Before we can gain an understanding of the practical application of virtue ethics by examining the theory within a whistle blowing situation, we must first explore a few concepts related to virtue. Rosalind Hursthouse provides a very basic structure for understanding how a virtue ethical approach to moral decision-making works. The first premise of this approach is that an action is right if it is what a virtuous agent would do in the circumstances. A virtuous agent is a person who has and exercises the virtues. In turn, a virtue is a character trait that is essential for a human being to flourish or live well, and the important point here is to recognize that the concept of right action cannot be explained without reference to the character of the agent who performs it. Also, Hursthouse is endorsing the Aristotelian contention that human flourishing is the ultimate end of our actions. According to Aristotle the nature and scope of character is directly related to living a flourishing life, so we will now turn our attention to an examination of character and character traits.

Robert Audi gives an exceptional account of character and the traits of which it is composed. Audi defines moral character specifically as a set of interconnected traits, which we can imagine as being analogous to a web where we cannot adjust one strand in the web without altering others. These traits are deeply held dispositions to act in a certain way. Importantly, a trait is not an inclination to act a certain way at one particular time; character traits exist within us over time. Even more importantly, these traits are changeable, and in my view, can even be overridden in the moment by the agent. However, the agent must have a motivation to override the vicious character trait. What this means is that a more deeply held conviction must exist, something even more essential to the personal identity of the agent. Later we will explore ways in which to shape our character into a more virtuous one, but now we must look at the virtue ethical concept of a regulative ideal to better understand the relation between character and action.

Justin Oakley and Dean Cocking introduce the concept of a regulative ideal in their book Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles. They define a regulative ideal as an internalized conception of correctness or excellence. Since the ultimate goal of all our actions is to flourish, then our regulative ideal is the internal standard that we believe will lead us to flourish. According to Oakley and Cocking, we have both a broad regulative ideal guiding our actions in a very general sense, and more specific regulative ideals that guide us in more precise areas of life. For example, a lawyer who has identified the end of her profession as the upholding of justice will believe that in order to achieve flourishing she must take actions in that particular domain (her profession) which she believes will conform to that end. Likewise, her colleague may hold the view that making money is what will facilitate flourishing, and thus making money is the end of the profession for him. For both of these professionals, their ideal lawyer has specific values, specific motivations, and would take specific actions in certain circumstances. It is my assertion that this ideal is the more deeply held conviction alluded to in the previous paragraph.

So, a regulative ideal is that deeply held standard which exists in various specific contexts, as well as in a more general sense. This ideal is not necessarily held consciously and in contrast to character traits it cannot be overridden. However, like our character traits, it is able to change due to our capacity for what Aristotle called practical wisdom (phronesis). As we navigate through our lives our rational capabilities ensure that we become increasingly knowledgeable about what constitutes human flourishing. Naturally, that knowledge will alter and mold our various regulative ideals. While this will not automatically alter our character as well, it can provide us with the notion that maybe some of our character traits are in need of revision too. Making those changes to our character will be discussed more fully after we have fleshed out the practical implications of these concepts, which will require us to shift our focus to the whistle blowing dilemma.

Let us put ourselves in the shoes of a young lawyer named Pat. Pat has been working at a law firm for the past few years and it has recently been revealed to her that her firm is committing the unethical action of excessively billing clients for hours that have not been worked. Furthermore, the clients being excessively billed are government agencies and corporations, meaning that this activity is having a negative effect on taxpayers and others associated with those corporations. In this situation, Pat is confronted with a choice: reveal the wrongdoing in order to curtail the illicit activity, in other words blow the whistle, or stay quiet and continue on with her work as usual. From an objective perspective it seems that Pat should reveal the wrong doing because doing so would uphold values that we as a society find important, such as integrity, loyalty to the public good, and honesty. However, when we attempt to understand the situation from Pat’s perspective it becomes much less clear because revealing this wrong doing may violate other values such as loyalty to friends or coworkers, responsibility for her personal welfare or that of her family, or reliability. This perspective shows us that the question of whether or not to blow the whistle is a true dilemma because there are legitimate ethical concerns on both sides of the issue.

In order to gain a full understanding of the situation that Pat has found herself in, I will now lay out a few elements of this situation that Michael Davis cites as being necessary for a true whistle blowing dilemma to present itself. First, this activity poses a threat to the public interest and were Pat to reveal the wrongdoing, it would most certainly arouse its audience. Next, Pat must first either attempt to alert her superiors to the problem or be sure that outside intervention is needed in order to end the wrongdoing. Pat must also be a member of the organization responsible for this wrongdoing and the illicit activity must be revealed to Pat due to the trust generated through her relationship with the wrongdoers or the nature of her professional role. Also, Pat must possess or have the ability to obtain the needed evidence in order to prove to an outsider that the threat exists. Lastly, Pat must have good reasons to believe that revealing this threat will actually end the wrongdoing. All of these elements ensure that Pat is not simply out for revenge, not prematurely sounding a false alarm, and that she faces a genuine dilemma, not simply an inter office problem.

In addition to this basic structure of a whistle blowing situation, Sissela Bok puts forth three additional elements that, “lend acts of whistle blowing special urgency and bitterness.” In other words, these three elements contribute to the feeling of conflict between possible actions and these elements are directly connected to the character of the agent. The first element is dissent, which Bok defines as a difference between the whistle blower’s convictions and the majority or authority view. The most common form of disagreement in a whistle blowing situation is whether or not the wrongdoing should be revealed publicly. While a potential whistle blower may think that the public needs to be aware of this wrongdoing, the culprits would disagree. What is important to understand is that this disagreement may be rooted in legitimate concerns from the culprits, such as the belief that blowing the whistle would produce more harm than good, or that it violates a supreme value such as loyalty. Let us assume that Pat’s professional regulative ideal is guided by the contention mentioned earlier that the end of the lawyering profession is upholding justice, while those responsible for the wrongdoing conceive that end as making money. If both parties truly believe that their perceived ultimate end will lead to flourishing lives, then we can see how the dissent arises.

The next element cited by Bok is the breach of loyalty that is involved. After finding herself in this situation, Pat will be forced to examine where her loyalties lie. It seems that in either path taken by Pat, she may feel like she violated a commitment to loyalty, either in the form of loyalty to the public good or loyalty to her coworkers or her firm. Again, if upholding justice is her ultimate criteria for determining what to do within her professional life, then it seems that she must follow her loyalty to the public good. But just as a regulative ideal can change for the better, Pat may find herself convinced by coworkers that making money is far more important for a flourishing life. This skewing of her regulative ideal may lead her to override the character trait of doing what is best for the public good. Whatever Pat happens to feel, the point is that she must decide where her loyalties lie.

Bok’s last element is accusation because if Pat decides to blow the whistle it will mean that she is accusing specific individuals or groups within the firm of posing a genuine threat to the public interest. This is dilemmatic because even if Pat is sure that the activity is unethical, other considerations may still weigh heavily on Pat’s mind. If she believes that those committing the wrongdoing are generally good people and simply wants them to stop excessively billing clients, but not suffer the other social sanctions of blowing the whistle, then this may prevent Pat from making the accusation. To relate this to her regulative ideal, maybe Pat’s general regulative ideal keeps her from making the accusation because of the practicality of the situation. For instance, if she believes that blowing the whistle will cost her job, or that the individuals responsible hold such an enormous amount of power that her accusation will not carry enough weight then once again that may lead her to override a more admirable character trait.

It seems clear that the structure of a whistle blowing dilemma and Bok’s three elements, against the backdrop of a virtue ethical approach, lead us to the assertion that the action of a potential whistle blower is less about what to do, and more about who we want to be. While it is tempting to focus on the action itself when pondering how to best be ethical in a dilemma like whistle blowing, it is more prudent to think about the influences which lead us to act. By doing this, Pat will be able to be confident that the decision that she ultimately makes will be the decision that is most in line with leading a truly flourishing life.  Now that we have explored virtue ethical concepts related to the person that we want to be, and also have a general understanding of what a whistle blowing dilemma entails, we can discuss how to become more virtuous.

Many critics of virtue ethics point to the fact that we cannot apply the principles of the theory to help us make an instantaneous decision as a case against the practicality of using virtue ethics. I will allow that theories such as Utilitarianism and Kantianism do provide us with a more systematic application of rules and principles in order to come to a decision on which action to take. However, it does not seem to follow that these theories give us an adequate account of how to live an ethical life. By actually living an ethical life, which is the ultimate in practicality, we remove the need for those kinds of theories because we can be sure that our decision-making already falls in line with achieving flourishing. By thinking about whom we want to be, striving for the acquisition of practical wisdom, and subsequently reflecting on that knowledge in order to shape our regulative ideal and character, we will find that navigating an ethical dilemma like whistle blowing is much easier. Next, we will examine the roles that motivation, habituation, practical wisdom, and intelligence play in shaping our regulative ideal and character so that these concepts conform to leading a flourishing life.

Motivation plays a very important role in determining whether or not we actually shape our character into a virtuous one in order to take the correct actions. Let us imagine that Pat has obtained the sort of practical wisdom that would allow her to be sure that upholding justice is the correct end of her profession. This in turn would alter the regulative ideal that guides her professional life. As previously mentioned, that would not automatically alter her character as well, meaning that she may still be disposed to act in a way that would not conform with upholding justice. If up to that point she has habitually done actions which conflict with upholding justice, for instance, maybe she regularly cuts corners for clients who pay her less per hour than other clients, that disposition will be a part of her character which is the main informant for her actions. Since she has become accustomed to doing this, even after her regulative ideal has shifted she will still have a natural disposition to continue that activity because she has yet to employ any steps to alter her character. However, now that her deeply rooted regulative ideal has changed, when she attempts to participate in an action which conflicts with that change she will inherently feel a conflict. At this point she now has a motivation to override that character trait.

Overriding a certain character trait one time will not eliminate Pat’s possession of the trait. While our character traits are not as deeply rooted as our regulative ideal, they remain a vital part of our identity and are more immediate than our regulative ideal in providing motivation to act. In Julia Annas’ article The Phenomenology of Virtue she states that becoming virtuous is never immediate, but rather requires time, experience and practice. Both Annas and Aristotle analogize this process to learning a practical skill, and this is the correct approach to take when attempting to possess a virtuous character. If Pat wants to become a better lawyer, she must identify those who are already exceptional lawyers. She will recognize certain skills that these lawyers exercise, say speaking well, maintaining good credibility, and understanding and articulating sound arguments. At first, it will be necessary for Pat to think about and consciously apply these characteristics to her own work. Eventually, through time, practice and the habituation of these skills, these thoughts will no longer be necessary. In addition, her experiences as she becomes more accustomed to the profession will lend her the advantage of applying certain aspects of the trade that she learned first hand. Obtaining virtuous character traits works in essentially the same fashion. If Pat would like to eliminate the character trait which causes her to fail to do the best work for certain clients, then she must continually work to eradicate the trait, which will naturally be replaced by the more virtuous trait of giving her best effort for all of her clients.

Annas states that, “a virtue is a disposition built up through intelligent practice” and we can turn to Aristotle to provide us with a method for determining how to practice our desired dispositions intelligently. This method is known as the golden mean and it calls for the use of our rational capacity to determine which actions are more virtuous than others. For every situation that we encounter in our daily lives, our rational capacity allows us to make a choice on which action to take. There is a wide spectrum of possible actions in response to all situations, and through the accumulation of practical wisdom we will become more adept at recognizing which action will accord with the golden mean. Aristotle wrote about avoiding the excessive and the deficient areas of this spectrum of choices. To borrow a widely used analogy, imagine an archery target, with a dot directly in the center of the target. When shooting at the target we are trying to hit the dot and avoid the areas outside of the dot. However even if we do not hit the dot directly but come close, that is always preferable to hitting the target on the outside edges or missing it altogether. Striving to do the most virtuous action is the same sort of process. We may not always hit the bull’s-eye but the more we practice, the better we become and the more likely we are to make a virtuous choice.

So how does all of this relate to the whistle blowing dilemma? Well unfortunately Pat will not be able to make a very virtuous decision if she has not made any attempt at being virtuous prior to the appearance of the dilemma in her life. However, by focusing on determining what sort of person she wants to be and why, she will be taking a step in the right direction. All professionals must strive to cultivate a virtuous character through the process described in this paper if they want to make a virtuous choice when they are faced with a dilemma. Not only will this help them to recognize when a certain situation fits the structure of a whistle bowing dilemma, but it will also give them a good grasp on where they stand in relation to Bok’s three elements. So much of our general regulative ideal, what we deem will ultimately facilitate flourishing, is dependant on our professional lives that we must cultivate a virtuous character long before we encounter a professional dilemma like whistle blowing in order to make a truly ethical decision. By doing this, we will shift the focus of our deliberations on the dilemma from the action itself to the reasons why we may choose one action over the other. This will allow us to make a comfortable decision when we are confronted with a dilemma like whistle blowing in our own workplace, which would be quite practical.

In order to live a flourishing life we must strive to incorporate all of these principles into all of our decisions. It all starts by consciously striving for the accumulation of practical wisdom. Our rational capacity will allow us to recognize that certain actions are more conducive to flourishing then others. Just like obtaining practical skills and virtuous dispositions, we must continually cultivate that rationality so that we may continually develop our capacity. If we are always striving for that continual development, then this will allow us to recognize how to lead a flourishing life. That in turn will alter our regulative ideals into a standard that is truly in line with flourishing. By having regulative ideals that are pointed toward virtue, we will feel a conflict when we are disposed to act viciously and have the necessary motivation for overriding a vicious trait. By recognizing that we must eradicate those vicious traits and replace them with virtuous ones through the same habituation process in which we obtain practical skills, we will be able to shape our character into a virtuous one as well. When we are unsure of the virtuous action in a certain situation, implementing the principles of the golden mean will assist us in understanding the implications of possible actions. Having a virtuous character will dispose us to naturally do virtuous actions in all areas of life. This is beneficial because rarely, if ever, are we expecting an ethical dilemma to present itself to us. By constantly and consistently using the virtue ethical approach in all of our actions we will easily and comfortably be able to make a decision in an ethical dilemma like whistle blowing, showing the true practicality and value of the virtue ethical approach to ethical decision-making.

Works Cited

Annas, Julia. “The Phenomenology of Virtue.” PhilPapers: Online Research in Philosophy. Springer, 12 Sept. 2007. Web. 05 Aug. 2011. <http://philpapers.org/rec/ANNTPO>.

Aristotle, and W. D. Ross. The Nichomachean Ethics,. London: Oxford UP, 1959. Print.

Audi, Robert. “Responsible Action and Virtuous Character.” Ethics 101.2 (1991): 304. Print.

Bok, Sissela. “Whistleblowing And Professional Responsibility.” New York University Education Quarterly 11 (1980): 2-7. Print.

Davis, Michael. “Some Paradoxes of Whistleblowing.” Business and Professional Ethics Journal 15 (1996). Print.

Hursthouse, Rosalind. “Virtue Theory and Abortion.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 20.3 (1991): 223-46. Jstor.org. Blackwell Publishing. Web. 22 July 2011.

Oakley, Justin, and Dean Cocking. Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001. Print.

The first objection Payton raises is as follows;

“What I consider to be the greatest weakness of Fedora’s assessment is its shameless association of the Bible and God; this assumption that the God of the Bible and the God of reality (indeed, of history) are of one mind.”

You may bring this up as a “weakness” of my article, but it’s arguments will still fall or stand on their own merits. This shows no weakness of my argument, it simply provides a scope within which it is limited. The core of the argument, sans examples perhaps, extend to the Islamic religion as well, among others. I admittedly have not researched the Muslim faith to the depth which I have the Christian faith (be it to a large extent or otherwise), and if I am wrong in saying it does extend to the Muslim faith, I apologize for my error. It is important to note, though, that this does not invalidate the argument, it merely limits its scope, albeit to one of the largest religions in the world today.

The second caveat Payton has with my article is shown in this quote.

“Now, I’m not sure if Fedora is getting at something Jesus actually said or forbade, as I’m not familiar with the story (maybe it doesn’t exist! I’m skeptical), but that’s beside the point.”

I was merely pointing out that, as far as my understanding of the crucifixion goes after my speaking with numerous theologians, some of whom had gone to college on the subject*, that Jesus was crucified to atone for our sins. This is, in essence, a sacrifice, which, as I stated, is unexpected in modern society. Payton continues with this quote.

“If Jesus did say such a thing, then I could say He was making a suggestion or teaching relative to those times.  In those days, such things were perhaps more understandable, I would not know.  In any case, such things are silly now, so we should consider whether this particular teaching is relative.”

If this is the case, then the original argument which my article was a response to falls apart, rendering my article unnecessary by default.

Another fault Payton finds within my article is raised is in the following quote.

“Who is right, Jesus or ‘modern society’?  Who is right, the God of the Bible, or “all sane humans”?…If he answers ‘modern society’, or ‘all sane humans’, hasn’t he begged the question in his article?”

Payton fails to recognize, this is the very point I am trying to make, the bedrock upon which my argument lies! The ethical facts which God follows and humans at least recognize to be true are different, and as such one of them must be wrong. As God is morally perfect, he must follow the correct ethical facts, making humanities incorrect, thus, the conclusion of my argument.

“From [1-7], the Judeo-Christian God cannot have revealed to Human beings a true, objective, perfect, set of ethical facts.”

I again quote Payton.

“The whole question of “Fact VS Metaphor” isn’t blasphemy.  A lot of the stories of God’s wrath are intended to teach people not to disobey Him.”

If I understand Payton correctly, he is essentially saying that the stories of the flood, etc. are simply meant to teach humans to fear God. This is a threat, plain and simple. Threats are considered grounds for legal conviction throughout the United States, among many other locations throughout the world. This is again an example of God’s behavior deviating from the ethical facts humans hold to be true.

The final counter-argument Payton raises is summarized in the following quotes,

“Christians hold it as a matter of fact that we are all sinners.  Secondly, we believe that all sinners deserve death,” and “Why is it that we complain that “bad things happen to good people”, when there are no good people?”

He is saying that the stories in the Bible are justified. As sinners, the humans whose deaths were chronicled in the Bible were justified. However, Jesus himself taught that sinners are to be forgiven, with such teachings as Matthew 18:21-22.

Matthew 18:21-22, “21 Then Peter came up and said to him, “Lord, how often will my brother sin against me, and I forgive him? As many as seven times?” 22 Jesus said to him, “I do not say to you seven times, but seventy times seven.”

And yet, God himself does not follow this ethical law. And even so, how does this justify the grievances afflicted to Job? God himself offers Job much praise, and holds him in glowing admiration.

Job 1:8, “8 Then the LORD said to Satan, “Have you considered my servant Job? There is no one on earth like him; he is blameless and upright, a man who fears God and shuns evil.”

God explicitly states that Job 1) is blameless, 2) fears God, and 3) shuns evil. By Paytons own admission, someone who fits this criteria would not deserve the grievances inflicted upon him. If a government official decided to, for example, prove to a different country that Americans are tougher and did the same with an American citizen, equally praiseworthy, this act would be condemned. Is God allowed to do this simply because he is God? Does his nature as God make him exempt from objective ethical facts?

Other objections raised :

In my discussion of this article with fellow UrbanPhilosophy.net users I have come across a few things I may need to clarify. These are as follows.

1.) I am not saying that human beings follow these ethical facts, they simply recognize them to be truthful.

2.) Accepting the lesser of two evils would be included in this ethical code.

3.) Humans are obligated to follow these ethical facts, not made to.

Again, I appreciate Payton’s time and effort in replying to my article! I appreciate the criticisms, and I welcome criticisms to my reply, or to my original argument. That’s what we’re here for, right? Thanks again, and I look forward to any and all replies!

______

* these are included, but not limited to, several pastors, several theology instructors, and Christians of a more intellectual persuasion. If they are in error, I apologize.

While not always in the form of an argument for the existence of a supreme being, sometimes merely pointed out as a “problem” for atheists, or at least something to ponder, many theists of all stripes point out lack of a moral compass for atheists to follow. In the argumentative form of this statement, it is often pointed out that their exists an, on the surface of it, objective moral order in the world. Regardless of whether or not this is true (I would contend it is not); this is then followed with the conclusion that the only explanation is the existence of a deity.

The argumentative form of the above statement is as follows.

1. God is necessary for the existence of a set of objective ethical facts.
2. An objective set of objective ethical facts exists.
3. God exists.

As stated, I will not contest either 1 or 2, but will presuppose them to be true. My problem, however, is how the Abrahamic God can be compatible with the moral code presented in the Bible. The argument (which I will elaborate on and explain) is as follows.

1. The Judeo-Christian God has revealed to human beings a perfect, objective moral set of ethical facts, contained in the Bible. (Ten commandments, Jesus, et. al)
2. An objective set of ethical facts must be followed by all beings. Human beings and God must adhere to the same set of perfect, objective, ethical facts.
3. God must follow any objective and perfect set of ethical facts.
4. The Judeo-Christian God, as described in the Bible, does not adhere to ethical facts humans find to be true.
5. Given [2-4], either God or Humans must follow an erroneous set of ethical facts.
6. Given 3, Humans must follow an erroneous set of ethical facts.
7. From [1-7], the Judeo-Christian God cannot have revealed to Human beings a true, objective, perfect, set of ethical facts.

It does not seem, to me, that many of these steps require explaining, save for (4).  Premises [1-3] seem obvious, and once (4) is explained, [5 - 7] follow logically. 3 follows from God being a perfect being, and a perfect being must adhere to the objective and perfect set of ethical facts.

In the Bible, God does many things which all sane Humans consider to be immoral. In any modern society, the expectation of a parent is not to require a sacrifice from their children after a wrong doing (Jesus). The problem is compounded wen God is given attributes which Humans do not possess, such as infinite love. A parent who left their children in the street because they did not make a sacrifice to them after a wrong-doing would be considered, by any court in the land, clinically insane. A similar verdict would be cast upon anyone who did the same, but not for the individuals wrong doing, but for their great-great-great grandfathers (Garden of Eden, Adam and Eve).

One may simply maintain that the Garden of Eden story was metaphorical, in which case it seems that Jesus’ sacrifice was unnecessary. If Jesus was simply taking on the sin which is/was present in every being simply due to the imperfect nature of human beings, the same problem arises. People in modern society are expected to forgive and forget, which God seems incapable of doing in the Bible in numerous situations. (The Flood, etc.)

Another ethical law which God does not adhere to is the usage of people as a means to an end. Take for example, the Book of Job, which I will assume you will have read. Any parents, for example, who, in trying to prove whose children were “tougher” had them take turns cutting off fingers to see who could last the longest, would be considered insane. And if, in the end, it turned out to be a “test” and the parents said “It’s ok, but, you still are losing a finger,” they would not gain an ounce of respect.

These are ethical laws which are set in stone to modern societies, and yet, God violates them both. How can an objective set of ethical laws, revealed by God, remain objective and yet be violated by the very person who revealed them?

• Objective ethical facts exist
• Ethical facts are not reducible to natural facts and properties
• Ethical facts do not require an external foundation

The view, therefore, is compatible with Theism and is not atheistic, but merely (as presented) non-theistic.

In this article, I will attempt to present the system in a simple manner.

Preliminary Definitions

A state of affair is a necessarily existing abstract entity. It can either obtain or fail to obtain. States of affairs which obtain are called facts and some facts are contingently true in that they exist only in some possible world as opposed to those which are necessarily true, and obtain in all. The state of affairs in which Bob is a firefighter is contingent since there are some possible worlds where Bob is not a firefighter. Further, the state of affairs in which Bob is not identical to the number two is a necessary state of affairs: there is no possible world where Bob is identical to the number two.

Many necessary states of affairs are expressed in terms of mathematical truths or trivial propositions such as “All bachelors are married.” Necessary states of affairs do not have to be so trivial, however, since some theists assert that God exists in all possible worlds, that is, God exists necessarily.

Further, there are some states of affairs which obtain because of other states. One example is the state of affairs in which Bob is hurt; this state of affairs being brought about by the fact that Lucy kicked a soccer ball at his head. States of affairs which are not brought about by other states are called brute facts. An example of one possible brute fact is that God exists. Typically, the theist will assert that there is nothing causing, grounding or being a reason for God’s existence – his existence is just a brute fact.

Ethical States of Affairs

Some states of affairs concern matters of ethics, involving notions of moral rightness, wrongness, goodness, evil, etc. Such properties are sui generis properties. That is, they are distinct from both natural, empirically testable properties and supernatural properties (thus, neither naturalism, nor supernaturalism but non-naturalism).

As discussed in a previous article some ethical states of affairs obtain necessarily, such as that it is wrong to torture the innocent for fun and that pain is intrinsically bad. Some other states obtain only contingently, such as that pushing a red button is morally wrong because it will cause Bob some pain. However, there are worlds in which pushing this button would not cause Bob some pain and therefore can only be a contingent fact.

Ethical Facts

That ‘pain is intrinsically bad’ obtains necessarily is evident in that it is not explained by some other state of affairs, it is not entailed but rather it is a brute fact. Ethical facts which are not entailed or explained by some other state of affairs are called basic ethical facts. These basic facts serve as the foundation of all further objective morality and rest on no foundation themselves. Some may be tempted to ask, “where do they come from?” but as Weilenberg notes:

To ask of such facts, “where do they come from?” or “on what foundation do they rest?” is misguided in much the way that, according to many theists, it is misguided to ask of God, “where does He come from?” or “on what foundation does HE rest”? The answer is the same in both cases: They come from nowhere, and nothing external to themselves grounds their existence; rather they are fundamental features of the universe that ground other truths.

Supervenience

The common view of moral properties is that if they are exemplified, they supervene on non-moral properties. That is to say, if there are two possible entities with identical non-moral properties, they will have identical moral properties: rightness supervenes on instances of truth-telling, goodness supervenes on certain character types in a necessary way.

What, then, is the connection between the natural fact that “Lucie is torturing Bob for fun” and the moral fact that it is wrong? Presumably, it is wrong because it is an act of torture, but how do we make sense of this ‘because’? Weilenberg states:

The answer, I think, is that ‘because’ here indicates metaphysical necessity. It is true in all metaphysically possible worlds that causing pain just for fun is wrong. This is the sense in which a given action is wrong because it is [an example of torturing for fun].

Theistic philosopher William Wainwright thinks that such supervenience is more ‘at home’ in a theistic universe than in a non-theistic one:

[T]he connection between the [natural fact] and the [moral property] can seem mysterious. For, in the absence of further explanations, the (necessary connection between these radically different sorts of properties… is just an inexplicable brute fact. (modifications are mine)

Under Weilenberg’s view, the relationships are equivalent to certain basic ethical facts. The claim that the property of “being intrinsically bad” supervenes on the property of pain is equivalent to the claim that necessarily, pain is intrinsically bad. Is such a ‘brute-fact-supervenience’ a problem? Might this supervenience give reason to prefer a theistic account, as Wainwright seems to think?

It seems only to be a problem if non-trivial necessary truths require explanations. But, there seems to be no reason to accept this. Especially for the theist, who posits one non-trivial necessary truth that does not require an explanation: that God exists. It sees that the proposed brute fact of ‘pain is intrinsically bad’ needs no more explanation. It seems, prima facie, to even be in less need of explanation than the existence of a perfect creator.

Perhaps it is true, however, that there is an explanation to God’s existence that is a ‘self-explanation’. Wainwright states that “if we could grasp [God's] nature we would see why it exists.” Wainwright is stating that even if we don’t know the explanation of God’s existence, it is there anyway. If this is true, then the existence of God is not a brute fact after all. Supposing that a self-explanatory being is a coherent notion (there is a lot of literature on this question), it seems that there is still some reliance on brute fact. To suggest that God’s existence is self-explanatory introduces another non-trivial necessary truth: that God’s nature possesses some feature which explains His existence. But, then, what is the explanation for this seemingly brute fact? Even under theism, it seems that one is committed to the coherence of brute fact.

“Mysterious, Floating Values”

Christian philosophers William Lane Craig and J.P Moreland define and criticize this view as follows:

Atheistic moral realists affirm that objective moral values and duties do exist and are not dependent on evolution or human opinion, but they also insist that they are not grounded in God. Indeed, moral values have no further foundation. They just exist.

… It is difficult, however, even to comprehend this view. What does it mean to say, for example, that the moral value justice just exists? It is hard to know what to make of this. I tis clear what is meant when it is said that a person is just; but it is bewildering when it is said that in the absence of any people, justice itself exists. Moral values seem to exist as properties of persons, not as mere abstractions – or at any rate, it is hard to know what it is for a moral value to exist as a mere abstraction. Atheistic moral realists seem to lack any adequate foundation in reality for moral values but just leave them floating in an unintelligible way.

On Weilenberg’s view, among the entities that “just exist” are states of affairs and properties which are accepted to “just exist” by a great number of contemporary philosophers. There are various states of affairs concerning justice, so when some person has the property of being just it is in virtue (partially) of the obtaining of precisely these states of affairs. Weilenberg explains:

For instance, I hold that it is just to give people what they deserve; thus, anyone who gives others what they deserve thereby instantiates the property of justice. The state of affairs that it is just to give people what they deserve obtains whether or not any people actually exist, just as various states of affairs about dinosaurs obtain even though there are no longer any dinosaurs. In this way, my approach cashes out the idea of justice “just existing” in terms of facts about justice. This approach is perfectly intelligible and coherent and no more posits mysterious, floating entities than does any view committed to the existence of properties and states of affairs.

“But You’re Just An Animal!”

A further criticism is that without a Creator, human beings lack moral rights altogether. As Craig states in his debate with Walter Sinnott-Armstrong:

[I]f there is no God, then what’s so special about human beings? They’re just accidental by-products of nature that have evolved relatively recently on an infinitesimal spec of dust lost somewhere in a hostile and mindless universe and that are doomed to perish individually and collectively in a relatively short time. On the atheistic view, some action, say, rape, may not be socially advantageous, and so in the course of human development has become taboo; but that does absolutely nothing to prove that rape is really wrong. On the atheist view, there’s nothing really wrong with your raping someone.

Arguments such as these take the form: If God does not exist, then human beings are just Xs and Xs don’t have moral rights or duties. But this is dubious, just because we may be Xs does not mean that we are nothing more than Xs. That is, human beings are animals, but are we really nothing more than animals? This doesn’t seem any more plausible then the claim that God is a necessarily existing being, and nothing more. It is true, according to theism, that God is necessarily existent but he is more than this, much more. So too, for human beings. We can suffer, love, strive for goals, etc. At any rate, Craig provides no argument for his claim that human beings are just animals, and nothing more.

As for the issue of rape, Sinnott-Armstrong replies, “[w]hat makes rape immoral is that it harms the victim in terrible ways. The victim feels pain, loses freedom, is subordinates, and so on. These harms are not justified by any benefits to anyone.” Essentially, he explains the wrongness of rape by appealing to a moral principle, namely that: any action that involves knowingly inflicting suffering, subordination, and a loss of freedom on another without producing any outweighing benefits is morally wrong. At the very least, we would need to see an argument suggesting that this proposed moral principle fails, but it seems quite plausible.

External Foundation?

Objections of this grade constantly ask for a foundation to be provided and this reveals the assumption that objective morality requires a foundation external to itself. Without any sound argument to suggest that this is true, why should one abandon the view that all non-brute ethical facts rest in part on a set of basic facts which serve as the axioms of morality and do not have an external foundation but are the foundation.

But further, the theist seems to offer nothing better. Craig states that “our moral duties are grounded in the commands of a holy and loving God… His nature expresses itself toward us in the form of moral commands which issuing from the Good, become moral duties for us.” Under this view, our moral duties still rely on some ungrounded ethical fact, namely that if the Good commands you to do something, then you are morally obligated to do it. What is the grounding for this claim? Does it simply “float mysteriously in an unintelligible way?”

Conlusion

At the very least, it is evident that the issue of morality in the absence of God is not as black and white as many people suppose that it is, theists and atheists alike. It has long been supposed that atheism leads to an abandonment of morality, but that doesn’t seem to be the case necessarily. In fact, it seems that a view such as Weilenberg’s is very similar to what the theist requires to escape the Euthyphro dilemma.

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¹All further quotations are from this paper unless otherwise noted.

1. If any being is God, he must be a fitting object of worship.
2. No being could possibly be a fitting object of worship, since worship requires the abandonment of one’s role as an autonomous moral agent.
3. Therefore, there cannot be any being who is God.

It very strongly seems the case that no one will dispute (1), so I will move on to Rachels’ defense of (2).

He describes worship thus:

We can very well comprehend people loving one another or respecting one another, but not (unless they are misguided) worshiping one another. This is because the worshiper necessarily assumes his own inferiority; and since inferiority is an asymmetrical relation, so is worship.

Rachels argues that whether or not God exists, we are moral agents; that is, we are autonomous and make moral decisions. However, this seems to conflict with being a worshiper:

To say “I will follow so-and-so’s directions no matter what they are and no matter what my own conscience would otherwise direct me to do” is to opt out of moral thinking altogether; it is to abandon one’s role as a moral agent. And it does not matter whether “so-and-so” is the law, the customs of one’s society, or Jehovah. This does not, of course, preclude one from seeking advice on moral matters and even on occasion following that advice blindly, trusting in the good judgment, of the adviser.

The conflict between being a worshiper and a moral agent is this: While a worshiper must always defer to God on moral decisions without question, a moral agent must make his or her own moral decisions.

Objections

1) God’s only command regarding morality is that we make our own moral decisions.

This is in fact the complete opposite of what most major theistic religions claim. Judaism, Islam, and Christianity all have God giving many specific moral commands to humanity. This objection may work if one is a deist, however it fails if one is a member of the Abrahamic religions.

2) Our responsibility as a moral agent is to do right, and God only ever commands us to do what is right.

The problem here is this: a being worthy of being called “God” will always command what is right, however, how can we know whether what he commands is right without using our own moral judgment? It seems that our own moral judgment is logically prior to deciding if some being is worthy of the title “God”.

3) We cannot trust our own judgment to determine what is right and wrong, we must trust God’s judgment, as only He is morally perfect.

Rachels gives two responses to this objection; for the sake of brevity I will only discuss the second. He argues that if we determine that God requires us to take some action, and we state that this action is morally right because God requires it, we have still made a moral judgment – that whatever God requires is morally right.

4) The conscience is God speaking to the individual.

This objection seems to lead to the conclusion that God is “tricking” us; that we think we have moral autonomy but in reality we do not. Rachels applies the famous Euthyphro dilemna here:

If in speaking to us through the voice of conscience, God is informing us of what is right, then there is no reason to think that we could not discover this for ourselves–the notion of “God informing us” is eliminable. On the other hand, if God is only giving us arbitrary commands, which cannot be thought of as right independent of his promulgating them, then the whole idea of conscience, as it is normally understood, is a sham.

5) “Finally, it might be objected that the question of whether any being is worthy of worship is different from the question of whether we should worship him.”

Rachels writes:

Mrs. Brown, being a fine woman, may be worthy of a marriage proposal, but we ought not to propose to her, since she is already married. Or, Seaman Jones may be worthy of a medal for heroism, but still there could be reasons why we should not award it. Similarly, it may be that there is a being who is worthy of worship and yet we should not worship him since it would interfere with our lives as moral agents.

The response to this objection deals with circumstances. Under circumstances X, Mrs. Brown would be worthy of marriage, while under circumstances Y, she is not. However, according to the argument, there are no cases in which moral agents should, or even can, worship God. One could say that an example would be beings which are not moral agents should worship God, however how could a non-moral agent, such as a spider, or even a rock, possibly worship?

The argument, if sound, forces the theist to one of two possible conclusions:

1) God does not exist.
2) We are not moral agents.

The problems for the theist if he chooses to accept 1 are apparent. However, if the theist instead goes with 2, then he must conclude that we are merely moral robots, devoid of any accountability for our actions.

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¹See: Can Ethics Provide Answers? : And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy by James Rachels