In mathematics we define most things precisely, and usually the solutions to problems are presented as a step by step progression starting from clearly defined things and finishing with an answer that is proven to be a correct solution.

But it is sometimes useful to jump straight to consideration of a final solution, asking “Suppose there were a solution to this problem, let us call this solution X, what properties must X have?”

This can be a useful approach and, even for problems that turn out to have no valid solutions, we would still consider the signifier “X” to be something that we have succesfully ascribed meaning to: we could talk about “X” to other mathematicians and they would respond back to us in a manner that we can predict based upon the supposition that they share with us an understanding of what “X” is intended to refer to.

The same applies when we consider the meaning of words, rather than the meaning of mathematical symbols.  Words can acquire meaning inductively, based upon sense data, the way a child learns language.  But words can also be defined deductively, as solutions to problems set up by applying logical conjunctions to propositions or by analogy.

And, as with “x”, just hypothetical definitions can be useful and should be considered meaningful, even if there is no actual thing to which they can refer, or it is unknowable as to whether the referent exists.

Brain in a Vat

Putnam (Putnam, 1981) argues that a Brain in a Vat couldn’t think or reason about Brains or Vats because the thing it referred to as “Brain” could only be the simulation of a Brain fed to it by the supercomputer maintaining its illusory world, rather than the actually piece of flesh sitting in the jar.   However suppose the Brain engaged in thoughts upon the following lines:

I am going to refer to the world accessible to my sense data as “World 1″, and use the phrase “Type 1 Brain” to refer to the sort of physical thinking organ that my senses tell me exist in World 1.

I am going to refer to the virtual world running on the computer on my desk as “World 2″, which is a subset of World 1, and use the phrase “Type 2 Brain” to refer to the locus of thought of any being whose perceptual universe is limited to World 2.

I am going to refer to any hypothetical superset of World 1 that is larger than World 1 as “World 0″, and use the phrase “Type 0 Brain” to refer to a hypothetical type of thing that bears the same relationship to Type 1 Brains as Type 1 Brains do to Type 2 Brains.

The phrase “Type 0 Brain” does indeed contain the word “Brain” which the Type 1 Brain originally defined, as a child, by reference to parts of World 1 that it could sense.  But the phrase itself is more than the sum of its constituent parts.  It is a hypothetical definition, and as such can be said to meaningfully refer to things the Type 1 Brain will never directly sense.

If, for instance, the Type 1 Brain wrote down in on a piece of World 1 paper “Hello World 0, please reply”, a computer programmer in World 0 examining the bits of data in the computer running the World 1 simulation could decode this message and program the simulation to make appear a piece of paper in response, carrying the message “Hi, this is Frank, how are you enjoying my simulation, would you like me to make you a pet unicorns ?”.   They could engage in  a meaningful dialog, even though the Type 1 Brain would still be limited to its Type 1 senses.

And, just as a mathematician can consider what properties a valid solution would have to have, and perhaps elliminate some from consideration by demonstrating that two contradictory properties would both be required, by engaging in thought about our hypothetical World 0, and then looking around our World 1 and noticing the lack of pet unicorns, we can start to place constraints upon what World 0 is likely to contain.

Doubt all that can be doubted?

Descartes (Descartes, 1641) advocated starting by doubting all that can be doubted.   But that takes us nowhere, because everything can be doubted.

The Ken Thompson Hack (Thompson, 1984) explains why, once the security on a machine has been fully breached, you can not necessarily detect this by using the compromised tools.  The same applies to reason.  We may think that valid syllogisms always produce true conclusions if given true premises.  Indeed, that may even be how we define what “valid” means.  But our only means of deciding which syllogisms are valid depend upon our memory and those same syllogisms.

Suppose Frank, a World 0 computer programmer, in order to write a paper on the nature of logic, decided to see if he could create a World 1 simulation in which all the intelligent inhabitants thought that “If A can see B, and B can see C, then A can see C” was a valid syllogism.  Could he do it?  Well, he might have to ensure that evolution gave the beings in the simulation visual telepathy so that, in most cases, the reasoning did work in practice and the beings didn’t die off.  But yes, there is no intrinsic reason why he could put a routine in the simulation that ensure that whenever a particularly philosophically inclined World 1 being started trying to reason it out, the conclusion was places in his thought stream that the syllogism was valid.

Indeed, there is no intrinsic difficulty preventing Frank from including in the simulation a method for the beings to arrive at conclusions that was more reliable than reason, such as sacrificing an animal while chanting certain words, then meditating for a few minutes and awaiting an internal emotion or insight inclining the being towards or away from certain options they were deciding between.

Don’t doubt just for the sake of doubting

So, if doubting everything gains us nothing, can we gain anything by doubting some things but not others?

To answer that it is helpful to consider our purpose.  What Descartes was seeking, that he hoped to gain by his method of doubt, was truth and certainty.  That, alas, is overly ambitious, but suppose we think of reason as a tool with many uses.  People can try to use the tool to find pure truth, but it can also be used in everyday life to helping us avoid mistakes and delusions.  So, setting aside the possible existence of other tools, let us restrict ourselves to the purpose of honing the tool of reason, and ask ourselves how we may use doubt to increase the effectiveness and reliability of this tool.

Reason

The first thing we can allow ourselves to stop doubting is reason itself, because doubting it has no predictable advantage for our purpose.  Our purpose allows us no outside check on the effectiveness of  reason compared to outside tools, and, if we are being deluded by some higher agency into thinking that various invalid syllogisms are valid, there is nothing that reason can tell us about the consequences of that so, as far as reason is concerned, following the syllogisms we believe to be valid might be just as effective at reaching true conclusions as rejecting them.  And, since we have no basis to decide which syllogisms to reject as pranks by Frank, and Frank could just as easily be fooling us into thinking invalid some syllogisms that actually are valid, we do not reduce the false-positive rate of our tool by not making the assumption.  So:

WORKING ASSUMPTION 1 : First-order logic is sound

Probability

Deductive reasoning, by itself, can’t take us far enough to affect our decisions.  It needs something to work upon, and for that we need inductive reasoning (of the non-mathematical kind) and, for that we need probability.  The minimum set of axioms needed is Zermelo and Fraenkel’s extensions of Paeno, with the addition of the axiom of choice, which mathematicians refer to as ZFC.

WORKING ASSUMPTION 2 : ZFC

Occam’s razor

Duns Scotus wrote (translated) “Plurality is not to be posited without necessity” which is a dictum that can be traced back to much earlier philosophers, and is best known in the version attributed to Occam.  The reason why this is wise advice has now be demonstrated by Hutter (Hutter, 2005) who has proven that, other things being equal, the simpler theory is actually more likely to be true (Reay, 1988).   This is a key result however, since it is a direct consequence of our first two working assumptions, we don’t need to list it as an additional one.

Reality

So we now we have a way to make decisions, we have a decision to make.  Consider the standard mental model of how ‘reality’ functions.   There is an external world which our body perceives through our senses that translate into electrical and chemical changes in the physical brain, some of which our conscious ‘mind’ is aware of and experiences subjectively as qualia and these, plus what we think of as our direct perception of our memories and thought processes constitute our internal worldview based upon which our conscious (and subconscious) mind reacts or makes decisions that direct our body and our further thoughts and emotions, which get stored as further memories.

Which parts of this model must we choose not to doubt, for our purpose, or are there at this point several possibilities that still leave reasoning as an effective tool?

Some would argue that we might be brains in a vat, so we should definitely doubt the reliability of an apparent regularities in the external (World 1) reality, and so the logical starting point is to accept our own existance and the qualia as that ‘we’ perceives them.

Others argue that various psychiatric ailments are known to interfere with memory and sense of self; and that the body’s perception system has known defects (eg optical illusions) which makes assuming an objective shared external reality a more reliable starting point.

If we craft the wording of our next working assumption carefully enough, we can remain agnostic on this point, accepting both possibilities, and using Occam’s Razor to allocate probabilities to them.

WORKING ASSUMPTION 3 : There is sufficient regularity to the reality that can be accessed or modeled by the reasoning process we identify as our own being, that we can apply inductive reasoning to it with better than random results.

Time

A corollary of adding this third working assumption is the nature of time, because it assumes the concept of results – of testability.  The concept of having a model of how reality works, using reasoning to form a prediction based upon that model, then later getting a result (an action guided by that prediction achieving or failing to achieve the anticiapted result) at a later time.

It is logically possible that Frank only started his simulation running 5 seconds ago, and everything we think happened before that time is merely what we were programmed to think by the initial starting state.  It is also possible that there are regularities in the simulation, but that at midnight Frank is going to upload a software patch that changes the laws of nature in the simulation, and that everything will work differently from that point on.

This is known as The Problem of Induction.  Just because induction has worked in the past, that’s no evidence that induction will work in the future, because that would be using induction to support induction which is circular reasoning.

However we can bootstrap induction supporting induction if we can find an initial reason to think that induction is even just slightly more likely to be correct than not.  And Occam’s Razor gives us that reason, because the theory that Frank will upload a software patch a midnight contains an additional piece of information (the time of the change), which increases its Chaitin-Kolmogorov complexity (Chaitin, 1987).

Our third working assumption isn’t quite the same as ontological naturalism or Hume’s Principle of Uniformity of Nature, but it leans sufficiently far in that direct that we can perform physics, while still leaving open the technical possibility of a World 0 and supernatural intervention in World 1.

And alternative formulation of our third working assumption might be “There are, in our lives, at least some decisions (choices between possible options for an action to take) where reason can help us predict what some of the likely consequences would be of choosing each option, with better than random odds.”

From ‘Is’ to ‘Ought’

These first three working assumptions are sufficient to let us function in reality, and act towards goals.  But they tell us nothing about what goals to set.  For that we need one final step:

WORKING ASSUMPTION 4 : At least some of the decisions in our life will matter.

This a safe assumption to make because, if none of the decisions matter, then our decision (to make a false working assumption) doesn’t matter (because it is one of the decisions we made in our life).

Once we have this fourth working assumption, we may apply Occam’s Razor to the various competing theories of what matters, to find the simplest that has at least as much predictive power as any of the others.

References

Chaitin, G. J. [1987] “Algorithmic Information Theory“ Cambridge University Press ISBN: 0521343062

Descartes, René [1641] “Meditations on First Philosophy” http://www.wright.edu/cola/descartes/

Hutter, Marcus [2005] “Universal Artificial Intelligence: Sequential Decisions Based On Algorithmic Probability” ISBN 3-540-22139-5 http://www.hutter1.net/ai/uaibook.htm

Putnam, Hilary Whitehall [1981] “Reason, Truth, and History” ISBN-10: 0521297761

Reay, Douglas William Windle [1988] “Reay’s Lemma” http://www.toothycat.net/wiki/wiki.pl?ReaysLemma

Thompson, Ken [1984] “Reflections On Trusting Trust” http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html

Before we can gain an understanding of the practical application of virtue ethics by examining the theory within a whistle blowing situation, we must first explore a few concepts related to virtue. Rosalind Hursthouse provides a very basic structure for understanding how a virtue ethical approach to moral decision-making works. The first premise of this approach is that an action is right if it is what a virtuous agent would do in the circumstances. A virtuous agent is a person who has and exercises the virtues. In turn, a virtue is a character trait that is essential for a human being to flourish or live well, and the important point here is to recognize that the concept of right action cannot be explained without reference to the character of the agent who performs it. Also, Hursthouse is endorsing the Aristotelian contention that human flourishing is the ultimate end of our actions. According to Aristotle the nature and scope of character is directly related to living a flourishing life, so we will now turn our attention to an examination of character and character traits.

Robert Audi gives an exceptional account of character and the traits of which it is composed. Audi defines moral character specifically as a set of interconnected traits, which we can imagine as being analogous to a web where we cannot adjust one strand in the web without altering others. These traits are deeply held dispositions to act in a certain way. Importantly, a trait is not an inclination to act a certain way at one particular time; character traits exist within us over time. Even more importantly, these traits are changeable, and in my view, can even be overridden in the moment by the agent. However, the agent must have a motivation to override the vicious character trait. What this means is that a more deeply held conviction must exist, something even more essential to the personal identity of the agent. Later we will explore ways in which to shape our character into a more virtuous one, but now we must look at the virtue ethical concept of a regulative ideal to better understand the relation between character and action.

Justin Oakley and Dean Cocking introduce the concept of a regulative ideal in their book Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles. They define a regulative ideal as an internalized conception of correctness or excellence. Since the ultimate goal of all our actions is to flourish, then our regulative ideal is the internal standard that we believe will lead us to flourish. According to Oakley and Cocking, we have both a broad regulative ideal guiding our actions in a very general sense, and more specific regulative ideals that guide us in more precise areas of life. For example, a lawyer who has identified the end of her profession as the upholding of justice will believe that in order to achieve flourishing she must take actions in that particular domain (her profession) which she believes will conform to that end. Likewise, her colleague may hold the view that making money is what will facilitate flourishing, and thus making money is the end of the profession for him. For both of these professionals, their ideal lawyer has specific values, specific motivations, and would take specific actions in certain circumstances. It is my assertion that this ideal is the more deeply held conviction alluded to in the previous paragraph.

So, a regulative ideal is that deeply held standard which exists in various specific contexts, as well as in a more general sense. This ideal is not necessarily held consciously and in contrast to character traits it cannot be overridden. However, like our character traits, it is able to change due to our capacity for what Aristotle called practical wisdom (phronesis). As we navigate through our lives our rational capabilities ensure that we become increasingly knowledgeable about what constitutes human flourishing. Naturally, that knowledge will alter and mold our various regulative ideals. While this will not automatically alter our character as well, it can provide us with the notion that maybe some of our character traits are in need of revision too. Making those changes to our character will be discussed more fully after we have fleshed out the practical implications of these concepts, which will require us to shift our focus to the whistle blowing dilemma.

Let us put ourselves in the shoes of a young lawyer named Pat. Pat has been working at a law firm for the past few years and it has recently been revealed to her that her firm is committing the unethical action of excessively billing clients for hours that have not been worked. Furthermore, the clients being excessively billed are government agencies and corporations, meaning that this activity is having a negative effect on taxpayers and others associated with those corporations. In this situation, Pat is confronted with a choice: reveal the wrongdoing in order to curtail the illicit activity, in other words blow the whistle, or stay quiet and continue on with her work as usual. From an objective perspective it seems that Pat should reveal the wrong doing because doing so would uphold values that we as a society find important, such as integrity, loyalty to the public good, and honesty. However, when we attempt to understand the situation from Pat’s perspective it becomes much less clear because revealing this wrong doing may violate other values such as loyalty to friends or coworkers, responsibility for her personal welfare or that of her family, or reliability. This perspective shows us that the question of whether or not to blow the whistle is a true dilemma because there are legitimate ethical concerns on both sides of the issue.

In order to gain a full understanding of the situation that Pat has found herself in, I will now lay out a few elements of this situation that Michael Davis cites as being necessary for a true whistle blowing dilemma to present itself. First, this activity poses a threat to the public interest and were Pat to reveal the wrongdoing, it would most certainly arouse its audience. Next, Pat must first either attempt to alert her superiors to the problem or be sure that outside intervention is needed in order to end the wrongdoing. Pat must also be a member of the organization responsible for this wrongdoing and the illicit activity must be revealed to Pat due to the trust generated through her relationship with the wrongdoers or the nature of her professional role. Also, Pat must possess or have the ability to obtain the needed evidence in order to prove to an outsider that the threat exists. Lastly, Pat must have good reasons to believe that revealing this threat will actually end the wrongdoing. All of these elements ensure that Pat is not simply out for revenge, not prematurely sounding a false alarm, and that she faces a genuine dilemma, not simply an inter office problem.

In addition to this basic structure of a whistle blowing situation, Sissela Bok puts forth three additional elements that, “lend acts of whistle blowing special urgency and bitterness.” In other words, these three elements contribute to the feeling of conflict between possible actions and these elements are directly connected to the character of the agent. The first element is dissent, which Bok defines as a difference between the whistle blower’s convictions and the majority or authority view. The most common form of disagreement in a whistle blowing situation is whether or not the wrongdoing should be revealed publicly. While a potential whistle blower may think that the public needs to be aware of this wrongdoing, the culprits would disagree. What is important to understand is that this disagreement may be rooted in legitimate concerns from the culprits, such as the belief that blowing the whistle would produce more harm than good, or that it violates a supreme value such as loyalty. Let us assume that Pat’s professional regulative ideal is guided by the contention mentioned earlier that the end of the lawyering profession is upholding justice, while those responsible for the wrongdoing conceive that end as making money. If both parties truly believe that their perceived ultimate end will lead to flourishing lives, then we can see how the dissent arises.

The next element cited by Bok is the breach of loyalty that is involved. After finding herself in this situation, Pat will be forced to examine where her loyalties lie. It seems that in either path taken by Pat, she may feel like she violated a commitment to loyalty, either in the form of loyalty to the public good or loyalty to her coworkers or her firm. Again, if upholding justice is her ultimate criteria for determining what to do within her professional life, then it seems that she must follow her loyalty to the public good. But just as a regulative ideal can change for the better, Pat may find herself convinced by coworkers that making money is far more important for a flourishing life. This skewing of her regulative ideal may lead her to override the character trait of doing what is best for the public good. Whatever Pat happens to feel, the point is that she must decide where her loyalties lie.

Bok’s last element is accusation because if Pat decides to blow the whistle it will mean that she is accusing specific individuals or groups within the firm of posing a genuine threat to the public interest. This is dilemmatic because even if Pat is sure that the activity is unethical, other considerations may still weigh heavily on Pat’s mind. If she believes that those committing the wrongdoing are generally good people and simply wants them to stop excessively billing clients, but not suffer the other social sanctions of blowing the whistle, then this may prevent Pat from making the accusation. To relate this to her regulative ideal, maybe Pat’s general regulative ideal keeps her from making the accusation because of the practicality of the situation. For instance, if she believes that blowing the whistle will cost her job, or that the individuals responsible hold such an enormous amount of power that her accusation will not carry enough weight then once again that may lead her to override a more admirable character trait.

It seems clear that the structure of a whistle blowing dilemma and Bok’s three elements, against the backdrop of a virtue ethical approach, lead us to the assertion that the action of a potential whistle blower is less about what to do, and more about who we want to be. While it is tempting to focus on the action itself when pondering how to best be ethical in a dilemma like whistle blowing, it is more prudent to think about the influences which lead us to act. By doing this, Pat will be able to be confident that the decision that she ultimately makes will be the decision that is most in line with leading a truly flourishing life.  Now that we have explored virtue ethical concepts related to the person that we want to be, and also have a general understanding of what a whistle blowing dilemma entails, we can discuss how to become more virtuous.

Many critics of virtue ethics point to the fact that we cannot apply the principles of the theory to help us make an instantaneous decision as a case against the practicality of using virtue ethics. I will allow that theories such as Utilitarianism and Kantianism do provide us with a more systematic application of rules and principles in order to come to a decision on which action to take. However, it does not seem to follow that these theories give us an adequate account of how to live an ethical life. By actually living an ethical life, which is the ultimate in practicality, we remove the need for those kinds of theories because we can be sure that our decision-making already falls in line with achieving flourishing. By thinking about whom we want to be, striving for the acquisition of practical wisdom, and subsequently reflecting on that knowledge in order to shape our regulative ideal and character, we will find that navigating an ethical dilemma like whistle blowing is much easier. Next, we will examine the roles that motivation, habituation, practical wisdom, and intelligence play in shaping our regulative ideal and character so that these concepts conform to leading a flourishing life.

Motivation plays a very important role in determining whether or not we actually shape our character into a virtuous one in order to take the correct actions. Let us imagine that Pat has obtained the sort of practical wisdom that would allow her to be sure that upholding justice is the correct end of her profession. This in turn would alter the regulative ideal that guides her professional life. As previously mentioned, that would not automatically alter her character as well, meaning that she may still be disposed to act in a way that would not conform with upholding justice. If up to that point she has habitually done actions which conflict with upholding justice, for instance, maybe she regularly cuts corners for clients who pay her less per hour than other clients, that disposition will be a part of her character which is the main informant for her actions. Since she has become accustomed to doing this, even after her regulative ideal has shifted she will still have a natural disposition to continue that activity because she has yet to employ any steps to alter her character. However, now that her deeply rooted regulative ideal has changed, when she attempts to participate in an action which conflicts with that change she will inherently feel a conflict. At this point she now has a motivation to override that character trait.

Overriding a certain character trait one time will not eliminate Pat’s possession of the trait. While our character traits are not as deeply rooted as our regulative ideal, they remain a vital part of our identity and are more immediate than our regulative ideal in providing motivation to act. In Julia Annas’ article The Phenomenology of Virtue she states that becoming virtuous is never immediate, but rather requires time, experience and practice. Both Annas and Aristotle analogize this process to learning a practical skill, and this is the correct approach to take when attempting to possess a virtuous character. If Pat wants to become a better lawyer, she must identify those who are already exceptional lawyers. She will recognize certain skills that these lawyers exercise, say speaking well, maintaining good credibility, and understanding and articulating sound arguments. At first, it will be necessary for Pat to think about and consciously apply these characteristics to her own work. Eventually, through time, practice and the habituation of these skills, these thoughts will no longer be necessary. In addition, her experiences as she becomes more accustomed to the profession will lend her the advantage of applying certain aspects of the trade that she learned first hand. Obtaining virtuous character traits works in essentially the same fashion. If Pat would like to eliminate the character trait which causes her to fail to do the best work for certain clients, then she must continually work to eradicate the trait, which will naturally be replaced by the more virtuous trait of giving her best effort for all of her clients.

Annas states that, “a virtue is a disposition built up through intelligent practice” and we can turn to Aristotle to provide us with a method for determining how to practice our desired dispositions intelligently. This method is known as the golden mean and it calls for the use of our rational capacity to determine which actions are more virtuous than others. For every situation that we encounter in our daily lives, our rational capacity allows us to make a choice on which action to take. There is a wide spectrum of possible actions in response to all situations, and through the accumulation of practical wisdom we will become more adept at recognizing which action will accord with the golden mean. Aristotle wrote about avoiding the excessive and the deficient areas of this spectrum of choices. To borrow a widely used analogy, imagine an archery target, with a dot directly in the center of the target. When shooting at the target we are trying to hit the dot and avoid the areas outside of the dot. However even if we do not hit the dot directly but come close, that is always preferable to hitting the target on the outside edges or missing it altogether. Striving to do the most virtuous action is the same sort of process. We may not always hit the bull’s-eye but the more we practice, the better we become and the more likely we are to make a virtuous choice.

So how does all of this relate to the whistle blowing dilemma? Well unfortunately Pat will not be able to make a very virtuous decision if she has not made any attempt at being virtuous prior to the appearance of the dilemma in her life. However, by focusing on determining what sort of person she wants to be and why, she will be taking a step in the right direction. All professionals must strive to cultivate a virtuous character through the process described in this paper if they want to make a virtuous choice when they are faced with a dilemma. Not only will this help them to recognize when a certain situation fits the structure of a whistle bowing dilemma, but it will also give them a good grasp on where they stand in relation to Bok’s three elements. So much of our general regulative ideal, what we deem will ultimately facilitate flourishing, is dependant on our professional lives that we must cultivate a virtuous character long before we encounter a professional dilemma like whistle blowing in order to make a truly ethical decision. By doing this, we will shift the focus of our deliberations on the dilemma from the action itself to the reasons why we may choose one action over the other. This will allow us to make a comfortable decision when we are confronted with a dilemma like whistle blowing in our own workplace, which would be quite practical.

In order to live a flourishing life we must strive to incorporate all of these principles into all of our decisions. It all starts by consciously striving for the accumulation of practical wisdom. Our rational capacity will allow us to recognize that certain actions are more conducive to flourishing then others. Just like obtaining practical skills and virtuous dispositions, we must continually cultivate that rationality so that we may continually develop our capacity. If we are always striving for that continual development, then this will allow us to recognize how to lead a flourishing life. That in turn will alter our regulative ideals into a standard that is truly in line with flourishing. By having regulative ideals that are pointed toward virtue, we will feel a conflict when we are disposed to act viciously and have the necessary motivation for overriding a vicious trait. By recognizing that we must eradicate those vicious traits and replace them with virtuous ones through the same habituation process in which we obtain practical skills, we will be able to shape our character into a virtuous one as well. When we are unsure of the virtuous action in a certain situation, implementing the principles of the golden mean will assist us in understanding the implications of possible actions. Having a virtuous character will dispose us to naturally do virtuous actions in all areas of life. This is beneficial because rarely, if ever, are we expecting an ethical dilemma to present itself to us. By constantly and consistently using the virtue ethical approach in all of our actions we will easily and comfortably be able to make a decision in an ethical dilemma like whistle blowing, showing the true practicality and value of the virtue ethical approach to ethical decision-making.

Works Cited

Annas, Julia. “The Phenomenology of Virtue.” PhilPapers: Online Research in Philosophy. Springer, 12 Sept. 2007. Web. 05 Aug. 2011. <http://philpapers.org/rec/ANNTPO>.

Aristotle, and W. D. Ross. The Nichomachean Ethics,. London: Oxford UP, 1959. Print.

Audi, Robert. “Responsible Action and Virtuous Character.” Ethics 101.2 (1991): 304. Print.

Bok, Sissela. “Whistleblowing And Professional Responsibility.” New York University Education Quarterly 11 (1980): 2-7. Print.

Davis, Michael. “Some Paradoxes of Whistleblowing.” Business and Professional Ethics Journal 15 (1996). Print.

Hursthouse, Rosalind. “Virtue Theory and Abortion.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 20.3 (1991): 223-46. Jstor.org. Blackwell Publishing. Web. 22 July 2011.

Oakley, Justin, and Dean Cocking. Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001. Print.

The first objection Payton raises is as follows;

“What I consider to be the greatest weakness of Fedora’s assessment is its shameless association of the Bible and God; this assumption that the God of the Bible and the God of reality (indeed, of history) are of one mind.”

You may bring this up as a “weakness” of my article, but it’s arguments will still fall or stand on their own merits. This shows no weakness of my argument, it simply provides a scope within which it is limited. The core of the argument, sans examples perhaps, extend to the Islamic religion as well, among others. I admittedly have not researched the Muslim faith to the depth which I have the Christian faith (be it to a large extent or otherwise), and if I am wrong in saying it does extend to the Muslim faith, I apologize for my error. It is important to note, though, that this does not invalidate the argument, it merely limits its scope, albeit to one of the largest religions in the world today.

The second caveat Payton has with my article is shown in this quote.

“Now, I’m not sure if Fedora is getting at something Jesus actually said or forbade, as I’m not familiar with the story (maybe it doesn’t exist! I’m skeptical), but that’s beside the point.”

I was merely pointing out that, as far as my understanding of the crucifixion goes after my speaking with numerous theologians, some of whom had gone to college on the subject*, that Jesus was crucified to atone for our sins. This is, in essence, a sacrifice, which, as I stated, is unexpected in modern society. Payton continues with this quote.

“If Jesus did say such a thing, then I could say He was making a suggestion or teaching relative to those times.  In those days, such things were perhaps more understandable, I would not know.  In any case, such things are silly now, so we should consider whether this particular teaching is relative.”

If this is the case, then the original argument which my article was a response to falls apart, rendering my article unnecessary by default.

Another fault Payton finds within my article is raised is in the following quote.

“Who is right, Jesus or ‘modern society’?  Who is right, the God of the Bible, or “all sane humans”?…If he answers ‘modern society’, or ‘all sane humans’, hasn’t he begged the question in his article?”

Payton fails to recognize, this is the very point I am trying to make, the bedrock upon which my argument lies! The ethical facts which God follows and humans at least recognize to be true are different, and as such one of them must be wrong. As God is morally perfect, he must follow the correct ethical facts, making humanities incorrect, thus, the conclusion of my argument.

“From [1-7], the Judeo-Christian God cannot have revealed to Human beings a true, objective, perfect, set of ethical facts.”

I again quote Payton.

“The whole question of “Fact VS Metaphor” isn’t blasphemy.  A lot of the stories of God’s wrath are intended to teach people not to disobey Him.”

If I understand Payton correctly, he is essentially saying that the stories of the flood, etc. are simply meant to teach humans to fear God. This is a threat, plain and simple. Threats are considered grounds for legal conviction throughout the United States, among many other locations throughout the world. This is again an example of God’s behavior deviating from the ethical facts humans hold to be true.

The final counter-argument Payton raises is summarized in the following quotes,

“Christians hold it as a matter of fact that we are all sinners.  Secondly, we believe that all sinners deserve death,” and “Why is it that we complain that “bad things happen to good people”, when there are no good people?”

He is saying that the stories in the Bible are justified. As sinners, the humans whose deaths were chronicled in the Bible were justified. However, Jesus himself taught that sinners are to be forgiven, with such teachings as Matthew 18:21-22.

Matthew 18:21-22, “21 Then Peter came up and said to him, “Lord, how often will my brother sin against me, and I forgive him? As many as seven times?” 22 Jesus said to him, “I do not say to you seven times, but seventy times seven.”

And yet, God himself does not follow this ethical law. And even so, how does this justify the grievances afflicted to Job? God himself offers Job much praise, and holds him in glowing admiration.

Job 1:8, “8 Then the LORD said to Satan, “Have you considered my servant Job? There is no one on earth like him; he is blameless and upright, a man who fears God and shuns evil.”

God explicitly states that Job 1) is blameless, 2) fears God, and 3) shuns evil. By Paytons own admission, someone who fits this criteria would not deserve the grievances inflicted upon him. If a government official decided to, for example, prove to a different country that Americans are tougher and did the same with an American citizen, equally praiseworthy, this act would be condemned. Is God allowed to do this simply because he is God? Does his nature as God make him exempt from objective ethical facts?

Other objections raised :

In my discussion of this article with fellow UrbanPhilosophy.net users I have come across a few things I may need to clarify. These are as follows.

1.) I am not saying that human beings follow these ethical facts, they simply recognize them to be truthful.

2.) Accepting the lesser of two evils would be included in this ethical code.

3.) Humans are obligated to follow these ethical facts, not made to.

Again, I appreciate Payton’s time and effort in replying to my article! I appreciate the criticisms, and I welcome criticisms to my reply, or to my original argument. That’s what we’re here for, right? Thanks again, and I look forward to any and all replies!

______

* these are included, but not limited to, several pastors, several theology instructors, and Christians of a more intellectual persuasion. If they are in error, I apologize.

What I consider to be the greatest weakness of Fedora’s assessment is its shameless association of the Bible and God; this assumption that the God of the Bible and the God of reality (indeed, of history) are of one mind.  I’m not saying I don’t believe they’re one and the same, but it’s an important distinction to make, insofar as we are judging the strength of Fedora’s argument.  We can say, first of all, that;

1.) The God of the Bible may not be the God of history

Right off the bat, we can see one of these ‘presuppositions’ as he calls them, which greatly damages the utility of his argument.  See, it only applies to people who would associate the God of the Bible with the God of history so fundamentally as his argument does.

Allow me to make myself clearer; this argument might only shake your faith if you believe God “does many things which all sane humans consider immoral”.  Of course this is the case, as Fedora is arguing modus ponens, but I should like to point out that this is a very big ‘if’ indeed.  If I wanted to be extreme, I would say there are no Christians at all who believe this.  But that may or may not be true, so I leave it there.

Here is an example:

“In any modern society, the expectation of a parent is not to require a sacrifice from their children after a wrong doing (Jesus).”

Now, I’m not sure if Fedora is getting at something Jesus actually said or forbade, as I’m not familiar with the story (maybe it doesn’t exist! I’m skeptical), but that’s beside the point.  He blows his own argument out of the water when he mentions ‘modern society’.  If Jesus did say such a thing, then I could say He was making a suggestion or teaching relative to those times.  In those days, such things were perhaps more understandable, I would not know.  In any case, such things are silly now, so we should consider whether this particular teaching is relative.

Or — and maybe this is the right way to go — should we appraise our ‘modern society’ for its expectations, and decide for ourselves whether we are justified in not expecting children to make sacrifices for their wrongdoing?  Who is right, Jesus or ‘modern society’?  Who is right, the God of the Bible, or “all sane humans”? I make no answer, but Fedora’s argument actually hinges on such questions. (the trouble lies in his 4th premise)

If he answers ‘modern society’, or ‘all sane humans’, hasn’t he begged the question in his article?  He can’t assume God is already wrong in order to prove it to be so.

Now, to continue to our second point, let’s ask ourselves, “Why does the Bible contain seemingly-mythic tales of mankind’s encounters with a wrathful God?” Are these tales meant to be histories, or moral lessons?  Fedora addresses this point himself, when he considers a ‘metaphorical’ Garden of Eden.  But he makes it sound like the acceptance of just one or two things as metaphor will bring down the whole faith!  Let’s make a second point:

2.) One can accept the whole Bible as infallible even if one were to accept some parts as metaphor.

(I’m not going to address Fedora’s assumptions about original sin.  He has got it all wrong, and I don’t care to correct him.)

The whole question of “Fact VS Metaphor” isn’t blasphemy.  A lot of the stories of God’s wrath are intended to teach people not to disobey Him.  It hardly matters whether they actually happened or not, in my opinion.

God does not violate His own laws.  If you get to thinking this, you have misunderstood the moral of the story, which is to say, you do not understand God’s laws.

Indeed, having said that, we might as well get to the third and final weakness of Fedora’s argument:

3.)  There is a difference between goodness and justice.

Christians hold it as a matter of fact that we are all sinners.  Secondly, we believe that all sinners deserve death.

And that is the key.

Why would we even care about the times God gave us what we deserved?  In the story of the Flood, the Bible very clearly points out that people were wicked! And I believe it! God does not do what all sane humans consider to be immoral. Ever.  He has only given us the hellfire we deserve.

This has always been a matter of great personal annoyance for me.  Why is it that we complain that “bad things happen to good people”, when there are no good people?  Why don’t we complain when good things happen to bad people, which is to say, every one of us?  Clearly, this is not justice!

Indeed, when we think bad things happen to good people, we say God is horrible, but when good things happen to bad people, we call it mercy.  We should stop thinking that one is good and one is bad. They are both two sides of the same coin.

So to conclude, Fedora’s argument hinges on questions which he either leaves unanswered, or he only barely understands.  His argument only applies to people who read the Bible in such a way as to see God as a maniacal tyrant, i.e. Richard Dawkins and all the street-preachers of Canada.  Therefore, as I believe none of these things, Fedora’s argument does not apply to me.  It could be the case that the humans in his fourth premise are simply mistaken, or it could be that these supposed transgressions on the part of the divine are merely metaphor.  I would say both.  We are mistaken about a great many moral issues.  Not only do we behave immorally, but we believe and decide incorrectly.  We must always remember who is omniscient, and who is perfect, here.  Furthermore, God has not actually done all these things some might say He has.  He has adhered to His own ethical facts rather perfectly, I might say.  And that is enough to dismiss Fedora’s assessment.

While not always in the form of an argument for the existence of a supreme being, sometimes merely pointed out as a “problem” for atheists, or at least something to ponder, many theists of all stripes point out lack of a moral compass for atheists to follow. In the argumentative form of this statement, it is often pointed out that their exists an, on the surface of it, objective moral order in the world. Regardless of whether or not this is true (I would contend it is not); this is then followed with the conclusion that the only explanation is the existence of a deity.

The argumentative form of the above statement is as follows.

1. God is necessary for the existence of a set of objective ethical facts.
2. An objective set of objective ethical facts exists.
3. God exists.

As stated, I will not contest either 1 or 2, but will presuppose them to be true. My problem, however, is how the Abrahamic God can be compatible with the moral code presented in the Bible. The argument (which I will elaborate on and explain) is as follows.

1. The Judeo-Christian God has revealed to human beings a perfect, objective moral set of ethical facts, contained in the Bible. (Ten commandments, Jesus, et. al)
2. An objective set of ethical facts must be followed by all beings. Human beings and God must adhere to the same set of perfect, objective, ethical facts.
3. God must follow any objective and perfect set of ethical facts.
4. The Judeo-Christian God, as described in the Bible, does not adhere to ethical facts humans find to be true.
5. Given [2-4], either God or Humans must follow an erroneous set of ethical facts.
6. Given 3, Humans must follow an erroneous set of ethical facts.
7. From [1-7], the Judeo-Christian God cannot have revealed to Human beings a true, objective, perfect, set of ethical facts.

It does not seem, to me, that many of these steps require explaining, save for (4).  Premises [1-3] seem obvious, and once (4) is explained, [5 - 7] follow logically. 3 follows from God being a perfect being, and a perfect being must adhere to the objective and perfect set of ethical facts.

In the Bible, God does many things which all sane Humans consider to be immoral. In any modern society, the expectation of a parent is not to require a sacrifice from their children after a wrong doing (Jesus). The problem is compounded wen God is given attributes which Humans do not possess, such as infinite love. A parent who left their children in the street because they did not make a sacrifice to them after a wrong-doing would be considered, by any court in the land, clinically insane. A similar verdict would be cast upon anyone who did the same, but not for the individuals wrong doing, but for their great-great-great grandfathers (Garden of Eden, Adam and Eve).

One may simply maintain that the Garden of Eden story was metaphorical, in which case it seems that Jesus’ sacrifice was unnecessary. If Jesus was simply taking on the sin which is/was present in every being simply due to the imperfect nature of human beings, the same problem arises. People in modern society are expected to forgive and forget, which God seems incapable of doing in the Bible in numerous situations. (The Flood, etc.)

Another ethical law which God does not adhere to is the usage of people as a means to an end. Take for example, the Book of Job, which I will assume you will have read. Any parents, for example, who, in trying to prove whose children were “tougher” had them take turns cutting off fingers to see who could last the longest, would be considered insane. And if, in the end, it turned out to be a “test” and the parents said “It’s ok, but, you still are losing a finger,” they would not gain an ounce of respect.

These are ethical laws which are set in stone to modern societies, and yet, God violates them both. How can an objective set of ethical laws, revealed by God, remain objective and yet be violated by the very person who revealed them?

• Objective ethical facts exist
• Ethical facts are not reducible to natural facts and properties
• Ethical facts do not require an external foundation

The view, therefore, is compatible with Theism and is not atheistic, but merely (as presented) non-theistic.

In this article, I will attempt to present the system in a simple manner.

Preliminary Definitions

A state of affair is a necessarily existing abstract entity. It can either obtain or fail to obtain. States of affairs which obtain are called facts and some facts are contingently true in that they exist only in some possible world as opposed to those which are necessarily true, and obtain in all. The state of affairs in which Bob is a firefighter is contingent since there are some possible worlds where Bob is not a firefighter. Further, the state of affairs in which Bob is not identical to the number two is a necessary state of affairs: there is no possible world where Bob is identical to the number two.

Many necessary states of affairs are expressed in terms of mathematical truths or trivial propositions such as “All bachelors are married.” Necessary states of affairs do not have to be so trivial, however, since some theists assert that God exists in all possible worlds, that is, God exists necessarily.

Further, there are some states of affairs which obtain because of other states. One example is the state of affairs in which Bob is hurt; this state of affairs being brought about by the fact that Lucy kicked a soccer ball at his head. States of affairs which are not brought about by other states are called brute facts. An example of one possible brute fact is that God exists. Typically, the theist will assert that there is nothing causing, grounding or being a reason for God’s existence – his existence is just a brute fact.

Ethical States of Affairs

Some states of affairs concern matters of ethics, involving notions of moral rightness, wrongness, goodness, evil, etc. Such properties are sui generis properties. That is, they are distinct from both natural, empirically testable properties and supernatural properties (thus, neither naturalism, nor supernaturalism but non-naturalism).

As discussed in a previous article some ethical states of affairs obtain necessarily, such as that it is wrong to torture the innocent for fun and that pain is intrinsically bad. Some other states obtain only contingently, such as that pushing a red button is morally wrong because it will cause Bob some pain. However, there are worlds in which pushing this button would not cause Bob some pain and therefore can only be a contingent fact.

Ethical Facts

That ‘pain is intrinsically bad’ obtains necessarily is evident in that it is not explained by some other state of affairs, it is not entailed but rather it is a brute fact. Ethical facts which are not entailed or explained by some other state of affairs are called basic ethical facts. These basic facts serve as the foundation of all further objective morality and rest on no foundation themselves. Some may be tempted to ask, “where do they come from?” but as Weilenberg notes:

To ask of such facts, “where do they come from?” or “on what foundation do they rest?” is misguided in much the way that, according to many theists, it is misguided to ask of God, “where does He come from?” or “on what foundation does HE rest”? The answer is the same in both cases: They come from nowhere, and nothing external to themselves grounds their existence; rather they are fundamental features of the universe that ground other truths.

Supervenience

The common view of moral properties is that if they are exemplified, they supervene on non-moral properties. That is to say, if there are two possible entities with identical non-moral properties, they will have identical moral properties: rightness supervenes on instances of truth-telling, goodness supervenes on certain character types in a necessary way.

What, then, is the connection between the natural fact that “Lucie is torturing Bob for fun” and the moral fact that it is wrong? Presumably, it is wrong because it is an act of torture, but how do we make sense of this ‘because’? Weilenberg states:

The answer, I think, is that ‘because’ here indicates metaphysical necessity. It is true in all metaphysically possible worlds that causing pain just for fun is wrong. This is the sense in which a given action is wrong because it is [an example of torturing for fun].

Theistic philosopher William Wainwright thinks that such supervenience is more ‘at home’ in a theistic universe than in a non-theistic one:

[T]he connection between the [natural fact] and the [moral property] can seem mysterious. For, in the absence of further explanations, the (necessary connection between these radically different sorts of properties… is just an inexplicable brute fact. (modifications are mine)

Under Weilenberg’s view, the relationships are equivalent to certain basic ethical facts. The claim that the property of “being intrinsically bad” supervenes on the property of pain is equivalent to the claim that necessarily, pain is intrinsically bad. Is such a ‘brute-fact-supervenience’ a problem? Might this supervenience give reason to prefer a theistic account, as Wainwright seems to think?

It seems only to be a problem if non-trivial necessary truths require explanations. But, there seems to be no reason to accept this. Especially for the theist, who posits one non-trivial necessary truth that does not require an explanation: that God exists. It sees that the proposed brute fact of ‘pain is intrinsically bad’ needs no more explanation. It seems, prima facie, to even be in less need of explanation than the existence of a perfect creator.

Perhaps it is true, however, that there is an explanation to God’s existence that is a ‘self-explanation’. Wainwright states that “if we could grasp [God's] nature we would see why it exists.” Wainwright is stating that even if we don’t know the explanation of God’s existence, it is there anyway. If this is true, then the existence of God is not a brute fact after all. Supposing that a self-explanatory being is a coherent notion (there is a lot of literature on this question), it seems that there is still some reliance on brute fact. To suggest that God’s existence is self-explanatory introduces another non-trivial necessary truth: that God’s nature possesses some feature which explains His existence. But, then, what is the explanation for this seemingly brute fact? Even under theism, it seems that one is committed to the coherence of brute fact.

“Mysterious, Floating Values”

Christian philosophers William Lane Craig and J.P Moreland define and criticize this view as follows:

Atheistic moral realists affirm that objective moral values and duties do exist and are not dependent on evolution or human opinion, but they also insist that they are not grounded in God. Indeed, moral values have no further foundation. They just exist.

… It is difficult, however, even to comprehend this view. What does it mean to say, for example, that the moral value justice just exists? It is hard to know what to make of this. I tis clear what is meant when it is said that a person is just; but it is bewildering when it is said that in the absence of any people, justice itself exists. Moral values seem to exist as properties of persons, not as mere abstractions – or at any rate, it is hard to know what it is for a moral value to exist as a mere abstraction. Atheistic moral realists seem to lack any adequate foundation in reality for moral values but just leave them floating in an unintelligible way.

On Weilenberg’s view, among the entities that “just exist” are states of affairs and properties which are accepted to “just exist” by a great number of contemporary philosophers. There are various states of affairs concerning justice, so when some person has the property of being just it is in virtue (partially) of the obtaining of precisely these states of affairs. Weilenberg explains:

For instance, I hold that it is just to give people what they deserve; thus, anyone who gives others what they deserve thereby instantiates the property of justice. The state of affairs that it is just to give people what they deserve obtains whether or not any people actually exist, just as various states of affairs about dinosaurs obtain even though there are no longer any dinosaurs. In this way, my approach cashes out the idea of justice “just existing” in terms of facts about justice. This approach is perfectly intelligible and coherent and no more posits mysterious, floating entities than does any view committed to the existence of properties and states of affairs.

“But You’re Just An Animal!”

A further criticism is that without a Creator, human beings lack moral rights altogether. As Craig states in his debate with Walter Sinnott-Armstrong:

[I]f there is no God, then what’s so special about human beings? They’re just accidental by-products of nature that have evolved relatively recently on an infinitesimal spec of dust lost somewhere in a hostile and mindless universe and that are doomed to perish individually and collectively in a relatively short time. On the atheistic view, some action, say, rape, may not be socially advantageous, and so in the course of human development has become taboo; but that does absolutely nothing to prove that rape is really wrong. On the atheist view, there’s nothing really wrong with your raping someone.

Arguments such as these take the form: If God does not exist, then human beings are just Xs and Xs don’t have moral rights or duties. But this is dubious, just because we may be Xs does not mean that we are nothing more than Xs. That is, human beings are animals, but are we really nothing more than animals? This doesn’t seem any more plausible then the claim that God is a necessarily existing being, and nothing more. It is true, according to theism, that God is necessarily existent but he is more than this, much more. So too, for human beings. We can suffer, love, strive for goals, etc. At any rate, Craig provides no argument for his claim that human beings are just animals, and nothing more.

As for the issue of rape, Sinnott-Armstrong replies, “[w]hat makes rape immoral is that it harms the victim in terrible ways. The victim feels pain, loses freedom, is subordinates, and so on. These harms are not justified by any benefits to anyone.” Essentially, he explains the wrongness of rape by appealing to a moral principle, namely that: any action that involves knowingly inflicting suffering, subordination, and a loss of freedom on another without producing any outweighing benefits is morally wrong. At the very least, we would need to see an argument suggesting that this proposed moral principle fails, but it seems quite plausible.

External Foundation?

Objections of this grade constantly ask for a foundation to be provided and this reveals the assumption that objective morality requires a foundation external to itself. Without any sound argument to suggest that this is true, why should one abandon the view that all non-brute ethical facts rest in part on a set of basic facts which serve as the axioms of morality and do not have an external foundation but are the foundation.

But further, the theist seems to offer nothing better. Craig states that “our moral duties are grounded in the commands of a holy and loving God… His nature expresses itself toward us in the form of moral commands which issuing from the Good, become moral duties for us.” Under this view, our moral duties still rely on some ungrounded ethical fact, namely that if the Good commands you to do something, then you are morally obligated to do it. What is the grounding for this claim? Does it simply “float mysteriously in an unintelligible way?”

Conlusion

At the very least, it is evident that the issue of morality in the absence of God is not as black and white as many people suppose that it is, theists and atheists alike. It has long been supposed that atheism leads to an abandonment of morality, but that doesn’t seem to be the case necessarily. In fact, it seems that a view such as Weilenberg’s is very similar to what the theist requires to escape the Euthyphro dilemma.

______________________________

¹All further quotations are from this paper unless otherwise noted.

1. If any being is God, he must be a fitting object of worship.
2. No being could possibly be a fitting object of worship, since worship requires the abandonment of one’s role as an autonomous moral agent.
3. Therefore, there cannot be any being who is God.

It very strongly seems the case that no one will dispute (1), so I will move on to Rachels’ defense of (2).

He describes worship thus:

We can very well comprehend people loving one another or respecting one another, but not (unless they are misguided) worshiping one another. This is because the worshiper necessarily assumes his own inferiority; and since inferiority is an asymmetrical relation, so is worship.

Rachels argues that whether or not God exists, we are moral agents; that is, we are autonomous and make moral decisions. However, this seems to conflict with being a worshiper:

To say “I will follow so-and-so’s directions no matter what they are and no matter what my own conscience would otherwise direct me to do” is to opt out of moral thinking altogether; it is to abandon one’s role as a moral agent. And it does not matter whether “so-and-so” is the law, the customs of one’s society, or Jehovah. This does not, of course, preclude one from seeking advice on moral matters and even on occasion following that advice blindly, trusting in the good judgment, of the adviser.

The conflict between being a worshiper and a moral agent is this: While a worshiper must always defer to God on moral decisions without question, a moral agent must make his or her own moral decisions.

Objections

1) God’s only command regarding morality is that we make our own moral decisions.

This is in fact the complete opposite of what most major theistic religions claim. Judaism, Islam, and Christianity all have God giving many specific moral commands to humanity. This objection may work if one is a deist, however it fails if one is a member of the Abrahamic religions.

2) Our responsibility as a moral agent is to do right, and God only ever commands us to do what is right.

The problem here is this: a being worthy of being called “God” will always command what is right, however, how can we know whether what he commands is right without using our own moral judgment? It seems that our own moral judgment is logically prior to deciding if some being is worthy of the title “God”.

3) We cannot trust our own judgment to determine what is right and wrong, we must trust God’s judgment, as only He is morally perfect.

Rachels gives two responses to this objection; for the sake of brevity I will only discuss the second. He argues that if we determine that God requires us to take some action, and we state that this action is morally right because God requires it, we have still made a moral judgment – that whatever God requires is morally right.

4) The conscience is God speaking to the individual.

This objection seems to lead to the conclusion that God is “tricking” us; that we think we have moral autonomy but in reality we do not. Rachels applies the famous Euthyphro dilemna here:

If in speaking to us through the voice of conscience, God is informing us of what is right, then there is no reason to think that we could not discover this for ourselves–the notion of “God informing us” is eliminable. On the other hand, if God is only giving us arbitrary commands, which cannot be thought of as right independent of his promulgating them, then the whole idea of conscience, as it is normally understood, is a sham.

5) “Finally, it might be objected that the question of whether any being is worthy of worship is different from the question of whether we should worship him.”

Rachels writes:

Mrs. Brown, being a fine woman, may be worthy of a marriage proposal, but we ought not to propose to her, since she is already married. Or, Seaman Jones may be worthy of a medal for heroism, but still there could be reasons why we should not award it. Similarly, it may be that there is a being who is worthy of worship and yet we should not worship him since it would interfere with our lives as moral agents.

The response to this objection deals with circumstances. Under circumstances X, Mrs. Brown would be worthy of marriage, while under circumstances Y, she is not. However, according to the argument, there are no cases in which moral agents should, or even can, worship God. One could say that an example would be beings which are not moral agents should worship God, however how could a non-moral agent, such as a spider, or even a rock, possibly worship?

The argument, if sound, forces the theist to one of two possible conclusions:

1) God does not exist.
2) We are not moral agents.

The problems for the theist if he chooses to accept 1 are apparent. However, if the theist instead goes with 2, then he must conclude that we are merely moral robots, devoid of any accountability for our actions.

________________________

¹See: Can Ethics Provide Answers? : And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy by James Rachels

The Dilemma

A formulation of the dilemma reads as follows:

(A) Is what is good commanded by God because it is good, or is it good because it is commanded by God?

The dilemma presents two ‘horns’ which each yield potentially undesirable consequences for the opponent. If the theist is to say that God commands certain things because they are good, this seems to imply that moral values are independent of God’s will. This assertion would entail a conflict with God’s sovereignty. If there are such independent moral truths, they would clearly restrict God’s choices insofar as he is said to be a good being. It also seems to entail that God is powerless to change the good. Perhaps more troubling, one could make the case from this assertion that if there were no God, there would still be objective moral truths.

If the theist chooses, rather, to say that things are good because God wills them, the implication is that God creates moral values. This has severe moral and epistemological consequences. If moral truths are merely determined by the will of God it follows that if God were to will that child molestation be morally good, this would be the case. Aside from this rather obvious consequence, there might also be epistemological consequences. Imagine that child molestation is a morally good action and we are part of a state of affairs in which deception about important things is also a morally good action. It follows from this that if God is morally good, then God is deceiving us about the fact that child molestation is actually a good action! Clearly, an acceptance of either horn of the dilemma is not without undesirable consequences.

A General Response

Perhaps the most heard response to the Euthyphro dilemma is to claim that it is indeed a false dilemma. The theist might want to suggest that there is a third option which has gone unmentioned in the original formulation:

(B) God’s goodness is grounded in his moral character and expressed through his moral commands.

Under this view, it is proposed that the good is not external, nor are God’s commands arbitrary as they flow out of his nature, which is necessarily good. It states that since God is essentially morally good, God could not be bad and thereby would never command that child molestation be morally good. To quote Christian apologist Greg Bahnsen from his Theonomy in Christian Ethics (pg. 284):

“The truth of the matter is that good is not independent of God. Certain behavior is good because God approves of it, and God approves of it because it is the creaturely expression of His holiness — in other words, it is good. To be good is to be like God, and we can only know what behavior is good if God reveals and approves of it. The important point is that good is what God approves and cannot be ascertained independent of Him…”

Surely this is an incoherent notion. It entails that something is good because God approves of it and that God approves of this something because it is good. How can these propositions be maintained simultaneously? In our previous example, if child molestation is bad because God disapproves of it, how can it be likewise true that child molestation being bad is the reason for God’s disapproval?

The attempt to evade the dilemma by moving away from God’s commands and towards his nature does not appear successful. One might reformulate the dilemma to read:

(C) Is God’s character the way it is because it is good or is God’s character good simply because it is God’s character?

Similarly to (A), we have the same horns. Is there an independent standard of good or is it the case that God’s character sets the standard? Again, consider: if God’s character is such because it is good then we still have an independent standard of goodness by which we are evaluating God’s character. Where God might condemn child molestation because of his just and merciful character, it would be the case that his nature is just and merciful because these things are good and God’s nature is necessarily good. Given this independent standard, however, if God did not exist it is still true that a character which is merciful and just is a good character.

What of the other horn of the dilemma? If God’s character is good merely because it is God’s character then God’s character, if cruel and unjust, would render cruelty and unjustness good. From this, it follows that he might condone child molestation. Perhaps one might reply that God can’t be cruel and unjust because he must necessarily be good. Unfortunately, without some independent standard of goodness it follows that whatever attributes God has are good by their very definition. If one wants to commit to the idea that God cannot be cruel and unjust, they must appeal to some external standard less they face the possibility that cruelty and unjustness are good in light of God’s possession of these attributes.

But perhaps God isn’t cruel and unjust, and we know this as it has been revealed to us. An appeal to revelation also does not seem to assist in any manner, for recall my previous example. If God’s character is good merely because it is God’s character and God’s character entails that deception about important things is morally good we might very well be in a state of affairs wherein God has lied to us in his proposed revealed knowledge. But surely, the theist might respond, God cannot lie for it is not good to do so. Such a statement, however, simply appeals to a standard of goodness that is external to God.

It seems, then, that any attempt to evade the dilemma by choosing to speak of God’s character rather than his commands is insufficient. How then might one respond to the dilemma?

A Better Response

It seems that the theist should attempt to answer the dilemma in a manner that suggests that some things God wills because they are good and other things are good because God wills them. This doesn’t seem too crazy of an idea since most philosophers of religion do accept that there are some things which God cannot alter, such as the truths of logic. So why can’t there be necessary moral truths in the same manner as there are necessary logical truths?

T.J  Mawson (in an article found in Think, Winter 2008 p. 25-33)  provides the following example:

Sometimes we pick something out using a concept that entails of logical necessity that the thing picked out is bad. Agonizing pain would be one such concept. Wherever there is agonizing pain, whether in people or animals, it cannot – of logical necessity – be anything other than bad. We wouldn’t call it ‘agonizing pain’ if it wasn’t bad. Of course if someone would benefit greatly from some agonizingly painful medical treatment to which they have consented, then giving them that treatment might be the best thing for us to do, but the fact that this treatment would involved the patient suffering agonizing pain would in itself be a bad feature of what it was that it would then be best for us to do.

Now consider that God’s omnipotence is such that it does not require that he be able to bring about logically impossible states of affairs. God cannot be required to be able to make agonizing pain refer to something, and yet the thing to which it refers be a good thing. Since torture, necessarily involves the inducing of agonizing pain, how can God bring about a state of affairs in which torture is good? So, it seems that we might have a class of things such that their being good entails a logical contradiction, that is to say, just as some propositions may be necessarily false (such as ’2+2=5′) some may also be necessarily evil or bad (such as ‘agonizing pain is exemplified’). In this regard, the theist can maintain there idea that God cannot make torture a good thing (an intuition I assume many theists would have) without falling victim to some horn of the Euthyphro dilemma.

T.J Mawson provides another example:

Some things are good or bad for people as a conceptual necessity arising from the fact that they are people. It is plausibly of the essence of personhood that it involves the having of beliefs and the concept of belief necessitates that person want true beliefs. Of conceptual necessity, one cannot go about acquiring beliefs save by thinking that one is acquiring them in a way which makes them more likely to be true than false because beliefs just are those mental occurrences one takes to be true representations of the world. If that is right, then it is not a logically contingent feature of people that people aim at true beliefs and thus we cannot but think that true beliefs are good for people. If this is right, then we cannot but think that it is of necessity always in itself bad to lie to people, i.e. try to get people to have false beliefs. Lying to someone might not always be the worst thing possible. If someone comes to your door asking after the whereabouts of a person whom you know they intend to murder and whom you also know is hiding in your attic, lying to this would-be murder might well be the best of the options available to you. But lying to someone even in this case, is in itself bad… Again, not even God could make lying to a person good, but again that is no more of a restriction on His power than that He could not make bachelors married whilst they nevertheless remained bachelors.

So, it seems that we are able to establish objective moral values and reconcile them with the existence of God only if they are treated as necessary truths. This has an interesting implication however, namely that there are objective moral truths which atheists can affirm and be consistent in affirming while denying the existence of God. Some concepts are necessarily bad, or evil things. Things such as torture are bad out of logical necessity in such a way that not even God could make it good. As Mawson states, “…anything which might be able to pick out under the concept of torture is a bad thing, just as anything which one can successfully pick our under the concept of bachelor must be a single person…”

Does this mean that God has absolutely no role in morality? Not quite. While it is true that God cannot affect or be the basis of any necessary truths (see a previous post of mine for a discussion of this idea as pertaining to logical truths) that is not to say that God doesn’t determine which contingent moral truths there are. As such, we have seen examples of situations which embrace (rather than reject) the first horn of the Euthyphro dilemma where God commands against certain things (such as torture) because these things are objectively bad. It is also true, however, that some things could be bad because God wills them to be so.

Take the example of passing a high voltage of electric current (an amount that would normally cause a lot of pain) through a person’s body. This action could have been made good by God. God could have made this action good if he created human beings with a biological structure that would prevent them from feeling the possible pain associated with this act. That is to say, while torture is necessarily wrong, shocking someone with high voltage is only contingently wrong in that shocking someone with high voltage is only considered torture if it causes agonizing pain, which needs not necessarily be the case.

To tie all of this together, I will quote at length one last example given by T.J Mawson:

Let us imagine that we are creating a board game. If in creating our game we are starting from scratch, with no pieces or board as yet, then the only principles ‘constraining’ us are conceptual necessities – for example that cheating cannot be an acceptable way to win the game – and these are, it is easy to see, not properly thought of as constraints at all. They don’t restrict in any sense our sovereignty, freedom or power over what sort of game to create, what it is that will count as cheating and what as winning fair and square. Once we have made the pieces and the board, there will still be decisions to be made about the rules. The same pieces and board might be used for several different games. However, the rules open for us to choose between will have been to some extent constrained by the natures of the pieces and the board we have by then created. For example, supposing us to have made only four pieces, we would not then be able to choose the rule, ‘The game must have at least six players, of whom each should start with an unshared piece’. This is a logical consequence of the number of pieces we have contingently made, not a contingent one. It is logically necessary that if there are only four pieces, then six people cannot have one unshared piece each. It is contingent whether there are only four pieces.

Thus it was with God’s creation of morality. Prior to the creation of humans and the universe, the pieces and the board if we assume for the sake of simplicity (what is false) that there are no non-human people or animals that count morally, the only principles which ‘constrained’ Him in what morality He could create were conceptual necessities, i.e. He was under no constraint at all. He couldn’t create a world where agonizing pain or torture was good, but that was just because it is logically impossible that agonizing pain or torture be good. He had complete freedom over what, if anything, in the universe He was about to create would instantiate the concepts of agonizing pain and torture and hence over what, if anything, would be bad in virtue of doing so. Having created the pieces, people, this entailed that certain things would, of logical necessity, be bad – lying, for example. Having created people as humans, with the contingent physiology that humans happen to have, this entailed that passing a certain electric current through their bodies would always in itself be bad as it would always produce agonizing pain (natural law-violating miracles aside), which is something which is in itself of conceptual necessity bad. This is analogous to the maker of a game who has created a certain number of pieces or a style of board that constrains the rules he or she might then choose in that it is a logically necessary consequence of a contingent fact. (It is logically necessary that if passing a certain electric current through persons’ bodies produces agonizing pain, then it is in itself bad to pass that amount of electricity through persons’ bodies.) These then are the things which have the value they do solely as a result of God’s will in creation; had God’s will been different, they would have been different. But there is nothing counterintuitive about this. Obviously if people’s physiology had been different, then things which are as a matter of fact universally bad for people might have been good and things which are universally good might have been bad. Obviously on theism people having the physiology that they do is a result of God’s entirely unconstrained will in His act of creation.

Conclusion

So, the Euthyphro dilemma can be ‘solved’, but not in the manner which is usually attempted. The negative implications of the dilemma can be avoided only if the theist accepts the necessary existence of some moral truths. In doing this, however, it seems they lose all ability to make any arguments for the existence of God from morality. It also follows that the atheist who affirms that objective moral values exist is not only correct, but that the theist attempts to deny them this liberty at their own peril.

The Argument

Assume we can rank moral beings on a scale from 1-10 with 10 being reserved for morally perfect (God) natures and 0 for perfectly evil (Satan, for example) natures. Suppose further that human beings are ranked at 5, neither perfectly good nor perfectly evil.

Let S represent the set of worlds comprised of being with morally better agents than humans, that is, S is a composite of all those worlds in which all moral agents score higher on the moral continuum than humans do in the actual world:

(1) God is omnipotent

(2) So, it is possible for God to actualize a member of S

(3) God is omniscient

(4) So, if it is possible for God to actualize a member of S, then God knows that He can actualize a member of S

(5) So, God knows that He can actualize a member of S

(6) God is morally perfect

(7) So, a morally perfect being will¹ attempt to maximize the likelihood of moral  goodness and minimize the likelihood of moral evil in the world

(8) If God knows He can actualize a member of S, then every world in which God exists is a member of S

(9) Therefore, every world in which God exists is a member of S

(10) Therefore, if God exists in the actual world then the actual world is a member of S

(11) The actual world is not a member of S

(12) Therefore, God does not exist

Objections

We shall now look at some objections:

Standards

The initial uproar at ChoosingHats centered around this idea of “holding God accountable.” This objection can best be summarized by directly quoting RK²:

Look at the assumption required for the second half of this sentence.“creating humans is not the morally best action”. Says who? By what standard? As usual, I think we can guess what that is.

Walker suggests that God is morally culpable for creating human beings with defective natures (defective in comparison to God’s).

Is He, now? Culpable to who? Oh, wait. That’s the assumption! The same assumption all of these dumb arguments make. God is answerable to man. That’s funny, here I thought Scripture answered that sort of ridiculousness.

See, man always believes that he can pass judgment on God. That he is morally autonomous. Scripture says differently.

By what standard is creating humans “not the morally best action”? That is the problem. You should know Christian theology quite well enough to understand that God is definitionally good. His actions, by virtue of being His actions, are definitionally good.

As I stated in the comments following RK’s response, the argument is not attempting to suggest that God is culpable to anyone but himself. Rather, the argument is making a consistency check in asking: if God exists, and his moral character were perfect, could he do action X?

RK states that the Christian God is definitionally good, but I am sure he would want to stay away from insinuating that God’s actions are arbitrarily good. To take RK’s statement at face value, that God’s actions are good because they are God’s actions, obviously raises the following question: Can a morally perfect God perform any action, and would that action thereby be considered good? Most Christian theists are quick to deny this, as it renders God’s goodness entirely arbitrary. Rather, it is stated that there are certain things that God cannot do by virtue of his perfect moral nature. For example, God cannot will that rape become morally permissible. It is claimed that God’s condemning of rape is not an arbitrary decree of God, but rather one that flows out of his perfectly loving nature. But how does this apply to the Anthropic Argument? Well, if RK wants to state that God can do whatever he wants and that whatever is thereby rendered “good” it seems that he is in some theological trouble. Presumably, RK would not want to embrace this line of reasoning and would affirm something similar to the idea that goodness flows necessarily out of God’s nature. But then what is his objection? In response to the statement found in the abstract of Walker’s paper, that “creating humans is not the morally best action” RK retorts by saying that God is definitionally good. Dismissing the idea of arbitrariness in God’s decrees it seems then that RK must be affirming something similar to:

If God exists his actions are always the morally best, and thus, creating humans is the morally best action

This is clearly question-begging, since we are discussing precisely what God’s nature would and would not allow him to do. This statement, if endorsed by RK, would merely affirm that God did create human beings and be utterly fallacious.

Perhaps RK would want to argue, in true presuppositionalist fashion, that if the conclusion of the argument holds, the terms “good”, “evil”, etc. lose their meaning. Of course, in the philosophy of religion throughout the literature on the various problems of evil, we see what is called “bracketing”, as explained by Mark Walker himself in a personal correspondence:

…theorists may agree that the Holocaust is evil but not agree why it is evil. Utilitarians would appeal to its massive disutility, whereas Kantians would explain the evil in terms of violations of the categorical imperative. I take it that there will be agreement that the Chumans³ lack some of the goodness we enjoy, but theorists may disagree on what this goodness amounts to: happiness or the development of intellectual or moral excellence, for instance. I am not suggesting that there are not serious disagreements about how to understand these terms, or that there are not serious philosophical issues here that need to be resolved, but I do believe that these disagreements can be bracketed for the purposes of my argument. Perhaps I am wrong about this, but I do take some comfort in the fact that most discussions of the problem of evil take a similar position.

Brain Knapp of ChoosingHats also had some comments:

Mitch said: “The principle of course is that God, being perfectly good, creates the best possible world. And if it is not logically possibly to create a world without evil (free will defense), he creates the world with the best ratio of good to evil.”

I will ask the same question I asked earlier, as it applies to your summation of the author’s quote … “according to what standard?” It is paramount that any moral evaluation of God (I shudder to even say such a thing) take into account the proper *standard* of evaluation. In this case, the author presumes that the current world is not the “best world”. Well, I will ask it again – “best according to what standard?”

What has yet to be demonstrated is that the “best” possible world is a world where moral goodness is maximized and moral evil is minimized. It may be “best” according to your standard, or Walker’s, or Leibniz’s, but that’s entirely irrelevant to God, of course.

Unless you have an objective moral standard that even God is held accountable to, that is.

He further states:

However, it has not yet been demonstrated that *not* maximizing moral goodness is, itself, a morally *imperfect* action. I mean, it may be a morally imperfect action “according to Mitch”, but if Mitch is the standard being used to evaluate such actions, then (as RK has stated already) what is being argued is a strawman.

Brian’s objection follows the same line as RK’s. I responded:

Firstly, the author is not presuming that this world is not the best possible, it’s demonstrably not the best world possible unless someone can present some logical impossibility in God creating the type of world Walker proposes. It clearly is a greater conceivable world (which gives us our modal possibility). Greater according to who’s standard? Is anyone actually going to argue that a world with more evil and less goodness is the greatest possible world? Again, we can deal with this counterfactually: what type of world would God’s nature desire? If one is going to answer that the current world is such a world, the questions of “why?” and “which characteristics make it desirable?” and “why are these not able to be employed in a demonstrably greater world?” arise.

Also, Brian has asked why if a being possesses the capability to maximize moral goodness, but does not, that being is thereby referred to as “morally imperfect”. He’s inquiring, like his peers, to the standard being utilized. The response is of course the same as it was to RK:

…theorists may agree that the Holocaust is evil but not agree why it is evil.

It is also addressed analogically, if as a human being you had the ability to stop the creation of a severely deficient race of people that you knew would only harm each other and themselves and you do not, can one conclude that you are morally good let alone morally perfect? There may be many different reasons for why this is the wrong thing to do, Utilitarianism, De-ontological and even Divine Command Ethics would have an answer and this perhaps shows some prima facie intrinsic quality of evil. With regard to a world, we can perhaps even extract from our idea of perfection, namely God, and ask what does he possess that a world might possess? We might say that God is loving, so a world with love is good, as such a world with more love than non-love is better than a world with less love than non-love etc.

On a somewhat related note I will say that given my recent reading of Swinburne’s material, the idea that there may be no best possible world seems more and more cogent. That is to say, assume a world in which having 5 ontological equivalent beings is good, a world containing 6 may be better and so on and so forth ad infinitum.  Given this, it is logically impossible that God choose the “best possible world” since there is no such thing. As such, it would follow that God merely (perhaps arbitrarily) actualizes a world. But this does not absolve him of moral duty, for his nature is still in effect and he must create a world in accordance with his nature.

God’s Attributes

RK has also expressed concern that criticisms of God put forth to the reformed tradition do not take his attributes into proper account. As explained by RK, the reformed version of Divine Simplicity differs greatly from the understand employed by traditional philosophers. For the reformed tradition, Divine Simplicity means merely that we cannot speak of God’s attributes as devoid from his being. That is, a God who is purported to be omnipotent but not omniscient is not the concept of God being held by the reformed believer.

This comes up in a disagreement with the Anthropic Argument. Does the Anthropic Argument fail to take into account the entirety of God’s attributes? Well, it certainly focuses on omnipotence, omniscience and moral perfection. There are other attributes which the Anthropic Argument does not introduce because any good deduction is one that only introduces what is needed for deduction. That is to say, should a contradiction be found between the aforementioned three attributes and the existence of human beings, then any being which possesses the three attributes and is purported to have created human beings cannot exist. Now, should one of God’s other unmentioned attributes directly effect the manner in which any of the aforementioned three is enacted, then we certainly do need to take account of them.

Chris Bolt raised the objection that in a world where God creates ontological equivalents rather than ontological deficients (a state of affairs proposed by Walker) he is unable to display his wrath, and this necessarily conflicts with the fact that wrathfulness is a part of God’s nature. Bolt states:

God is the Creator who reveals His glory in what He has made by displaying, among other things, his wrath. Now can you tell me what a world without evil might look like where our just and righteous God is still able to display His wrath and thus also the riches of His mercy and grace?

To which I responded:

It is important to note, though, that Walker suggests that there might still be evil in a world in which God has created ontologically equivalent beings but it certainly would be a different ‘type’ of evil than what we see in our Universe. In this possible world, perhaps it is still possible for God to display his grace.

One seemingly obvious example is that instead of moral wrath or moral grace, the world might contain natural wrath and natural grace. The idea that Bolt presents sounds strikingly similar to some East Asian theories of morality, wherein good exists only because of its contrast with evil and vice versa. Perhaps it is the case that if no evil existed, then no good could exist. This might entail that God, if he did not create a world of sentient beings, was not intrinsically good. Surely this is absurd, for if there is to be any intrinsic goodness in the Christian tradition, God himself is a prime candidate.

A commenter by the name of Justin made a further reply about a characteristic of God being overlooked:

God’s ultimate purpose is His own Glory. This is the premise that the Bible presents, yet you insist on putting forth the argument that He is restrained only to maximizing the moral goodness in the world, and with the presence of morally corrupt beings it could not be the case. That is a strawman argument. God is the definition of what is good, What is good is His glory, He can use morally corrupt beings for His purposes. Even though they may do these things for evil purposes, God is doing it for Good purposes. Therefore it He does not compromise any aspect of His perfection.

Let us briefly introduce the scriptural justification for this point (Isaiah 43:1-7 NASB):

But now, thus says the Lord, your creator, O Jacob, and He who formed you, O Israel, “Do not fear, for I have redeemed you; I have called you by name; you are Mine! When you pass through the waters, I will be with you; and through the rivers, they will not overflow you. When you walk through the fire, you will not be scorched, nor will the flame burn you. For I am the Lord your God, the Holy One of Israel, your Savior; I have given Egypt as your ransom, Cush and Seba in your place. Since you are precious in My sight, since you are honored and I love you, I will give other men in your place and other peoples in exchange for your life. Do not fear, for I am with you; I will bring your offspring from the east, and gather you from the west. I will say to the north, ‘Give them up!’ and to the south, ‘Do not hold them back.’ Bring My sons from afar, and My daughters from the ends of the earth, everyone who is called by My name, and whom I have created for My glory, whom I have formed even whom I have made

And a brief explanation by John Piper:

But this means that when God says, He made us for His glory, He does not mean He made us so that He could become more glorious in Himself. Instead what Isaiah 43:7 means is that He created us to display His glory, that is, glory might be known and praised. This is the goal of God that we must be aligned within our hearts and actions if we hope to escape His wrath at the judgment.

Now, with our understanding aligned we can examine Justin’s comment. Recall when he stated:

God is the definition of what is good, What is good is His glory, He can use morally corrupt beings for His purposes. Even though they may do these things for evil purposes, God is doing it for Good purposes

We want to be careful not to slip into calling God’s goodness wholly arbitrary, so perhaps we should not read this with a “God can do whatever he wants and that whatever is good because God did it”. Further, this statement seems to miss the point. If the argument holds, then the existence of God is logically incompatible with the existence of morally corrupt beings, and as such the above statement simply begs the question. What seems to be required here is an argument showing that the only way in which God can glorify himself is to create morally corrupt human beings.

If it is possible that God can be glorified in a world with ontologically equivalent beings (they can still pay homage to their creator) then the argument still holds.

Equivalence

Chris Bolt brings up two other objections:

A being ontologically equivalent to God would be indistinguishable from Him and hence at the very least is difficult to propose excepting that such a being is created at which point it is creation rather than Creator which not only serves to distinguish it from God and apparently resolve the difficulty but also then makes it ontologically non-equivalent to God… Further, God created humans morally perfect, a claim which is assumed to be false throughout the argument.

In response to the first objection, I stated:

I see no reason to accept that a being that is ontologically equivalent to God would be indistinguishable from God. You’re invoking Leibniz’s principle of indiscernibles and this was actually the first objection I had hoped to raise against the argument. However, the created being would have, as a property of its existence, at least contingency in that he relies upon the first Creator God for his existence. As such, he cannot be identifiable with the Creator God because they would not share all properties in common. You argue that this no longer makes it an ontological equivalent but this is not true according to Walker’s definition. When Walker states “ontological equivalent” he means equivalent in omnipotence, omniscience and moral goodness. I see no such problem once this definition is understood.

and in response to the second:

As for God creating humans morally perfect, are you suggesting that God made human beings with precisely the same moral nature that He has? If this is true, it should be as impossible for man to “fall” as it is for God to “sin”. If this is not the case, then in which manner have human beings been created morally perfect? It seems that there is still some distinction between the moral nature of God and the moral nature of a morally perfect human being.

Clearly, I disagree with Chris on both accounts. I think my first objection is clear so I would like to address the second in further depth.

If God is a 10 on the moral scale we introduced earlier, and is thus morally perfect and human beings were also created as a 10. Then it seems we have a problem, for if human beings share the same moral nature as God but did indeed “fall into sin”, it is logically possible that God also fall into sin. This seems absolutely absurd, God’s morally perfect nature renders God unable to sin/fall and if this is true and human beings share the same moral nature as God (moral perfection), they too should be unable to sin/fall. Clearly though, according to Christian tradition, man did fall so it follows that his moral nature is not equivalent to God’s.

Conclusion

Though I expect that my interlocutors will have further objections, I trust that having a compendium of the topic will be useful in the future.

___________________

¹There was some disagreement over the usage of the term “should” in the previous formulation of the argument. The usage does mean the same as “will” so in order to avoid any discussion on that issue I’ve amended the argument so that it includes “will” rather than “should.”

²These comments were made specifically to the form of the argument which utilized the term “should.” I am only assuming that RK would apply the same objections to this formulation as well.

³Chumans are a proposed race of beings engineered by human beings that have severe deficiencies and a propensity towards violence. It is utilized as an analogy to outline precisely why God’s creating of human beings may be morally abhorrent. In the same manner that we would be morally culpable for creating such a deficient race, God is culpable for creating beings deficient in relation to himself.

The argument is related to the classic Argument from Evil but may very well overtake it in terms of ‘interestingness’.

The Idea

The following is taken from the abstract of the paper:

If God is morally perfect then He must perform the morally best actions, but creating humans is not the morally best action. If this line of reasoning can be maintained then the mere fact that humans exist contradicts the claim that God exists. This is the ‘anthropic argument’. The anthropic argument, is related to, but distinct from, the traditional argument from evil. The anthropic argument forces us to consider the ‘creation question’: why did God not create other gods rather than humans? That is, if God is omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect then why didn’t He create a world populated exclusively by beings that are perfect in the same way that He is—ontological equivalents— rather than choosing to create humans with finite natures and all the suffering that this entails?

To illustrate, Walker proposes an example wherein the world government implements an edict which states that all children being born outside of the capital city will be of a new species. “Chumans”, as he calls them are human-chimpanzee hybrids. They are both mentally and physically challenged in comparison to humans and they have a strong propensity to violent outbursts (and they wish they did not). Walker states that such an edict would be morally wrong for any number of reasons.

He parallels this with God’s decision to create human beings, who are at least as inferior to God as the Chumans would be to humans, if not more. As such, Walker suggests that God is morally culpable for creating human beings with defective natures (defective in comparison to God’s).

As such, if God is morally perfect then He must perform the morally best actions, but creating human beings is not the morally best action. It would indeed be better for God to create ‘ontological equivalents’, that is, other gods.

Moral Scale

Assume we can rank moral beings on a scale from 1-10 with 10 being reserved for morally perfect (God) natures and 0 for perfectly evil (Satan, for example) natures. Suppose further that human beings are ranked at 5, neither perfectly good nor perfectly evil.

The Argument

Let S represent the set of worlds comprised of being with morally better agents than humans, that is, S is a composite of all those worlds in which all moral agents score higher on the moral continuum than humans do in the actual world:

(1) God is omnipotent

(2) So, it is possible for God to actualize a member of S

(3) God is omniscient

(4) So, if it is possible for God to actualize a member of S, then God knows that He can actualize a member of S

(5) So, God knows that He can actualize a member of S

(6) God is morally perfect

(7) So, a morally perfect being should attempt to maximize the likelihood of moral  goodness and minimize the likelihood of moral evil in the world

(8) If God knows He can actualize a member of S, then every world in which God exists is a member of S

(9) Therefore, every world in which God exists is a member of S

(10) Therefore, if God exists in the actual world then the actual world is a member of S

(11) The actual world is not a member of S

(12) Therefore, God does not exist

Free Will?

What about Plantinga’s free will defense, which states that in every possible world, God must permit some moral evil to maintain free will? Walker proposes that this problem is resolvable by proposing a possible world in God creates an ontologically equivalent being who is free to sin, but would never do so because of their moral nature (in the same way God would never sin).

Conclusion

What I have offered is nowhere near the in depth discussion that Walker offers in his own article, but it offers, at the very least, some familiarity with the argument.