausted God’s attributes, but what I can claim is that any further property ascribed to God such that God’s perfection increases will add to and not take away from those about which I have managed to think. Perhaps Bahnsen is in agreement when he states:

However, God has also revealed that He is much greater than anything that we can finitely imagine. His thoughts are higher than our thoughts (without our thoughts being false or misleading). (Bahnsen, Analysis, 634, n.163)

The key thing to notice here is that it is said God is much greater than anything we imagine. Greater, not worse.

Chris continues:

Recall that [Van Til] claims, “When we speak of our concept or notion of God, we should be fully aware that by that concept we have an analogical reproduction of the notion that God has of himself.” What Van Til is saying is that our concept of God  is God’s concept of God. Now this in and of itself is rather interesting, for surely no one should expect a Christian, which I would at the moment say that I am, to accept a man’s concept of God over God’s concept of God, but that is precisely what Mitch is asking us to do.

Let us keep in mind that Chris can only non-question-beggingly assert that God has a concept of God if it is non-question-begging to assert that God exists. In order for this assertion to be non-question begging, he has to mean by God something other than what the argument means by God; something other than a perfect personal being, since he has not yet argued that any of my ascriptions are false. He has suggested that my ascriptions are inexhaustive but that is of no consequence to the argument unless there is a necessary property of God such that its existence renders the operation of some other property limited. It’s yet to be seen if a suggestion such as this is even coherent, or if coherent, can apply to the ascriptions made in the previous articles.

Chris goes on to cite a previous quote of mine, I will quote the relevant portion:

Many of my discussions with Christians have resulted in their looking at the Christian story and saying that particular conceptual analyses don’t line up with the Biblical conception of God. As I’ve said before, so long as our conceptual analyses are reasonable, so much the worse for the Biblical conception of God; if a God did exist, it would not be that one.

This follows from taking the proposition “If God exists, God is a perfect personal being” to be true. If that is indeed true (and I hope to present my argumentation for this in a future article), and if the Christian story presents a depiction of God that is not a perfect personal being, so much the worse for that depiction. I hope my statement is clearer now, in light of what’s been discussed so far.

Towards the end of his response, Chris calls into question some of the ascriptions I’ve made and while I don’t see an argument against them in what he’s written, there are some questions worth answering. Chris says:

Any problems with Mitch applying his concept of “compassion” to the Christian God are now apparent as well. He writes, “Granting that there can exist no being more compassionate than God, if she exists, this perfect compassion coupled with perfect knowledge of what it is to undergo Horrific Suffering entails that God is, as Schellenberg puts it, maximally opposed to these sufferings.” But why does Mitch grant that God is compassionate at all? Perhaps some god is the very opposite of compassionate even in Mitch’s understanding of the matter. How would the argument then apply to that god?

Taking God to be a perfect personal being, we can reason as to the properties such a being would have by analyzing out the great-making properties of human persons; the great-making properties of personhood. That is, human beings possess the properties of being loving, being compassionate and being generous. These properties differ in quality from, say, the property of being deceptive or the property of being violent such that the properties of being loving, compassionate and generous can be called great-making properties. There are a lot of ways in which we can hash out this idea, but for the purposes of this article we can say that they are the properties which are intrinsically better to have than not, the properties we regard as great-making in that the more of these a person has, the more we speak of their excellence as a person in the positive sense. Now God, if the perfect personal being, will possess all the great-making properties of human persons to their maximal (highest possible) degree and probably possess some great-making properties that human persons do not. It is because of this that we can perform a conceptual analysis of what love means, what compassion means and so on, and reason (even if inexhaustively) as to which properties a perfect personal being would have. Such reasoning in this case has led us to the conclusion that because of God’s perfect knowledge and compassion which entails a profound awareness and opposition (compassion is sympathetic opposition), she will know what it is to suffer horrifically and not permit such a state if unnecessary for the deepest good of human persons. Again, since it is unnecessary for the deepest good of human persons, the existence of horrific suffering shows us there is no God.

So, in summation, and to be precise, the argument demonstrates that there exists no perfect personal being. It may turn out that this argument does not impact Chris in any way because as a Calvinist, he already agrees that there exists no perfect personal being. If this is the case, so be it, as the argument was never addressed to Chris directly (though his responses are always welcome). Certainly many people do believe in a perfect personal being and this argument has much discussion to provide amongst them. Alternatively, Chris might argue against the properties I’ve associated with perfection; arguments which I imagine will be quite interesting given how obvious the analyses seem upon reflection. At any rate, having the discussion head in this direction (if it continues) could serve to be very beneficial in understanding not only this argument, but other important issues in the philosophy of religion.

Note: For those who may not know, the article image is a reference to the old Christian poem entitled “Footsteps” which tells the story of a person told by God that they never walk alone, when God is asked then why at times there is only one set of footprints she remarks that those are the times in which she carried the person. I think this, though a story, can help to demonstrate what perfect compassion might look like.

Horrific Suffering (def.) = that most awe-full form of suffering that gives the victim and/or the perpetrator a prima facie reason to think that his or her life is not worth living.

(1) Necessarily, if God exists, finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God realize their deepest good.

(2) Necessarily, if God exists, the prevention of horrific suffering does not prevent there being finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God.

(3) Necessarily, if God exists, the prevention of horrific suffering does not prevent there being finite persons who realize their deepest good. (from 1, 2)

(4) Necessarily, if God exists, there is horrific suffering only if its prevention would prevent there being finite persons who realize their deepest good.

(5) Necessarily, if God exists, there is no horrific suffering. (from 3, 4)

(6) There is horrific suffering.

(7) God does not exist (from 5, 6)

Chris’ first objection takes aim at premise (2) of the argument. The premise is motivated by the existence of persons in the actual world who attest to experiencing the reality of God and who, themselves, have not gone through horrific suffering. Chris mentions that we must assume that these people are not “lying, deceived, forgetful, or otherwise confused about their alleged lack of horrific suffering.” He rightly notes the extraordinary implausibility of defending such a position, and I add that it would be a most uncharitable interpretation of those in question. However, he does suggest that such a question can be asked of their experiencing the reality of God. That is, of those who attest to experiencing the reality of God and not having gone through horrific suffering, how do we know that they are not lying, deceived or confused with respect to experiencing the reality of God? Chris says:

Now we need not take so strong a position as to deny that these people have experienced the reality of God in order to plant this objection. Rather, we may point out that the subjective nature of experiencing the reality of God is sufficient to raise our suspicions about these people who claim to have had the experience of God without the experience of horrific suffering. How do we know that what one non-suffering person believes is an experience of the reality of God is anything at all like what some suffering person believes is an experience of the reality of God?

To experience the reality of God, in the context of this argument, is to be in a personal relationship with the creator of the cosmos. A relationship of the type theists mention often. It is a being as aware of the existence of God as a child is aware of his or her loving mother. That such an experience occurs in the “ever more fully” sense is to simply point out that given the infinite complexity of God, there will always be more about God for some finite human person to know. That is, if God exists and is as awesome as theists often claim, it is difficult to see how any finite human person can exhaust the things there are to know about God, or exhaust the feelings there are to be had about God, or exhaust the myriad of forms a personal relationship with her might take. It is indeed doubtful that these things can be exhausted in the context of human-to-human relationships, let alone human-to-divine relationships.  Indeed such an experience of God’s reality might manifest itself in different ways to different persons; perhaps we should even expect such a thing given God’s infinite resourcefulness, creativity, and the existence of unique individuals. Chris’ question then seems misguided. Why should we have to know that what one non-suffering person believes to be an experience of God’s reality is what a suffering person believes to be an experience of God’s reality? What is it about the subjective nature of experiencing God’s reality that should lead us to, as Chris suggests, be suspicious of those who claim to experience God, having never suffered horrifically? I fear I must have misunderstood Chris here, as I cannot bring out the objection.

Chris’ next objection is also misguided, but I fear the fault is mine for not taking the time in the initial article to outline the meaning of “ever more fully experiencing the reality of God”.  Chris says that even granting that there exists one person who has not experienced horrific suffering and has experienced the reality of God, it does not follow that the individual is in a position to “ever more fully experience” the reality of God. I hope my paragraph above clarifies what is meant by that term. I am speaking here of, in many ways, an experience of God that unfolds throughout eternity and is such that, given God’s infinite resourcefulness and creativity, the fruits of which are inexhaustible by the finite human person. Now, as Chris continues there is an important distinction to be made. Chris says that:

It could be the case that the non-suffering individual experiences the reality of God in an increasingly fuller sense but that the individual will never experience the reality of God to the degree that she could have had she of endured horrific suffering.

But this is no objection to the argument. No matter which “level of experience” the finite human person initially finds themselves at, there will be an infinite amount of unfolding left to occur. This effectively diffuses Chris’ objection as the value is placed not in the degree at which the divine experience occurs, but in its unfolding nature, the “ever more fully experiencing.” But even setting this point aside, what would be preventing the experience of the non-sufferer from reaching the heights of the sufferer? Is it God, the nature of horrific suffering, or something else? And further, why think that such prevention is necessary? Thus, assuming Chris does not want to object to (2) by taking the strong position of denying that those who claim to experience the reality of God without having suffered horrifically have actually experienced such a reality, the premise seems to survive this round of scrutiny.

Chris’ next target is (4). The denial of (4) seems quite the denial indeed. To deny the premise suggests that if God exists, there can be instances of persons who undergo horrific suffering even though their doing so is unnecessary for the realization of their deepest good. Chris, being the good Calvinist that he is, writes:

It is conceivable that a perfectly good God would “justifiably cause/permit some person A to suffer” even if that suffering were not necessary for bringing about some greater good for A. God not only owns that person, but is Himself the standard of what is just. God does no man wrong by taking his life from him immediately and without any cause known to us, and the same might just as easily be said with respect to “horrific suffering.” Herein lies a serious difficulty with reasoning through atheists’ arguments; the assumption throughout this particular argument is that humanity is the main focus of God’s dealings rather than God being the main focus of God’s dealings as Scripture describes.

It would be fruitful to understand to which particular flavor of Divine Command Theory Chris adheres, if he does possess such a view. I think Chris owes us some argumentation as to how the existence of a perfectly good God is compatible with the existence of human persons unnecessarily undergoing horrific suffering. Looking at an analogous instance, it seems obvious that something has gone wrong when we are saying of the parent that they are acting in accordance with anything we might remotely pick out as being “good” when they cause or permit their beloved child to suffer horrifically when the prevention of that suffering would occur at no loss to the beloved! Chris hints that the analysis may be too narrow, assuming that humanity is the main focus of God’s dealings. The lurking suggestion might be that God causes or permits the existence of horrific suffering for her own “deepest good.” It’s difficult to see how this might work out. This does suggest, however, that there is some good-for-God which only obtains if finite persons exist. But goods in this category seem to be, for example, instances of personal relationship between God and the created. Certainly I do not want to limit the category to those things, but I want to note the prima facie implausibility of there being, as a good in that category, that finite beings suffer horrifically. What is it about the existence of horrific suffering that makes it a necessary condition for the realization of God’s deepest good?

But these considerations aside, Chris’ objection simply begs the question. Recall, he says: “It is conceivable that a perfectly good God would justifiably cause/permit some person A to suffer even if that suffering were not necessary for bringing about some greater good for A.” Temporarily ignoring the debate of whether or not conceivability is a suitable modal epistemology, that is, whether or not it is a suitable guide to possibility, the argument from horrific suffering seeks to demonstrate that such a thing is not possible. Thus, unless Chris is just assuming from the outset that this argument is unsound, the objection does not work. Chris needs to argue (in a non question-begging way) against any justification of that premise, rather than merely assuming the premise false!

It is also important to note that when Chris says, “… the assumption throughout this particular argument is that humanity is the main focus of God’s dealings rather than God being the main focus of God’s dealings as Scripture describes,” it seems he is taking it to be the case that if God creates a world, God creates this world. That is, he is taking the data presented by the argument and attempting to make sense of how it “fits” in this “Christian-God created world.” The argument, however, has as its conclusion that there is no God, so Chris must be careful not to beg the question against the argument by reasoning in a manner that assumes the conclusion false, to show the conclusion false. An appeal to Scripture to show that the existence of horrific suffering is consistent with the Christian story may easily yield to us the conclusion that “If God creates a world, God does not create this world.” More precisely, we must be careful in looking upon the actual world as being created by God when attempting to reason about the type of world God would create and the types of worlds she would not/could not! Argumentation may lead us to say, “So, Scripture claims that God made a world with unnecessary horrific suffering… so much the worse for Scripture.“

Given these considerations, Bolt’s objections to the argument in their current form fail, and we may successfully conclude that God does not exist.

In response to Bolt’s opening post, I replied and Bolt has since authored his rebuttal. What follows will be a response to the issues he raises therein.

Liangzhi, Proper Function, and Selflessness

First, I will explain some more about li, qi, and liangzhi. To quote directly from Tien’s paper:

For most Neo-Confucians, li describes the way a thing or state of affairs ought to be. So when things or states of affairs are in accord with li, they are deemed “natural,” and when they are not, they are deemed “deviant.” All things possess all the li of the universe within them. In human beings, the li exist complete in the mind (xin). For Wang, though, the mind not only contains li, the mind is itself li.

The liangzhi is the mechanism by which one can come to know the li or the principle of all things. Liangzhi is both a cognitive and affective (thinking and feeling) faculty. The li serves as the principle which describes the way things ought to be. Every existing thing contains all of the li within and so li is completely existent within the mind and while the mind contains li it is also, itself, li. Birth endows all human beings with a perfect mind or xinzhibenti. The perfect mind does not come to knowing by thinking, but simply knows. Liangzhi is a faculty of this mind which discerns “flawlessly, naturally and spontaneously between right and wrong,” thus forming correct beliefs and correct affective responses. However, there is a problem of qi:

All things in the universe are a combination of li and qi. Qi is the stuff of which the universe is made. It exists in various grades of purity. Although all things possess all the li of the universe within them, because of the impurity of the qi of which they are composed, some li are obstructed, thereby accounting for the differences between things.

Just as all things possess all of the li of the universe, because of the qi that forms their composition some li are obstructed. However, human beings have the ability to purify the levels of qi within and in turn allow the li to “shine forth”. Internal manifestations of qi within human beings are self-centered desires. It is these desires, or subsequent states of mind that cause us to lose touch with our pure mind and liangzhi. That liangzhi is to operate effectively requires that the self-centered desires are eliminated. Thus, our minds while li, are corrupted by qi. But how then can we come to know things? Regarding proper function, one can be said to be able to discern knowledge when one is employing liangzhi at some time; that is, our beliefs are warranted when we come to them while employing liangzhi. But how may we do this when qi “blocks” the liangzhi?

The proper functioning of the mind is acquired through selflessness or the absence of self-centered desires. Self-centered in this context does not mean selfish, but is translated from si meaning “to make oneself the center of one’s world.” It can be said that being in a state of selflessness in order to employ liangzhi equates to being unselfconscious of personal agency. To form an analogy, we can say that in order for our beliefs to be warranted, we must polish (liangzhi) the dust (qi) off of a mirror, in order to see the reflection (li) clearly. This “polishing of the dust” is a cumulative process, we must first rid ourselves of self-centered thoughts one at a time; and each time we do, we become better equipped to do so with other self-centered thoughts in the future. Second, we must extend liangzhi to our everyday lives.

The means by which one achieves a state of selflessness is firstly through the rectification of thoughts. This is simply to purge one of the impurities of self-centeredness to permit the second stage of the extension of knowledge, which results in the attainment of warranted belief.  The rectification of thoughts or gewu explains that the mind is li and the proper place to discover li is in the mind and not in any outside world. In eliminating incorrect thoughts, one’s mind can function freely and being to operate properly. Gewu entails that once a single self-centered thought begins to stir, it must be cast out. As it is a continual effort, each individual success allows the liangzhi to operate more freely and the more freely the liangzhi is the more easily it can identify incorrect thoughts and eliminate them. As such, when one eliminates some self-centered desire relevant to a particular belief, one attains an affective state of selflessness in relation to that belief and the liangzhi constitutes a properly functioning cognitive-affective faculty relative to that belief. This is, in effect, polishing the mirror to reflect the images before it.

Further, there is the additional criterion of the extension of knowledge. Succinctly, this is to extend the liangzhi to matters of everyday life. It is the difference between knowing “how” and knowing “that.” One cannot extend the liangzhi if they are not in an affective state of selflessness to some specific belief which would prevent one from attaining an affective state of action which stands as a necessary condition for true belief to constitute warranted knowledge. In some instances self-centered desires hinder the liangzhi from extending and the effective way of unearthing one’s incorrect thoughts are by attempts at such extension. “When the attempted extension fails, the subject will then be in a much better position to identify the relevant self-centered desires, and when they are identifies, she will be forced to confront them.” Upon doing so, extension of the liangzhi will be possible. That is, failure to extend one’s liangzhi reveals the relevant self-centered desires that need overcoming. As such, the rectification of thoughts and the extension of knowledge is a cyclical process. “The rectification of thoughts is the effort to extend knowledge. As one knows how to extend his knowledge, he also knows how to rectify thoughts. If he does not know how to rectify thoughts, it means he does not yet know how to extend his knowledge.” For those who have already eliminated all the self-centered desires and still cannot extend the liangzhi the issue of unity between knowledge and action arises. That is to say, the extension of liangzhi is merely acting upon the deliverances of the properly functioning liangzhi. Is it possible to know that filial piety involves caring for one’s parents in both winter and summer without actually doing so? One might have right beliefs about such but until one extends this otherwise lesser kind of knowledge, one will never truly “know.” Knowledge is the beginning of action, and action is the completion of knowledge.

And so, we can identify the Neo-Confucian theory of warrant as:

A belief p will have real warrant for a person S if and only if S is in an affective state appropriate to belief p, and p is produced in S by properly functioning cognitive-affective faculties in an appropriate cognitive affective environment for S’s kind of cognitive-affective faculties, according to a function successfully aimed at truth, and the degree of warrant p enjoys for S is directly proportional to the firmness with which S holds p.

Bolt’s Lack of Clarity

Bolt writes:

Recall that the reason atheistic epistemic justifications fail is because atheism does not provide for objective epistemic normativity which is required for propositional knowledge.

As evidenced by the italics in the above quote, Bolt clearly considers justification and normativity to be two different things. This statement seems counter to some things Bolt has said in his opening statement:

“Something like justification or warrant is required in order for someone to have propositional knowledge.”

“What is required for propositional knowledge is some sort of objective epistemic normativity.”

“Some type of epistemic warrant must be accounted for in Nocterro’s view of the world because of the need for warrant in knowledge.”

“The character and command of God and His having created us in His image and obligated us toward Him provides for the epistemic normativity necessary to right belief.”

“Epistemic warrant is in some sense necessary for human intelligibility yet it is foreign to an atheistic worldview while the Christian worldview provides for epistemic warrant. “

Bolt, in his most recent response, claims that atheistic epistemic justifications fail because atheism does not provide for objective epistemic normativity. However, as evidenced by the quotes above from his opening post, he uses the terms “justification”, “warrant”, and “normativity” interchangeably. So I must wonder, what is he asking the atheist to provide? In fact, I must wonder this same thing overall. I do not think Chris has been at all detailed enough in describing his worldview and how it provides warrant/normativity, or in stating what it is the atheist needs to do in order to effectively argue against his position. Furthermore, Bolt states in his response that:

Nocterro allegedly provides a brief summary of Plantinga’s position on epistemic justification which I do not adhere to and did not bring up in my opening statement.

Firstly, I am not sure what Bolt means here by “allegedly”; I must ask him to clarify his choice of words. Bolt thinks I am assuming that Plantinga’s position is his position as well. However, this is not the case. There are two reasons why I chose to discuss Plantinga’s view on warrant. The first is that Bolt, in his opening statement, never went into detail on what the concept of warrant entailed. I was thus forced to go with the leading view in order to discuss the topic:

Perhaps the most prevalent view of warrant in contemporary philosophy is that of proper function, as employed comprehensively and famously by Alvin Plantinga.

The second reason has nothing to do with Bolt’s (as yet explained) account for warrant, but a possible atheistic account for warrant. I merely presented Plantinga’s view as background information, going on to quote Plantinga himself in defense of atheistic warrant:

Even if [the atheist] doesn’t think we human beings have been designed and created by a powerful and highly competent being who proposed to endow us with the ability to achieve true beliefs, he may nonetheless think of this idea as a convenient and useful fiction [...] he may say that our cognitive faculties are working properly when they are working in the way they would work if the theistic story were true. He may therefore treat this story the way corresponding stories are treated by some who accept ideal observer theories in ethics…

Perhaps in response to this, he writes, in the section previous to his quote above:

Finally, Nocterro believes that he can presuppose God in his reasoning without believing that God exists. Not only does the argument presented show that epistemic normativity is impossible on a view where God does not exist, but it is impossible to “presuppose God” without believing that God exists, so Nocterro fails in his attempt to escape the conclusion of the argument given the soundness of the argument.

I agree that it is impossible to presuppose God without believing that God exists. Plantinga’s quote above states that the atheist does *not* presuppose God (which would entail belief that He exists), but rather that he may take the idea to be “a convenient and useful fiction”. That is, the atheist may use the concept of God as a thought experiment, and nothing more. To conclude, I must ask Chris to clarify his views on a few things before this discussion can proceed any further:

1) What is warrant?

2) What is justification?

3) What is epistemic normativity?

Bolt’s Objections to Neo-Confucian Warrant

Bolt states:

Nocterro has not provided any explanation of how the liangzhi may have been designed to function as it is held to function as opposed to any other way.

This, however, strikes me as similar to asking why God is the way he is rather than other way. Do questions such as these really have answers? Surely they are brute facts that are unexplained by any external states of affairs.

Bolt further states:

The liangzhi must be the result of unintentional, undirected, non-human, non-divine, non-intelligent processes by which the liangzhi came to be or comes to be.

Or simply not a result of anything at all, similar to how God is not a result of any non-God thing. If what Bolt is hinting at here is a sort of evolutionary objection in that it seems odd that evolution would develop liangzhi, I think we can agree with him. Of course, under Neo-Confucianism the existence of a mind necessarily entails the existence of liangzhi so that insofar as we have an explanation as for why evolution would bring about a mind, we have thereby explained why there is liangzhi. That liangzhi is the type of faculty that it is seems to be merely a brute fact.

Bolt states:

Further, he implies through his use of terms like “ought” that li, while only a descriptive concept, is somehow normative. Indeed he states this outright but without any reason for doing so.

But the li is not only a descriptive concept, it is both descriptive and normative as outlined above: “…when things or states of affairs are in accord with li, they are deemed ‘natural,’ and when they are not, they are deemed ‘deviant.’” Bolt states:

… the question remains as to why the li should be preferred over qi anyway. Again, epistemic normativity is lacking in this view and there is no apparent reason why one is obligated to conform one’s thoughts to li to begin with.

This seems no different than asking why one would prefer or adjust their lives towards God over Satan? Bolt might answer that we should do so because God created us, but where is the principle that says if one creates another, we should adjust our lives towards them? Even if there were such a principle, why should one follow it rather than not? Perhaps Bolt would state that because God commands us to do so, but why should we listen to his commands rather than not? Bolt might state that we’ll be punished if we don’t, but why should we prefer non-punishment over punishment?  Of course, perhaps there is no obligation under Neo-Confucianism to conform to the li, or perhaps one should prefer the li because of the better lives that result in ridding one’s self of self-centered desires. The question seems to be importing standards from Bolt’s own view in examining Neo-Confucianism but he must not judge this system by his presuppositions to determine internal incoherence he must examine my system from within and there does not seem to be any necessity for this idea of “preference” that Bolt is introducing. Bolt states:

Some may think that I have already given Nocterro too much, for while Christianity is a revelatory worldview, Neo-Confucianism is not. There are questions concerning how anyone comes to know these sort of claims concerning liangzhi and li and qi to begin with. Has Nocterro ‘discovered’ and ‘reached’ the liangzhi? If he has not, then he cannot claim to have come to know the liangzhi apart from the ‘authority’ of Wang (given that Wang reached it himself), but this is not bringing even one’s most basic thoughts into conformity with li because Wang was just another human being.

Given the discussion on the role of action, it would actually be impossible to count claims based on authority as knowledge. There must be that role of personal experience and affective states. This doesn’t, then, seem to be a problem. He further states:

The world of li and qi is not an appropriate cognitive environment for the operation of liangzhi since qi obstructs the operation of the liangzhi so that it does not function properly.

Of course the same might be said for his worldview as well, that the noetic influence of sin prevents any knowledge whatsoever. However, Bolt has the faculties of the so-called sensus divinatus as an alleged “way-out” of this problem, and so too has the Neo-Confucian a “way out” in the criteria previously outlined.

Conclusion

It does seem that Neo-Confucianism epistemology permits the ideas of warrant, proper function and normativity (as understood by traditional definitions, I now assume that Bolt is using them as such). Indeed, since this is true Bolt’s claim that only Christianity could do so is clearly false. Since this also forms the basis of his argument for the truth of Christianity, one is not required to accept his conclusion that Christianity is true and one need not accept on this basis that scripture is true, or that I presuppose God. If Bolt’s key argument for the Christian position has indeed failed, one must wonder by which means is he now establishing the truth of Christianity.

The Argument

Again, I will reintroduce the argument of which we are speaking:

(1) If God exists, then God is necessarily omnipotent and necessarily triune

(2) If God is necessarily omnipotent, then God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs

(3) If God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs, then God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune

(4) If God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune, then God is not necessarily triune

(5) Therefore, God does not and cannot exist

The state of affairs which is being referred to in premise (3) is:

(A) Toronto’s being flooded is brought about directly or indirectly by a being that has never been triune

One might understand this further with our example of Bob:

Imagine we have Bob who works at the city dam, who for some reason makes a computer error or falls asleep and as a result of such an action (or inaction) brings about that the city of Toronto is flooded. There is nothing logically impossible about this notion. Let it also be true that Bob is not triune. There is still nothing logically impossible about this notion. Given this, it is clear that (A) is true.

The Objection

Chris expresses disagreement that (A) is a logically possible state of affairs. Chris states:

Triune God brings about all things. If this is true then the state of affairs in which Toronto’s being flooded is brought about directly or indirectly by a being that has never been triune is not a logically possible state of affairs.

The Response

Where (A) is a state of affairs that has the property of being brought about only by a being who has never been triune, Chris argues that no state of affairs with such a property may obtain. Chris’ assertion can be regarded as:

(i) If God exists, necessarily: no non-triune being can bring about a state of affairs

One might worry as to the theological implications of (i). Perhaps we should look to Chapter III of the Westminster Confession for clarification:

God from all eternity did by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass. Yet so as neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty of contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established…

This passage seems wholly incoherent if one reads it with either a libertarian or a hard determinist understanding of freedom. It follows then that we must read it with a compatibilist understanding of freedom. Since the other two options seem incoherent for a Calvinist to support (libertarianism or hard determinism), it follows that they must embrace compatibilism. We should then apply compatibilism to our scenario with Bob the Dam Employee:

God decreed from all eternity that a non-triune being, Bob, would directly or indirectly bring about that the city of Toronto is flooded. Yet, Bob was not forced to directly or indirectly bring this about. That is to say, God ordained Bob’s thoughts and desires in such a way that he would freely, either through action or inaction, bring about that the city of Toronto is flooded.

But surely this is not the same as God bringing about the state of affairs himself. To illuminate the understanding of compatibilism, one might look at the Calvinist doctrine of Effectual Calling (as taken from Chapter X of the Westminster Confession – emphasis mine):

All those whom God hath predestinated unto life, and those only, he is pleased, in his appointed and accepted time, effectually to call, by his Word and Spirit, out of that state of sin and death, in which they are by nature, to grace and salvation by Jesus Christ; enlightening their minds spiritually and savingly, to understanding the things of God; taking away their heart of stone, and giving them an heart of flesh; renewing their wills, and by his almighty power determining them to that which is good, and effectually drawing them to Jesus Christ, yet so as they come most freely, being made willing by his grace.

Thus, for example, in Calvinism those who come to Christ through irresistible grace are not forced against their will to come. It is not that these people want to reject Christ and God forbids them, but rather he has changed their desires so that they come without hesitation. It seems clear then, as Calvinist Philosopher John Feinberg states:

Calvinists as determinists must either reject freedom altogether or accept compatibilism.¹

But what relevance does this bear as an analysis of (i)? Well, according to Christian tradition there are states of affairs in which man sins. My understanding is that Calvinism (or at least, non-hypercalvinism) does not affirm that God works unbelief in the hearts of the reprobate. R.C Sproul writes:

The Reformed view teaches that God positively or actively intervenes in the lives of the elect to insure their salvation. The rest of mankind God leaves to themselves. He does not create unbelief in their hearts. That unbelief is already there. He does not coerce them to sin. They sin by their own choices².

As such, consider the following state of affairs:

(B) Bob’s murdering of Tom is brought about directly or indirectly by a being that has never been triune

Now, if (i) holds, (B) is impossible and it would rather be the case that:

(B*) Bob’s murdering of Tom is brought about directly or indirectly by a being that is necessarily triune

On (B), Bob freely commits the sinful act and while God might work this towards some greater good, it is Bob who is responsible. It is Bob who brings about this state of affairs, even if by virtue of his sinful nature. On (B*) the situation is somewhat different. If we are to say that God has brought about the state of affairs, that is to say he directly brought about Bob’s murdering of Tom and it seems that God has directly inspired Bob to do evil. One might even state that under (B*) Bob commits no action at all, anymore than a tool actively performs the task intended by its wielder. If this is true, it seems that the Calvinist must reject (i) lest they accept that sinful states of affairs are brought about by God. If (i) is rejected, then (A) remains logically possible.

Recall also the response given to a consideration of a similar-type object in the initial post:

Further, one might object that it is possible that God cause a being, Bob, to perform an action so that a certain state of affairs obtains by the action of a necessarily non-omniscient being. But in this regard, has God has brought about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily omniscient? Not quite, God did not bring about the state of affairs that the lesser being did, but rather God brought about the state of affairs which brought about the lesser being to have a certain state of affairs obtain. In this regard, God still stands in causal relation and the argument still applies.

Conclusion

If the above analysis fails in accurately representing the position of Chris then I apologize. It is not an intentional misrepresentation. Further, one should be aware that arguments of this nature are plentiful and diverse that the failure of one, if it should fail, does not constitute a failure of all. Also, with the many different types of theism it is perhaps impossible for one argument to succeed in disproving all concepts of God. As such, one should not assume that the potential failure of this argument as applied to Chris’ position shows the argument wholly incorrect.

With that said, I simply have to wait and see if I’ve accurately represented Chris’s position. If I so have, I think the argument still stands. If not, there may be another approach or it may be that this argument is simply not the applicable formulation. At the very least, I hope to convey that the atheist need not rely wholly upon the alleged failure of theistic arguments for their case, and in fact, they should not.

__________________

¹Feinberg, John. S. “God, Freedom and Evil in Calvinist Thinking,” in The Grace of God, the Bondage of the Will, ed. Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1995), 2:465

²Sproul, R. C. Chosen by God. Tyndale House Publishers, Inc, 1994. 142-43.

Note: The discussion posted is only that up until December 9th, 2009. Chris and I both agreed to end the discussion between ourselves at this point.

My posts will be colored blue while Chris’ posts will be colored maroon.

Mitch:

My mention of hybridization was not because I think conventionalism is “compromised”, it was a specific point drawn to a premise of the formulation. My paper is *not* on logical conventionalism. There are heaps of resources available should one want to explore the system, I’ve even mentioned one in a footnote for further reading.

Further, the form of TAG is not unique/indirect, it’s simply modus tollens. Even in Jamin’s article this is clear, he offers a formal representation.

As for Fristianity, the illustration is clear. I can simply add “or as close to Christianity” as possible in brackets to satisfy your problem, but it does not render it unsound.

I surely hope that this is not an attempt a full critical response to my paper.

Chris:

Since I did not state that your paper is on conventionalism, and since there are “heaps of resources available” should one want to explore the problems with conventionalism, and since conventionalism as a tenable position is at least as equally valid given your program as a “specific point drawn to a premise of the formulation”, I do not see that there is much by way of a counter in the first part of your comment. Bahnsen does not offer a trilemma, so you are arguing against a straw man, and I have shown the problem with proposing a hybrid. Since “or as close to Christianity as possible” with respect to Fristianity is not in your article, there is nothing wrong with my objection. You have a bit of a worrisome tendency to add things to your arguments after you have made them and then fault me for being faithful to your original arguments in my critiques. I critiqued parts of your article, not subsequent comments from you that are not in the article.

Mitch:

Bahnsen’s TAG from his debate with Stein, which Jamin says is a good resource, does invoke a trilemma. If you look at the subsection entitled “II. OPENING STATEMENT—BAHNSEN” I think this is quite clear.

I also do not think you can make so bold a claim as to say that you have knowledge of what every possible hybridized account of logic would “look like”. At least, if you want to, that burden is clearly on you.

As for the Fristianity point, I’ve said that I will add the bracketed note in the final draft so I would expect that you read it as such.

It’s not my intention to fault you for criticizing the original arguments, but in a dialog we move forward (so long as we’re not shifting goalposts). Oh sorry, forgot to add… the mention of hybridization was a response to premise (2a) in my paper. A premise that is drawn, again, from Bahnsen’s debate with Stein.

Chris:

If it is so clear then quote the exact portion where Bahnsen offers a trilemma. You cannot, because he does not. Bahnsen offers different ways that the atheist might try to justify logic, but he never says that these examples are exhaustive; something you would need to have him say for the argument you made concerning this portion of the debate. This is why you have put something into the text of the transcript of the debate that is not actually there.

I do like one thing Bahnsen says though that is certainly relevant here. “To say that they are merely conventions is to simply say ‘I haven’t got an answer.’”

Mitch:

In the above passage I’ve mentioned, Bahnsen explicitly makes the argument that no non-Christian theistic way to justify the existence of the laws of logic is possible, he then criticizes the a priori way, the a posteriori way and the conventionalist way.

Now it should be clear here that his point, that “no non-Christian theistic way to justify the existence of the laws of logic is possible” (premise 2 of the argument) cannot merely be asserted. But rather, from his statement we can extract the defending premises, that is where we get (2a) and (2b), they are required to make sense of (2c) and further (2).

You say that he never says his list is exhaustive, well he never explicitly says this, but in him presenting the three different ways, and asserting they must necessarily fail, and then stating (2) gives us a pretty justified reason to utilize this premise in a formal representation. In effect, (2a-c) are the required supporting premises of Bahnsen’s claim in the debate (as represented by premise 2)

Of course, if you still want to quibble with (2a) we could certainly just say that Bahnsen hasn’t/can’t provide an exhaustive list. But that does not move us from (2b) to (2c) and back to (2). If you really want to admit that the argument Bahnsen has given in his debate is invalid, that is fine with me, but such a move is not conducive to discussion (or his position).

My point against (2a) in my paper is pointing out precisely why the premise is questionable, and whether or not Bahnsen explicitly stated it, it’s tantamount to his argument in that debate. We can certainly ask for an exhaustive list, but I doubt he’d be able to provide one, and even if he did provide one it would necessarily include the three positions mentioned in the premise. If anything, we’d be attributing too little to Bahnsen’s claim, which does not give us a problem anywhere in my paper, save for where I say that a hybridization might account.

With that said, I give Bahnsen the benefit of the doubt and assume that he was not intending to (and indeed did not) make an invalid argument during his debate. Even if I am wrong in this, the majority of my paper does not depend on it. In fact, the majority of my paper (perhaps every section besides “Initial Objections” seems that it could be applied to any formal representation of the TAG so long as it attempted to establish the type of relationship between logical principles and God that has been attempted by Bahnsen/Frame.

As for Bahnsen’s quote on conventionalism, one could simply retort that to say they are part of God’s nature is also a non-answer. The reading I’ve suggested in my paper on conventionalism seems like a good place to start to understand why the ‘usual’ objections to conventionalism fail.

Chris:

Not only am I having difficulty finding this alleged trilemma in the debate transcript, I am likewise having difficulty finding the premises you are referring to. I am glad you admit that Bahnsen never explicitly states that the ways of justifying logic he mentions are exhaustive. Bahnsen provides examples of ways the atheist might attempt to justify logic. The trilemma, again, is something you are forcing into the text of the transcript. As Bahnsen mentions later, everything cannot be said in one debate. What Dr. Bahnsen has done here is analogous to what he does later in the debate in response to the question, “What solid evidence do you have to maintain that the Christian faith is the only true religion with a God?” You may read his answer there for some further insight.

With this out of the way though, what other ways might you think of to justify the laws of logic? I think Dr. Bahnsen has provided a pretty substantial list of examples, do you not? Since your hybrid example falls prey to the leaky bucket problem that Bahnsen uses in multiple other places there is no reason that I can see for either asserting it as some kind of tenable fourth option or accusing Bahnsen of having left it out in an attempt to provide an exhaustive list.
Since your argument concerning this point relies upon the premises you have mentioned, I must repeat what I mentioned at the beginning of this comment, which is that I am having difficulty finding the premises you are referring to in the debate transcript. Perhaps you could quote them for me. When I read the transcript, I see Bahnsen clearly stating his argument at the end of his opening statement.

“When we go to look at the different world views that atheists and theists have, I suggest
we can prove the existence of God from the impossibility of the contrary. The
transcendental proof for God’s existence is that without Him it is impossible to prove
anything. The atheist world view is irrational and cannot consistently provide the
preconditions of intelligible experience, science, logic, or morality. The atheist world view
cannot allow for laws of logic, the uniformity of nature, the ability for the mind to
understand the world, and moral absolutes. In that sense the atheist world view cannot
account for our debate tonight.”

This looks different from the argument you are attributing to Bahnsen and then writing about. You ascribe a trilemma to Bahnsen that he never states and then critique “him” on it, and then appeal to a formulation of an argument that Bahnsen never states in order to try and prove that the trilemma is in the text. It looks like you are not arguing against what Bahnsen said, but rather what you wish Bahnsen would have said. Another example of this is found in [7], which states, “Bahnsen erroneously assumes that if one is an atheist, they[sic] must be a materialist”. Try as I may, I cannot find this conditional in anything Bahnsen has said or written. Perhaps you could quote this for me from the text of the transcript while you are getting the other two quotations for me?

As for your conventionalism, you have written, “Conventionalism, as applied to logic, is the philosophical attitude that logical principles are grounded on agreements in society rather than any external reality” and then suggest that the case may be made that Bahnsen has misunderstood conventionalism. The suggestion is dubious, but at any rate you do not pursue this in your article, which is fine. You attempt to answer the charge of a lack of universality by writing that “it is impossible to think of anyone in existence who could visualize the effects of a proposition which violated the LNC[24] and in this regard the LNC is universally self-grounded”. This is an extremely bold and unproven assertion. You continue that “Bahnsen criticized conventionalism for being arbitrary and potentially giving way to people with contradictory logical systems”. Your answer is that “it is hard to imagine someone who has adopted a logical system in which there is no LNC or equivalent mechanism”. Nonsense! I do not even have to imagine this, as there are people who claim to have done so and even attempt to live in accordance with the claim. You continue by spelling out a consequence of such a view, writing, “Such a system would be as trivial as a magic eight-ball that answers ‘yes’ to every question[25]”. Well, sure, but what does this have to do with anything? This is merely a result of accepting your conventionalist program. You continue, “It is difficult to see why Bob or any of his friends would adopt a system with no mechanism to differentiate between any propositions”. Again, who cares? Do I need to know the reason someone adopts a position to know that they do in fact do so? Of course, I do know the reason people reject logic and attempt to embrace denials of logic and positions like conventionalism; it is because they are sinners. You next write, “On pragmatic grounds, it is entirely useless”. This is just your unsupported opinion though. Useless for what? I just gave one pragmatic reason for rejecting logic; logic presupposes the existence of God whom sinners want nothing to do with apart from God regenerating them and bringing them to repentance from sin and a trusting in Jesus Christ as Savior and Lord. Two quotes from the debate transcript may be brought to bear upon this discussion. The first is from Stein and the second is from Bahnsen. Together, they answer the alleged responses you provided to the brief critique of conventionalism that Bahnsen made.

“He says that the laws of logic are the same everywhere. This is not true, although they
are mostly the same. And I wonder if he ever heard of a Zen Koan, and the answer to a Zen
Koan, is something which is like – ‘what is the sound of one hand clapping’ is the most
famous Zen Koan – The answer to that kind of question is in a different kind of logic in a
sense, or extra logical, if you want to call it that.”

“It might be appropriate in some societies to say, ‘Well, my car is in the parking lot, and
it’s not the case that my car is in the parking lot.’ There are laws in certain societies that have
a convention that says, ‘go ahead and contradict yourself’. But then there are in a sense,
some groups in our own society that might think that way. Thieves have a tendency to say,
‘this is not my wallet, but it is not the case that it’s not my wallet.’ They may engage in
contradictions like that, but I don’t think any of us would want to accept this.”

The very last sentence in the quote from Dr. Bahnsen is important. There are people who will attempt to reject the kind of logic we need for intelligibility, and in a conventionalist program there are no worries in doing this. After all, “logical principles are grounded on agreements in society”, but then, how is it that logic is necessary?

Mitch:

There’s not much more I can say that has not been said in my last comment. If Bahnsen in his debate was not using the premises I’ve outlined, his argument is simply invalid. You cannot move from:

(1) There is a rational justification for the laws of logic

to:

(3) Christian theism is true

without:

(2) It is necessary that: if Christian theism is false, then there is no rational justification for the laws of logic

And further, (2) needs justification. Given Bahnsen’s criticisms in the debate, if he is attempting to construct a valid argument (which we can assume), he is doing so by the deduction from (2a-c), this is what gives him (2).

If he was not intending to give an exhaustive list, he could have just said that. But there’s no reason to infer that he did not think he was giving one, especially given how strong of a claim he was making… that *only* Christian theism can account for logic. I do think his list of examples is pretty comprehensive, but I cannot discount the possibility of some other system. It also doesn’t follow that if even these three all fail, a hybridized system containing them would also fail. That statement seems as if it would be a fallacy of composition. All I’m claiming in my paragraph there is the possibility, something Bahnsen needs to discount for the strong claims of his position to hold.

As for the justification, Bahnsen seems to assume that Dr. Stein is a materialist because he is an atheist: “What are the laws of logic, Dr. Stein, and how are they justified? We’ll still have to answer that question from a materialist standpoint.” (p. 23)

I do not think that Stein anywhere says that he is a materialist, and as such, Bahnsen assumes it.

As for conventionalism, some people may have adopted systems with no LNC-like mechanism, but these systems are trivial.

You said: “You continue, “It is difficult to see why Bob or any of his friends would adopt a system with no mechanism to differentiate between any propositions”. Again, who cares? Do I need to know the reason someone adopts a position to know that they do in fact do so? Of course, I do know the reason people reject logic and attempt to embrace denials of logic and positions like conventionalism; it is because they are sinners.”

A system with no mechanism to differentiate between propositions would still be classified as a logical system, but a trivial logical system. So if you are saying that these people reject logic, you are entirely incorrect. Conventionalism is not a denial of logic, it’s a denial of what you believe logic to be and there certainly is a difference.

As for the pragmatic justification of logic, a trivial system is useless because it does not permit us to make usable inferences. If the answer to every question is “yes”, what do we do with such a system? We must also take into account our evolutionary history and any development of language therein. How would a trivial system aid in our survival? Again, this is discussed at great length in the book I’ve cited in my paper.

Bahnsen’s criticism of conventionalism seems quite misunderstood, that is simply not how it works. But, as a commenter said elsewhere on this site, it perhaps is not your job to educate me on the TAG, and by this virtue, it is perhaps not my job to educate you on conventionalism.

So, in short, the formal version of the TAG I present *is* based on Bahnsen’s position as espoused in the debate.He does not explicitly state the trilemma, but if his argument in the debate is to be valid, he must be assuming it. Further, I’m not quite sure that Bahnsen understands conventionalism, at least in some present forms.

Also, these objections are fine and dandy but I do not feel that they address the ‘meat’ of my paper.

Chris:

I will take your repetition of what you have already stated and the lack of quotes as evidence that you are unable to answer my concerns over your representation of the argument Bahnsen actually used. I see no reason to repeat what I have already written and the quotes that I am able to produce in support of my understanding of the transcript. I will briefly mention that so far as I remember Stein did not deny the implication that he was a materialist and while he asked how a law could be material he immediately began what appears to be an attack on the opposite position from materialism during his cross-ex time which is when he made his famous error. It might be argued that in the history of Western thought atheists have traditionally been materialists, and it may also be that Bahnsen held an argument to the effect of atheism needing to be a materialist position to remain consistent, though I doubt this was the case. In any event, the conditional is far too strong to assign to Bahnsen when he stated no such thing.

Now if I understand you right, you are asserting that there may possibly be some other way to account for logic, but you do not have any idea what this would look like. Of course, if the three examples of attempts at justification fail, this leaves you in the position of being unable to account for logic and hence needing to accept Christianity upon pain of irrationality, but I suppose atheists must cling to such fideistic and irrational positions. If I may rip a quote from Bahnsen out of context and misapply it:

“One more interesting comment about that and we’ll let it go, he says ‘We do believe there are answers to these problems. We have yet to find them’. You see, that’s the problem: atheists live by faith.”

It appears that in light of my criticisms you have changed one of your views, for you write, “As for conventionalism, some people *may have* adopted systems with no LNC-like mechanism” which is certainly not consistent with your earlier, “it is *impossible* to think of anyone in existence who could visualize the effects of a proposition which violated the LNC” and “it is *hard to imagine* someone who has adopted a logical system in which there is no LNC or equivalent mechanism”. I suppose you may answer that it is impossible for you to think and that it is hard for you to imagine but nevertheless “some people may have adopted systems with no LNC-like mechanism”, but I will just repeat that it actually is the case that people have adopted such systems and your difficulty with it, if not based purely in ignorance, is that you are attempting to evaluate another society’s agreed upon logical principles from within your own, but why should your system be accepted rather than the other? I hope you will not make the mistake of appealing to the agreed upon logical principles of your society in answering this question.

You write: “A system with no mechanism to differentiate between propositions would still be classified as a logical system, but a trivial logical system. So if you are saying that these people reject logic, you are entirely incorrect.”

Not if I am right about logic. This aside, I am glad you agree that there could, according to your conventionalism, be other logical systems without such a “mechanism”. It is perhaps the case that you are only calling it trivial based upon your own society’s agreed upon logical principles though. Adherents to that system may not think it is trivial at all!

You continue, “Conventionalism is not a denial of logic, it’s a denial of what you believe logic to be and there certainly is a difference.” Unless of course what I believe logic to be is what logic actually is, but I did not write that conventionalism is a denial of logic anyway. For you to state that conventionalism is not a denial of logic is likewise to assume that your position on logic is correct. Also, it may be the case that in a system there is no difference between what people believe logic to be and what logic actually is, and as a conventionalist you certainly are not in a position to critique that system because you differ with it. It looks as though conventionalism is actually such a system.

“As for the pragmatic justification of logic, a trivial system is useless because it does not permit us to make usable inferences.”

This is circular, but aside from this you are again just assuming the agreed upon logical principles of your own society in making this claim, and the “trivial” system is certainly not subject to such a criticism as has already been mentioned.

“If the answer to every question is ‘yes’, what do we do with such a system?”

Yes.

“We must also take into account our evolutionary history and any development of language therein. How would a trivial system aid in our survival?”

I suppose we would use the agreed upon logical principles of our societies to try to answer this question.

The meat of your article actually does not look like it is TAG specific. Other than this, I briefly touched upon my approach in the original post.

It is not my job to educate you on the TAG when you are the one who is writing an argument against it, but then, it is “my job” to point out when you have made errors in your alleged refutation. The same may perhaps apply in the case of conventionalism, but add to this that you are supposedly using a conventionalist platform to argue from, so a reductio on the position leaves you…well, there is a picture.

Mitch:

I will likewise take your repetition of the problem to mean that you have not understood what I’ve stated. I assume that somewhere in obtaining your philosophy degree you were required to analyze texts and extrapolate arguments, in doing so, there are often times where a premise is not explicitly stated but must be assumed to maintain the validity of the argument. I will not repeat myself anymore, but this is one of those times. Now, moving on…

Yes, I am making the claim that if the three mentioned ways of justifying logic fail, it does not follow that all possible justifications fail unless these three are necessarily the only type of justifications. Your quotation just exemplifies something typical of religion in general, if I may utilize a quote of my own which I think applied beautifully here:

“Philosophy is questions that may never be answered. Religion is answers that may never be questioned.”

You said: “If course, if the three examples of attempts at justification fail, this leaves you in the position of being unable to account for logic and hence needing to accept Christianity upon pain of irrationality, but I suppose atheists must cling to such fideistic and irrational positions.”

This is no better than a God of the Gaps argument, applied to logical justifications. Why can’t epistemology rely on the possibility of there being justifications? If you’re saying that the case is such that these three justifications have been shown to be false, and Christianity has not, therefore we must choose Christianity, I think you’ve just begged the question in favor of Christianity. If the arguments in the bulk of my paper hold up, it is an incoherent notion to state that logical principles can be grounded in the existence of God.

“It appears that in light of my criticisms you have changed one of your views, for you write, “As for conventionalism, some people *may have* adopted systems with no LNC-like mechanism” which is certainly not consistent with your earlier, “it is *impossible* to think of anyone in existence who could visualize the effects of a proposition which violated the LNC” and “it is *hard to imagine* someone who has adopted a logical system in which there is no LNC or equivalent mechanism”.”

There is no contradiction here, I was making a modal claim (I should have clearly stated this), there is a possible world in which a species/society/what-not has adopted a system with no LNC (think, different evolutionary pressures, or what not), and it is likewise impossible to think of anyone in existence (actual) who could visualize the effects of a proposition that violates the LNC.

You say that some societies have (presumably, societies in this world) contradicted the LNC, well… which societies do you think have contradicted the LNC?

As for non-logical societies, Bahnsen used the example of Buddhist societies, with the use of Koans. I think if you know the answer to that hand-clapping Koan, you instantly reach enlightenment. Do you know the answer, and happen to know that it’s “extra-logical” or is it just a really hard question that might not have an answer (maybe that is even the point of the question, but I digress)

In an effort to clear up some of this misunderstanding, I have modified footnote #23:

“Conventionalism, as applied to logic, is the philosophical attitude that logical principles are grounded on agreements in society rather than any external reality. This agreement is not necessarily voluntary (and perhaps is necessarily not-voluntary); of course, logical conventions may have very well arisen via evolution, giving us a neurological predisposition to the conventions we do hold. Another possibility is that we acquire logic at around the same time we acquire language, and once it’s in our minds, it can’t be changed.”

I think that this is where your confusion comes in, it’s not that we can actually will to change our logical system. Bahnsen famously said in his debate that logic can’t be actions in our brains, because all of our brains are different. Perhaps he means to say that our minds are different, because evolutionarily, we’re all the same species!

At any rate, as I’ve said before, a proper treatment of conventionalism was not the aim of this paper and is available elsewhere. Given that you might not fully understand this system, it is questionable as to why you’ve rejected it’s coherence outright.

The meat of my paper is specific to the claim “logical principles can be grounded in the existence of God”, a claim I would have thought you’d have embraced wholly.

Chris:

When the proponent of a view explicitly denies an interpretation of his work and you subsequently argue against that interpretation as though it is correct you argue against a straw man. Perhaps if we let Bahnsen interpret himself (as we should) he has no argument, but then it is sufficient to point this out. You have not done this, but rather ascribe an argument to Bahnsen and argue against it as though it were his own. Further, if you do not have an argument to show the impossibility of demonstrating the premise in question then you have not refuted your alleged reformulation of TAG at this point since by your reasoning there is a possibility that it can be demonstrated.

“…there is a possible world in which a species/society/what-not has adopted a system with no LNC…”

I agree, it happens all the time in the actual world.

“You say that some societies have (presumably, societies in this world) contradicted the LNC, well… which societies do you think have contradicted the LNC?”

Actually I did not say this. I do not suppose one can contradict the Law of Non-Contradiction if the system of logic wherein it is supposedly contradicted does not have contradictions, but then, trying to operate in accordance with your view on logic, that may just be the way things look like to me.

As for societies etc. that have attempted to claim a system without the Law of Non-Contradiction and have attempted to live in accordance with this I provided some examples per Bahnsen and Stein. Other examples might include adherents to Eastern religions and philosophies, pluralists, and freshman philosophy students. The quote about the Koan is from Stein, not Bahnsen, and it is illegitimate to call it “non-logical” if you are to be consistent with conventionalism.

“…it is likewise impossible to think of anyone in existence (actual) who could visualize the effects of a proposition that violates the LNC.”

Again, this is a bold assertion that has not been given any support, and it likely is just a result of the agreed upon logical principles of your society blinding you concerning other systems.

In your arguing against TAG, you argue against a claim that you admit is not a part of the traditional presuppositionalist program. In my arguing against conventionalism, I argue against the position you describe in your footnote. You have now added to but have not changed your definition of conventionalism and your addition does not affect anything I have written with respect to problems with the view. Your attempt to write me off as having misunderstood conventionalism is telling. I have not misunderstood your conventionalism and I have been quoting your definition of it. To repeatedly claim that I have “misunderstood” a simple definition is almost as bad as an undergraduate philosophy student claiming that a brilliant scholar with a PhD in the realm of epistemology “misunderstood” conventionalism. It is becoming exceedingly clear that you do not have a counter.

You write, “I think that this is where your confusion comes in, it’s not that we can actually will to change our logical system”. Again, I beg to differ that I am “confused”, I think it more likely that you are using your rhetoric in lieu of argumentation. Where did I state “we can actually will to change our logical system”? How were any of my considerations contingent upon such an assumption? A voluntary or involuntary neurological predisposition toward logical conventions via evolution and or acquisition of logic at the same time as acquisition of language that cannot be changed is perfectly consistent with the actuality of various logical systems people adhere to that factors into what I have written. What do agreed upon logical principles in a society forced upon us by evolutionary processes have to do with rationality anyway? It is nevertheless dubious that people are incapable of changing their logical schemes, and the addition to your definition does not give rise to your statement that my “confusion comes in” because “it’s not that we can actually will to change our logical system”. If anyone is confused here, it is you, for the addition to your definition only states that “agreement is not *necessarily* voluntary”, “*perhaps* is necessarily not-voluntary”, “logical conventions *may* have very well arisen via evolution”, and another “*possibility* is that we acquire logic at around the same time we acquire language”. Further, it is either ignorant or disingenuous to attribute misunderstanding and confusion to people who have encountered conventionalism elsewhere and seen it defined as, for example, “the philosophical doctrine that logical truth and mathematical truth are created by our choices, not dictated or imposed on us by the world (Cambridge 184)” in opposition to your definition of it.

“Bahnsen famously said in his debate that logic can’t be actions in our brains, because all of our brains are different. Perhaps he means to say that our minds are different, because evolutionarily, we’re all the same species!”

All of us being the same species does not necessitate all of our brains being the same. In fact, our brains are not the same.

Not only are there problems with pragmatism, not the least of which is that it does not provide epistemic warrant, but it is difficult to see how the Law of Non-Contradiction is solely of pragmatic concern even given, contrary to some of my considerations, that its denial is not useful (Why do people lie?); for its denial is apparently more than pragmatically problematic, it is logically problematic; a contradiction. This is to say nothing of the total failure of logical positivism or the inconsistency with the dismissal of the analytic/synthetic distinction in Objectivism which program you used in debate with respect to logic. Further, if “logical principles are grounded on agreements in society rather than any external reality” then logic is not necessary, even if one tries to ground it in evolution or language for we could have evolved differently; “…there is a possible world in which a species/society/what-not has adopted a system with no LNC (think, different evolutionary pressures, or what not)” and “…there is a possible world in which a species/society/what-not has adopted a system with no LNC…”

I wrote that “if the three examples of attempts at justification fail, this leaves you in the position of being unable to account for logic and hence needing to accept Christianity upon pain of irrationality, but I suppose atheists must cling to such fideistic and irrational positions” to which you respond that this “is no better than a God of the Gaps argument, applied to logical justifications”. This is simply false, for I can deny that lightning is caused by Zeus and even come up with other explanations for it, even other unscientific explanations, and not be concerned about my entire epistemology crashing down. You actually cannot, however, deny that Christianity is the precondition for logic and come up with other “explanations” for it and not be concerned about your entire epistemology crashing down. If you are actually unable to account for logic then you are reduced to absurdity and unable to even entertain allegedly possible justifications for logic. You have no place to stand.

Since I have called into question your ability to advance even one argument by my utilizing a TA in defense of the TAG, it should be understood that we are debating actual justifications for logic here rather than mysterious “possible justifications” that you have no access to in your epistemological considerations. Even if you had a place to stand in making your arguments, you have offered little more than a Naturalism of the Gaps with respect to this point. You have not offered a consistent account of our experience concerning logic, and hence the TA has done its job. Your arguments are, as I believe you wrote of TAG elsewhere, “dead upon arrival”. “Religion” is in fact your only hope for redemption of your “philosophy”.

(The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy: Second Edition. Edited by Robert Audi. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1999.)

By the way, I would like to tell you that I have very much enjoyed the conversation and that I appreciate you taking even my “jabs” “in stride”. Even philosophers have feelings somewhere deep inside, and I do not want my attempt at the rigorous interaction that you are likely to be familiar with to come across as hateful. I am not just concerned *about* you, I am concerned *for* you.

Mitch:

I give Bahnsen the benefit of the doubt in assuming that he was attempting to make a valid argument. If he was knowingly making an argument that is invalid, and intended for this to be the case, then I have certainly erred in my inclusion of the exposition. Philosophy had to wait many years during Van Til before anything formal happened, and then some. Now, you folks complain that the formalizations are not accurate. Well, to this I say firstly that I disagree, and secondly that maybe you folks should get to work and make something cogent.

The thing about logic is that, similarly to programming languages, there might be different languages or systems and ways about going about some issue, but we can understand all of these nonetheless, we can communicate. The same is likewise the case for spoken languages, something obviously conventional in nature.

As for the Eastern Religions, pluralists and philosophy students, can be you please provide some evidence for these claims?

On the impossibility of visualizing a proposition which violates the LNC, you said: “Again, this is a bold assertion that has not been given any support, and it likely is just a result of the agreed upon logical principles of your society blinding you concerning other systems.”

Can you think of an elephant which is both pink and not pink? Can you conceive of anyone doing so? I think not, since doing so would be conceiving of it yourself!

You said: “Your attempt to write me off as having misunderstood conventionalism is telling. I have not misunderstood your conventionalism and I have been quoting your definition of it. To repeatedly claim that I have “misunderstood” a simple definition is almost as bad as an undergraduate philosophy student claiming that a brilliant scholar with a PhD in the realm of epistemology “misunderstood” conventionalism. It is becoming exceedingly clear that you do not have a counter.”

Except my statement is not an argument from authority, I’m basing it on your criticisms of conventionalism. The person with a PhD in epistemology should really not misunderstand conventionalism, and for this, one must wonder if they were just being dishonest in their presentation. As for having a counter, the counter is simply the literature on the topic, which would answer many of your questions in perhaps a much more succinct manner. My deference to the literature is due to the fact that my paper is not a defense of conventionalism, and does not rely upon a defense of conventionalism.

You said: “A voluntary or involuntary neurological predisposition toward logical conventions via evolution and or acquisition of logic at the same time as acquisition of language that cannot be changed is perfectly consistent with the actuality of various logical systems people adhere to that factors into what I have written.”

But surely you are keeping in mind the specific evolutionary pressures of our species, that is something that would be shared throughout every single human being. It could certainly give the illusion of an “abstract universal”, no?

You said: “What do agreed upon logical principles in a society forced upon us by evolutionary processes have to do with rationality anyway?”

Sounds like you are on the verge of forming a version of Plantinga’s EAAN. I’d be interested to hear some further argumentation down this line.

You said:

“If anyone is confused here, it is you, for the addition to your definition only states that “agreement is not *necessarily* voluntary”, “*perhaps* is necessarily not-voluntary”, “logical conventions *may* have very well arisen via evolution”, and another “*possibility* is that we acquire logic at around the same time we acquire language”.”

This seems to be common among presuppositionalists. If your opponent is not claiming absolutely certainty, you criticize them for this. I do not see the validity of such a criticisms, and it does not arise from confusion, it arises from honesty.

You said:

“All of us being the same species does not necessitate all of our brains being the same. In fact, our brains are not the same.”

If you could, be very specific on what you mean about our brains not being the same? My understanding of neurology is that all of our brains share a commonality in the manner of their basic functions. Of course, I’m not a neurologist or a psychiatrist, so I wonder what mental illnesses bring to the discussion. Probably, as with most disabilities of that type, biological errors in development.

You said:

“Not only are there problems with pragmatism, not the least of which is that it does not provide epistemic warrant, but it is difficult to see how the Law of Non-Contradiction is solely of pragmatic concern even given, contrary to some of my considerations, that its denial is not useful (Why do people lie?”

I do not think lying qualifies as a violation of the LNC. If I steal your bike, and I tell you that I did not. It is not the case that I did and did not steal your bike, it’s the case that I stole your bike and told you I didn’t.

You said:

” Further, if “logical principles are grounded on agreements in society rather than any external reality” then logic is not necessary, even if one tries to ground it in evolution or language for we could have evolved differently; “…there is a possible world in which a species/society/what-not has adopted a system with no LNC (think, different evolutionary pressures, or what not)” and “…there is a possible world in which a species/society/what-not has adopted a system with no LNC…””

I realize now that these statements were probably the result of writing at 4am in the morning, I could have been much more clear. If it is indeed, as I have said, impossible (for us, in this world) to visualize an elephant that is both pink and not pink, then there is no possible world in which one can visualize an elephant that is both pink and not pink (since doing so would thereby mean visualizing the visualizer and subsequently the visualization in question). It seems then that it is more accurate to state that there is no possible world in which this is the case (or you can embrace RK’s hypothesis and stop a few steps earlier).

So this requires that I change my statement about a possible world where they have evolved with no LNC. I suppose it is true though that they may have evolved with a LNC-like mechanism that is different than our LNC, a mechanism by which they can distinguish different propositions. The distinction needs to be made between evolving creatures and whether or not they are *thinking* beings. A world in which no thinking creatures ever evolved would perhaps satisfy my criteria for a “species evolving with no LNC”

Even if it were the case that conventionalism is wrong, if my criticisms in the paper hold, it follows that Christianity cannot provide the preconditions either. You might say, well you were borrowing from my worldview to establish that position, well even if this were true, the fact that the position has crumbled from within shows its failure. Isn’t this precisely what you folks mean by an internal critique? If, throughout my paper, I’ve been utilizing a Christian justification for logic and the end result of the paper is the conclusion that no Christian justification is possible, if my analyses are sound, I would have revealed the internal inconsistency of Christianity.

Your last paragraph can be summed up in what seems to be a common presuppositionalist mantra:

“You didn’t do it the way I want you to do it, therefore, you’re wrong”

I also have enjoyed the conversation, though it has taken a lot of time. I suppose I should thank you for your concern, if it is indeed genuine, but I do feel it is misplaced. Cheers.

Chris:

Unfortunately there are not many more ways I can state that arguing against your own interpretation of Bahnsen which conflicts with his interpretation of himself is an instance of the Straw Man Fallacy rather than the ‘accurate formalization’ you tenaciously claim that it is. The TAG is “cogent”, but you have not interacted with it as presented by Van Til and Bahnsen. It is the case that, according to conventionalism, there might be different systems of equally valid logic since logical principles are agreed upon by societies, and I am glad that you finally agree. The Hindu tenet “atman is brahman”, Oprah’s “many ways” theology, and a freshman’s exclamation in my philosophy class “all truth is relative!” are systems held by members of each of the three groups I mentioned which attempt to deny the Law of Non-Contradiction. It is not the case that if I cannot conceive of something myself then I cannot conceive of someone else conceiving of it; you need to think this through, and on a different point you need to realize that if conventionalism is true you are thinking it through according to the agreed upon logical principles of your own society and not necessarily upon someone else’s. Having taken your definition of conventionalism and having run it through a reductio in plain sight with no direct answer from you I cannot think of any pressing need to read the literature you have recommended to me in order to provide you with a defense of your own position on logic (and why assume that I have not read it anyway?). The truth of the matter is that you have not shown where either I or Bahnsen have misunderstood conventionalism at all even though you continue to assert that we have whereas I have shown that you have misunderstood it in some respects and that you have not offered any other counter than to tell me I need to read more about it when perhaps it is you who need to do so in order to better understand the devastating critiques written on it. You are mistaken to think that your paper does not rely upon a defense of conventionalism, for once again I have offered a TA in defense of the TAG you are allegedly attempting to argue against, and this TA calls into question the very basis upon which you make your arguments, which is prior to said arguments. Even given the specific evolutionary pressures of our species there may be differences between agreed upon logical principles from one society to the next as you have conceded above, and an “illusion” of an “abstract universal” is not the same thing as an abstract universal. Since you attempted to attribute a “misunderstanding” to me concerning conventionalism at the point of the agreed upon logical principles of a society being non-voluntary (in direct opposition to the Cambridge definition I provided), the burden was upon you to provide a definition of conventionalism wherein said logical principles are agreed upon in a society in a non-voluntary fashion, which you did not do. Instead you made an irrelevant comment about certainty as though it should not strike me as strange that you would charge me with misunderstanding conventionalism on a definitional point that you have conceded you do not actually know to be the case. Each brain differs physically from every other brain, no two being identical, but this is really a side point and not overly important since it is clear that people think very differently about even the most fundamental aspects of reality, our discussion providing all the evidence we need to establish the point. There is contradiction involved in stealing and not stealing a bike, however there is also contradiction involved in someone stealing a bike and then claiming that he or she has not done so, namely the contradiction between what is said and what is actually the case; but the greater point is that it is difficult to see how the Law of Non-Contradiction is solely of pragmatic concern. Assuming we are working within the context of evolved, thinking, social beings and want to ground the alleged necessity of logic in evolution, there is still the problem that we (being these beings in this instance) could have evolved differently, not to mention that societies are contingent entities and so, again, logic is not necessary on your conventionalism, contrary to your claims and practice. It would appear that you have offered a sort of pragmatic justification for the laws of logic only, if that.

Since your paper is offered in accordance with conventionalism, if conventionalism is wrong it does not follow that your criticisms in the paper may still hold, but rather it follows that they do not. It is true then, that you are borrowing from my worldview in order to even argue against my worldview, in which case you refute yourself and prove Christianity true. What you have stated as your belief about what presuppositionalists hold with respect to an internal critique is incorrect, as we propose that the only way by which an internal critique is possible is when it is carried out upon the Christian worldview. You may again deny that Christianity is true, but then you end in self-defeating subjectivism and ultimately skepticism, as has been shown. I will be praying that you do come to see the cogency of what I have presented, as fallible and unclear as I sometimes am, and as incapable as our philosophical systems are in expressing the truth of God. All of the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are in Christ Jesus.

Mitch:

Around and around in circles we go, Chris.

The formal exposition of Bahnsen’s argument as presented in his debate is not inaccurate. It is either the case that Bahnsen’s argument is as I’ve stated, or that he was making an invalid argument. Given that Sean Choi has posted once on this blog here before, you may find it beneficial to get in contact with him and ask him about the formulation.

How precisely are the examples that you have given of the Hindu tenet, Oprah and freshman philosophy students violations of the LNC? I’m starting to wonder if we’re even thinking about the LNC in the same way (aside from the obvious differences between our positions).

Also, people who operate within a system that utilizes LNC-like mechanisms can still make false statements… humans don’t always deduce properly (like a computer would).

You said:

“It is not the case that if I cannot conceive of something myself then I cannot conceive of someone else conceiving of it; you need to think this through, and on a different point you need to realize that if conventionalism is true you are thinking it through according to the agreed upon logical principles of your own society and not necessarily upon someone else’s.”

I would wholly disagree. If you can conceive of someone conceiving P and not-P, you have thereby conceived of P and not-P. Furthermore, what is the problem of thinking about another logical system through the eyes of my own? As I said before, there is certainly communication between the different programming languages, spoken languages and also logical ‘languages’. Some research on “bootstrapping” will help to clarify these notions.

You said:

“Having taken your definition of conventionalism and having run it through a reductio in plain sight with no direct answer from you I cannot think of any pressing need to read the literature you have recommended to me in order to provide you with a defense of your own position on logic (and why assume that I have not read it anyway?).”

I have been responding to you this entire time. I assume that you have not read the literature precisely because of the criticisms you’ve been making. Similar things happen when atheists criticize the medieval version of the ontological argument, and dismiss present forms of the ontological arguments on that basis. I suspect that both Bahnsen, and yourself, may be thinking of conventionalism in a much previous form, and thus are not taking into account all of the factors. The book I’ve cited in my paper is a fairly recent explanation of conventionalism, and is beneficial for this reason.

You said:

“You are mistaken to think that your paper does not rely upon a defense of conventionalism, for once again I have offered a TA in defense of the TAG you are allegedly attempting to argue against, and this TA calls into question the very basis upon which you make your arguments, which is prior to said arguments. ”

You need this to be true so that you can avoid dealing with the bulk of my arguments, but unfortunately it’s incoherent. There would be nothing inconsistent with my paper claiming to begin from a Christian theistic account of logic. My criticisms in the sections entitled: “A Logical Euthyphro Application”, “God and the Abstract” and “The Mind of God” would still hold and if they are sound would lead to the rejection of Christian theism as an account of logic. This would not serve as a defeater to the conclusion of my argument, but rather to the system. Merely showing me that I need to “ground” logic by some other means.

Just as the presuppositionalist says if no non-Christian theistic ways can ground logic, than a Christian theistic way can, if the Christian theistic way cannot ground logic (which follows if my critique is sound), than a non-Christian theistic way can.

You said:

“Even given the specific evolutionary pressures of our species there may be differences between agreed upon logical principles from one society to the next as you have conceded above, and an “illusion” of an “abstract universal” is not the same thing as an abstract universal. Since you attempted to attribute a “misunderstanding” to me concerning conventionalism at the point of the agreed upon logical principles of a society being non-voluntary (in direct opposition to the Cambridge definition I provided), the burden was upon you to provide a definition of conventionalism wherein said logical principles are agreed upon in a society in a non-voluntary fashion, which you did not do.”

I gave you an entire book.

You said:

“Each brain differs physically from every other brain, no two being identical, but this is really a side point and not overly important since it is clear that people think very differently about even the most fundamental aspects of reality, our discussion providing all the evidence we need to establish the point.”

Sure Chris, but the fact that we can communicate is what is of the utmost importance. Even if we’re running programs written in different computer languages, bootstrapping lets me talk to you!

“There is contradiction involved in stealing and not stealing a bike, however there is also contradiction involved in someone stealing a bike and then claiming that he or she has not done so, namely the contradiction between what is said and what is actually the case”

It is not the case that Bob has both stolen and not stolen the Bike, nor is it the case that Bob has both said he has stolen the bike, and has not said that he has stolen the bike (in the same respect). You’re forgetting that key point, “in the same respect”. The contradiction between what is said and what is actually the case is not the type of contradiction the LNC deals with.

You said:

“Assuming we are working within the context of evolved, thinking, social beings and want to ground the alleged necessity of logic in evolution, there is still the problem that we (being these beings in this instance) could have evolved differently, not to mention that societies are contingent entities and so, again, logic is not necessary on your conventionalism, contrary to your claims and practice.”

This is an example of one of your statements which shows that you have not read, or have not understood the material on conventionalism.

There is a distinction between “object-level” and “meta-level”. Consider a meta-ethical circumstance, where an evolutionary account of morality may be charged with becoming eliminitivist. “if I do some good deed X just because I am programmed to, then X is not really good to do, it’s just part of my programming” But these statements are operating on different levels. Both the following propositions would be true: “X really is good to do” and “X really is just a part of my biological programing, and that’s the only reason I think X is good to do” A contradiction only occurs when both statements are taken to be expressing a proposition of the same level.

Applied to logic, “X is really necessarily true, everywhere, regardless of what anyone thinks, and regardless of anyone’s conventions. And X really is just part of a system of conventions I have adopted as part of my programming.”

There is no contradiction here because one statement is operating on the object-level, and the other is operating at the meta-level. These ideas are all integral to conventionalism and are all dealt with in the material.

In regards to your last paragraph, my mention of conventionalism was very specific and you have been somewhat taking it out of context. It is in a subsection dedicated to exploring possible ways that God might account for logic.

So all in all, I don’t find your criticisms very convincing, and even if they did hold, they would do little to the arguments in my paper. Further, I wonder why you are reluctant to deal with the very portions of my paper that would show a Christian theistic justification of logic is incoherent.

If you are indeed hinting that we should end the discussion here (your last paragraph sounds like it is), then I also thank you for your interaction and wish you the very best during this holiday season.

Argument #1: That logical principles are not contingent on God

(1)    If logical principles are dependent on God, they are not logically necessary

(2)    But logical principles are logically necessary

(3)    Therefore, logical principles are not dependent on God

Chris stated:

Unfortunately, Mitch constantly employs this strawman and thinks he has thereby refuted presuppositionalism. God is a necessary being. Logic does not depend upon the existence of God; it is not contingent. Logic is necessary. Presuppositionalism is thus immune to the first argument Mitch makes.

Chris wants us to accept that God exists necessarily.  He may hold that belief as properly basic, but if he should wish to convince anyone else of this claim he’d be best served to present some type of an argument. He can either defend an Ontological Argument, or a modal formulation of the TAG. Why is it the case that God exists necessarily? If this reason finds its basis at all in the existence of logical principles and their dependence on God, he will have begged the question in affirming such a conclusion. But Chris has said that logic does not depend on the existence of God. From this, it is difficult to understand what the relationship between the propositions “Logic exists” and “God exists”, if the relationship is not one of dependence, then what precisely is the TAG stating? Without a dependence relationship, why is it that only X can account for Y? Further, without such a relationship there is no problem in affirming the existence of logical principles and denying the existence of God.

Argument #2: That logical principles are not contingent on God (and that presuppositionalism presumes an Ontological Argument)

(4)    If logic depends on God, then if God possibly doesn’t exist, then some law of logic possibly fails

(5)    No law of logic can possibly fail

(6)    So God necessarily exists

(7)    But there is a possible world in which God does not exist

(8)    Therefore, logic is not dependent on God

I fear that Chris may have misunderstood the argument here. Firstly, let me first say that there is no problem with a later premise contradicting a previous one if the premise being contradicted was established via deduction within the argument (or is an assumptive premise). An example of this is the logical problem of evil, which begins with the premise that God exists and concludes with the premise that God does not.

The purpose of this argument is twofold, it brings out the question of the dependence relationship between logical principles and the existence of God, and it questions the assertion that God not only exists, but exists necessarily. Premise (7), if even possibly true shows an obvious absurdity in the previous deductions. Of course, what I’m trying to elucidate is that the sub-conclusion of a modal ontological argument is being smuggled into the game by the presuppositionalist. One cannot merely affirm that God exists necessarily, it must be shown with an ontological argument. It could possible be shown with a modal version of the TAG as well, but it of course, could not be assumed within that argument. If that were the case, the argument would be question-begging. Chris might just flat out disagree with me on this point, but at any rate, this argument might be properly entitled Argument #1.5 as it is supplemental to the previous.

Impossibility of the Contrary

This portion of my post is too long to paste here so I will simply paste the entirety of Bolt’s criticism:

Mitch immediately gives chase to a rabbit and asks his readers to consider four “worldviews”: Christianity, Christianity without the incarnation (C1), Christianity with four persons in God (C2), and Christianity with an extra disciple of Jesus (C3). Mitch writes that these, “are, in effect, non-Christian worldviews that match Christianity point for point in every regard, save for one difference”. Unfortunately for Mitch this assertion is false, as may be easily demonstrated. If there is no incarnation, then Jesus has not been raised from the dead. If there are four persons in God, then baptism is to be performed in the name of more than just Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. If there is an “extra” disciple of Jesus, then the risen Christ was seen by more than “the Twelve” as the term was understood. Thus C1, C2, and C3 are not non-Christian worldviews that match Christianity point for point in every regard save for one difference and the statement Mitch makes is false. It is therefore doubtful that the rest of whatever Mitch argues in this regard makes sense. Sunday School teachers refute these kind of “worldviews” all the time, especially in cases where the class is made up of children. Since C1, C2, and C3 accept the authority of Scripture but contradict what Scripture teaches they are to be rejected as incoherent. Now I suspect that Mitch might change his argument, but really none of this should be of any concern anyway as will be seen in a moment.

This largely misses the point and I’ve addressed this issue in the previous post.

I stated:

It’s the job of TAG to show that all worldviews (actual and possible) incompatible with Christian theism are incoherent. If TAG is successful there should be a guarantee that [C1-4] (and every other possible worldview) will be incoherent. The proponent of TAG must show that all possible ways of tinkering with the contents of Christian theism, to create [any other view] are bound to fail, and must fail, necessarily.

As such, the objector to TAG needs not provide a positive proof for the coherence of [C1-4] as all that is needed to defeat TAG is to argue that for all we have reason to believe, a fully developed Fristianity seems coherent. Of course, it may sound odd and bizarre but judgments about oddness and such are governed by one’s presuppositions and are not reliable indicators of incoherence.

Clearly it is the job of the TAG defender to show us why the worldview must fail necessarily.

Bolt further states:

To begin with, Mitch is not entirely clear concerning what he believes about logic. Mitch writes that it “is clear and evident that logical principles exist as logically necessary abstractions…” but elsewhere writes in a self-contradictory fashion that logic “isn’t a thing, it’s a referrer to things” and argues that logic cannot be referred to as it is not an abstract object or entity.

As has usually been the case, Bolt charges me with being contradictory. Unfortunately for him, there is no contradiction here. Saying that logic exists as a necessary abstraction is not the same as saying that it’s a thing; why does Bolt think this? Logic may not be an abstract object or entity, but they certainly seem to be abstractions. I was not making a claim about the ontological status of abstractions. Surely, just as justice is an example of an abstraction, one must not be immediately understood to be saying that “Tennis exists, out there!”

To clarify any future misunderstanding, my position on logic falls under the heading of conventionalism.

Bolt further criticizes the notion of “Fristianity” (see above linked post):

What is Mitch standing on when he raises the Fristianity objection? What would Mitch have us to believe concerning the laws of logic, and how are they at all consistent with his worldview? How can such immaterial entities exist in a materialist universe? Why does logic continue to apply in a contingent realm of experience? How is logic imposed upon the world? Why should anyone care about adhering to the laws of logic? How is the universal and absolute nature of such laws consistent with the existence of only particular and finite minds? Such questions are only the beginning of an internal critique.

Presumably, Bolt is asking about my position rather than the hypothetical Fristian position. All of the questions which he has asked have been answered in various places throughout conventionalist literature.

Conclusion

It should be noted that Bolt did not address the last argument in the post which he criticizes. I’m not entirely sure what Bolt’s post accomplishes, perhaps it’s merely to satisfy those who have requested that he reply to me. I am, however, puzzled when Bolt states:

Mitch may continue to parrot old arguments against TAG, but what has been offered in reply is a TA in defense of TAG. I, for one, do not think Mitch is quite able to answer it. This may be the reason for the prolonged discussions concerning apologetic method as well as the search for anything on the Internet which might be used against the presuppositionalist method.

Is Bolt honestly saying that my discussion regarding apologetic method comes out of some insecurity with regard to the TAG? I don’t see any reason to make this claim, but perhaps it’s merely a joke.

I have been relatively silent on the TAG as of late, not because I am ignoring it, but rather because I am preparing a paper for submission. The topic is indeed the TAG, and I will post the paper once it has gone through the review process. Until that time, I can only say that it would be interesting to hear Bolt offer his own analysis of the relationship between logical principles and God.

As a matter of preliminaries, I feel it prudent to address the first claims of inconsistency Bolt has placed on me. Granted these are not wholly relevant to the topic at hand, but as they were brought up it is prudent to deal with them accordingly.

Bolt said:

Mitch often ranges well beyond the scope of a topic in responding to it; that this is the case may be seen in his presentation of numerous contradictory views in his responses to me concerning the Problem of Induction and in his introduction of a version of the Ontological argument wherein he attempted to show that the traditional apologist can affirm that God cannot lie (even though he subsequently admitted that he did not accept the argument anyway) while trying to show that in the presuppositionalist view God might lie.

The matter of ‘contradictory responses’ in my posts on Induction is something I thought was a settled issue. Nowhere was I being inconsistent, I was attempting to elucidate the full scope of the issue at hand for the readership. The series of posts ended for Bolt with a response discounting a pragmatic justification for Induction. I do not find this inconsistent with any of my previous replies as I have told Bolt, and as he should know from his time on this website, the primary purpose is elucidation and that comes before any outlining of my own views. As such, the ‘inconsistencies’ which Bolt refers to when speaking of our discussion on induction are misinterpretations.

Bolt also ended with an espousal of the Christian’s ability to account for the Uniformity of Nature but did not respond to the subsequent criticism in my “Final Response to Bolt on Induction“.

This matter of this Ontological Argument seems to be a source of confusion, I had thought the issue settled in my “Response to Bolt’s Misunderstanding“.

In matters of the Ontological Argument philosophers deal with what is called “maximum excellence” or “modal perfection”, these classifications necessarily include honesty as a positive property attributable to God. As such, the Ontological Argument if successful would establish an honest God. I am not sure where the problem lies. One can find a recent formulation of the Ontological Argument from Dr. Maydole, accessible here.

We can now move on to Bolt’s latest claims.

In response to my saying “I am not one to defend Christian apologists, as you can imagine, they and I disagree on many things”, Bolt says that I’m lying! I think this is merely a matter of semantics, when I say that I’m not one to do it, I have not made a habit out of doing so. I was speaking colloquially. We could argue for days on what constitutes a habit, but it is besides the point.

When I stated that I was a firm defender of philosophy and philosophical discourse, Bolt said:

Notice again the inconsistency. Mitch is defending non-presuppositional schools of apologetics and I am defending presuppositional apologetics, both of us launching attacks upon the other school, yet he sees himself as defending philosophical discourse in his efforts while I am apparently not. Where is the difference? Is Mitch implying that if someone argues against his philosophical monstrosities that one is no longer engaging in philosophical discourse?

The implication is that presuppositionalism is bad philosophy in a manner akin to Young Earth Creationism being pseudo-science. In many regards, it is accurate to say that presuppositionalism is to the philosophy of religion what creationism is to biology. I don’t expect Bolt to agree with me, but I fail to see how this is an inconsistency.

I stated:

My defense of Classical/Evidentialist apologetics is a defense of coherent philosophical approaches…

to which Bolt replies:

Either Mitch accepts Classical and Evidentialist apologetics as philosophically coherent or he does not. His statement here would indicate that he does accept them as philosophically coherent, but then why is he not a Christian Theist? His actual position, so far as I understand it, is atheism which would entail the rejection of these apologetic arguments. If he rejects Classical and Evidentialist apologetics then he surely does so because they are not philosophically coherent. This inconsistency plagues Mitch’s responses. The truth is that neither he nor I accept the arguments as philosophically coherent, and he is making a mess of himself by trying to pretend that he does.

What appears to Bolt as an inconsistency is actually just a misunderstanding on his part. I wholeheartedly accept the Classical and Evidentialist apologetic methods as being philosophically coherent. That is to say, I am an agnostic atheist and I accept, along with professional philosophers of religion, that the Classical and Evidentialist (and Reformed Epistemological to some extent) methods are the only coherent means in our attempt to establish the existence of God. There is no inconsistency in my accepting of the method of argumentation but rejecting the conclusions arrived at from said method. To suggests such would be so absurd to say that in my ‘acceptance’ of Modal Logic as an apt system to reveal logical contingency, I must thereby accept the conclusions of every modal argument. This is pure nonsense and there is no inconsistency with my statement.

I also charged presuppositionalism as being a type of Fideism. Bolt seems to think there is another inconsistency:

This brings us to yet another contradiction in what Mitch has written. He claims that pressuppositionalists belittle reasoned discourse and favor instead a type of Fideism. For one, this is an amazing assertion coming from someone who claims to have been studying the presuppositional method. This aside, Mitch has elsewhere written, “All matters of demonstrating God’s existence are in the realm of Philosophy. Even for the presuppositionalist, it is merely a philosophical defense of God…”, which directly contradicts his claim that presuppositionalism is fideistic. Further, what exactly has the recent obsession with “refuting presuppositionalism” over on Mitch’s site been about anyway? There he has presented three different articles explicitly setting out as per their titles to refute presuppositionalism. There is simply no material or need to do this with truly fideistic systems. Mitch is yet again exhibiting inconsistency.

We should of course, first define Fideism. Plantinga defines it as a system with  ”urges reliance on faith rather than reason, in matters philosophical and religious” (via the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). The presuppositionalist in suggesting that a belief in God is required to formulate a coherent worldview certainly seems Fideistic. As for the quotation which Bolt takes from a previous post, I still stand by it. In fact, I think that anything which involves thinking is within the realm of Philosophy. Fideism as an epistemological theory is not somehow thereby removed from Philosophy, it still lies within it. Does bolt think that Fideism is so removed? Fideism is the placement of faith as having primacy over reason, this in no way implies that Fideism escapes the encompassing nature of Philosophy.

It is of course true that I have recently authored articles critical of presuppositionalism, but is Bolt honestly saying that this would be unnecessary if presuppositionalism truly was Fideistic? By this criteria, all Fideistic systems would go unchallenged (and unsupported), forever! How absurd a notion is this. Perhaps he is merely saying that such criticisms would simply have no effect, I am beginning to agree. Or perhaps Bolt simply misunderstood. In saying that presuppositionalism is Fideistic, I was making an observation. He is more than welcome to disagree (and I’m sure many do, either presuppositionalist or not). I do see presuppositionalism as a type of Fideism, masquerading as non-Fideistic philosophy. Whether or not this is true remains to be seen, and it is quite possible that I may reverse my opinion that presuppositionalism is Fideistic, but whether I do this or not is largely irrelevant as there is no inconsistency in anything I have said on the matter.

Bolt quotes me as saying:

It is my continued desire that the Philosophy of Religion play host to reasoned discussion between both believers and non-believers that can be conducive to the formulation of coherent positions.

and then asks:

Does Mitch hold that there are such things as contradictory coherent positions? I have a difficult time making sense of this statement otherwise.

Of course not! I do not think the topic of God’s existence is a closed on in Philosophy, so I was merely stating that it is my hope that continued discussion between both viewpoints eventually lead to a conclusion!

Bolt quotes me further as saying:

It would also be prudent for Bolt to note that it is not uncommon in academia for non-theists to critique other non-theists work, or that they respond with defeaters to non-theistic objections to criticisms of a theistic argument.

and then states:

Again, Mitch is hardly an authority regarding “academia”, regardless of what he and his friends on his site believe.

This is simply uncalled for. Bolt’s entire post is dripping with this type of underhanded sarcasm. It is not fair to the readers of UrbanPhilosophy.net to be subjected to such a sneaky insult. I feel that I have been quite kind and gracious in our exchanges and I certainly do not know of any negative interactions had between Bolt and any UP.net member.

In the next portion, Bolt is speaking of the Moreland quote outlined in my previous article. If you have not read this quotation yet, it would be prudent to do so before continuing.

I stated:

With regard to the statement that ‘in the order of being there would have to be the city of Atlanta before there could be a map showing one how to get to Atlanta’ Bolt objects that this need not necessarily be the case. He offers an example of a map to CandyLand. There are a few problems with this objection. Firstly, the existence of CandyLand as espoused by his map is presumably not representative of an actual state of affairs. Similar to a map of Middle Earth, the plotted locations represent their co-ordinates in some possible world, the references need not be actualized. In this regard, his map to CandyLand and a map of Middle Earth are not necessarily false constructs, they simply represent a non-actualized reality, that of a fictional world.

Bolt objects by repeatedly saying that what is the case for CandyLand could be the case for Atlanta., but he makes a grave error when he states:

This could be the case [that the point on a map represents a false construct] also with a map to Atlanta. It need not exist for there to be a map to it.

This is simply false! The mapped point would at least have to exist as a modal proposition. Atlanta need not actually exist to plot it, but any plotting of it necessitates possible existence. That is to say, the map represents a modal proposition where in some possible world X exists (provided there is no logical impossibility in the proposition). Every fictional map is a possible world just as every fictional story is a possible world. As such, there is nothing inconsistent with representing a point on a map which does not possess actual existence.

I stated:

But is it possible for someone to map something that doesn’t exist at all? I’d argue not.

To which Bolt states:

Actually, Mitch just argued that one can. What he is about to do is equivocate on what he means by “exist” in an ad hoc attempt to save Moreland’s statement.

I did no such thing! I’m not equivocating at all, the distinction between actual and possible existence is clear.

Thus, Moreland’s point is made. The order of being always holds primacy over the order of knowing. Modal semantics only strengthen this claim, it is logically impossible that something can be known without being. Bolt should not misinterpret this as saying that it is logically impossible that something can be known without actually being, the distinction is tantamount to understanding the entire point of Moreland’s passage.

I stated:

The fact is, to be plotted on a map the object/location being plotted must possess either actual or possible existence. In both respects the existence holds primacy over the plotting in the order of being.

Bolt replied:

Mitch has not shown that it need possess actual existence. It need not. Mitch has only tried to show that it need possess possible existence, but Moreland is not talking about possible existence anyway, so this has nothing to do with Moreland’s argument. Really one is left wondering why an atheist would ever go to such great lengths to try and save a bad illustration set forth in a bad argument by a Christian apologist.

Again Bolt misses the point entirely. It should be as clear as day that to be plotted on a map, the object must possess either actual or possible existence. That I have not shown the necessity of actual existence is irrelevant and an odd request.

Saying that Moreland’s passage is not referring to possibilities therefore any mention of them is not an objection! Bolt made a criticism of Moreland’s statement, to which I am offering a reply that is wholly relevant.

I stated:

For the person who was not aware of the existence of Atlanta, in looking at the map, could at least discern that (i) Atlanta exists (ii) I either am in Atlanta, or must move to get to Atlanta (provided the person new their position on the map)

To which Bolt objects:

Mitch presented an argument that Atlanta must possess possible existence but now reasserts that one can know that Atlanta actually exists if there is a map to Atlanta. He thus equivocates on “exists” and asserts something which has already been shown to be false. He cannot argue that he is speaking of merely possible existence in the above quote, as one cannot be in or move into a possible existence as it is not actual.

This is yet another misunderstanding on Bolt’s part. I did not state that Atlanta actually exists if there is a map to Atlanta, that is ludicrous. Bolt almost touches on the relevant point towards the end where he mentions that “one cannot be in or move into a possible existence”. This is true if the person is actual by my example didn’t necessitate this, in fact, it seems clear to me that in my example even the person is being treated as a modal proposition.

If I were to write out my modal indicators, my above statement would read: “In the case of possible world W1, the person who was not aware of the existence of Atlanta, in looking at the map, could at least discern that (i) Atlanta exists (ii) I either am in Atlanta, or must move to get to Atlanta…”

I could have included the modal indicator, but I thought the context of the passage implied it. At any rate, this is yet another ‘inconsistency’ which can be chalked up to Bolt’s misunderstanding.

I stated:

But I fail to see the relevance of this objection. It is only relevant in light of his next criticism.

Bolt replies:

Notice Mitch writes that he cannot see how an objection is relevant and in his very next sentence writes that the same objection is relevant. This is yet another example of the aforementioned inconsistency found throughout what Mitch writes.

This is just grasping for straws! Perhaps I overestimate that the reader will understand the first sentence in light of the second. It is clear that I am stating the relevance of the objection on its own is non-existent.

I stated:

It is interesting to note here that Moreland does not claim that one needs a map to KNOW God, but rather needs a map to find God

To which Bolt replies:

The quote is: “But in the order of knowing, it might be the case that one would need a ‘map’ to God, i.e., a theistic argument.” My interpretation of what Moreland is stating here fits with the context of the sentence and argument since Moreland is speaking of the order of KNOWING, not the order of FINDING…  Consider what one might mean by “find God”. There is no meaning to “find God” I can think of which might require a traditional theistic proof.

My reading of Moreland’s material leads me to conclude that his use of “find” is synonymous with uncover, arrive at, realize, etc… It is not my understanding from his work that he denies the a priori knowledge of God.

Bolt states:

What does it mean to “reveal…known knowledge” anyway? Is not all knowledge known? If something is known, what would it mean to reveal said knowledge?

I didn’t think I’d have to explain this to a Calvinist! All knowledge is known, but it’s my understanding that Bolt’s own theology states that it is suppressed. Thus, the revealing of such known knowledge would be similar if not identical to an ‘un-suppressing’.

Bolt seeks further to establish a divide between God’s metaphysical priority and his epistemological priority. For a philosopher of religion this move seems to be just silly. If it is the case that God holds metaphysical priority and all existents are contingent upon God’s necessary existence then this precludes God’s having epistemological priority, it could not be any other way. It would in fact be the case, necessarily.

I stated:

Where Moreland states: The presuppositionalist is wrong to think that if an argument leads on to a belief in the existence of God, this God could not be the God of Christianity…Bolt responds with the claim that the God in which Antony Flew believes cannot be the Christian God. It is true that Flew was led to belief in a God through argument, and that his concept of God is deistic.

To which Bolt replies:

A deistic god is not the Christian God. So again, Flew was led to belief in the existence of a god through argument, but this god is deistic and hence not the Christian God. Moreland’s statement is, again, false.

But according to Bolt there is no deistic God, there is only the Christian one. So the attributes which Flew ascribes to the deistic God are actually attributes of the Christian God, to a lesser extent. He’s believing in the same God to a lesser degree.

Bolt states that he agrees with me when I say:

If it is the case that only one God exists, and that it is the Christian God then anyone professing belief in a God as a result of argument must believe in the Christian God insofar as the presented arguments are sound.

His issue is that he does not deem the theistic arguments to be sound. Of course, neither do I. (please don’t confuse this to mean I think the methods are unsound as well)

Bolt seems to find that I am inconsistent, he claims that at some times I state that a theistic argument can prove the Christian God and at other times I do not. In order to examine whether or not this is true, let’s examine it further.

I stated in a previous comment on one of Bolt’s posts about a traditional argument:

This argument alone does not arrive at Christian theism, obviously

and I later qualified by stating:

That quotation is a lack of clarity on my part. I should have said that traditional arguments that are given in a cumulative apologetic. It was also in specific reference to a discussion on the Ontological Argument, I think. It is still my position that if the Ontological Argument holds, it cannot possibly argue for any other God than the one that necessarily exists, by virtue of the modal approach it takes.

Bolt takes issue by stating:

Unfortunately this does not clarify things much, but we can refute what Mitch writes concerning the problem before us anyway. The Ontological Argument need not require belief in the Christian God. This is true upon my presuppositions, but it is also true upon the traditional apologist’s presuppositions. How does Mitch keep trying to argue against this? By assuming that traditional arguments are to be used in a so called cumulative case apologetic. There are fatal problems with such an approach; why might not the cosmological argument refer to one god and the teleological to another? Why assume the arguments are connected at all? What has a person actually argued for prior to bringing in the rest of the apologetic? Most important here is this consideration: any one of the traditional arguments is not the equivalent of the sum of the traditional arguments. Traditional arguments do not make the case for the Christian God. All of this may nevertheless be set aside as well, for Moreland never qualifies his statement the way that Mitch does. It is false to assume that because someone comes to believe in a god via theistic argument that the person believes in the Christian God, yet this is precisely what Moreland states, “The presuppositionalist is wrong to think that if an argument leads on to a belief in the existence of God, this God could not be the God of Christianity…”. Aristotle no doubt came to belief in a very different god as did Flew; both via arguments. Moreland’s statement is false. Mitch’s statement is not Moreland’s, but it is likewise problematic.

I am unsure what Bolt means when he says that the Ontological Argument need not require belief in the Christian God. The Ontological Argument establishes a God which necessarily exists (a task far beyond most other arguments) and if the only God which exists is the Christian God, then the Ontological Argument establishes that the Christian God exists necessarily. Obviously, Bolt has issue with a cumulative apologetic, he seems to want a “magic bullet”, perhaps things are not as simple as Bolt thinks they are.

He asks why the cosmological argument might refer to one god and the teleological to another. At the very least, a theistic application of Occam’s razor removes this possibility. Furthermore, one could apply Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles [∀F(Fx ↔ Fy) → x=y]. That is to say that if there is no difference between ‘either’ god established, they are necessarily the same. We would be forced to identify one characteristic that one God had that another did not, but since god definitionally possesses all possible attributes, this is absurd.

Of course, Bolt keeps replying that these certain people have come to believe in different gods but this just sounds silly to me, if it is necessarily the case that there exists only one God and that God is the Christian God then anyone who professes belief in a god who possesses a positive attribute is professing belief in the Christian God, just to a lesser degree than that which may be possible. I don’t know of a simpler way to convey this. Aristotle and Flew may have thought they have come to different Gods than Chris Bolt, but if God is the Christian God, they could not have. That is to say, the Christian God possesses all the attributes which Aristotle attributed to his prime mover and that Flew attributes to his deity. For the arguments which brought them to these conclusions to be sound, a God must exist and insofar as the Christian God exists, such arguments were sound only because the Christian God existed.

Bolt may take issue with the fact that no single argument meets the uniqueness proof in that it can establish the Christian God outright, but he is simply asking too much. Traditional arguments in a cumulative case possess the capability to prove the existence of the Christian God. If he wants to isolate a single argument and criticize an entire apologetic on the basis of that argument alone he’s being very silly. It seems that he may even be committing a Fallacy of Composition:

(A) No traditional argument can prove the existence of the Christian God

(B) Therefore, no set of traditional arguments can prove the existence of the Christian God

This is obviously fallacious.

He goes on to state:

If the full reality of God’s nature is not proven then God has not been proven.

But I see no good reason to accept this statement. In fact Bolt seems kind of foolish to imply that he has complete knowledge of God’s nature. Are there really no mysteries left in God for Chris Bolt? He knows everything about God’s nature?

Bolt also stated:

No, they [apologists] do not all present cumulative cases. No, proponents of the Ontological Argument do not always not present a cumulative case. Is Mitch just making this stuff up as he goes? It is certainly not true.

We should distinguish between Philosophers and Apologists of course. A Christian Philosopher may not be an apologist and may publish articles focusing on just one argument, obviously. But if there are Classical/Evidentialist apologists out there who are not using cumulative cases, this seems to be a fault of the apologist and not of the method.

Bolt also accuses me of being like Jello when I outlined a possible scenario in which an atheist would arrive at the existence of God. I said that I did not feel that such a move was warranted, and Bolt saw this as a contradiction. Surely just because I see a move as unwarranted does not mean the move is impossible. Again an alleged inconsistency is merely a misunderstanding by Bolt. It is wholly possible that an atheist come to the Christian God through a cumulative approach, I just do not see the current arguments convincing enough to warrant such a move. This does not mean the apologetic method is defeated, merely that I find the arguments insufficient (not the method!).

Bolt begins to critique my analysis of his argument. His argument is:

(1)If the Christian worldview is true then Christ is Lord of all.
(2)According to Craig, Christ is not Lord of all.
(3)Therefore according to Craig, the Christian worldview is not true

I granted (1) and criticized (2) on the basis that anyone who has read Craig’s work knows that this is not the case. Bolt attempts to reformulate my criticism as:

I think he means something like, as anyone who has read Craig’s work [knows], Craig obviously [considers this] untrue? If so, he has granted the second premise of the argument. Since the argument is valid, the conclusion follows that according to Craig, the Christian worldview is not true. Yet Craig is arguing that it is true, thus Craig defeats himself through his apologetic method.

His reformulation is questionable, it is even more questionable as to how that would concede the point. Even if we accepted his reformulation and said that “Craig considers that the statement “according to Craig, ‘Christ is not the lord of all’ false”, how does this grant the premise? It is wholly consistent with (2) being false! This is simply incoherent.

This is where we arrive at the issue of Craig’s statement of “checking one’s view at the door”. We all know that presuppositionalists claim that objectivity is impossible, but this has not been demonstrated. There is still the issue of the common ground of reality which both the believer and unbeliever share. In this respect Craig ‘checking his view at the door’ does not outright deny the existence of God, but it is rather an agreement to argument upon the common ground shared between believer and unbeliever!

It’s not as if suddenly, for Craig, the qualifiers for the various propositions in his head become ~God, how absurd of an idea is that?

I stated:

In fact, to establish this [that all propositions lose modal contingency] from his position Craig would have to make the fantastical argument that he exists necessarily rather than contingently.

Bolt says this is false, but does not demonstrate how. Craig does not suddenly presume that his existence is logically necessary when he is debating with an unbeliever. How then, is he being objective? As I’ve said before, by extending the invitation to discuss on the common ground of reality that both he and his opponent share.

In closing I said that the differences between apologetic methods came down to:

… whether or not presuppositionalism formulates a sound argument for the existence of God.

Bolt replied:

Since Mitch holds that presuppositionalism does not have a “sound” argument for the existence of God, and presuppositionalism differs from classicalism on this point, it follows that classical apologetics includes a sound argument for the existence of God. However, Mitch is an atheist and does not accept that God exists. Therefore Mitch is by his own argument shown to be irrational, since one rejects a sound argument upon pain of irrationality.

This is perhaps the epitome of silliness. It does not follow from what I said that I accept classical arguments as sound, I merely acknowledge that the classical method has the potential of generating a sound argument for God’s existence (if it hasn’t done so in one I am ignorant of). This is contrasted with the current state of presuppositional apologetics which are dead in the water in terms of philosophical merit.

Bolt closes:

Now watch him backtrack and try to clean up his sloppy argument! “Oh, oh I did not mean that!” Sure, but tomorrow he will repeat it again and deny saying it before. Yeesh.

That is simply rude.

It seems that upon further inspection, these ‘inconsistencies’ are just Bolt’s misunderstandings.

In closing, I would like to request that Bolt begin to make proper links back to the material he is responding to on this website. I offer links to his work and it seems courteous to do the same in return.

Initially, I’d like to point out to Chris the nature of this website may not be the same as his. The reason I made a point to convey that the matter of the problem of induction was hotly debated was simply to point out this fact to the reader base of Urban Philosophy. This website isn’t quite a personal blog of my own, it’s a community and we have some readers who are not as involved in Philosophy as either of us. The last thing I want to do is have anything I’ve said be taken on authority alone, hence why I make pointed here and there which encourage further reading. Further, I find it almost humorous that Bolt would criticize me on being skeptical or encouraging skepticism when his entire epistemic system is based on such skepticism.

With that said I’ll turn to a couple of the points he raised:

Pragmatism as Failure

Bolt accuses me of biased reading and erroneously assuming that finishing a book will provide me with answers. I assume no such thing, I simply said that I have not finished the book yet but the portions which I have leave me in agreement. In saying that we can continue to use induction to eventually discover any true inductions (if there are any) does not seem to me to beg the question. It might not be a justification of induction in Bolt’s opinion, but such is the nature of pragmatism. It needs not be a justification, it simply is a warrant for its continued use. There is no error here as Reichenbach is not attempting to contest that induction is justified or unjustified in that statement, simply that we have a reason to continue to use it. I do not see any invoked instance of induction in this very statement as he is not extrapolating from any past occurrences, but even if he were it is not a problem.

On Scientific Knowledge

[Mitch] writes, “That is to say, the better of two theories will be the one which has been subjected to more falsification attempts and has not yet been falsified”. I find the assertion that a theory somehow becomes more certain through more testing dubious and the assertion that a theory which has undergone more tests is the better theory dubious as well.

I’m afraid that Bolt misunderstands. A theory does not become more certain through more testing, it becomes more corroborated. To the best of my knowledge, Popper did not hold that proof or certainty was possible in scientific theorem, but this does not entail that knowledge is impossible.

An example of what Popper means is evident in the present day action of Science. When a theory is falsified it becomes discarded for a theory which explains the phenomena, this theory is the one which has the better explanatory power. Hence we deem theories obsolete and replace them when we discover another with greater explanatory power, the process of finding such further theories is to attempt to falsify all the theories which we have. Knowledge is completely possible, but it is certainty or proof which is the issue.

Square One?

I do not apply Popper’s method outside of science, with the exception of perhaps the legal system, but this doesn’t mean it cannot be. My area of specialty is certainly not the philosophy of science and it may be prudent to discuss such matters with such a philosopher.

A Tall Drink of Water

Bolt asks why I expect my next glass of water to remain water anymore than he expects it to turn into merlot. There are several reasons, including pragmatic reasons, but surely we can ask the same question to Bolt. In a portion of my most recent article which he chose to ignore, I presented three points which show the inability of Christianity to account for this same problem. Let us reconsider one of my three points here (briefly, as consultation to the previous article is expected):

Why the Uniformity of Nature doesn’t save the Christian

When the Christian proposes that the UON somehow relieves them of the burden set forth from the problem of induction they are simply deluded.

Even if one KNOWS that nature is uniform, this doesn’t seem to provide a justification for inductive reasoning. It would only act as such a justification if the Christian were omniscient. Consider the following example:

John is a Christian and John has had it revealed to him from God that nature is uniform. Is John any more justified than a non-Christian in concluding that because all of the swans he has seen are white therefore all swans are white? Surely, when John were to come across a Black Swan his proposed justification of induction would fail.

There are obviously things we do not know about the Universe and as such we can hold no certainty as to our inductive inferences. Perhaps the next time you throw a ball in the air it will cease to fall, not because of any violation in the UON but rather because of a previously unknown factor of the UON.

Let us contextualize what I’ve said here, why does Bolt presume that his next glass of water won’t become merlot? He says that he has been assured of the Uniformity of Nature, but even if this is the case he is not omniscient and cannot know all of nature’s uniformities! There is nothing inconsistent with Bolt being assured of the UON and going to get a glass of water and having it turn into merlot. This would not be a violation of the UON necessarily, but rather it could be an applicability of the UON to which Bolt was previously ignorant. That is to say that water turning into merlot under condition X may not be a violation of the UON but rather a previously unknown uniformity. Thus, how can Bolt say he is a position any better than the non-Christian? He is in precisely the same position, he just operates under a faulty presumption of certainty.

As for Bolt’s points on the nature of God, these would be better addressed in a separate article and I intend to do so after he responds in full to my discussion of God’s proposed honesty.

In closing, Bolt encourages me to turn my life over to Jesus Christ. I appreciate that Bolt may have good intentions in suggesting such a thing, but I have seen no good reasons for me to do so.

In pointing out that the “problem of induction” possesses debate on it’s proposed status as a “problem”, I was not intending to “wave a wand”, as Bolt puts it. In pointing out such I simply mean to suggest that one should be as skeptical about the problem of induction as the problem is skeptical of inductive reasoning itself. The assertion of the problem, is of course, that it is not rational to use inductive reasoning. As a precursor to such a discussion, one must be sure to identify what the “term” rational is defined as in this context. From this point, and only this point, can we really reach a conclusion.

Bolt expresses some confusions on my position, and while the intent of my post(s) is not to convey my personal position but rather to show the inability of Christianity to offer any type of solution to the proposed problem, I will for the sake of clarity (and perhaps to satisfy Bolt’s curiosity) outline my own position. I will attempt to do this in a manner which is both concise and accessible:

Is there a problem of induction?

Yes, I think there is an inability to justify our extrapolations of past events into the future. Admittedly, I am still making my way through Reichenbach’s writings on probability theorem but I agree with him that if there are any true inductions our consistent use of induction will eventually discover them. This justification is pragmatic in nature but certainly a reason for it’s continued use.

Can Science establish the truth of a theory?

Briefly speaking, no. I believe it was Popper himself who said that the scope of scientific theories is infinite and no finite amount of evidence can establish the truth of any. Scientific theories cannot be supported, but they can be corroborated by virtue of their falsifiability. That is to say, the better of two theories will be the one which has been subjected to more falsification attempts and has not yet been falsified.

That’s great for science, but what about other areas of our life?

Popper’s falsificationism works very well for science, but we do not have the luxury of being able to extrapolate it to our everyday lives (at least, if we do I’m unaware of such a way). As such, the justification for the use of induction in our everyday lives falls onto that of pragmatism. We should continue to use induction because if there are true inductions, we will discover them by our continued use of induction. I do not think Bolt will find this very convincing, but this leads into my next point.

What about Christianity, doesn’t it solve the problem of induction?

This was the main thrust of my initial post and it is perhaps my own fault that it’s taken this long to convey it accurately. What I am attempting to convey is that if there is a problem of induction the Christians are in the same boat as everyone else, they do not have a way out of the problem (contrary to what they assert).

The presuppositionalist asserts that they have a way out of the problem of induction by virtue of the Uniformity of Nature (UON) as guaranteed to them by God. But I think this is flawed reasoning. There seem to be three main problems with this assertion:

1. The trusting of God’s proposed assurance of the UON presupposes the honesty of God (I’ve outlined the problem with this here and am still awaiting a full response from Bolt: http://urbanphilosophy.net/index.php/philosophy/a-response-to-chris-bolt-on-presuppositionalism-and-gods-honesty/ )

2. The trusting of God’s promise presupposes the justification of induction. Therefore, to use God’s word to justify inductive reasoning is to beg the question.

3. The Uniformity of Nature does not provide justification for induction.

I will forgo dealing with the first issue as the article I linked does so sufficiently. I will then begin with the second (although it draws on matters from the first):

Trusting God
Why does the Christian trust God’s word rather than not? Forgoing the issues raised in the first point and insofar as God’s reliability is determined on the basis of the honesty God has shown in the past, we are faced with a vicious circularity. Such an argument would state:

God has never lied to me in the past, therefore God won’t lie to me in the future

The problem here should be obvious as this statement utilizes the very thing which it seeks to justify: inductive reasoning. But what of the claim that God cannot lie by his very nature? While I have touched upon this issue more in depth in the post I linked above it seems that such a statement again presupposes the validity of inductive reasoning:

It has been against God’s nature to lie in the past, therefore it will be against God’s nature to lie in the future

The Christian will undoubtedly assert that God’s nature is necessarily unchanging, but in doing so they seem to be appealing to knowledge which has yet to be justified (re: the same aforementioned linked post) or another instance of inductive reasoning:

God’s nature has not changed in the past, therefore it will not change in the future

Insofar as it is the case that God’s nature is necessarily unchanging by virtue of X, I am interested to hear a defense.

Why the Uniformity of Nature doesn’t save the Christian

When the Christian proposes that the UON somehow relieves them of the burden set forth from the problem of induction they are simply deluded.

Even if one KNOWS that nature is uniform, this doesn’t seem to provide a justification for inductive reasoning. It would only act as such a justification if the Christian were omnipotent. Consider the following example:

John is a Christian and John has had it revealed to him from God that nature is uniform. Is John any more justified than a non-Christian in concluding that because all of the swans he has seen are white therefore all swans are white? Surely, when John were to come across a Black Swan his proposed justification of induction would fail.

There are obviously things we do not know about the Universe and as such we can hold no certainty as to our inductive inferences. Perhaps the next time you throw a ball in the air it will cease to fall, not because of any violation in the UON but rather because of a previously unknown factor of the UON.

So what?

Well it seems then insofar as there is a problem of induction the Christian and the non-believer are in the same boat and must either abandon inductive reasoning or utilize it on a pragmatic basis. The Christian inherits no benefits by virtue of their belief in God in relation to induction than the non-believer.

Nowhere in my article did I attempt to provide a solution for the problem, but rather echo the fact that even the idea that there IS such a problem is still debated. As it stands then, presuppositionalists are simply bending the evidence when they present this idea that there certainly is a problem of induction and even moreso when they assert that they have the solution.

It also seems that Bolt has quoted me out of context. He writes:

Mitch apparently grants that scientific reasoning is “largely inductive in nature” and even grants the possibility that the sun might not rise tomorrow. He writes, “Science would invoke the principle of the uniformity of nature, presuming that in certain circumstances the future will resemble the past. For example, because the sun has risen everyday in the past, it is probable that it will rise tomorrow. Though [sic] it is, of course, possible that the sun may not.

I did not grant any such thing, if he would simply read the sentence directly before the portion he quoted, he would have read:

It is proposed that scientific reasoning is largely inductive in nature, moving from specifics (observing white swans repeatedly) and drawing conclusion for the whole (there are no black swans).

The key portion being, “It is proposed…”, identifies that people proposes that science is inductive. This is a vastly different statement than what Bolt would have you believe I’ve said. In fact, with regard to Science I agree with Popper’s falsifiability criterion and his conclusion that science relies primarily on deductive reasoning.

Later in his response Bolt criticizes me for my extensive sourcing of philosopher Michael Martin. I suppose it should be noted that I disagree with Martin on many things, but I find myself often in agreement when it comes to his critiques of presuppositionalism, hence my extensive sourcing.

With that said, the relevance of quoting Martin on his analysis of Hume was specifically because Hume is the primary source of Bahnsen’s critique on induction. It stands to reason then that if Bahnsen is quoting Hume and misunderstanding what Hume meant, then either Bahnsen must abandon his advocacy of Hume’s “problem of induction”, appeal to another philosopher or reformulate the problem himself.

Bolt then accuses me of gratuitous name dropping, but surely this is not malicious in nature. Though Bolt did misunderstand my thesis, the citing of various names is to show that the specific philosophical area we’re speaking of is still hotly debated! He could certainly add names of his own to my list, but this only further proves to validate my point.

Following these portions, Bolt finally moves to the critique of the Christian solution for the “problem”. I am disappointed with Bolt’s treatment here, it is largely superficial.

Bolt states:

Could God have a sufficient reason for causing a departure from the normal? Depending on what we mean by “normal”, the answer is, “Yes, and in fact He has caused departures from the normal”.

How is this not in direct contradiction with the entire idea of the principle of uniformity?

Further, he states:

Could we appeal to God’s sufficient reasons for any departure from the uniformity of nature? Of course; in fact, I do. It does not follow that we cannot expect uniformity in nature. Mitch is grasping for problems that are not there.

This is patent silliness! His argument here seems to be that though God has sufficient reasons to violate the uniformity of nature and further that he does violate the uniformity of nature, Bolt is still justified in expecting uniformity in nature. I simply don’t see how this could be the case. Is Bolt talking about a type of segregated uniformity? If so, he has departed from the principle of uniformity and should perhaps define his own.

As for my “grasping for problems that are not there”, I’d simply contend that presuppositionalism has a monopoly on this point and I dare not attempt to take share away from the stockholders.

Bolt foregoes a defense against the point of scripture made by Martin in my previous post stating that it need not be refuted there. I’d like to ask that in any further response he address the argument, as if there are any responses I remain entirely ignorant of them. The point regarding “why should we assume that the Bible is true” ties into some of the issues I raised in another post to which I am still awaiting a response.

He also finds trouble with the following point by Martin, which I wholeheartedly endorse:

…even if the Christian worldview must be assumed to make sense of X it does not follow that it is true

Bolt responds:

The trouble here is that one cannot “assume the Christian worldview” without accepting that it is true, as the claim to truth is itself a necessary constituent of the Christian worldview

Apparently, Bolt thinks that one cannot assume the truth of the Christian worldview without accepting that it is true? I suppose this depends on what he means by ‘accepting’, for an assumption is, in effect, a provisional acceptance. In assuming the Christian worldview, I can certainly agree, by virtue of provisional acceptance that it is true. The very definition of “assume” is to “suppose that something is true”, so I’m afraid I do not see the problem.

Perhaps Bolt is suggesting that an assumption of the Christian worldview would result in the acceptance of the assertion that it is the only worldview which offers an account for X, since such is a part of the set which is being assumed. But why is this a problem? It’s provisional acceptance on the grounds of an initial assumption, and it does not seem inconsistent that such can make sense of X without it being true. That is to say, it could be the case that all intelligibility requires the Christian worldview but this does not lead to the conclusion that God exists, Jesus was His son, etc…