Molinism

Essentially, it is a doctrine which seeks to reconcile God’s omniscience with libertarian human free will.

God’s Knowledge

Non-molinists typically affirm two types of knowledge within God: Necessary Knowledge and Free Knowledge.

Necessary Knowledge is God’s knowledge of necessary truth. Such truths are true independently of the will of God and include propositions such as “2+2=4″ and “All bachelors are unmarried.” God’s Free Knowledge is God’s knowledge of contingent truths, truths which are dependent upon God’s will, that is – propositions which are true, but could have been false, such as: “Bob drives a Mercedes” and “Flowers smell nice.”

Molinists affirm both of these types of knowledge but propose another category known as Middle Knowledge under which God knows contingent truths that are independent of his will. To use a common example, in Matthew 11:23 we find a counterfactual, it reads:

And you, Capernaum, will not be exalted to heaven, will you? You will descend to Hades; for if the miracles had occurred in Sodom which occurred in you, it would have remained to this day. (NASB)

A counterfactual is any statement with the form “If it were the case that P, then it would be the case that Q.” In the above verse we find: “…If the miracles had occurred in Sodom which occurred in you, it would have remained to this day.” This is an example of a counterfactual. Jesus is saying that if Sodom and Gomorrah had some experience similar to that of Jesus’ generation of Israel, then they would have repented. Jesus is expressing knowledge of what the Sodomites would have done under a different set of circumstances. There are various other examples of counterfactual statements in the Bible, but this brief illustration should suffice.

Counterfactuals of Freedom

Given God’s knowledge of counterfactuals, it follows that insofar as counterfactuals of freedom are possible, God knows them. This is to say that God knows, for example, that “If Bob wins the lottery, he would freely buy a sportscar.” This counterfactual, if true, is true even if Bob never wins the lottery. It is also a counterfactual of freedom because the latter portion of the conditional pertains to some free action. God can then know what every agent would freely do under some circumstance.

Logical Ordering

Molinists affirm that God’s middle knowledge is logically prior to his creation of the world. That is to say, the logical ordering of events is:

1. God’s knowledge of necessary truths

2. God’s middle knowledge

-Creation-

3. God’s free knowledge

This ordering is of the utmost importance to the Molinist for if middle knowledge falls logically posterior to Creation, libertarian freedom cannot obtain since all counterfactuals would be actively caused by God. Since God’s middle knowledge (and counterfactuals in general) falls logically prior to the creation event, libertarian freedom is possible. This is because logically prior to God’s creative action, it would still be true that “If Bob wins the lottery, he would freely buy a sportscar.” In having this knowledge, God can make a free choice as to which type of world to create.

RK has taken issue with the notion of logical priority altogether. He has failed to account for the differences.

Consider the example where Bob wakes up in the morning, goes to work and then goes to the gym. It is true for this situation that temporally prior to Bob’s going to work, he woke up in the morning. And it is true that temporally posterior to Bob’s going to work, he goes to the gym. We are applying temporal priority to this circumstance because it is a sequence of events that takes place in time. What does it mean, then, to say that something is logically prior, or logically posterior to some other thing?

Consider the following set of numbers:

{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}

In this set, the number 3 is logically prior to the number 4 and the number 5 is logically posterior to the number 4. It is not true, however, that 4 obtains, happens or exists before 5. Because we are talking about ordering that is necessarily timeless, such as would be many facets of God (logically) before the creation of time, we must speak of logical priority and not temporal priority. RK also makes a category error when he attemps to apply the notion of succession to logical orders. In our first example, it is true that Bob wakes up and then goes to work and then goes to the gym, this is coherent because the set is a temporally ordered set of propositions. However, when applied to the numbered set above it is an incoherent idea to say, 1 and then 2 and then 3. The word “then” is a temporal adverb and applying it to a non-temporal set is a clear category mistake (it might be used analogically, but the usage should be noted as purely analogical). Perhaps RK simply means that in reading some members of the set we must read them one by one. But this is not a matter of succession on the part of the set, it is a matter of temporal succession on the part of human perception/understanding! The set simply is, absolutely complete and without any “becoming.”

We can say that some X has logical priority over some Y if  the latter is logically dependent on the former. Again, no temporality involved since there could be presumably an infinite number of dependencies that occur simultaneously. So with regard to the logical ordering of God’s creative decree, for example, the Molinist purports that God’s free knowledge is logically posterior to his creation of the world. That is, God cannot have knowledge of the actual state of affairs until there is an actual state of affairs. As such, God’s knowledge of the actual state of affairs is dependent on there being an actual state of affairs – thus, Creation is logically prior to God’s free knowledge.

If one is still not convinced and wants to continue to assert that the notion of logical priority is incoherent (or merely temporal), the following argument reveals a devastating conclusion:

(1) God created the Universe

(2) The Universe marks the creation of time

(3) Therefore, God created time (from 1, 2)

(4) God is atemporal

(5) God could not have willed the beginning of the universe temporally (from 4)

(6) God must have willed the beginning of the universe atemporally (from 5)

(7) God’s will to create the universe is not temporally prior to the actualization of the universe (from 4, 5, 6)

(8) God’s willing of the universe is logically prior to the actualization of the universe

(9) Logical priority is incoherent (assumptive premise)

(10) God’s willing of the universe is not temporally or logically prior to the actualization of the universe (from 4, 5, 6, 7, 9)

(11) God did not will the actualization of the universe (from 10)

(12) God did not create the Universe

To this argument, RK has responded:

(11) fails by assuming your own categories for (10) as the only possible ones…

He never offered any alternative method of priority that is neither temporal, nor logical. Given that there is no present reason to accept his criticism, if one rejects logical priority it is clear that they reject God’s creation of the universe altogether.

Middle Knowledge and Creation

How, then, might God’s middle knowledge influence his creative decree? William Lane Craig states²:

[God] knows, for example, that in some possible world Peter freely denies Christ three times and that in another possible world Peter freely affirms Christ under identical circumstances, for both are possible.

God’s middle knowledge is His knowledge of all contingently true conditional propositions in the subjunctive mood, including propositions about creaturely free actions. For example, logically prior to His creative decree, God knew that if Peter were in circumstances C, he would freely deny Christ three times. Such subjunctive conditionals are often called counterfactuals. These counterfactuals serve to delimit the range of possible worlds to worlds which are feasible for God to actualize. For example, there is an intrinsically possible world in which Peter freely affirms Christ in precisely the same circumstances in which he in fact denied him; but given the counterfactual truth that if Peter were in precisely those circumstances he would freely deny Christ, then the possible world in which Peter freely affirms Christ in those circumstances is not feasible for God. God could force Peter to affirm Christ in those circumstances, but then his confession would not be free. By means of His middle knowledge, God knows what is the proper subset of possible worlds which are feasible for Him, given the counterfactuals that are true.

God then decrees to create certain free creatures in certain circumstances and, thus, on the basis of his middle knowledge and His knowledge of His own decree, God has foreknowledge of everything that will happen (His free knowledge). In that way, He knows, simply on the basis of His own internal states and without any need of any sort of perception of the external world, that Peter will freely deny Christ three times.

… So there are worlds which are intrinsically possible but which God, given the counterfactuals that happen to be true, is not capable of actualizing and which are therefore, in Flint’s terminology, infeasible for God. Notice that because counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are contingently true, which worlds are feasible for God and which are infeasible is also a contingent matter. It all depends on how creatures would freely behave in various circumstances, which is beyond God’s control.

The explanation is pretty clear but it is important to note that when Craig says that how creatures freely act is beyond God’s control, he is merely asserting that it is logically impossible that God make an agent freely do X. This seems to be a contradiction in terms comparable to 2+2=5.

Theology

The biggest theological implication of the view is perhaps that God is able to maintain his sovereignty without preventing man’s freedom. Imagine the state of affairs in which God knows that if Bob wins the lottery, he will freely donate to a Haiti relief fund. So, if God wants Bob to freely donate to a Haiti relief fund, all he has to do in this example is place Bob in a circumstance where he wins the lottery. God retains sovereignty by having his purposes/desires obtain and Bob retains his freedom.

With regard to Christian salvation, Molinism asserts that God knows logically prior to the creation of the world the worlds in which certain people would freely choose him. Let us again look at Bob, imagine that God knows that if Bob were placed in circumstance C, he would freely believe in Christ. God then actualizes a world in which Bob finds himself in C and thus believes in Christ. Thus, God’s sovereignty is upheld by his actualization of some world, and Bob’s free will is upheld by his freely choosing to believe in Christ. Note: This is not to say that Bob comes to believe in Christ without Christ’s assistance (see: “simultaneous concurrence”)

Conclusion

While I have not attempted to defend Molinism against coherent objections, I have tried to outline specifically what Molinism is stating in an effort to quell what seems to be a growing number of strawmen on the topic.

__________________________

¹RK has constantly objected that he does not misunderstand, but if this is true, I can’t help but feel that RK is simply being dishonest in his representation of these issues. I would hope that he is not being willfully dishonest, so I will presume that he is simply mistaken.

²http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5633

Definitions

The most commonly used definitions of omnipotence (in non-academic circles) seem to be:

(A) God can do anything

(B) God can do anything that is in accordance with his nature

(C) God can do anything logically possible

All three of these definitions are insufficient. In the case of (A) the Cartesian idea that God could alter necessary truths has long been discarded so I shall not identify the problems therein.

With regard to (B), the definition is shown to be inadequate by Plantinga’s illustration of McEar. Put simply, if (B) is the proper definition of omnipotent then every being is omnipotent. McEar, the poor sap who’s nature determines that he can only scratch his ear, is omnipotent according to (B) and this is clearly absurd.

So what of (C)? The argument provided in the first article on the “Disproof” illustrates precisely why (C) fails. Put shortly, there are logically possible states of affairs which God cannot bring about.

A Better Definition

Erik J. Weilenberg in his paper, “Omnipotence Again,” has presented a definition of Omnipotence which successfully evades the initial argument I presented:

(D) x is omnipotent if and only if it is not the case that there is some state of affairs, p, such that x is unable to bring about p at least partially because of a lack of power in x

For this definition of omnipotence, consider the example of Hercules, as Weilenberg presents. Assume that Hercules is the strongest possible man and that you want to test his strength. Weilenberg continues:

…We ask Hercules to life a one hundred pound stone. He lifts it easily. Next we ask him to lift a one thousand pound stone; He does so. Similarly for ten thousand pounds, one hundred thousand pounds – Hercules even lifts a million pound stone.

So far we have failed to prove that Hercules is not the strongest possible person. But now imagine that we take a ten pound stone and coat it with a substance that renders it incredibly slippery. It is so slippery that no one can get a grip on it. Now we as Hercules to lift this ten pound stone. Hercules cannot grip the stone and so cannot lift it. “Aha!” we declare triumphantly, “Hercules, you are a liar! You said that you were the strongest possible person, yet you cannot lift this ten pound stone. This proves that you are not the strongest possible person.”

But of course, we have not proven that Hercules is not the strongest possible person. For we know that Hercules is strong enough to lift the slippery stone – we have just seen him lift much heavier stones. It is not a lack of strength that prevents Hercules from lifting the stone; it is the slipperiness of the stone.

Imagine that we have somehow acquired a ten pound stone that is essentially slippery. It is so slippery that no human can grip it, and so no human can lift it. Let’s assume that Hercules is essentially human. It follows that there is no possible world in which Hercules lifts this stone. Yet is seems clear that Hercules is strong enough to lift the stone – even though it is metaphysically impossible that he do so.

The example can be expanded to many other situations. Imagine Hercules is so honest that he cannot break promises and he at some point promised not to lift some ten pound stone. It does not follow from Hercules being unable to lift the stone that he is therefore not strong enough.

Similarly, this applies to God. His inability to bring about some state of affairs is not sufficient to show that he is not omnipotent. We must further ask why can’t God bring about some state of affairs. If the answer is that God lacks the power to do so, then and only then is he not omnipotent.

The Argument Defeated

So, with respect to the argument I presented, “A Possible Disproof of God’s Existence,” the inability of God to actualize some logically possible state of affairs is not sufficient to show that God is not omnipotent. In the specific argument I outlined, the reason that God cannot actualize some state is not due to a lack of power in God but rather his necessary omniscience and necessary triunity. Given this definition of omnipotence, it is clear that the argument I’ve previously presented succeeds in showing that (C) is an incorrect definition of omnipotent, but fails in establishing the non-existence of God – that is, unless someone insists on defining their God’s omnipotence as (C).

Who is this God character anyway?

The list of God’s proposed attributes is indeed a lengthy one. For discussion purposes the focus will be on Omnipotence, Creatorship, Omniscience, and Eternality.

Omnipotence

It is widely considered that Descartes position, that God can make contradictions true, is incoherent. Most philosophers have sided with Aquinas on the issue, taking the position that God can do only that which is logically possible. Now, certain strategies have been taken to show that this idea of omnipotence is incoherent. There are clearly some logically possible things which God cannot do, he cannot sin, commit suicide, or change the past.

In an attempt to answer these criticisms, people have proposed that God’s omnipotence require him only to be able to perform actions which are logically possible for God to perform (relativized omnipotence). Under this view, if some of God’s necessary characteristics make it logically impossible to do some action, this inability does not count against his omnipotence. One might say, then, that God’s inability to sin or to kill himself are as a result of some of his other attributes, such that it is irrelevant to the matter of omnipotence that he cannot do these things.

However, this notion of relativized omnipotence has problems. Consider Plantinga’s example of McEar, a person whose very nature entails that the only action he can perform is to scratch his ear. Since what McEar can do, and what is logically possible for McEar to do are co-extensive, McEar is omnipotent according to the definition of relativized omnipotence. This surely is absurd, for how can a being that can only scratch his ear be properly identified as omnipotent. Further, this definition seems to entail that all people are omnipotent, insofar as people can do what is logically possible for them to do, an obvious fact.

Another definition has said that omnipotence is not about performing actions, but the ability to bring about states of affairs (thinking of states of affairs as propositional entities). Under this view, omnipotence is the power to make propositions true. But this view seems troubled, for how does one make the proposition “Mitch is running” true without Mitch actually running?

Some philosophers have attempted to define such omnipotence that X’s omnipotence is the power of X to actualize any state of affairs which is possible for someone or other to actualize. Under this view, even if there are states of affairs which God cannot bring about, it will not follow that God is not omnipotent unless the inability stems from a lack of power in X. Under this view, God has the power to sin but is unable to sin because of his goodness. Initially, this view seems contradictory for how can some being X have the power to do Y even though his doing Y is metaphysically impossible?

Creatorship

Traditionally it is said that God creates and sustains the universe. This is often given in an analogous manner to a human’s creation of some object, but perhaps such a comparison is not warranted since there are severe differences (human beings do not create ex nihilo, their creation is temporal, etc). As such, it is proposed that talk of divine creation should focus on explanation rather than analogy. Such that to say that God created the universe would mean that God provides the ultimate explanation of why there is such a universe. Under this view, there is no absurdity in saying that God caused himself since it would merely mean that God is the explanation of himself. This view is not without its problems, however, as we then need an account of the sort of explanation that is being provided.

Assume that God is the creator and sustainer of time. This is to say that God serves as an explanation for why an object exists at time t1. Unless God is seen as the sustaining power of the universe, there would be no explanation under theism for why an object exists at t1+n where n is some value. Under theism, objects have an intrinsic tendency to cease to exist, that is, without God’s sustaining of things there would simply be nothing. This view is not without some problems of its own. Imagine, similarly to Everitt, that Bob decides to murder Tom by shooting him in the head. Bob picks up the gun, pulls the trigger, and the bullet is on route to Tom’s brain where it causes as a massive hemorrhage leading to Tom’s death. It seems that Bob has single handedly murdered Tom, but if we factor in God as the divine sustainer than after Bob’s decision to pull the trigger, every other member of the causal chain is brought about by God. It is not only that God permits this event, he actually actively brings them about. For if God were to cease in willing that the bullet enter Tom’s brain, the bullet would not do so.

Some have tried to avoid this problem by saying that God is the sustainer of everything other than human free choices. Some have attempted to invoke an idea of ‘secondary’ causation, but this does not relieve the theist of the fact that God, even if only a co-agent, must be a willing co-agent. The issue of Divine Creatorship, and Sustaining is one that has implications for both the problem of evil and the matter of Divine Goodness.

Omniscience

Generally defined, Omniscience entails that God knows of every truth that it is true and of every falsehood that it is false. Immediately, if it is possible that there are some truths which are not logically possible to know, then no Omniscient being exists (under this definition). Some examples of unknowable truths might include the outcome of the Big Bang singularity, future human free actions (there is debate on both of these issues).

When speaking of Divine Omniscience, there is also a problem of indexicals. An indexical is a statement whose truth value depends on the when, where or by whom it was uttered. With God’s general definition including eternal and omnipresent in a manner such that God is not located anywhere in space, nor anywhen in time this poses a significant problem. The indexical proposition “It is not raining today” expresses truth if asserted, for example, in Toronto on 17 January 2010 but might express falsehood if uttered tomorrow, or somewhere else today. The truth of the proposition is inextricably linked to the spatio-temporal reference included therein. For a non-spatiotemporal being there is no “today” nor “here”. So this indexical is an example of a proposition which God cannot possibly know. Might God be able to know some formulation, though?

One might propose that God can know ‘It did not rain (timelessly) in Toronto on 17 January 2010″ but an explanation is needed to explain how this might work. Consider:

(1) It is not raining here and now (said in Toronto on 17 January 2010)

(2) It is not raining (timelessly) in Toronto on 17 January 2010

These propositions have different epistemological content in that knowing (1) does not entail knowing (2). The person who knows (1) might not know where they are, or be wrong about what day they think it is. That is, if one knows (1) and then comes to know (2) they have learned something. The two propositions have different entailment, content, inductive implications and explanatory power. This is good reason to think that an atemporal and non-spatial being could not be omniscient, perhaps, then, God is spatial and temporal.

Further, there is an issue of personal indexicals. That is, in the same manner that such a being cannot know that today is Monday, such a being cannot know the truth which I know when I know that I am hot. That is, even if God can know that the only philosopher in a certain apartment in Toronto is hot, it is not what I know when I know that I am hot.

Additionally, an atemporal being’s ignorance of indexical truths renders truths about named individuals also unknowable. That is, naming requires demonstrative indexicals such as “this one” and “that one”. If God cannot know such indexicals and cannot distinguish between person A and person B he cannot intend to save one and damn the other.

Lastly, notions from the field of Set Theory can be brought in and be of some assistance. It is a truth of set theory that every non-empty set has more subsets than members. Consider a set, S, formed of all truths. It is necessarily true that S will have more subsets than its members, but corresponding to each subset there would be some truth in saying that the subset contains a particular truth. Thus, there are more truths correlated with subsets than there are members of S and this contradicts the initial assumptions that S was the set of all truths. As such, a set of all truths is an inherently self-contradictory idea. If omniscience then requires knowledge of all truths (even all knowable truths), no being can be omniscient.

Eternality

One view Divine Eternity is that God is a temporal being who has always and will always exist. Under this view, some times are past, some are future and he ages. According to another view, God is not temporal any more than numbers are temporal. As such, it would be a category mistake to use tensed verbs in connection with an atemporal God so the application of past, present or future is incoherent when applied to this definition. There seem to be problems with both views.

If God is temporal, he cannot be the cause of time and is subsequently not the cause of everything contingent. Given modern science, it also entails that God began to exist 15 billion years ago (though it is still true that he always existence, in that he existed at every past time).

Philosophers such as William Lane Craig have attempted to solve this problem by saying that God first existed as non-temporal, then creates a temporal universe and then has a temporal existence. But how might we make sense of the idea that a being had an atemporal existence before a temporal one.

In avoiding these problems, one might adopt the atemporal view of divine eternity, but there are difficulties here as well. It’s already been suggested that divine atemporality rules out divine omniscience, but can an atemporal God even be an agent? An atemporal God cannot form intentions and act on them, nor can he respond to the events in the world. He cannot hear prayers and respond accordingly. There cannot even be a causal relation between God and the world.

It might be said that to say that God created the universe is to say that the universe has a contingent existence such that it would not have existed unless God had timelessly will that it should. But how might we make sense of a timeless willing? This seems as incoherent as a timeless headache, or timeless reasoning. Of course, this atemporal definition of cause seems weak. As necessarily false propositions entail every proposition it is true that there would be no universe if 2+2 did not equal 4, but the mere fact that 2+2 does equal 4 does not suggest that this equation caused the universe. The same applies to any notion of timeless divine willing.

Conclusion

The above problems testify to the fact that the philosophy of religion is still alive and that the issues are not merely those of theism vs atheism, but that even once a side is chosen there are issues to be fleshed out.

The Argument

(1) God is (by definition) a being than which no greater being can be thought

(2) Greatness includes greatness of virtue

(3) Therefore, God is a being than which no being could be more virtuous

(4) Virtue involves overcoming pains and danger

(5) A being can only be properly said to be virtuous if it can suffer pain or be destroyed

(6) A God that can suffer pain or is destructible is not one than which no greater being can be thought (for you can think of an indestructible and non-suffering being)

(7) Therefore, God does not exist

Now, contextually, the usage of the term virtue denoted the cardinal virtues. As such, virtue in the argument may be treated as a variable to be replaced by some cardinal virtue: wisdom, temperance, justice or courage. In particular, it seems that the argument is best exemplified where virtue is to mean courage, where courage is the quality by which one undertakes dangerous tasks and endures hardships.

The premise which seems most likely to be called into question is (4). Is it true that courage involves overcoming pains and danger? It seems to me that courage can be exemplified only in situations wherein one faces some hurdle, or hardship that they might not overcome. Walton states:

… courage is doing the right thing in a situation where it is markedly dangerous or difficult to do that thing.

If courage is indeed a virtue, then a being who is virtuous must be courageous. But how can God be courageous in this manner?

A Christian Objection?

One possible Christian objection is that God does exemplify courage in Jesus’ crucifixion where Jesus must endure difficult hardship to accomplish his goal. In Luke 22:42, Jesus states:

“Father, if You are willing, remove this cup from Me; yet not My will, but Yours be done.” (NASB)

Might one then say that in God’s incarnation into man he gains all virtue that man may have previously claimed their own, due to their imperfect natures and as such exemplifies the virtue of courage? I am not sure that this notion is coherent with God’s proposed divine immutability.

The Doctrine of Divine Immutability (DDI) states that God cannot undergo intrinsic change. This would entail that if Jesus exemplifies courage at time t and Jesus is fully God, that God exemplifies courage at time t and that if DDI holds there can be no prior t or later t in which God does not exemplify courage. This clearly means that temporally prior to the biblical events leading to Christ’s crucifixion, he exemplified courage. This is not immediately troubling given that God could surely have knowledge of the impending events, but this would entail that God knows he will succeed at the task. That is to say, it would be true at any t prior to the biblical account of Christ’s crucifixion that Christ both exemplifies courage regarding his crucifixion, and knows that he will succeed in his task. Clearly, courage cannot be exemplified by Christ if courage is taken to mean facing a challenge that they might not overcome. Not only does God’s omnipotence ensure that Christ will succeed, God’s omniscience ensures that Christ knows he will succeed. As such, any exemplification of courage in this manner seems incoherent.

But might it be said that Christ’s task was still difficult? Surely, difficulty entails some hardship. In any given situation where there are two tasks, the more difficult of the two tasks is the harder to do. How can one make sense of this in light of God’s omnipotence? It seems that for God, no tasks are harder than others and further, no tasks are hard. With respect to God, is it possible that the creation of the universe was a more difficult task than the resurrection of Christ? It’s unclear as to how this distinction could be made unless one brings in an idea of effort, or expenditure of energy. But, again, how might one apply these concepts to an omnipotent being?

What of the hypostatic union, wherein we are to understand that Jesus is both fully man and fully God (and has both divine and human natures)? Perhaps it is indeed possible that Christ’s human nature experienced difficulty, fear and saw his upcoming crucifixion as a hardship. But, it seems incoherent to state that the divine nature somehow learns from, absorbs, extracts or even shares the hardship and pain which Jesus’ human nature may have exemplified in the time before his death. Surely, DDI entails that the divine nature of Jesus, being fully God, cannot change at all. As such, either God’s divine nature has never exemplified hardship and pain or it has always. But again, though there be hardship and pain for Jesus the man, what hardship or pain can there be for God? In this regard it seems there is no contradiction between the two propositions, “Jesus the man exemplified courage” and “God cannot exemplify courage.”

Conclusion

Christianity has the unique feature of having a triune God, who has taken the form of a human being. Most times, arguments of this variety will apply to a wide variety of Gods and not to the Christian God for this very reason. In this circumstance, though, it does not seem that God’s proposed triunity saves it from the criticism of the argument. That is to say, if the argument is sound, it will apply to the Christian God insofar as I am correct in that there is no unique feature of the Christian God which renders it exempt from any of the premises. With that said, it is always true that no argument of this type can encompass all concepts of God. Such that if one remarks that their God does not have to be all-virtuous, this argument does not apply. It strictly attempts to show the incoherence of an all-virtuous Divine being. It might be proposed that there exists a God who is not all-virtuous, but an exploration of what it means for God to be devoid of virtue is required, perhaps there are severe implications. Lastly, one should note that further argumentation would be required to suggest that any Divine being must be necessarily all-virtuous.

The Argument

Again, I will reintroduce the argument of which we are speaking:

(1) If God exists, then God is necessarily omnipotent and necessarily triune

(2) If God is necessarily omnipotent, then God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs

(3) If God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs, then God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune

(4) If God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune, then God is not necessarily triune

(5) Therefore, God does not and cannot exist

The state of affairs which is being referred to in premise (3) is:

(A) Toronto’s being flooded is brought about directly or indirectly by a being that has never been triune

One might understand this further with our example of Bob:

Imagine we have Bob who works at the city dam, who for some reason makes a computer error or falls asleep and as a result of such an action (or inaction) brings about that the city of Toronto is flooded. There is nothing logically impossible about this notion. Let it also be true that Bob is not triune. There is still nothing logically impossible about this notion. Given this, it is clear that (A) is true.

The Objection

Chris expresses disagreement that (A) is a logically possible state of affairs. Chris states:

Triune God brings about all things. If this is true then the state of affairs in which Toronto’s being flooded is brought about directly or indirectly by a being that has never been triune is not a logically possible state of affairs.

The Response

Where (A) is a state of affairs that has the property of being brought about only by a being who has never been triune, Chris argues that no state of affairs with such a property may obtain. Chris’ assertion can be regarded as:

(i) If God exists, necessarily: no non-triune being can bring about a state of affairs

One might worry as to the theological implications of (i). Perhaps we should look to Chapter III of the Westminster Confession for clarification:

God from all eternity did by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass. Yet so as neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty of contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established…

This passage seems wholly incoherent if one reads it with either a libertarian or a hard determinist understanding of freedom. It follows then that we must read it with a compatibilist understanding of freedom. Since the other two options seem incoherent for a Calvinist to support (libertarianism or hard determinism), it follows that they must embrace compatibilism. We should then apply compatibilism to our scenario with Bob the Dam Employee:

God decreed from all eternity that a non-triune being, Bob, would directly or indirectly bring about that the city of Toronto is flooded. Yet, Bob was not forced to directly or indirectly bring this about. That is to say, God ordained Bob’s thoughts and desires in such a way that he would freely, either through action or inaction, bring about that the city of Toronto is flooded.

But surely this is not the same as God bringing about the state of affairs himself. To illuminate the understanding of compatibilism, one might look at the Calvinist doctrine of Effectual Calling (as taken from Chapter X of the Westminster Confession – emphasis mine):

All those whom God hath predestinated unto life, and those only, he is pleased, in his appointed and accepted time, effectually to call, by his Word and Spirit, out of that state of sin and death, in which they are by nature, to grace and salvation by Jesus Christ; enlightening their minds spiritually and savingly, to understanding the things of God; taking away their heart of stone, and giving them an heart of flesh; renewing their wills, and by his almighty power determining them to that which is good, and effectually drawing them to Jesus Christ, yet so as they come most freely, being made willing by his grace.

Thus, for example, in Calvinism those who come to Christ through irresistible grace are not forced against their will to come. It is not that these people want to reject Christ and God forbids them, but rather he has changed their desires so that they come without hesitation. It seems clear then, as Calvinist Philosopher John Feinberg states:

Calvinists as determinists must either reject freedom altogether or accept compatibilism.¹

But what relevance does this bear as an analysis of (i)? Well, according to Christian tradition there are states of affairs in which man sins. My understanding is that Calvinism (or at least, non-hypercalvinism) does not affirm that God works unbelief in the hearts of the reprobate. R.C Sproul writes:

The Reformed view teaches that God positively or actively intervenes in the lives of the elect to insure their salvation. The rest of mankind God leaves to themselves. He does not create unbelief in their hearts. That unbelief is already there. He does not coerce them to sin. They sin by their own choices².

As such, consider the following state of affairs:

(B) Bob’s murdering of Tom is brought about directly or indirectly by a being that has never been triune

Now, if (i) holds, (B) is impossible and it would rather be the case that:

(B*) Bob’s murdering of Tom is brought about directly or indirectly by a being that is necessarily triune

On (B), Bob freely commits the sinful act and while God might work this towards some greater good, it is Bob who is responsible. It is Bob who brings about this state of affairs, even if by virtue of his sinful nature. On (B*) the situation is somewhat different. If we are to say that God has brought about the state of affairs, that is to say he directly brought about Bob’s murdering of Tom and it seems that God has directly inspired Bob to do evil. One might even state that under (B*) Bob commits no action at all, anymore than a tool actively performs the task intended by its wielder. If this is true, it seems that the Calvinist must reject (i) lest they accept that sinful states of affairs are brought about by God. If (i) is rejected, then (A) remains logically possible.

Recall also the response given to a consideration of a similar-type object in the initial post:

Further, one might object that it is possible that God cause a being, Bob, to perform an action so that a certain state of affairs obtains by the action of a necessarily non-omniscient being. But in this regard, has God has brought about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily omniscient? Not quite, God did not bring about the state of affairs that the lesser being did, but rather God brought about the state of affairs which brought about the lesser being to have a certain state of affairs obtain. In this regard, God still stands in causal relation and the argument still applies.

Conclusion

If the above analysis fails in accurately representing the position of Chris then I apologize. It is not an intentional misrepresentation. Further, one should be aware that arguments of this nature are plentiful and diverse that the failure of one, if it should fail, does not constitute a failure of all. Also, with the many different types of theism it is perhaps impossible for one argument to succeed in disproving all concepts of God. As such, one should not assume that the potential failure of this argument as applied to Chris’ position shows the argument wholly incorrect.

With that said, I simply have to wait and see if I’ve accurately represented Chris’s position. If I so have, I think the argument still stands. If not, there may be another approach or it may be that this argument is simply not the applicable formulation. At the very least, I hope to convey that the atheist need not rely wholly upon the alleged failure of theistic arguments for their case, and in fact, they should not.

__________________

¹Feinberg, John. S. “God, Freedom and Evil in Calvinist Thinking,” in The Grace of God, the Bondage of the Will, ed. Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1995), 2:465

²Sproul, R. C. Chosen by God. Tyndale House Publishers, Inc, 1994. 142-43.

The Argument

I will reintroduce the argument of which we are speaking:

(1) If God exists, then God is necessarily omnipotent and necessarily triune.

(2) If God is necessarily omnipotent, then God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs.

(3) If God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs, then God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune.

(4) If God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune, then God is not necessarily triune.

(5) Therefore, God does not and cannot exist

The Objection

I will quote the objection in full, since it is quite short:

Given the first two premises (which must be given, as we are confronting orthodox Christian theism), his third premise ought never obtain; i.e., in order to obtain (3) LeBlanc is forced to contradict (1) and (2)!

How so? Consider what it is that (3) asserts: that God necessarily can bring about some X such that it was brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune. But given (2) which defines omnipotence as being able to “bring about any logically possible state of affairs,” and given (1) which defines God as “necessarily triune” (it is not logically possible for God to not be triune), we therefore observe that (3) contradicts these very premises…

The Reply

I must wonder whether or not this is an objection or a defense of my argument. Let us analyze:

(3) If God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs, then God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune.

This premise garners support from the following:

(A) The state of affairs in which Toronto’s being flooded is brought about directly or indirectly by a being that has never been triune is a logically possible state of affairs

Imagine we have Bob who works at the city dam, who for some reason makes a computer error or falls asleep and as a result of such an action (or inaction) brings about that the city of Toronto is flooded. There is nothing logically impossible about this notion. Let it also be true that Bob is not triune. There is still nothing logically impossible about this notion. Given this, it is clear that (A) is true.

Now, let us assume (2):

(2) If God is necessarily omnipotent, then God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs.

This is a standard definition of omnipotence. Now let us bring in (1) and compile the premises with which we are currently working:

(1) If God exists, then God is necessarily omnipotent and necessarily triune.

(2) If God is necessarily omnipotent, then God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs.

(3) If God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs, then God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune.

Now, we have seen that (A) is true, and that it meets the criteria for a “logically possible state of affairs.” As such, if (1) and (2) obtain (which David grants), (3) must obtain. But what does David say about this?

Given the first two premises (which must be given, as we are confronting orthodox Christian theism), his third premise ought never obtain; i.e., in order to obtain (3) LeBlanc is forced to contradict (1) and (2)!

Exactly! That is to say, the validity of (3) as a conditional shows that either (1) or (2) must be false! This is precisely what the argument is intending to show, and instead of this being an objection, David has agreed with the argument.

To elaborate, if (3) is to fail to obtain as a conditional, it must be due to the falsehood of either (1) or (2), not their truth. Indeed the truth of (1) and (2) (and of (A)) lead to the validity of (3) as a conditional.

Again, David states:

Consider what it is that (3) asserts: that God necessarily can bring about some X such that it was brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune. But given (2) which defines omnipotence as being able to “bring about any logically possible state of affairs,” and given (1) which defines God as “necessarily triune” (it is not logically possible for God to not be triune), we therefore observe that (3) contradicts these very premises…

It seems that David is stating that the “then” portion of the conditional can only obtain if God is contingently triune. I would agree, it is indeed by virtue of the fact that God is necessarily triune that he cannot bring about the logically possible state of affairs mentioned. God could bring about the state of affairs if he were contingently triune (that is, not necessarily triune) but I strain to think of how any Christian would make this idea of a contingently triune God comprehensible. In fact, David’s observation is made in my own argument:

(4) If God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune, then God is not necessarily triune.

But God is necessarily triune and necessarily omnipotent so:

(5) Therefore, God does not and cannot exist

Conclusion

I am indeed confused by David’s objection, because based on what he says, he actually agrees with the argument.

The Argument

For those who may not like syllogisms, the argument can be stated as such: Could an omnipotent being bring about the state of affairs q where q = that Toronto’s being flooded is brought about directly or indirectly by a being that has never been triune/omniscient?

Christian-Specific

(1) If God exists, then God is necessarily omnipotent and necessarily triune

(2) If God is necessarily omnipotent, then God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs

(3) If God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs, then God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune

(4) If God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune, then God is not necessarily triune

(5) Therefore, God does not and cannot exist

General Theism

(1′) If God exists, then God is necessarily omnipotent and necessarily omniscient

(2) If God is necessarily omnipotent, then God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs

(3′) If God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs, then God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily omniscient

(4′) If God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily omniscient, then God is not necessarily omniscient

(5) Therefore, God does not and cannot exist

(3) and (3′) follow from the fact that such a sate of affairs is logically possible given that human beings who are not triune/omniscient can bring about such states of affairs. (5) follows deductively and shows that a being who is necessarily omnipotent cannot be necessarily triune/omniscient as well.

Possible Objections

One might state that (2) is an improper definition of omnipotence. It could be said that divine omnipotence is best understood as stating: God can do anything that is in accordance with his nature. But what kind of omnipotence is this? This implies that every being is omnipotent for it is true of every being that they can do anything in accordance with their nature. It seems that this is a mere truism and devoid of meaning. One may state that omnipotence need not make claims of ability, only claims of power and that God being omnipotent merely states that there is no being more powerful than God. This is not really an objection to the argument as the person raising it would be speaking of something wholly different than what is being discussed. The argument is certainly one of ability and would need to be reformulated in lieu of any redefinition.

Further, one might object that it is possible that God cause a being, Bob, to perform an action so that a certain state of affairs obtains by the action of a necessarily non-omniscient being. But in this regard, has God has brought about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily omniscient? Not quite, God did not bring about the state of affairs that the lesser being did, but rather God brought about the state of affairs which brought about the lesser being to have a certain state of affairs obtain. In this regard, God still stands in causal relation and the argument still applies.

____________

¹Martin, M. (1990). Atheism: A philosophical justification (p. 310). Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press.

The Argument

Assume we can rank moral beings on a scale from 1-10 with 10 being reserved for morally perfect (God) natures and 0 for perfectly evil (Satan, for example) natures. Suppose further that human beings are ranked at 5, neither perfectly good nor perfectly evil.

Let S represent the set of worlds comprised of being with morally better agents than humans, that is, S is a composite of all those worlds in which all moral agents score higher on the moral continuum than humans do in the actual world:

(1) God is omnipotent

(2) So, it is possible for God to actualize a member of S

(3) God is omniscient

(4) So, if it is possible for God to actualize a member of S, then God knows that He can actualize a member of S

(5) So, God knows that He can actualize a member of S

(6) God is morally perfect

(7) So, a morally perfect being will¹ attempt to maximize the likelihood of moral  goodness and minimize the likelihood of moral evil in the world

(8) If God knows He can actualize a member of S, then every world in which God exists is a member of S

(9) Therefore, every world in which God exists is a member of S

(10) Therefore, if God exists in the actual world then the actual world is a member of S

(11) The actual world is not a member of S

(12) Therefore, God does not exist

Objections

We shall now look at some objections:

Standards

The initial uproar at ChoosingHats centered around this idea of “holding God accountable.” This objection can best be summarized by directly quoting RK²:

Look at the assumption required for the second half of this sentence.“creating humans is not the morally best action”. Says who? By what standard? As usual, I think we can guess what that is.

Walker suggests that God is morally culpable for creating human beings with defective natures (defective in comparison to God’s).

Is He, now? Culpable to who? Oh, wait. That’s the assumption! The same assumption all of these dumb arguments make. God is answerable to man. That’s funny, here I thought Scripture answered that sort of ridiculousness.

See, man always believes that he can pass judgment on God. That he is morally autonomous. Scripture says differently.

By what standard is creating humans “not the morally best action”? That is the problem. You should know Christian theology quite well enough to understand that God is definitionally good. His actions, by virtue of being His actions, are definitionally good.

As I stated in the comments following RK’s response, the argument is not attempting to suggest that God is culpable to anyone but himself. Rather, the argument is making a consistency check in asking: if God exists, and his moral character were perfect, could he do action X?

RK states that the Christian God is definitionally good, but I am sure he would want to stay away from insinuating that God’s actions are arbitrarily good. To take RK’s statement at face value, that God’s actions are good because they are God’s actions, obviously raises the following question: Can a morally perfect God perform any action, and would that action thereby be considered good? Most Christian theists are quick to deny this, as it renders God’s goodness entirely arbitrary. Rather, it is stated that there are certain things that God cannot do by virtue of his perfect moral nature. For example, God cannot will that rape become morally permissible. It is claimed that God’s condemning of rape is not an arbitrary decree of God, but rather one that flows out of his perfectly loving nature. But how does this apply to the Anthropic Argument? Well, if RK wants to state that God can do whatever he wants and that whatever is thereby rendered “good” it seems that he is in some theological trouble. Presumably, RK would not want to embrace this line of reasoning and would affirm something similar to the idea that goodness flows necessarily out of God’s nature. But then what is his objection? In response to the statement found in the abstract of Walker’s paper, that “creating humans is not the morally best action” RK retorts by saying that God is definitionally good. Dismissing the idea of arbitrariness in God’s decrees it seems then that RK must be affirming something similar to:

If God exists his actions are always the morally best, and thus, creating humans is the morally best action

This is clearly question-begging, since we are discussing precisely what God’s nature would and would not allow him to do. This statement, if endorsed by RK, would merely affirm that God did create human beings and be utterly fallacious.

Perhaps RK would want to argue, in true presuppositionalist fashion, that if the conclusion of the argument holds, the terms “good”, “evil”, etc. lose their meaning. Of course, in the philosophy of religion throughout the literature on the various problems of evil, we see what is called “bracketing”, as explained by Mark Walker himself in a personal correspondence:

…theorists may agree that the Holocaust is evil but not agree why it is evil. Utilitarians would appeal to its massive disutility, whereas Kantians would explain the evil in terms of violations of the categorical imperative. I take it that there will be agreement that the Chumans³ lack some of the goodness we enjoy, but theorists may disagree on what this goodness amounts to: happiness or the development of intellectual or moral excellence, for instance. I am not suggesting that there are not serious disagreements about how to understand these terms, or that there are not serious philosophical issues here that need to be resolved, but I do believe that these disagreements can be bracketed for the purposes of my argument. Perhaps I am wrong about this, but I do take some comfort in the fact that most discussions of the problem of evil take a similar position.

Brain Knapp of ChoosingHats also had some comments:

Mitch said: “The principle of course is that God, being perfectly good, creates the best possible world. And if it is not logically possibly to create a world without evil (free will defense), he creates the world with the best ratio of good to evil.”

I will ask the same question I asked earlier, as it applies to your summation of the author’s quote … “according to what standard?” It is paramount that any moral evaluation of God (I shudder to even say such a thing) take into account the proper *standard* of evaluation. In this case, the author presumes that the current world is not the “best world”. Well, I will ask it again – “best according to what standard?”

What has yet to be demonstrated is that the “best” possible world is a world where moral goodness is maximized and moral evil is minimized. It may be “best” according to your standard, or Walker’s, or Leibniz’s, but that’s entirely irrelevant to God, of course.

Unless you have an objective moral standard that even God is held accountable to, that is.

He further states:

However, it has not yet been demonstrated that *not* maximizing moral goodness is, itself, a morally *imperfect* action. I mean, it may be a morally imperfect action “according to Mitch”, but if Mitch is the standard being used to evaluate such actions, then (as RK has stated already) what is being argued is a strawman.

Brian’s objection follows the same line as RK’s. I responded:

Firstly, the author is not presuming that this world is not the best possible, it’s demonstrably not the best world possible unless someone can present some logical impossibility in God creating the type of world Walker proposes. It clearly is a greater conceivable world (which gives us our modal possibility). Greater according to who’s standard? Is anyone actually going to argue that a world with more evil and less goodness is the greatest possible world? Again, we can deal with this counterfactually: what type of world would God’s nature desire? If one is going to answer that the current world is such a world, the questions of “why?” and “which characteristics make it desirable?” and “why are these not able to be employed in a demonstrably greater world?” arise.

Also, Brian has asked why if a being possesses the capability to maximize moral goodness, but does not, that being is thereby referred to as “morally imperfect”. He’s inquiring, like his peers, to the standard being utilized. The response is of course the same as it was to RK:

…theorists may agree that the Holocaust is evil but not agree why it is evil.

It is also addressed analogically, if as a human being you had the ability to stop the creation of a severely deficient race of people that you knew would only harm each other and themselves and you do not, can one conclude that you are morally good let alone morally perfect? There may be many different reasons for why this is the wrong thing to do, Utilitarianism, De-ontological and even Divine Command Ethics would have an answer and this perhaps shows some prima facie intrinsic quality of evil. With regard to a world, we can perhaps even extract from our idea of perfection, namely God, and ask what does he possess that a world might possess? We might say that God is loving, so a world with love is good, as such a world with more love than non-love is better than a world with less love than non-love etc.

On a somewhat related note I will say that given my recent reading of Swinburne’s material, the idea that there may be no best possible world seems more and more cogent. That is to say, assume a world in which having 5 ontological equivalent beings is good, a world containing 6 may be better and so on and so forth ad infinitum.  Given this, it is logically impossible that God choose the “best possible world” since there is no such thing. As such, it would follow that God merely (perhaps arbitrarily) actualizes a world. But this does not absolve him of moral duty, for his nature is still in effect and he must create a world in accordance with his nature.

God’s Attributes

RK has also expressed concern that criticisms of God put forth to the reformed tradition do not take his attributes into proper account. As explained by RK, the reformed version of Divine Simplicity differs greatly from the understand employed by traditional philosophers. For the reformed tradition, Divine Simplicity means merely that we cannot speak of God’s attributes as devoid from his being. That is, a God who is purported to be omnipotent but not omniscient is not the concept of God being held by the reformed believer.

This comes up in a disagreement with the Anthropic Argument. Does the Anthropic Argument fail to take into account the entirety of God’s attributes? Well, it certainly focuses on omnipotence, omniscience and moral perfection. There are other attributes which the Anthropic Argument does not introduce because any good deduction is one that only introduces what is needed for deduction. That is to say, should a contradiction be found between the aforementioned three attributes and the existence of human beings, then any being which possesses the three attributes and is purported to have created human beings cannot exist. Now, should one of God’s other unmentioned attributes directly effect the manner in which any of the aforementioned three is enacted, then we certainly do need to take account of them.

Chris Bolt raised the objection that in a world where God creates ontological equivalents rather than ontological deficients (a state of affairs proposed by Walker) he is unable to display his wrath, and this necessarily conflicts with the fact that wrathfulness is a part of God’s nature. Bolt states:

God is the Creator who reveals His glory in what He has made by displaying, among other things, his wrath. Now can you tell me what a world without evil might look like where our just and righteous God is still able to display His wrath and thus also the riches of His mercy and grace?

To which I responded:

It is important to note, though, that Walker suggests that there might still be evil in a world in which God has created ontologically equivalent beings but it certainly would be a different ‘type’ of evil than what we see in our Universe. In this possible world, perhaps it is still possible for God to display his grace.

One seemingly obvious example is that instead of moral wrath or moral grace, the world might contain natural wrath and natural grace. The idea that Bolt presents sounds strikingly similar to some East Asian theories of morality, wherein good exists only because of its contrast with evil and vice versa. Perhaps it is the case that if no evil existed, then no good could exist. This might entail that God, if he did not create a world of sentient beings, was not intrinsically good. Surely this is absurd, for if there is to be any intrinsic goodness in the Christian tradition, God himself is a prime candidate.

A commenter by the name of Justin made a further reply about a characteristic of God being overlooked:

God’s ultimate purpose is His own Glory. This is the premise that the Bible presents, yet you insist on putting forth the argument that He is restrained only to maximizing the moral goodness in the world, and with the presence of morally corrupt beings it could not be the case. That is a strawman argument. God is the definition of what is good, What is good is His glory, He can use morally corrupt beings for His purposes. Even though they may do these things for evil purposes, God is doing it for Good purposes. Therefore it He does not compromise any aspect of His perfection.

Let us briefly introduce the scriptural justification for this point (Isaiah 43:1-7 NASB):

But now, thus says the Lord, your creator, O Jacob, and He who formed you, O Israel, “Do not fear, for I have redeemed you; I have called you by name; you are Mine! When you pass through the waters, I will be with you; and through the rivers, they will not overflow you. When you walk through the fire, you will not be scorched, nor will the flame burn you. For I am the Lord your God, the Holy One of Israel, your Savior; I have given Egypt as your ransom, Cush and Seba in your place. Since you are precious in My sight, since you are honored and I love you, I will give other men in your place and other peoples in exchange for your life. Do not fear, for I am with you; I will bring your offspring from the east, and gather you from the west. I will say to the north, ‘Give them up!’ and to the south, ‘Do not hold them back.’ Bring My sons from afar, and My daughters from the ends of the earth, everyone who is called by My name, and whom I have created for My glory, whom I have formed even whom I have made

And a brief explanation by John Piper:

But this means that when God says, He made us for His glory, He does not mean He made us so that He could become more glorious in Himself. Instead what Isaiah 43:7 means is that He created us to display His glory, that is, glory might be known and praised. This is the goal of God that we must be aligned within our hearts and actions if we hope to escape His wrath at the judgment.

Now, with our understanding aligned we can examine Justin’s comment. Recall when he stated:

God is the definition of what is good, What is good is His glory, He can use morally corrupt beings for His purposes. Even though they may do these things for evil purposes, God is doing it for Good purposes

We want to be careful not to slip into calling God’s goodness wholly arbitrary, so perhaps we should not read this with a “God can do whatever he wants and that whatever is good because God did it”. Further, this statement seems to miss the point. If the argument holds, then the existence of God is logically incompatible with the existence of morally corrupt beings, and as such the above statement simply begs the question. What seems to be required here is an argument showing that the only way in which God can glorify himself is to create morally corrupt human beings.

If it is possible that God can be glorified in a world with ontologically equivalent beings (they can still pay homage to their creator) then the argument still holds.

Equivalence

Chris Bolt brings up two other objections:

A being ontologically equivalent to God would be indistinguishable from Him and hence at the very least is difficult to propose excepting that such a being is created at which point it is creation rather than Creator which not only serves to distinguish it from God and apparently resolve the difficulty but also then makes it ontologically non-equivalent to God… Further, God created humans morally perfect, a claim which is assumed to be false throughout the argument.

In response to the first objection, I stated:

I see no reason to accept that a being that is ontologically equivalent to God would be indistinguishable from God. You’re invoking Leibniz’s principle of indiscernibles and this was actually the first objection I had hoped to raise against the argument. However, the created being would have, as a property of its existence, at least contingency in that he relies upon the first Creator God for his existence. As such, he cannot be identifiable with the Creator God because they would not share all properties in common. You argue that this no longer makes it an ontological equivalent but this is not true according to Walker’s definition. When Walker states “ontological equivalent” he means equivalent in omnipotence, omniscience and moral goodness. I see no such problem once this definition is understood.

and in response to the second:

As for God creating humans morally perfect, are you suggesting that God made human beings with precisely the same moral nature that He has? If this is true, it should be as impossible for man to “fall” as it is for God to “sin”. If this is not the case, then in which manner have human beings been created morally perfect? It seems that there is still some distinction between the moral nature of God and the moral nature of a morally perfect human being.

Clearly, I disagree with Chris on both accounts. I think my first objection is clear so I would like to address the second in further depth.

If God is a 10 on the moral scale we introduced earlier, and is thus morally perfect and human beings were also created as a 10. Then it seems we have a problem, for if human beings share the same moral nature as God but did indeed “fall into sin”, it is logically possible that God also fall into sin. This seems absolutely absurd, God’s morally perfect nature renders God unable to sin/fall and if this is true and human beings share the same moral nature as God (moral perfection), they too should be unable to sin/fall. Clearly though, according to Christian tradition, man did fall so it follows that his moral nature is not equivalent to God’s.

Conclusion

Though I expect that my interlocutors will have further objections, I trust that having a compendium of the topic will be useful in the future.

___________________

¹There was some disagreement over the usage of the term “should” in the previous formulation of the argument. The usage does mean the same as “will” so in order to avoid any discussion on that issue I’ve amended the argument so that it includes “will” rather than “should.”

²These comments were made specifically to the form of the argument which utilized the term “should.” I am only assuming that RK would apply the same objections to this formulation as well.

³Chumans are a proposed race of beings engineered by human beings that have severe deficiencies and a propensity towards violence. It is utilized as an analogy to outline precisely why God’s creating of human beings may be morally abhorrent. In the same manner that we would be morally culpable for creating such a deficient race, God is culpable for creating beings deficient in relation to himself.

The Argument

(1)    If God is omnipotent, he can bring about any state of affairs conceivable for God to bring about

(2)    Both the sustaining and non-sustaining of material human life at time, t, are states of affairs conceivable for God to bring about

(3)    God is omnipotent

(4)    God can sustain or not sustain material human life at time, t

(5)    If material human life is being sustained at time, t then it is not being not-sustained at time, t

(6)    If material human life is being not-sustained at time t then it is not being sustained at time t

(7)    God must either be sustaining or not-sustaining material human life at time t

(8)    If God is omniscient, he knows everything that is conceivable for God to know

(9)    If God cannot make free choices, he is not perfectly free

(10) God is perfectly free

(11) God can make free choices

(12) It is conceivable for God to know the outcome of his choices

(13) God is omniscient

(14) God knows the outcome of his choices

(15) God knows the outcome of sustaining material human life at time t

(16) God knows the outcome of not-sustaining material human life at time t

(17) Both states of affairs cannot obtain at time t

(18) If God has knowledge of the outcome of both states of affairs, he has such knowledge without one state of affair obtaining

(19) Either God has counterfactual knowledge of at least one state of affair or God is not omniscient

(20) God has counterfactual knowledge of at least one state of affair

Possible Objection

The biggest objection I see coming from RK is that of (9) and further deductions. What does it mean to say that God is perfectly free?

We must first note that RK has listed some characteristics of God in his third premise:

God is Simple(a), Sovereign(b), Holy(c), Immutable(d), Eternal(e), Wise(f), Infinite(g), Knowing(h), Powerful(i), Near(j), Loving(k), Merciful(l), Gracious(m), Just(n), Good(o), Spirit(p), Revelatory(q), Glorious(r), Joyful(s), Patient(t), Incomprehensible(u), Jealous(v), Transcendent(w), True(x), Wrathful(y), Self-Existent(z), Self-sufficient(A), Trinitarian(B), Perfect(C)

Most relevant here are those of Immutability and Perfection. RK may object to (9) saying that (i) God cannot do anything other than he has already intended to do, (ii) God is free only insofar as his actions are in accordance with his nature.

Now (i) seems entailed by (ii) insofar as immutability is part of God’s nature. We will take God’s immutability to mean that God cannot change. We must also wonder whether or not RK wishes to assert that God is perfectly free. It seems to me that if God is not perfectly free, he deserves no worship for his actions any more than we worship a Pepsi machine for mechanistically dispensing our refreshing cola when we insert our money.

Richard Swinburne, Emeritus professor of Christian Philosophy at Oxford University writes extensively on the subject:

We can understand ‘immutable’ in a weaker or stronger way. In the weaker way to say of a person that he is immutable is simply to say that he cannot change in character. To say of a free an omniscient creator that he is immutable is simply to say that, while he continues to exist, necessarily he remains fixed in his character… Theists have, however, sometimes understood immutability in a much stronger sense. On this understanding to say that God is immutable is to say that he cannot change at all. (Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism. 1993, pg 221)

How might this relate to the idea that God has determined all occurrences from the “beginning”? Swinburne continues with an example of Augustine worshiping God at one time, but not another:

This would not rule out God at one time not being worshipped by Augustine, and at a later time being worshipped by Augustine. For in such a case, intuitively, Augustine changes but God does not. It might seem that it rules out God acting – for acts take places at particular times; in action God changes from not doing a certain action to doing that action. This difficulty could be avoided if one said that all that God brings about he has chosen ‘from all eternity’ to bring about. The effects (e.g. the fall of Jerusalem, the fall of Babylon) which God brings about occur at particular times (587 BC and 538 BC respectively). Yet God has always meant them to occur at those times – i.e. there was no time at which God did not intend Jerusalem to fall in 587 BC. When 587 BC arrived there was no change in God – the arrival of the moment put into effect the intention which God always had… If God has thus fixed his intention ‘from all eternity’ he would be a very lifeless thing; not a person who reacts to men with sympathy or anger, pardon or chastening because he chooses to there and then. Yet, as we saw… the God of the Old Testament, in which Judaism, Islam and Christianity have their roots, is a God in continual interaction with men, moved by men as they speak to him, his action being often in no way decided in advance. We should note, further, that if God did not change at all, he would not thinking now of this, now of that. His thoughts would be one thought which lasted forever. (Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism. 1993, pg 222)

Now, what of Immutability as RK proposes? Swinburne states:

It seems to me that although the God of the Old Testament is not pictured as such a being, nevertheless a perfectly free person might act in fact only on intentions which he had had from all eternity, and so in a strong sense never change. However, a perfectly free person could not be immutable in the strong sense, that is unable to change. For an agent is perfectly free at a certain time if his action results from his own choice at that time and if his choice is not itself brought about by anything else. Yet a person immutable in the strong sense would be unable to perform any action at a certain time other than what he had previously intended to do. His course of action being fixed by his past choices, he would not be perfectly free. Being perfectly free is incompatible with being immutable in the strong sense…

Why should many theists have wished to suppose that God is immutable in the strong sense? The belief that God is immutable in this sense does not seem to me to be much in evidence in Christian tradition until the third or fourth century A.D. It came, I suspect, from neo-Platonism. For a Platonist, things which change are inferior to things which do not change, Aquinas, claiming that God is altogether unchangeable, gives as one of his reasons that ‘anything in change acquires something through its change, attaining something not previously attained. Now God… embracing within himself the whole fullness of perfection of all existence cannot acquire anything. Being perfect already he can lack nothing. However, an obvious answer to this point is to suggest that the perfection of a perfect being might consist not in his being in a certain static condition, but in his being in a certain process of change. Only neo-Platonic dogma would lead us to suppose otherwise. That God is completely changeless would seem to be for the theist an unnecessary dogma. It is not… one implicit in the Old or New Testaments. (ibid.)

Conclusion

It seems to me that if God’s perfection entails, as Swinburne suggests, being in a certain process of change, then this idea that he does not make free choices due to his immutability fails. Given this, if the rest of the argument is sound then it seems to suggest that God would have counterfactual knowledge. This itself entails that possible worlds are indeed compatible with Christian theism.

(1) Todd is omniscient

Of course, Todd’s being omniscient entails that for any proposition p, the following must be true:

(2) If p, then Todd knows that p

Basically, Todd knows any truth. Now, consider  hiders:

…whose defining property is that they are capable of perfectly concealing their existence from any other being. When a hider conceals its existence, it is in hiding.

Now, if there are hiders who are hiding, Todd’s omniscience is compromised because he would not know that there is at least one hider in hiding.

If it is even the case that hiders are merely possible, Todd’s omniscience is compromised because he would not be able to distinguish between a state of affairs in which hiders exist but are hiding, and a state of affairs in which hiders do not exist.

If it is the case that hiders are impossible, Todd must know that they are impossible, otherwise his omniscience is compromised since not knowing they are impossible, it will seem to him that they are possible and he would be subjected to the aforementioned problem.

Thus:

(3) If Todd does not know that hiders are impossible, then Todd is not omniscient

and the contraposition

(4) If Todd is omniscient, then Todd knows that hiders are impossible

Thus given (1):

(5) Todd knows that hiders are impossible

Bass states:

Of course, that argument can be run in reverse. If hiders are either possible, or else impossible in

some way that Todd doesn’t know, then Todd doesn’t know hiders are impossible. If he doesn’t

know that hiders are impossible, then Todd is not omniscient. The question that faces us here is

how Todd knows—if he does—that hiders are impossible.

Of course, that argument can be run in reverse. If hiders are either possible, or else impossible in some way that Todd doesn’t know, then Todd doesn’t know hiders are impossible. If he doesn’t know that hiders are impossible, then Todd is not omniscient. The question that faces us here is how Todd knows – if he does – that hiders are impossible.

So, how might hiders be impossible? They may be  intrinsically impossible, like a square circle or they might be extrinsically impossible, like irresistible forces are impossible in worlds containing immovable objects.

There can be no possible world in which hiders, if intrinsically impossible, exist. On the other hand, extrinsically impossible hiders are logically possible and would be present in some possible worlds (but not the ones where the conditions of that world render their existence impossible).

There are now two questions, are hiders intrinsically or extrinsically impossible, and how does Todd know? If Todd knows that hiders are impossible, his knowledge will be either inferential or non-inferential. Could Todd non-inferentially know that hiders are impossible?

Bass is suspicious:

There are two reasons for suspicion. First, so far as Todd’s non-inferential knowledge is being modeled upon ours, plausible cases of non-inferential knowledge typically yield less than certainty. I do not infer from premises that the person with the familiar profile and gait that I see walking across campus is my friend, David. But, upon catching up with him, I can be surprised to discover that it is someone else entirely. Further, even where non-inferential processes appear to yield certainty, as in the case of whether two straight lines can enclose a space, the certainty may turn out to be on certitude, the state of feeling certain that something is so, which may not in fact be so. If the normal products of non-inferential belief -forming mechanisms deserve to be called knowledge, that is due to the fact that those mechanism are generally reliable. General reliability is not enough for Todd to rule out the existence of hiders, however. For if he reaches the belief that hiders are impossible only through a generally reliable mechanism, and if he also knows, as he must if he is omniscient, that the way in which he comes to the belief is only generally reliable, it will remain possible that, though his belief that hiders are impossible was the product of a generally reliable belief-formation mechanism, it is still mistaken.

But what about extrinsic impossibility? Presume there are finders, beings from which no other being can successfully hide. It seems that the existence of finders render the existence of hiders impossible. Surely, if there are any omniscient beings, there can be no hiders. But, if Todd is to know that there are any finders or omniscient beings, it stands to reason that he has already ruled out the existence of hiders. Appealing to the existence of finders, or omniscient beings in an attempt to show that there are no hiders would obviously beg the question. So, as Bass states:

…the existence of something incompatible with the existence of hiders can only be known if it is already known that there are no hiders – which leaves us, in order to show that hiders are extrinsically impossible, trying to show that they are impossible in some other way – that is, presumably, that they are intrinsically impossible. But if that could have been shown, we would never have needed to explore the question of their extrinsic impossibility at all.

As such, Todd does not know that he is omniscient and therefore is not omniscience. But what if we consider God rather than Todd, that is to say, a being with the characteristics traditionally ascribed to God. Could this being rule out the possibility of hiders?

Bass states:

Much remains the same. There is still the fact that the conception of a hider appears consistent, and if it is, hiders are not intrinsically impossible. Perhaps, however, there is something God knows that would enable him to show that hiders are extrinsically impossible. One suggestions derives from consideration of God’s role as creator. The argument would be that there could be hiders only if God had created them, but since he did not, and knows that he did not, there are none. The problem with this is that, according to orthodox conceptions of God, there is at least one thing that exists without having been created by God, namely, God himself. God cannot argue that it is impossible for there to be anything uncreated by God because that would rule out his own existence. And that means that hiders might be beings uncreated by God and, being in hiding, unknown to God.

Perhaps a revision of this line of thought will succeed. God is self-existent – that is, does not depend for his existence upon anything else. If God had a proof that there could be only one self-existent being, he could argue that if hiders exist without being his creations, then they would have to either be self-existent or the creations of some other self-existent being. But since there are no other self-existent beings – which, ex hypothesi, has been proven – there is no way for hiders to exist.

Let’s set this attempt aside, for the moment, to consider another. Suppose that some (modal) version of the ontological argument is sound. Then, it will be necessarily true that God exists with the full set of theistic attributes. That being than which no greater can be conceived will be omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good, self-existent and so on. But if the ontological argument is sound, God will understand that it is, and therefore will have proof that there is an omniscient being and hence that there are no hiders.

Both of the foregoing attempts depend upon proofs which have not actually been given, and in the absence of the proofs, it is difficult to be confident of the solution. In addition, however, they share another feature – both are susceptible to the identification problem. In each case, we are supposing that there is a proof of the existence of some being with one or more of the traditional attributes of God. Then, the conclusion of that proof is used as a premise for a further argument to rule out the existence of hiders. But what about the being considering the proof? What is to identify that being – call it the Arguer – as the one proved to exist?

Let’s call the being supposedly proved to exist a God-like being:

(a) There is a God-like being

(b) If there is a God-like being, it knows that it is omniscient

(c) If some being knows that it is omniscient, then it is omniscient

(d) The Arguer is the God-like being

(e) Therefore, the Arguer is omniscient.

The identification problem lies in (d). How would the Arguer know that he is the God-like being? If the Arguer does not know that, he does not know the conclusion and this renders the conclusion false. Even if the Ontological Argument is sound, what is to certify to the Arguer that he is the omniscient being proved to exist?

The problem can also be expressed in matters of omnipotence. How would an all powerful being know that it is all powerful? Having no problem in accomplishing anything it has set out to do does nothing to establish the conclusion that it is all-powerful, perhaps it just has not tried anything that exceeded its power. Similar problems apply to most, if not all, of the attributes of God.

So, it even seems that this provides evidence that the ontological argument is not sound. For it were sound, then there would be an omniscient being, and therefore hiders would be, and could be known to be, impossible. But any proposed omniscient being is faced with the identification problem, and has to acknowledge that they might not be the omniscient being proved to exist.

Conclusion

As such:

(1) If any being is omniscient, then it knows that it is omniscient

(2) No being knows that it is omniscient, because there is no being that knows hiders to be impossible and who can solve the identification problem

(3) Therefore, no being is omniscient

Justification for (2):

(2a) If hiders are not known to be impossible or if the identification problem is not solved, then no being knows that it is omniscient

(2b) Hiders are not known to be impossible, or the identification is not solved

And we therefore have:

(1) If any being is omniscient, then it knows that it is omniscient

(2a) If hiders are not known to be impossible or if the identification problem is not solved, then no being knows that it is omniscient

(2b) Hiders are not known to be impossible, or the identification is not solved

(3) Therefore, no being is omniscient

Objections and subsequent responses can be found in the linked paper.