Preliminary Discussion

                It is useful to begin by saying a brief bit on logic. Logic concerns itself with consequence, which has been referred to as truth-preservation. An analysis of consequence is performed by demonstrating the validity of arguments such that:

(Logical Consequence) Some conclusion C is a consequence[4] of a set of premises P iff in a case where all the premises of P are true, it is a case where C is true.

The “cases” referred to above are laid out by truth-conditions. Systems of logic provide truth-conditions for that which will be parsed through them[5], or rather, what will be a consequence of what. For example, I might provide the following condition (Where P and Q are the ‘things’[6] being parsed):

P ^ Q is true in some case iff P is true and Q is true in the same case.

In providing such a truth-condition I have enabled the system to demonstrate the validity of the following:

P ^ Q

_____

P

If P ^ Q is true then P is true, or in other words, P is a consequence of P ^ Q. The question is whether or not there are multiple ways to understand, or lay out, the aforementioned cases. Logical pluralism rejects the position[7] that there is only one way to determine whether or not some argument is formally valid, or put differently, that there is but one true logic[8].  It proposes instead that there are multiple ways of specifying cases (truth-conditions), all of which are true. If you were to ask the logical particularist whether some argument were valid he or she would maintain that there is only one answer to that question. The logical pluralist would reject that statement.

The Presuppositionalist’s Logical Laws[9]

                In much of the literature I have come across and in my discussions with presuppositionalists as they defend their thesis re logic they state that the non-believer cannot account[10] for the truth of the so-called Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC), Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM) and the Law of Identity (LI). These titles denote particular propositions found in, at least, Classical Logic (let the following ‘P’s stand for any sentence letter or compound sentence:

LNC: ~(P ^ ~P)

LEM: (P v ~P)

LI: A <-> A

These propositions are tautologies under Classical Logic and while their being named “laws” by some; they possess no special status over any other tautology under Classical Logic, such as:

((A v B) ^ (A -> C) ^ (B -> C)) -> C

Tautologies are formulae which are always true in their systems by virtue of the logical rules, regardless of the truth-value assignment of some sentence letter or compound sentence. That is to say, the mere syntax of the system is sufficient for the truth of tautologies. As an example, take the LEM: (P v ~P) is always true because the logical rules for Classical Logic state that a disjunction is only false when both disjuncts are false and whatever truth-value assignment we give to P, one of the disjuncts in the LEM will be true (Classical Logic only has two truth values: T/F) and that is sufficient for the truth of the entire disjunction.

I suspect that the presuppositionalist will want to disagree with my statement above, that the logical rules of a system are sufficient for the truth of that system’s tautologies. The presuppositionalist will claim that the existence of God stands in some truth-making relation to the tautologies (and everything other truth the system parses). It seems abundantly clear, however, that the logical rules are enough. I suspect the presuppositionalist would posit God as a necessary and sufficient condition, in some fashion, to the truth of the LEM (for example, and to remain consistent).

I have heard two common expositions of the truth-making relationship between the existence of God and the LEM (or any other logical truth). One maintains that the LEM is a reflection of God’s nature. I do not know precisely what is meant by this particular suggestion. What does it mean to be a ‘reflection’ in this context? How is the LEM a reflection? What is it about God’s nature that causes the LEM to be reflected? The questions are numerous. The other suggestion is that the LEM (or any other logical truth) is a reflection of the way God thinks. Similar questions arise to this suggestion as well. In order to move the discussion forward, we can at least concede that both suggestions suggest that there is something about God that makes (in some way) the LEM true.

Concerns

                Now, recall logical pluralism once more and consider some ternary logic (a three-valued logic) in which the LEM comes out false. The LEM essentially states “either true or false” but ternary logic introduces some third value (depending on the system that value might be: indeterminate, irrelevant, unknown, etc.) and so regards the LEM false. This system of logic will have a different logical rules than Classical Logic, in many ways it is a different language as French is different to English. The logical pluralist wants to maintain that this system is fundamentally no ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than Classical Logic (though different systems may in different contexts be more ‘useful’). This system will also have tautologies which differ from those of Classical Logic and the pluralist will maintain that they are true tautologies, given the particular ternary system.

Let us assume, though it may be difficult to do, that the logical rules of this system are not sufficient conditions for the truth of some proposition which entails the falsehood of the LEM, and that the existence of God is a necessary and sufficient condition of the truth[11]. If we take the relationship between the existence of God and the truth of the proposition to have something to do with his nature or thinking, then it seems that there is something about God’s nature or thinking that is making the LEM true in one instance and making the LEM false in the other. That is, where under Classic Logic God is making (a) (P v ~P) true, under some ternary logic he is making (b) ~(P v ~P) true.

The two propositions initially seem to be contradictions of each other, but because they are arising out of different logics, they are essentially arising out of different languages. If no translator were present, I think it obvious that “I am hungry” does not contradict “Je n’ai pas faim.” A contradiction only seems to arise when we parse one sentence from some other language into whichever one we are using. So, if I translate “Je n’ai pas faim” and I see that it is the negation of “I am hungry”, now I have some contradiction where prior to the translation/integration, I merely had foreign symbols. So where (P v ~P) and ~(P v ~P) seem to be contradictory, I suggest that this is only the case if taken into a common language where both are expressed and where the rules of that language determine them to be in contradiction. We should not be misled, in our example of (a) and (b) both instances use the same symbols but essentially arise from different languages. So, (a) as expressed in Classical Logic is only contradicted by (b) if it too is expressed in Classical Logic and so on.

Now, continuing along with our assumption that the existence of God (in some way) is a necessary and sufficient condition of the truth of the aforementioned propositions in their respective systems if they are to be non-contradictory, it seems that they must be non-translated. But, focusing on God’s thoughts, what might it mean to say that God’s thoughts (or thinking) act as the truth-maker for the truth of both statements, but that he thinks them in a manner analogous to thinking a statement in French and thinking a statement in English and not knowing the translation[12]? Surely if the statement is translatable, God knows the translation. Put in another way, God in some way makes (a) true in Classical Logic and (b) true in some ternary logic. Assume that by translating (a) into the system of (b), (a) is rendered false and by translating (b) into the system of (a), (b) is rendered false. Something about God (presumably an unchangeable something, according to the Reformed tradition) in this example makes (a) true and makes it false, and likewise with (b). How is one to make sense of this?

Perhaps it is the case that God possesses a system of logic which he translates both (a) and (b) into, and this logic is such that the contradiction yielded by the aforementioned translation “does not matter”. This would be to suggest that God-Logic[13] is dialtheist in some sense, permitting of contradictions in a non-explosive manner. This God-Logic however will of course have its own logical rules, but continuing with our assumption these are insufficient for any of the truths yielded, the truth-maker will have to be something about God. Now we also have something about God that makes the LNC, after translation into God-Logic, both true and false. If this is true then the presuppositionalist explanation regarding what logic is, or how the existence of God relates (in a necessary way) to logic, becomes quite unparsimonious, on one hand leaving being quite mysterious and barely serving as an explanation, and on the other having to invoke a God-Logic which all ‘subsidiary’ logics depend on for coherence.

It renders the position far less plausible, I think, than accepting that the logical rules of various logic systems are the necessary and sufficient conditions for their respective logical truths and that each system generating propositions which may conflict only when translated into another system where the logical rules generate the confliction is not a problem.

Though, at this point, the presuppositionalist may just want to rid themselves of logical pluralism. They may admit to the existence of these other logical systems but deny that they are the one true logic. In this case, as presuppositional logical particularists it seems that they would suggest there exists only one system of logic that is true and something about God stands in a necessary and sufficient truth-making relation to the truths of this system. They might further suggest then that all of this talk about other logics generating contradictions when translated is simply not a problem because that is what we should expect if the other systems are wrong. The problem with this route, I think, is that we do not appear to have any way of knowing which system of logic is the one true logic! From the various presuppositional writings it sounds like the consensus amongst them would be that Classical Logic is the one true logic, but why must one accept this? It would seem then that all of the talk about the “laws” of logic, which are just tautologies of a particular system, is quite possibly irrelevant and incorrect if there exists one true logic. We are in an uncomfortable epistemic position, the very thing from which presuppositionalism promised us deliverance.

                Thusly, the common presuppositionalist argumentation regarding logic and God’s necessity hitherto has, I think, some explanatory work to undertake. It is currently far from convincing that one should reject the sufficiency of a system’s logical rules regarding the truth of some proposition arising from that system in favor of adopting the presuppositionalist view on the matter.

[2] ‘Experience’ should be taken very loosely.

[3] This list is not exhaustive, but is indicative of the usual discussions as per my experience.

[4] One can also make sense of the principle by replacing ‘consequence’ with ‘follows from’.

[5] Provided that what is parsed is capable of being expressed given the system.

[6] Most commonly a claim of some type

[7] Hereby referred to as logical-particularism

[8] The particularist will not deny the existence of other systems of logic any more than the religious particularist denies other religions; he or she will merely deny their truth.

[9] I find it a source of confusion that presuppositionalists only seem to refer to three particular tautologies of a particular system. I do not understand the restriction, but perhaps sake of simplicity plays a role.

[10] I cannot find a conceptual analysis of their usage of ‘account’ though it seems to mean a type of explanation.

[11] Again, that is to say it stands in some type of truth-making relation

[12] Assuming the translation will yield a contradiction.

[13] Thought of as an overarching logical system.

Before I begin, I would like to make the point that the claims in my paper do not need to be true for the TAG to be defeated (with regard to logic, in this circumstance). The TAG fails due to the fact that logical conventionalism is coherent. Zao briefly touches upon this point, which I will address later, but I want to make it clear that my paper attempts to go beyond the mere claim that “logic does not presuppose God” and suggest something closer to the idea that it cannot.

The Criticisms

In my paper, I remark:

It seems to me that some hybridization of any of the mentioned means of justification may bring about a new means of justification. For example, a hybridization of an a priori and conventionalist system may succeed in providing the justification of logic sought by Bahnsen, but in a manner wherein the new system may be thought of as unique to both previous a priori systems, and forms of conventionalism.

Zao takes issue with this, stating:

Mitch starts off on the wrong foot immediately by proposing a hypothetical “hybridization” of two positions which is also “unique” to those other positions. So, is it a “hybrid” or is it “unique”?

I don’t think that one needs to choose between something being a hybrid, or unique. It’s doesn’t seem to be an either/or situation. For example, take gas-powered automobiles  and electric automobiles and combine the two concepts so that we create a gas-electric hybrid. In this circumstance we have a car that is unique in that there is a property that members of the previous categories do not have, namely, the property of being both gas and electric powered. Must we agree with Zao’s criteria that because this car is a hybrid, it cannot be unique or vice versa? I don’t think so, in fact it seems to me that it may be unique by being a hybrid!

Zao suggests that if there is such a system, I should present it rather than bringing it up as a hypothetical because it isn’t an objection. I think, however, if Zao understood me correctly he(?) would see that I merely rely on the possibility of a system and that this possibility is enough to make the point I wanted to make.

He also takes issue with the formal presentation of the TAG I’ve included in my paper which I’ve borrowed from Sean Choi. Zao states:

…advances have been made in presuppositionalism which have shown Choi’s position to be mistaken. Don Collett has argued effectively (in Revelation and Reason edited by K. Scott Oliphint) that Van Til’s conception of presuppositional semantics is identical to the Strawson/Van Fraasen semantics, which makes a clear distinction between “presupposition” and “implication.” (Even John Frame has accepted Collett’s argumentation in this respect.)

Choi presents his formulation of the TAG as a traditional transcendental argument (a la Kant) which would suggest (in this context) that the existence of logic implies the existence of God. Strawson in attempting to formalize a sufficient theory of presupposition proposes something similar to the following:

P presupposes Q if and only if Q is true provided P is true or P is false.

Where P is logic and Q is God, if one is to use this formulation instead of the previous, we would not say that the existence of logic implies God but that even the denial of the existence of logic also presupposes God. But what real difference does this make to our discussion? If I’m missing something then I wait to be informed, but it seems to me that even under this view the claim that “Both the truth of P or falisity of P presupposes Q” will reduce, in our discussion, to the claim that “logic presupposes the existence of God” since I am not denying the existence of logic. In other words, what difference does this make to any of my subsequent criticisms insofar as they pertain to the presuppositionalist ideas I mention?

This much can be said about the entire section of my paper where I introduce Choi’s formalism. It is of course nice to have something with which to work, but I am not dependent on this formulation. The arguments in my paper can be extended and applied to any (as I can conceive) assertion that amounts to “logic presupposes God.”

I go on to criticize Bahnsen’s idea of the “impossibility of the contrary” stating:

But what might this mean for our discussion? If Bahnsen is permitted to carry on with his criteria, then if any a priori, a posteriori or conventionalist justifications of logic are shown to be false (and subsequently, the worldviews that house and depend on them) all other formulations which properly fall under those headings will also be false (worldviews included) since they employ the same proposition, namely, ‘Christianity is false’. Of course, this is not sound reasoning unless the shared proposition is what is causing the justification to be false. Bahnsen needs to show that ‘Christianity is false’ is the ‘false-making’ proposition of all non-Christian worldviews, and it doesn’t seem that this is possible by any means other than (i) showing that all possible non-Christian justifications will have ‘Christianity is false’ as the onlyproposition in common (for if there is even one other proposition shared by these worldviews, how might one disqualify that proposition as possibly being the ‘false-maker’?), and (ii) showing that Christianity is not false. The obvious problem is that if (ii) is shown, the TAG becomes superfluous as it is no longer needed; one has already arrived at the truth of Christian theism, and for (i) to be shown, one still has to have an awareness of “every single variation of unbelieving philosophy.”

Zao replies that the false-maker of the proposition is its axiomatic nature. But I cannot see any reason to accept the claim that every worldview which has the proposition “Christianity is false” has that proposition as an axiom.

He states:

If the most basic presupposition of a non-Christian worldview is “not Christianity” (which appears to be definitional, given the above framework), then it is the basic nature of the presupposition which exerts a rational controlling influence on all other worldview content. It is not merely one proposition among many, floating loose and free in a certain worldview, but is rather foundational.

Again, why is this true? It seems to me that the only reason for claiming that “Christianity is false” is the most basic presupposition of non-Christian worldviews lies simply in identifying them as non-Christian worldviews. That is to say, I might identify some worldview as being non-Mitchist because I see that their worldview does not utilize what I utilize as my axiomatic foundation but I cannot see how this entails that “Mitchism is false” becomes their foundational axiom. It also seems that depending on who is looking at Bob’s worldview, he has several other axioms! For instance, what if a Muslim is looking at Bob’s worldview, does he now have as a foundational axiom that “Islam is false?” If a Hindu is looking at his worldview, does he now have as foundational the axiom that “Hinduism is false?” It even seems that atheists can analyze Zao’s worldview under his own criteria and suggest that he has as a foundational axiom that “Atheism is false” as his most basic presupposition.

Further, imagine Bob the Buddhist who has as his foundational axiom “Buddhism is true.” If we take Zao’s criteria, then since Bob the Buddhist can be identified as possessing a non-Christian worldview it follows that he has, also as a foundational axiom that “Christianity is false.” We can say that he’d also have as foundational axioms, under Zao’s criteria, propositions such as “Islam is false,” “Confucianism is false,” and “Scientology is false.” It seems more proper to say that Bob merely has the axiom “Buddhism is true” (if even this), and that he deduces from this postulate all of the other aforementioned propositions. That is to say, “Christianity is false” is not an axiom for Bob, it’s a deduction and so like other deductions it is “floating loose and free”. If we are to follow Zao’s criteria, it seems we render the term “axiom” meaningless. In fact Bob would have possibly an infinite number of axioms about religions of which he has not even heard! I see no reason to accept such absurdity.

In further response to my mention of Fristianity, Zao responds:

Being quite thoroughly familiar with various Fristianity objections, I had to chuckle at this one. I apologize for it, but I did. Let’s be perfectly clear here: an atheist can get zero cash value out of the Fristianity objection in debate with a Christian. Are you planning on being baptized in the name of the Father, Son, Holy Spirit and “Fred” anytime soon, Mitch?

The Fristianity objection, if sound, merely shows that the central claim of presuppositionalism is false. That is, if the Fristianity objection holds then it is false that no non-Christian theistic methods can possibly justify X, Y, Z. This is all I was intending to show.

Moving right along we come to my application of a Euthyphro-like dilemma to the laws of logic. Similar to many Christians with regard to the actual Euthyphro dilemma, Zao takes the route of stating:

The Christian’s argument is that logical laws are a reflection of God’s thought which is in accordance with God’s nature, which are all necessary.

But analyze what I said in the section, as Zao even quoted himself:

Frame essentially makes the claim that it is logically impossible for the nature of God to change. But the standard Frame is using to identify logical possibility is allegedly the nature of God. As such, his claim appears to be represented more accurately as:

(C)  Based on God’s nature it is logically impossible for God’s nature to be different because God is necessarily a rational God

This does not seem to assist in any regard as what is rational is allegedly determined by God’s nature. So to argue that God’s nature must be the way it is because God is necessarily rational seems to only appeal to a standard of rationality that is separate from God, otherwise it is clearly circular.

In what manner would it be the case that God’s nature was not rational? It does not seem that a God who forms the basis of logical principles and thereby is the standard of rationality can ever be irrational (though he may certainly appear irrational when judged by a foreign standard). That is to say, if one wants to state that the Christian God forms the basis of rationality and the logical principles thereby in effect cannot be anything other than what they are, they must be appealing to a standard of logic that is separate from God’s nature as to appeal solely to God’s nature does not sufficiently answer the question; it is a non-answer.

If Zao does not think that (C) is circular, I suggest he read a bit closer. He says that my dilemma is circular in itself because the first horn “…asserts that there is a meaningful sense in which logic is independent of the thought of God.” What is the implication of the aforementioned circularity in basing them on God? It seems to me that, as a direct implication, we must conclude that the necessary principles of logic indeed are external to God just as is the case with necessary moral principles and the original Euthyphro dilemma. I have not, as Zao has suggested, assumed that they are independent to show they are independent, I’ve formulated a dilemma and shown that given the alternatives are incoherent we have no choice but to accept that logical principles exist independently of God.

We might even supplement this by raising a point that was conveyed to me by a fellow UP.net member. Zao stated that the logical laws are a reflection of God’s thought and that God thinks logically. Moving over the seemingly obvious incoherence in such a statement, one might want to ask what it even means to say that God thinks logically? Logic permits us to deduce from premises, distinguish conclusions and so on. But God, if he is omniscient, surely does not have to do any of these things to have knowledge. God does not “reason” to his conclusions, he simply knows them. To say that the logical laws are reflections of God’s logical thinking stands in opposition to the idea that God knows all there is to know. Truly omniscient beings do not require logic, because they do not require a means to apprehend knowledge. This, I think, just adds to the incoherence of stating that logical principles reflect God’s rational thought.

In my section entitled “God and the Abstract” I offered an argument which is basically as follows:

The dependence relationship between “God exists” and “logical principles exist” seems problematic. If God is the source of all things other than himself, and he depends on nothing for his existence, surely the relationship must be asymmetrical (with primacy granted to God), but it appears not to be. It can be shown, in fact, that God depends on logical principles for his existence.

Lewis’ counterfactual semantics tell us that ‘any proposition is counterfactually implied by a necessarily false proposition’. Since “logical principles do not exist” is a necessarily false proposition, it counterfactually implies any proposition whatsoever.[21] So it is also true that if logical principles did not exist, neither would God. Thus, God depends on logical principles for his existence.

The relationship between the existence of logical principles and the existence of God would be asymmetrical iff God depended on nothing for his being and logical principles depended wholly on him. In this regard, the relationship of dependence is one-way; logical principles depend on God but not vice versa. If dependence is asymmetrical, then logic cannot depend on God as it has been shown that God depends on logic.

The asymmetrical relationship can be depicted further: where P refers to logical principles and Q refers to God. If P depends on Q asymmetrically, then the worlds in which P is true must be a proper subset of the worlds in which Q is true. Since it is the case that the principles of logic hold in every world, and the set of all worlds is not a proper subset of any other set of worlds, the laws of logic cannot depend on anything, including God.

Zao responds:

Given the nature of the points under contention (the existence of God and the relationship between God and logic), to argue that “logical principles do not exist” counterfactually implies that God depends on logical principles for his existence is to beg the question in a rather bald and obvious sort of way. How about, “God does not exist” is a necessarily false statement? Given that TAG is intended to argue for the necessary existence of God, to assume the contingency of God’s existence upon logic in order to prove God is contingent upon logic is, well, unpersuasive (to put it mildly).

I might be mistaken, but it seems to me that Zao interprets my argument as an argument against the existence of God. This is not the case, however. I can accept both the necessary existence of God and the necessary existence of logical principles, and still deny the type of relationship that the presuppositionalist is proposing. It’s not the necessary existence of either of these things that is the issue, it’s the proposed asymmetrical relationship between God and logic. I think Zao has really misunderstood the thrust of my argument here.

After a point about my brief treatment of divine simplicity and Trinitarianism (I agree, that could be a paper unto itself!) Zao closes with a very brief criticism of logical conventionalism. Zao states:

Finally, we have a section where logic is said to be both conventional while necessary and universal. This is rather fun. It’s like something from Alice in Wonderland. “Sentence first – verdict afterwards!

This is a claim that is thrown around a lot, and it is a claim that is just simply false. There simply is no problem with logic being conventional, while having its principles be necessarily true. Zao is welcome to either read the literature cited in my paper, the brief treatment here or wait for an upcoming article I’m expecting authored by a logician.

Conclusion

Again, the arguments in my paper are not needed to show that the TAG fails, the mere coherence of Conventionalism serves as a defeater for the endeavor. What my arguments seek to show is that logic cannot be based on God in any such implied way. I can only say that Zao’s brief treatment of Conventionalism towards the end of his post seems to violate his own suggestion of “… [understanding] the matter for [one's self] before attempting to criticize…”

P.S: I’d like to politely ask that in the future Zao link to my articles rather than pasting them in full. I’d also like to ask that he adds a hyperlink to the specific post he’s writing about. Thanks!

In response to Bolt’s opening post, I replied and Bolt has since authored his rebuttal. What follows will be a response to the issues he raises therein.

Liangzhi, Proper Function, and Selflessness

First, I will explain some more about li, qi, and liangzhi. To quote directly from Tien’s paper:

For most Neo-Confucians, li describes the way a thing or state of affairs ought to be. So when things or states of affairs are in accord with li, they are deemed “natural,” and when they are not, they are deemed “deviant.” All things possess all the li of the universe within them. In human beings, the li exist complete in the mind (xin). For Wang, though, the mind not only contains li, the mind is itself li.

The liangzhi is the mechanism by which one can come to know the li or the principle of all things. Liangzhi is both a cognitive and affective (thinking and feeling) faculty. The li serves as the principle which describes the way things ought to be. Every existing thing contains all of the li within and so li is completely existent within the mind and while the mind contains li it is also, itself, li. Birth endows all human beings with a perfect mind or xinzhibenti. The perfect mind does not come to knowing by thinking, but simply knows. Liangzhi is a faculty of this mind which discerns “flawlessly, naturally and spontaneously between right and wrong,” thus forming correct beliefs and correct affective responses. However, there is a problem of qi:

All things in the universe are a combination of li and qi. Qi is the stuff of which the universe is made. It exists in various grades of purity. Although all things possess all the li of the universe within them, because of the impurity of the qi of which they are composed, some li are obstructed, thereby accounting for the differences between things.

Just as all things possess all of the li of the universe, because of the qi that forms their composition some li are obstructed. However, human beings have the ability to purify the levels of qi within and in turn allow the li to “shine forth”. Internal manifestations of qi within human beings are self-centered desires. It is these desires, or subsequent states of mind that cause us to lose touch with our pure mind and liangzhi. That liangzhi is to operate effectively requires that the self-centered desires are eliminated. Thus, our minds while li, are corrupted by qi. But how then can we come to know things? Regarding proper function, one can be said to be able to discern knowledge when one is employing liangzhi at some time; that is, our beliefs are warranted when we come to them while employing liangzhi. But how may we do this when qi “blocks” the liangzhi?

The proper functioning of the mind is acquired through selflessness or the absence of self-centered desires. Self-centered in this context does not mean selfish, but is translated from si meaning “to make oneself the center of one’s world.” It can be said that being in a state of selflessness in order to employ liangzhi equates to being unselfconscious of personal agency. To form an analogy, we can say that in order for our beliefs to be warranted, we must polish (liangzhi) the dust (qi) off of a mirror, in order to see the reflection (li) clearly. This “polishing of the dust” is a cumulative process, we must first rid ourselves of self-centered thoughts one at a time; and each time we do, we become better equipped to do so with other self-centered thoughts in the future. Second, we must extend liangzhi to our everyday lives.

The means by which one achieves a state of selflessness is firstly through the rectification of thoughts. This is simply to purge one of the impurities of self-centeredness to permit the second stage of the extension of knowledge, which results in the attainment of warranted belief.  The rectification of thoughts or gewu explains that the mind is li and the proper place to discover li is in the mind and not in any outside world. In eliminating incorrect thoughts, one’s mind can function freely and being to operate properly. Gewu entails that once a single self-centered thought begins to stir, it must be cast out. As it is a continual effort, each individual success allows the liangzhi to operate more freely and the more freely the liangzhi is the more easily it can identify incorrect thoughts and eliminate them. As such, when one eliminates some self-centered desire relevant to a particular belief, one attains an affective state of selflessness in relation to that belief and the liangzhi constitutes a properly functioning cognitive-affective faculty relative to that belief. This is, in effect, polishing the mirror to reflect the images before it.

Further, there is the additional criterion of the extension of knowledge. Succinctly, this is to extend the liangzhi to matters of everyday life. It is the difference between knowing “how” and knowing “that.” One cannot extend the liangzhi if they are not in an affective state of selflessness to some specific belief which would prevent one from attaining an affective state of action which stands as a necessary condition for true belief to constitute warranted knowledge. In some instances self-centered desires hinder the liangzhi from extending and the effective way of unearthing one’s incorrect thoughts are by attempts at such extension. “When the attempted extension fails, the subject will then be in a much better position to identify the relevant self-centered desires, and when they are identifies, she will be forced to confront them.” Upon doing so, extension of the liangzhi will be possible. That is, failure to extend one’s liangzhi reveals the relevant self-centered desires that need overcoming. As such, the rectification of thoughts and the extension of knowledge is a cyclical process. “The rectification of thoughts is the effort to extend knowledge. As one knows how to extend his knowledge, he also knows how to rectify thoughts. If he does not know how to rectify thoughts, it means he does not yet know how to extend his knowledge.” For those who have already eliminated all the self-centered desires and still cannot extend the liangzhi the issue of unity between knowledge and action arises. That is to say, the extension of liangzhi is merely acting upon the deliverances of the properly functioning liangzhi. Is it possible to know that filial piety involves caring for one’s parents in both winter and summer without actually doing so? One might have right beliefs about such but until one extends this otherwise lesser kind of knowledge, one will never truly “know.” Knowledge is the beginning of action, and action is the completion of knowledge.

And so, we can identify the Neo-Confucian theory of warrant as:

A belief p will have real warrant for a person S if and only if S is in an affective state appropriate to belief p, and p is produced in S by properly functioning cognitive-affective faculties in an appropriate cognitive affective environment for S’s kind of cognitive-affective faculties, according to a function successfully aimed at truth, and the degree of warrant p enjoys for S is directly proportional to the firmness with which S holds p.

Bolt’s Lack of Clarity

Bolt writes:

Recall that the reason atheistic epistemic justifications fail is because atheism does not provide for objective epistemic normativity which is required for propositional knowledge.

As evidenced by the italics in the above quote, Bolt clearly considers justification and normativity to be two different things. This statement seems counter to some things Bolt has said in his opening statement:

“Something like justification or warrant is required in order for someone to have propositional knowledge.”

“What is required for propositional knowledge is some sort of objective epistemic normativity.”

“Some type of epistemic warrant must be accounted for in Nocterro’s view of the world because of the need for warrant in knowledge.”

“The character and command of God and His having created us in His image and obligated us toward Him provides for the epistemic normativity necessary to right belief.”

“Epistemic warrant is in some sense necessary for human intelligibility yet it is foreign to an atheistic worldview while the Christian worldview provides for epistemic warrant. “

Bolt, in his most recent response, claims that atheistic epistemic justifications fail because atheism does not provide for objective epistemic normativity. However, as evidenced by the quotes above from his opening post, he uses the terms “justification”, “warrant”, and “normativity” interchangeably. So I must wonder, what is he asking the atheist to provide? In fact, I must wonder this same thing overall. I do not think Chris has been at all detailed enough in describing his worldview and how it provides warrant/normativity, or in stating what it is the atheist needs to do in order to effectively argue against his position. Furthermore, Bolt states in his response that:

Nocterro allegedly provides a brief summary of Plantinga’s position on epistemic justification which I do not adhere to and did not bring up in my opening statement.

Firstly, I am not sure what Bolt means here by “allegedly”; I must ask him to clarify his choice of words. Bolt thinks I am assuming that Plantinga’s position is his position as well. However, this is not the case. There are two reasons why I chose to discuss Plantinga’s view on warrant. The first is that Bolt, in his opening statement, never went into detail on what the concept of warrant entailed. I was thus forced to go with the leading view in order to discuss the topic:

Perhaps the most prevalent view of warrant in contemporary philosophy is that of proper function, as employed comprehensively and famously by Alvin Plantinga.

The second reason has nothing to do with Bolt’s (as yet explained) account for warrant, but a possible atheistic account for warrant. I merely presented Plantinga’s view as background information, going on to quote Plantinga himself in defense of atheistic warrant:

Even if [the atheist] doesn’t think we human beings have been designed and created by a powerful and highly competent being who proposed to endow us with the ability to achieve true beliefs, he may nonetheless think of this idea as a convenient and useful fiction [...] he may say that our cognitive faculties are working properly when they are working in the way they would work if the theistic story were true. He may therefore treat this story the way corresponding stories are treated by some who accept ideal observer theories in ethics…

Perhaps in response to this, he writes, in the section previous to his quote above:

Finally, Nocterro believes that he can presuppose God in his reasoning without believing that God exists. Not only does the argument presented show that epistemic normativity is impossible on a view where God does not exist, but it is impossible to “presuppose God” without believing that God exists, so Nocterro fails in his attempt to escape the conclusion of the argument given the soundness of the argument.

I agree that it is impossible to presuppose God without believing that God exists. Plantinga’s quote above states that the atheist does *not* presuppose God (which would entail belief that He exists), but rather that he may take the idea to be “a convenient and useful fiction”. That is, the atheist may use the concept of God as a thought experiment, and nothing more. To conclude, I must ask Chris to clarify his views on a few things before this discussion can proceed any further:

1) What is warrant?

2) What is justification?

3) What is epistemic normativity?

Bolt’s Objections to Neo-Confucian Warrant

Bolt states:

Nocterro has not provided any explanation of how the liangzhi may have been designed to function as it is held to function as opposed to any other way.

This, however, strikes me as similar to asking why God is the way he is rather than other way. Do questions such as these really have answers? Surely they are brute facts that are unexplained by any external states of affairs.

Bolt further states:

The liangzhi must be the result of unintentional, undirected, non-human, non-divine, non-intelligent processes by which the liangzhi came to be or comes to be.

Or simply not a result of anything at all, similar to how God is not a result of any non-God thing. If what Bolt is hinting at here is a sort of evolutionary objection in that it seems odd that evolution would develop liangzhi, I think we can agree with him. Of course, under Neo-Confucianism the existence of a mind necessarily entails the existence of liangzhi so that insofar as we have an explanation as for why evolution would bring about a mind, we have thereby explained why there is liangzhi. That liangzhi is the type of faculty that it is seems to be merely a brute fact.

Bolt states:

Further, he implies through his use of terms like “ought” that li, while only a descriptive concept, is somehow normative. Indeed he states this outright but without any reason for doing so.

But the li is not only a descriptive concept, it is both descriptive and normative as outlined above: “…when things or states of affairs are in accord with li, they are deemed ‘natural,’ and when they are not, they are deemed ‘deviant.’” Bolt states:

… the question remains as to why the li should be preferred over qi anyway. Again, epistemic normativity is lacking in this view and there is no apparent reason why one is obligated to conform one’s thoughts to li to begin with.

This seems no different than asking why one would prefer or adjust their lives towards God over Satan? Bolt might answer that we should do so because God created us, but where is the principle that says if one creates another, we should adjust our lives towards them? Even if there were such a principle, why should one follow it rather than not? Perhaps Bolt would state that because God commands us to do so, but why should we listen to his commands rather than not? Bolt might state that we’ll be punished if we don’t, but why should we prefer non-punishment over punishment?  Of course, perhaps there is no obligation under Neo-Confucianism to conform to the li, or perhaps one should prefer the li because of the better lives that result in ridding one’s self of self-centered desires. The question seems to be importing standards from Bolt’s own view in examining Neo-Confucianism but he must not judge this system by his presuppositions to determine internal incoherence he must examine my system from within and there does not seem to be any necessity for this idea of “preference” that Bolt is introducing. Bolt states:

Some may think that I have already given Nocterro too much, for while Christianity is a revelatory worldview, Neo-Confucianism is not. There are questions concerning how anyone comes to know these sort of claims concerning liangzhi and li and qi to begin with. Has Nocterro ‘discovered’ and ‘reached’ the liangzhi? If he has not, then he cannot claim to have come to know the liangzhi apart from the ‘authority’ of Wang (given that Wang reached it himself), but this is not bringing even one’s most basic thoughts into conformity with li because Wang was just another human being.

Given the discussion on the role of action, it would actually be impossible to count claims based on authority as knowledge. There must be that role of personal experience and affective states. This doesn’t, then, seem to be a problem. He further states:

The world of li and qi is not an appropriate cognitive environment for the operation of liangzhi since qi obstructs the operation of the liangzhi so that it does not function properly.

Of course the same might be said for his worldview as well, that the noetic influence of sin prevents any knowledge whatsoever. However, Bolt has the faculties of the so-called sensus divinatus as an alleged “way-out” of this problem, and so too has the Neo-Confucian a “way out” in the criteria previously outlined.

Conclusion

It does seem that Neo-Confucianism epistemology permits the ideas of warrant, proper function and normativity (as understood by traditional definitions, I now assume that Bolt is using them as such). Indeed, since this is true Bolt’s claim that only Christianity could do so is clearly false. Since this also forms the basis of his argument for the truth of Christianity, one is not required to accept his conclusion that Christianity is true and one need not accept on this basis that scripture is true, or that I presuppose God. If Bolt’s key argument for the Christian position has indeed failed, one must wonder by which means is he now establishing the truth of Christianity.

1) The reliability of scripture
2) The self-deception of atheists
3) The presupposition of God in my reasoning

¹Response to the “Reliability of Scripture”

Bolt writes:

Scripture is reliable and is the source of my claim that Nocterro believes both ‘God exists’ and ‘Nocterro does not believe that God exists’. Scripture is also the source of my claim that Nocterro presupposes God in order to reason at all.

Bolt bases his other claims on the claim that scripture is reliable. But how does he know scripture is reliable? He writes:

From the providence of God and the results of textual critical science it can be known that we currently posses substantially correct transcriptions of the autographa of Scripture. Nocterro must assume from the outset of the discussion that God has not spoken clearly and that He has not provided us with an adequate means of learning what He has said if Nocterro is to call into question the reliability of Scripture.

It is interesting here that Bolt is not defending the claim that scripture is true, rather he is defending the claim that our current texts match the originals. Also interesting is that one of his justifications for this claim is “the providence of God” – going on to state that:

Nocterro must assume from the outset of the discussion that God has not spoken clearly.

He claims that scripture is the source of his claim that I (and presumably everyone else) must presuppose God in order to reason. He is presupposing God in order to show that scripture is true. But surely scripture is correct only if both the Christian God exists and one must presuppose the existence of God to account for reason.

Bolt must show both that the Christian God exists and that we must presuppose the existence of him to account for reason but cannot use Scripture alone to do so. To do so would be to assume the very thing in question. Bolt can’t use that which necessarily depends on the existence of the divine to argue for the existence of the divine using its proposed divinity as a reliability-maker.

Response to “Self-deception”

He also writes:

It is worth noting that the second-order belief mentioned influences the way that Nocterro interprets evidence. Nocterro suppresses the truth in unrighteousness. This feat is accomplished through rationalizing away evidence of the existence of God, ignoring obvious points, dodging anything which might challenge his anti-Christ presuppositions, etc.

There are a few things to say about this:

a) Can Chris point to anything I have ever written that is an example of me rationalizing away evidence of the existence of God?
b) What “obvious” point or points does he feel I have ignored?
c) What have I ever dodged?

Apparently Bolt feels that I have been intellectually dishonest in this discussion by not addressing the issue directly.

Scripture, according to Bolt, states that I am self-deceived. But why believe Scripture? If Scripture is false, then it seems Bolt has no reason whatsoever to claim that I am self deceived, but as we have seen above, we may not simply assume that Scripture is true since it is obviously false if God does not exist, and if I do not have to presuppose him.

Further, if there are good arguments which reduce the probability of God’s existence then so too is the likelihood of Scripture’s being true reduced and by proxy this reduction extends to my being self-deceived. Granting that there are such arguments and coupled with the fact that I have a privileged access to the contents of my own mind, in that I experience them directly, it seems even more unlikely that I am so deceived.

To quote Richard Swinburne:

The adequacy of grounds is often expressed in terms of probability—both by the externalist and by the internalist. The grounds for a belief are adequate to the extent to which they render the belief probable. (And if the grounds for one belief B consist of another belief C, then, for B to have adequate grounds, Cs grounds must make B probable. (Epistemic Justification, pg. 56)

In other words, a belief on a certain matter is justified if it is more probable than other mutually exclusive beliefs on the matter. So, if this argument is sound, then I am justified in my belief that I am not self-deceived.

Response to “Presupposing God”

This is quite clearly the most important portion since Bolt’s justification for all the previous sections is based on the success of his argument here. That is to say, if Bolt does not succeed in showing that God exists and that I must presuppose him in order to reason he has, by proxy, not succeeded in showing that scripture is reliable, and that I am self-deceived.

Bolt writes:

Given his anti-theistic worldview, Nocterro cannot posit the notion of right or wrong ways that beliefs should either come about or be held and hence his position is reducible to absurdity.

Bolt assumes here either that (1) no atheistic epistemic justifications have ever been offered; or (2) all such justifications offered fail. As for (1), even a simple Google or Wikipedia search will show this is blatantly false. Regarding (2), Bolt has a grand task indeed if he must offer objections to ALL forms of non-theistic theories of justification.

He states:

There is no absolute person or persons on an atheistic view which provides an account for epistemic normativity.

This assumes that any justification must necessarily be based on an absolute person or persons (by which I assume he means a deity) – it begs the question against atheism.

He continues:

The character and command of God and His having created us in His image and obligated us toward Him provides for the epistemic normativity necessary to right belief.

It seems quite odd to me that while several philosophers have written entire books on epistemic justification, Bolt’s justification consists of merely a single sentence – a sentence which, all things considered, doesn’t really tell us much at all. All Bolt does here is state that his theory of justification is based on God; he does not explain how or why, he gives no details. How exactly is it that belief in Yahweh leads to correct beliefs? Is it Bolt’s claim that if one is a believer, then Yahweh will prevent that person from ever believing something which is false? I’m also not sure what Bolt means by “right belief”. Is a right belief a belief with is justified? Is it a belief which is true?

Truth be told, this conversation seems eerily similar to Bolt’s conversation with Mitch LeBlanc regarding another formulation of TAG (Transcendental Argument for the existence of God), the laws of logic, and conventionalism in which LeBlanc states:

[The TAG] is no better than a God of the Gaps argument, applied to logical justifications. Why can’t epistemology rely on the possibility of there being justifications? If you’re saying that the case is such that these three justifications have been shown to be false, and Christianity has not, therefore we must choose Christianity, I think you’ve just begged the question in favor of Christianity. If the arguments in the bulk of my paper hold up, it is an incoherent notion to state that logical principles can be grounded in the existence of God.

To which Bolt replies:

I can deny that lightning is caused by Zeus and even come up with other explanations for it, even other unscientific explanations, and not be concerned about my entire epistemology crashing down. You actually cannot, however, deny that Christianity is the precondition for logic and come up with other “explanations” for it and not be concerned about your entire epistemology crashing down. If you are actually unable to account for logic then you are reduced to absurdity and unable to even entertain allegedly possible justifications for logic. You have no place to stand.

All this ties in closely with the notion of the ”impossibility of the contrary”. Bolt’s overall argument here (modified to reflect our current discussion) is:

1) Christianity gives a sound epistemic justification.
2) Nocterro cannot give a sound non-Christian epistemic justification.
3) Therefore, Nocterro must borrow from Christianity for epistemic justification.

However, Bolt has merely asserted (1). He has offered no real defense of this, or even explained how Christianity does so. Until he can do that, (3) does not follow from (1) and (2). Furthermore, even if he successfully defends (1), he must still defeat any epistemic justification I could possibly offer in order to show that (2) is true.

Leblanc touches upon this notion in a paper by referencing presuppositionalist Greg Bahnsen’s attempt at avoiding having to show all possible justifications false:

As such, in an attempt to avoid the arduous task of showing that all flavours of the aforementioned possible justifications are false (and thereby that any worldviews that employ them are false), he seeks only to show that they all depend upon a particular claim, that ‘Christianity is false’, and that this claim renders everything unintelligible….

To paraphrase this section of LeBlanc’s paper:

i) One must have knowledge of all possible non-Christian justifications in order to show that they all share this claim in common.
ii) If one shows that this claim “Christianity is false” is false, then the TAG is no longer needed.

On Warrant

Perhaps the most prevalent view of warrant in contemporary philosophy is that of proper function, as employed comprehensively and famously by Alvin Plantinga. To say that warrant is proper function is to say that some persons true beliefs are justified in counting as knowledge if they have arisen by virtue of the proper functioning of some cognitive faculties.

Plantinga outlines some criteria in his paper “Epistemic Justification” (Nous, 1986):

A) Your faculties must be in good working order.

This is of course not a problem for the theist, since he will believe that he was designed with faculties in good working order. However, I think two points need to be brought up:

1) Many theists can believe this, not just Christians.
2) Even an atheist may employ an “epistemic veil of ignorance”; that is, he may use God merely as a hypothetical, just as Rawls did in discussing how we may decide what is moral.

In regard to (2), Plantinga writes:

Even if [the atheist] doesn’t think we human beings have been designed and created by a powerful and highly competent being who proposed to endow us with the ability to achieve true beliefs, he may nonetheless think of this idea as a convenient and useful fiction [...] he may say that our cognitive faculties are working properly when they are working in the way they would work if the theistic story were true. He may therefore treat this story the way corresponding stories are treated by some who accept ideal observer theories in ethics…

B) You must be epistemically dutiful.

This merely means that you make real, honest efforts to come to hold true beliefs.

C) Your environment must be appropriate for your particular repertoire of epistemic powers.

Plantinga asks us to imagine:

You awake on a planet near Alpha Centauri. There, conditions are quite different; elephants (or their counterparts) are invisible to human beings but emit a sort of radiation that causes human beings to form the belief that a trumpet is sounding…

…The problem is that your cognitive faculties and the environment in which you find yourself are not properly attuned. The problem is not with your cognitive faculties; they are in good working order; the problem is with the environment.

So basically, it must be the case that our faculties are “suited” to our environment.

Warranted Neo-Confucian Belief

Bolt states:

Given his anti-theistic worldview, Nocterro cannot posit the notion of right or wrong ways that beliefs should either come about or be held and hence his position is reducible to absurdity.

Based on this statement, and drawing from other conversations that Bolt has had, it seems that he is making the claim that only the Christian God can provide the type of warrant required for knowledge. That is to say, he is attempting to prove the truth of Christianity by showing that a denial of Christianity necessarily leads to a denial of warrant, and thereby a denial of knowledge. This, however, is dubious for it is certainly not clear that only the Christian worldview can account for warrant. As one example, David Tien shows that Neo-Confucianism meets the criteria for warrant² (should Bolt also want to claim that his belief is properly basic, Tien’s discussion attempts to show that warranted Neo-Confucian belief provides a defeater for Christian theism).

Briefly, in Neo-Confucian belief, the liangzhi is the “perfect state of mind”. The li (or principle) is the way things ideally ought to be. So, if it can be said that one has a liangzhi state of mind, one’s state of mind is ideal, natural, or perfect. A Christian may consider the mind of God to be liangzhi.

Tien states:

The liangzhi operates as a faculty of the mind that discerns flawlessly, naturally, and spontaneously between right and wrong. It not only forms correct beliefs, it also produces correct affective responses.

I will not delve too much into affective responses here, as I do not think it is important to the discussion. However, the Chinese scholar Wang Yangming states that all humans innately possess liangzhi.

In response to one seeming problem with such an account of the mind,  how does Wang account for our poor moral choices? He offers this explanation:

All things in the universe are a combination of li and qi. Qi is the stuff of which the universe is made. It exists in various grades of purity. Although all things possess all the li of the universe within them, because of the impurity of the qi of which they are composed, some li are obstructed, thereby accounting for the differences between things.

Wang’s view is that while humans possess both li and qi, we are able to purify our minds and eliminate qi. He says that qi is manifested mainly as self-centered desires. Qi can thus be compared to the Buddhist concept of negative karma, or the Christian concept of sin.

In Plantinga’s Warranted Christian Belief, he states that, according to the sensus divinitatus, Christians have warrant for belief because they have a faculty that produces true beliefs. Thus, Christian belief is warranted (the SD being created by God). However, Wang’s Neo-Confucian beliefs also meet Plantinga’s criteria for warrant.

Tien writes:

First, the liangzhi, once it is discovered and utilized, is a properly functioning (and affective) faculty. Second, the world of li and qi is an appropriate cognitive environment for the operation of liangzhi. Third, the liangzhi faculty of our original minds is simply the conscious aspect of li, which is itself descriptive and normative truth; li conveys the truth about the way things are when they are the way they should be.

Plantinga defends his warrant by stating that if his model is true, then Christians and non-Christians are in different epistemic situations. He also states that one who holds to a non-Christian worldview is necessarily assuming the Christian worldview is false. If this is the case, then it is also the case that the Christian is assuming all non-Christian worldviews are false. Plantinga holds that the claim of arbitrariness only works if the Christian and non-Christian are in similar epistemic situations. If, however, the Christian account is epistemically superior, then the objection is not sound. Since the Neo-Confucian account for warrant is at least internally consistent, and the Neo-Confucian account is epistemically similar to the Christian account, then the Neo-Confucian may accuse the Christian of arbitrarily assuming the falsity of non-Christian belief, just as the Christian may likewise accuse the Neo-Confucian. Thus, Plantinga’s response is self-defeating.

Later on in his paper, Tien examines the overall issue:

And all along, I have claimed that Neo-Confucian belief is probably warranted only if Neo-Confucian belief is true, and Plantinga has claimed the same for Christian belief. The de jure objection is dependent on the de facto objection. If Wang’s description of ultimate reality is true, then Wang’s Neo-Confucian beliefs probably are warranted. If it is false, then they are probably not warranted.

To conclude:
1) If Christian beliefs are possibly warranted (by Plantinga’s method), then Neo-Confucian beliefs are also possibly warranted.
2) If Christian beliefs are true, then they are probably warranted; and likewise for Neo-Confucian beliefs.

As such, if Bolt intends to make the claim that only Christian theism can account for epistemic warrant, it seems that he is simply wrong. Further, it is also an open issue as to whether or not Neo-Confucianism is overall a preferable system to Christian Theism, as well as whether or not Bolt’s system succeeds in providing what he hopes it does. One might discover that I am not presupposing God to reason, but rather, that Bolt is presupposing Neo-Confucianism (and further, possibly deceived about his doing so!) It seems to follow that Bolt should make a case not that Christian belief (and only Christian belief) is warranted, but that it is in fact true.

Assumption vs. Existence

Further, even if Bolt is correct in saying that I must presuppose God, it obviously does not follow that God exists. Bolt seems to be operating with a principle similar to: If I can do Q by assuming P and P only, then my assumption is true where Q is account for reason, or having warranted beliefs and P is that God exists. However, would it not be more accurate to say: If I can do Q by assuming P and P only, then I must assume P? Does the necessity of assuming P entail that P is true? I think not. So, even if Bolt is correct in that I must presuppose that God exists (and I do not think he is), that would mean only that Bolt’s belief in God is possibly justified, not that God actually does exist.

Conclusion

As such, our three topics are really one topic. Of that one topic, it does not appear to me that Bolt has presented any sufficient case or convincing reason to accept that (i) his Christian theism provides warrant, (ii) no non-Christian system can possibly provide warrant. Indeed, the internal consistency of Neo-Confucianism and that it meets the criteria for warrant seems to render at least (ii) obviously false. Given that one does not need to presuppose the Christian God in order to satisfy the requirement of warrant in knowledge, one does not need to accept the authority of scripture and given that, one need not to accept that they are self-deluded if they think differently than Bolt does.

___________________________

¹Any time the word “God” is used, it refers to specifically the Christian God, unless stated otherwise.

²Tien, David W. “Warranted Neo-Confucian Belief: Religious Pluralism and the Affections in the Epistemologies of Wang Yangming [1472-1529] and Alvin Plantinga” in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 55:1 (2004).

The Discussion

Posts by myself will be colored in blue while Olson’s will be colored in green. I will only be modifying the conversation to correct spelling and grammar. Any comments I make will be indicated within the quotation by “[...]”

My initial comment was on a Facebook post by Olson in which he linked a video of Greg Bahnsen offering a criticism of Naturalism.

Mitch:

That’s quite a primitive understanding of naturalism as related to cognitive activity. The best argument of this type is Plantinga’s EAAN. Bahnsen is employing the same fallacy as Craig does when speaking about morality, that is, human beings are animals therefore human beings are JUST animals. By this same token, the physicalist might assert that brain states or chemical reactions but it does not follow that they are then JUST chemical reactions.

Joshua:

I thought you would comment on this one. But how do you account for the logic you used to determine that a fallacy was committed? That is, how do you account for it from within your world view?

Mitch:

We’ve already talked about this… in fact, I’ll post something on UrbanPhilosophy later tonight that outlines precisely how logic is justified without reference to God [this is the previously linked paper on conventionalism]… of course the paper I submitted already showed that your position is logically impossible.

Joshua:

Like I said before, you are arguing against a straw man. The explanation you offered in your paper fails to account for the preconditions of intelligibility.

You are simply making an attempt at showing how an atheistic/evolutionary world view accounts for the preconditions of intelligibility, but the fact that these preconditions exist demands that the Christian world view be true.

But anyway, I will be happy to look over your new article. And if its alright with you I’d like to submit it to a few people I know for further critique…

Mitch:

I’m not really sure why what I’ve said continually regarding this matter is going ignored. You can simply take the argument and run a reductio through your own worldview! The argument, if sound, will be sound regardless of which worldview it is uttered from. If the conclusion of the arguments truly are that the Christian worldview cannot account for logic, then that obtains even in your own worldview rendering it incoherent from the inside. You can’t simply beg the question in favor of your own worldview, not when faced with the conclusion of my argument.

The conclusion of your argument is based on your ignorance of the very foundation for the Christian world view. There were certain aspects of the Christian world view that you simply ignored, and the ones that you documented were misrepresented. Now, if its that important to you, I will go ahead and sift through your article one paragraph at a time. and comment on the ones that are faulty.The issue I have with doing this is simply the fact that you wouldn’t rethink your world view regardless of my counter arguments. You will simply formulate another strawman to argue against. But anyway, I will send you a copy of my review within a few days.

Conventionalism? I suppose I should have stopped reading when I saw the word “truthhood,” but nevertheless, Mitchell, aside from the question begging contained within the article, why ought anyone absolutely be logical?

I’m sorry Sye but you’re not going to get away with that so easily, where is the question-begging?

Well, you’re begging the question that an evolutionary world view can even account for the recognition of logical absolutes. If evolution is in fact true, there is no real foundation by which we deem our senses to be ultimately reliable and we therefore can’t really be sure that we know the truth about anything, at least not in an absolute sense. This reliability of our senses is also presupposed but not accounted for in the atheistic/ evolutionary world view.

You’re not giving the TAG anymore, you’re giving a form of EAAN which is largely besides the point. Conventionalism need not be embraced solely on an evolutionary basis, it would hold if evolution were false.

Well, the only alternative to evolution is creation, so if evolution were false and your argument holds despite the theistic world view or the atheistic world view, then what’s the point of making the argument?

The point is that even if intelligent design is true this does not immediately lead to Christian Theism. It certainly does not satisfy the criteria laid out by that TAG, that Christian theism be the ONLY worldview which accounts for logic. Our discussion shouldn’t be focused on evolution vs. Christianity since the real issue here is the coherence of conventionalism. One only needs that conventionalism be possibly true and the TAG, as formulated by Bahnsen, fails.

Sure, but I think you’re missing my point. That being that if evolution were true, and that natural/material realities are all that exist, we can have no ultimate standard for truth, nor would we have any real reason to adopt an ultimate standard so that truth can be known. Afterall, how can a system of complex chemical reactions really know anything?So, with that said, if you are in fact consistent within your atheistic world view, you should understand that you are limited to naturalism, which renders you utterly incapable of making any claims on the metaphysical aspects of life since those claims are by nature outside the scope of naturalistic explanation, and therefore outside of your world view (at least not without borrowing from Christian principles, which is what you are guilty of doing.)

If you really want to subject your article to tough scrutiny I would suggest submitting to Dr. Jason Lisle at Answers in Genesis or Matt Slick from carm.org.

You’re committing the same fallacy I outlined earlier, just because X is Y it does not follow that X is ONLY Y. Again you bring in this idea of “ultimate standard of truth” but I’ve just outlined an entire system that shows your conception to be in error. Your question “how can a system of complex chemical reactions really know anything?” is not an argument against complex chemical reactions knowing things.I am also not restricted to naturalism as an atheist, that is clearly false. People can be (and in fact are) atheists without being naturalists, namely, there are mind/body dualists who are atheists! Why should I accept your dichotomy as being true? Of course, if I were a naturalist you’d have to show that there are even “metaphysical aspects of life” that I should even care about, otherwise you’re just begging the question against the naturalist.

I have already attempted to speak with Slick but received no response (and his version of TAG is subject to even more problems than Bahnsen’s). I’ve also read Lisle’s book and he is clearly no philosopher, when he talks about epistemology I feel as I imagine many theists feel when Dawkins talks about religion.

Now let’s not diverge from the issue here Joshua, it’s a very simple one. The TAG asserts that no non-Christian theistic system can possibly account for the laws of logic. I have presented a version of conventionalism to which you have not objected to directly. You’ve attempted to invoke a form of the EAAN, but to maintain the coherence of your argument you need my position to be NECESSARILY false (that is, not even POSSIBLY true). The EAAN, even if it succeeded, would not provide you with this! You might show that I have no reason to accept conventionalism (though I don’t think you would), but that is clearly not the same as showing that conventionalism is incoherent. So what you must do, it seems, is find some incoherence in the system of conventionalism I’ve outlined or as you presuppositionalists say, “subject it to an internal critique.”

Until then, even though I don’t think it was necessary to provide, I’ve given you a justification for the laws of logic that does not depend on the Christian God. Now, with this system (again, even though it was not necessary), you can go back and review the articles in my paper. If they are sound, which I’m entitled to think until you show otherwise, not only does your system NOT account for the laws of logic, it CANNOT. So why shouldn’t I just say that it is you who are borrowing from my system?

Answer me this: Is it or is it not true that you must presuppose the reliability of your senses in order to make an argument about anything, or even to recognize and implement logical laws for that matter? If you agree that the reliability of your senses must be presupposed, could you explain why and how these presuppositions are justified from within the atheistic world view, and thereby establishing that your argument for conventionalism is rational to begin with?

Senses and the reliability thereof have absolutely nothing to do with the conventionalist justification of logic. The justification is not a posteriori, why do you think this is? I’ve outlined precisely how conventionalism is explained so I don’t see where you got this idea from.Also, again, the reliability of my cognitive faculties is not the issue here. That is – if we pursue that avenue instead of the TAG, it seems that you are implicitly conceding that the TAG fails to establish its conclusion and that you now have to attempt to undermine my epistemic reliability.

Nope, I believe you’re ducking the questions, just as I thought you would. The point is this, if you cannot account for the reliability of your senses (which you presuppose), you don’t really know the truth about anything, much less the rationality of your argument for conventionalism.The reliability of your senses is another precondition of intelligibility that simply must be assumed in the atheistic world view, but cannot be accounted for, so since it’s just an assumption, how do you know that you really know the things that you know? So, whether you realize it or not, my questions are very relevant to your argument, and also to your position itself, not directly, but they are relevant none the less.You see, a good world view is internally consistent, a rational world view must be able to account for the preconditions of intelligibility, including the reliability of your senses. As for your argument, I’ve already submitted your articles to Dr. Lisle for further review. I’ll let you know if I get a response.

I’ve not ducked your question, I’ve answered it. You’re attempting to shift the goalposts, we WERE discussing the justification for logic but now you want discuss the reliability of senses. Firstly, It is NOT true that I must presuppose the reliability of my senses before conventionalism can be justified. That is to say, the justification of conventionalism is an a priori justification (no senses involved). And again, the point that I seem to have to keep repeating is that if conventionalism possibly accounts for the laws of logic (you have to show that it can’t!) then the TAG fails. It’s really that simple.I am actually surprised that given my article on conventionalism you would ask something like: “Is it or is it not true that you must presuppose the reliability of your senses in order… to recognize and implement logical laws…” That seems to me to have a rather obvious answer.

On the matter of reliability, if you’re going to ask what constitutes knowledge then you really should define what you mean when you say ‘knowledge’. This issue is going to get quite convoluted, the reliability of the senses has a justification in (1) the existence of an external reality (2) evolution. That is, if an external reality exists, natural selection will favor those creatures which can better navigate their environments. The result is that we have senses which are generally reliable in navigating the external world. So when you say that reliability of senses *cannot* be accounted for by an atheist, that’s just plainly false.

Your paragraph is also kind of diluted, you want to talk about the reliability of my senses and then about things that I know. There is only a connection here if we’re speaking about things I might know in virtue of my senses, that is, facts about the external world. As I’ve said, my senses are not involved in my justification of logic. So it’s clear that the reliability of my senses is not a precondition for ALL types of knowledge, only some. It is not clear, however, that I am in err for relying on them.

I suspect that what you mean to argue is something in line with Plantinga, that if I accept both naturalism and evolution then I have some defeater for my position. You need to make this case though, I won’t make it for you.

No; the reliability of your senses must be presupposed. To state that evolution can somehow account for this is a speculation derived from the presupposition that evolution is true. Also, to even perceive an external reality is done with the presupposition that your ability to perceive is in fact reliable. If you cannot account for the reliability of your senses from within your world view, than you don’t know with certainty that you can actually recognize and implement logical laws.It is true that you must assume the reliability of your senses to even contemplate any argument, and your ability to account for that reliability is foundational to the rationality of your world view.

I also never attempted to define knowledge as the definition of knowledge is not the primary issue; the issue is the justification of your senses actually being reliable enough so that you can in fact really KNOW what you know. It’s also not clear that your NOT in err for relying on them. That’s my point; you don’t really KNOW that you can.

You also made a statement about naturalism, so are you a naturalist or not? If so, I would be glad to explain what I feel is a defeater of that position.

Why must the reliability of my senses be presupposed before I consider a priori matters? This is incoherent.I also fail to see any argument for the fact that my evolutionary explanation of the reliability of the senses is ‘speculation’. I don’t want to turn this into a scientific discussion. I also don’t appreciate you just labeling every claim I make as a presupposition. I made a conditional statement:

” … if an external reality exists, natural selection will favor those creatures which can better navigate their environments. The result is that we have senses which are generally reliable in navigating the external world”

Do you disagree that IF an external reality exists and IF evolution by natural selection occurs, it would favor creatures that can better navigate their environments?

You said: “… to even perceive an external reality is done with the presupposition that your ability to perceive is in fact reliable…”

Why is this true? To perceive an external reality is simply to perceive an external reality. I can perceive an external reality without supposing that my perceptions are reliable. I would a belief similar to “…it seems that I am perceiving X”… while “I am perceiving X” can be false, I cannot see how “… it seems that I am perceiving X” can be false.

You NEED to define what you mean by knowledge because you make statements such as: “…the issue is the justification of your senses actually being reliable enough so that you can in fact really KNOW what you know…”

What do you mean by “knowing?” That is a very important issue.

You have not shown that ALL knowledge relies upon sense experience, in fact, that assertion is just blatantly wrong. Why, then, is this discussion about the reliability of my senses relevant to the justification of conventionalism given that such justification is not an a posteriori manner?

” … if an external reality exists, natural selection will favor those creatures which can better navigate their environments. The result is that we have senses which are generally reliable in navigating the external world”-MitchellLike I said, this statement is made with the presupposition that evolution is true. But even if it were true, that doesn’t mean that having reliable senses equates to a survival value that natural selection would preserve. Things like bacteria and plants have no senses or perceptions; and they manage to survive very well without them. If your claim is that these things evolved as well, than you bear the burden of proof that they in fact did, but then of course we’ll have to get into the discussion of irreducible complexity and irreversible complexity for both, and also how photosynthesis evolved. We then would have to get into how your evidences actually relates to the scientific method. But, you already said that you don’t want to turn this into a scientific discussion.

“Do you disagree that IF an external reality exists and IF evolution by natural selection occurs, it would favor creatures that can better navigate their environments?”-Mitchell.

Yes sir, I disagree.

Also, if evolution were true, we wouldn’t have any reason to believe that our perceptions of the external world actually DO reflect reality, this therefore renders your very argument for conventionalism a non sequitur at best.

What I mean by knowing is simply knowledge gained by use of the senses, two of the most implemented in learning being sight and sound. I think it to be foolish to claim that the attainment of knowledge is accomplished without at least some of your senses. If this can be done, the burden of proof is on you to at least explain how this is possible.

My conditional statement is not made with the presupposition that either the ‘if’ or a ‘then’ is true. I think you need to read up on the nature of conditionals.Further, I am not a scientist nor is my job to tackle the “creationist problems” that have been tackled time and time again by various experts in various scientific fields.

You said: “Also, if evolution were true, we wouldn’t have any reason to believe that our perceptions of the external world actually DO reflect reality, this therefore renders your very argument for conventionalism a non sequitur at best.”

Again, you have not given ANY argument for this statement and for the third time I am now repeating that the conventionalist justification is an A PRIORI justification, sense experience is absolutely irrelevant!

Your definition of knowledge also seem inept for it denies knowledge of ALL a priori truths. The burden is not on me to show that there are a priori truths, it’s on you to show that the “a priori”truths are actually a posteriori. That is absolutely incoherent…

So, I feel the need to focus the conversation yet again. Since it is not the case that the justification of conventionalism requires any empirical support whatsoever, and since you have also not provided any argument showing that my cognitive faculties are unreliable, and further since you’ve only attempted to offer an irrelevant argument regarding knowledge acquired through the senses (of which conventionalism is no such knowledge), why should I accept your claim that conventionalism is incoherent?

Dude, just forget it. It is obvious that you either do not understand the argument, or your avoiding it all together. I also think that we’re operating on two different levels here, you’re aiming to defend your argument, and I’m aiming at your ability to make the argument to begin with by pointing out that your world view cannot account for the other preconditions of intelligibility, and I still don’t believe that you accounted for logical laws, it sounds like all guess work to me, you have also failed to address a lot of my core arguments. So I believe its best to call it quits now before I have 200 posts on my profile over a topic that we’ll never agree on. If you wish to discuss other topics, I’m for it; and I will glad to show you Lisle’s review of your articles if I do in fact get a response from him.

(a) I have authored a paper outlining my criticism against presuppositionalism in such a manner that if my criticisms are sound then Christian Theism cannot possibly account for the laws of logic

(b) I have been challenged, after posting the paper, to account for my preconditions lest my arguments be cast aside

(c) I strongly feel that if my arguments are utilized by the Christian presuppositionalist within the Christian presuppositionalist worldview, and if they are sound, they render the worldview internally incoherent

(d) I strongly feel that if the arguments are utilized in such a manner outlined by (c) and they do establish the conclusion that Christian Theism cannot account for the laws of logic, this conclusion may not be simply dismissed by a statement  that amounts to “Well, yes it does…”

(e) I have, in response to being asked, outlined the conventionalist justification of logic such that even without my first paper, if the justification is internally coherent (and possibly true) the TAG is defeated

(f) I do feel that the conventionalist justification of logic is internally coherent and by proxy, I do believe the TAG to be unsound

“Like I said before, you are arguing against a straw man. The explanation you offered in your paper fails to account for the preconditions of intelligibility. You are simply making an attempt at showing how an atheistic/evolutionary world view accounts for the preconditions of intelligibility, but the fact that these preconditions exist demands that the Christian world view be true. ” (spelling corrections mine)

What I have tried to explain is that Joshua should simply take my arguments and run them as an internal critique in his own worldview, a sort of internal reductio. The soundness of my article, if truly sound, will not be limited to one worldview. That is to say, if my argument truly does establish its conclusion it will do so if parsed through his own worldview and if that conclusion is such that it shows that his worldview cannot account for logic, then all the worse for his worldview! He may not simply beg the question in favor of his position after seeing the outcome of my criticisms. To this suggestion he has responded:

The conclusion of your argument is based on your ignorance of the very foundation for the Christian world view. There were certain aspects of the Christian world view that you simply ignored, and the ones that you documented were misrepresented. Now, if its that important to you, I will go ahead and sift through your article one paragraph at a time and comment on the ones that are faulty.

This is a pretty heavy charge, but I look forward to his analysis. I do recommend, of course, that it take into account the following material.

With that said, in an effort to quell any further attempts at avoiding the ‘meat’ of my paper due to an “inability to account for the laws of logic,” I will present the conventionalist justification of logic. In my discussions with presuppositionalists they have seemed to largely misunderstand the system and in turn create strawmen of their own to argue against. We must be cognizant now that the TAG as I’ve outlined in the previously linked paper or the statement that only the Christian worldview can account for the laws of logic requires that no other justification be possibly true. If the presentation of conventionalism is coherent it saddens me to say that one will not even need to read my paper to show that TAG (and presuppositionalism) fails. Further, there are those who would assert that presuppositionalism is the true apologetic system in that it is the one that Christianity explicitly endorses. There are also those who say that presuppositionalism/TAG cannot possibly be false because of the guarantee given by scripture. For these people, there is much more at stake than merely the coherence of the TAG, they also risk the truthhood of Christianity.

If the TAG, and further, presuppositionalism, are the true exemplifications of Christianity it follows that their defeat is symbiotically a defeat of Christianity. We can demonstrate this with a simple modus tollens:

(1) If Christianity is true, then the TAG succeeds

(2) The TAG does not succeed

(3) Therefore, Christianity is not true

What of course needs to be shown is (2), and while I feel that I’ve shown it sufficiently in the aforementioned paper, as I’ve said there are those who wish to address my supposed “inabilities.” Let us analyze if the claim that conventionalism cannot possibly account for the laws of logic is true.

What is Conventionalism?

What follows will be a series of excerpts I’ve chosen from Creath’s article that I feel outline the conventionalist justification of logic quite well.

Carnap made a refreshing and welcome suggestion: the axioms can be construed as definitions (implicit definitions) and their assertion as commitment to a language containing the terms so defined. The axioms or postulates need no further epistemic justification because a language is neither true nor false, and one is free to choose a language in any convenient way. If someone else should choose other apparently conflicting postulates, there is in fact no disagreement because each postulate set is constitutive of the concepts it employs, and hence the one body of postulates is not denying what the other is asserting. In this manner the postulates are not even intended to reflect an antecedently and independently existing reality, but rather literally to create the claims they express.

It may be that some postulate sets are better than others. But the ‘betterness’ in question concerns their practical usefulness: some are more powerful or easier to use than others. In terms of epistemic justification or cognitive warrant they are all on a par. Indeed, they are the ‘meter sticks’ for the justification of anything else. Epistemically the choice among them is conventional, though the constraints imposed by pragmatic utility can be significant. For example, an inconsistent postulate set is not very useful. For most logicians of the period, including Carnap, every sentence as well as its negation would trivially follow from a contradiction. An inconsistent postulate set would therefore fail to draw any cognitively interesting distinctions among sentences or beliefs. Though the preference for consistent systems is treated as a pragmatic one, the pragmatic considerations are powerful indeed.

In this first excerpt we see some constant presuppositionalist claims addressed. If logic is conventional, can’t people just choose different conventions? If some people choose different conventions than others, they will be contradicting each other, so how do we know which one is true? The answers to these questions are laid quite simply in the excerpt. Each language or system of logic will have a set of definitions that require no further epistemic justification. Think about the English language, there are definitions of words but to ask why a certain word is defined as such rather than some other definition is a question that simply makes no sense for languages which are neither true nor false, they simply are. Further, if someone chooses some language different than ours (say, French), there is no contradiction because the French language cannot disagree with the English language because they are creating their claims independently of one another.

Pragmatism comes into play when want to decide which system to use. Now, keep in mind that Carnap is not proposing that people somehow “choose” their basic brain languages (the language upon which they would choose all other languages). This is as silly as suggesting that one should be able to choose their genetic makeup as to yield a certain eye-color. Our fundamental operating language, our basic logical brain language (logical because there is no such thing as non-logical languages) is not chosen by us, but rather is the precondition for all other choosing. For the systems we can choose, be it in mathematics or computer science, we use the ones that allow us to perform certain tasks. We would not choose a trivial system because anything follows from trivial systems, the answer to every proposition is “Yes,” clearly this is useless.

“This discussion of pragmatic usefulness and explication must not obscure, however, the epistemic core of Carnap’s doctrine. The choice among alternative postulate sets is epistemically arbitrary; the choice is a matter of convention. Moreover, the postulates themselves are the fundamental epistemic doctrine.”

Again, where choice is possible amongst systems the choice is arbitrary. Creath continues:

At this point it would be well to say a bit more about convention, for it is not always clear what is at stake in saying that something is a matter of convention (Quine, 1936). Plainly, when Carnap speaks of the semantic and epistemic features of our language as conventional, he does not mean to suggest that they are the products of some actual legislative assembly convened in antiquity. But shorn of such unhelpful metaphor, what does conventionality come to? The answer, in essence, is that to lay down a linguistic convention is to adopt a certain scheme of justification. This scheme involves two specific features: first, there are alternatives to certain aspects of the justificatory system; and, second, the choice among these alternatives is arbitrary in the sense that no justification is required for the choice. In particular, to say that postulates are laid down by convention commits one to the idea that there are alternative postulates that could have been chosen, but were not. It commits one likewise to the idea that no further epistemic justification for the choice of postulates is required. Conventions are not designed to reflect antecedent and independent facts; if they were thus designed one would have to show that they had done so. Rather, the postulates (together with the other conventions) create the truths that they, -the postulates, express.

So put, conventionalism is the adoption of a system of justification. Other systems could have been chosen, but weren’t and no justification is required for the choice. Further, conventionalist systems are not reflecting some external reality, they really are creating their truths. We will see a further explanation of this below.

Creath continues:

That the conventions constituting the system of justification are at bottom arbitrary poses no threat whatever to the objectivity of the postulates and their consequences. This was of particular concern to Carnap because he thought that all of logic and mathematics, insofar as the claims thereof can be assessed at all, is to be justified as are postulates and their consequences. Once a system of justification is chosen, i.e., once the various terms of the language are given a definite sense, it is a completely objective matter whether B is a consequence of A. It in no way depends on what any person may happen to imagine, think, believe, or know about these sentences. It is likewise a completely objective matter whether or not a given claim needs further justification. These things are no more subjective than the truth value of the claim “All swans are white”, given of course that the meanings of the terms are fixed. If the word ‘white’ has a sense different than it in fact does, then the truth value of the claim might be different, but this in no way impugns the objectivity of “All swans are white”.

Here we have an answer to the common presuppositionalist assertion that “if logical principles are conventional, they are not necessary.” As the quotation says, once we adopt a system of justification whether or not X is true, or Y is true is a completely objective matter. To quote myself in a previous discussion with presuppositionalist Chris Bolt:

There is a distinction between “object-level” and “meta-level”. Consider a meta-ethical circumstance, where an evolutionary account of morality may be charged with becoming eliminitivist. “if I do some good deed X just because I am programmed to, then X is not really good to do, it’s just part of my programming” But these statements are operating on different levels. Both the following propositions would be true: “X really is good to do” and “X really is just a part of my biological programing, and that’s the only reason I think X is good to do” A contradiction only occurs when both statements are taken to be expressing a proposition of the same level.

Applied to logic, “X is really necessarily true, everywhere, regardless of what anyone thinks, and regardless of anyone’s conventions. And X really is just part of a system of conventions I have adopted as part of my programming.”

Thus we can see that the common charges against conventionalism by the presuppositionalists are simply misunderstandings. Conventionalism does not entail that some logical systems will contradict others, nor does it entail that everything becomes subjective and that logical principles are no longer necessary. Now, so long as conventionalism is a possible justification of the laws of logic, the TAG (and for some people, Christianity) is simply defeated:

(1) If Christianity is true, the TAG succeeds

(2) If some system other than Christian Theism can possibly account for the laws of logic then that TAG does not succeed

(3) Conventionalism possibly accounts for the laws of logic

(4) The TAG does not succeed

(5) Therefore, Christianity is not true

Conclusion

In dispelling the myths surrounding conventionalism put forth by presuppositionalists it should be clear and evident that conventionalism is coherent. Further, given its coherence it is a possible justification of the laws of logic, showing that the TAG fails. Coupled with the criticisms in my aforementioned paper we are left with the possibility of a conventionalist justification and the impossibility of Christian Theistic justification. For certain Christians, these conclusions are nothing less than devastating. If their position is the one I’ve outlined in the syllogisms, not only can Christian Theism not account for the laws of logic, it is false altogether.

Smart begins with an explanation of the formal TAG I’ve utilized in my paper. He does not seem too fond of my formal representation and offers one of his own. I do think that the form I have offered is more in line with the notion of Transcendental Arguments as they have traditionally been employed, as a tool for answering the skeptic.

The Critique of the TAG

Immediately, Smart charges me with having begged the question with my utilization of Fristianity. I find this charge puzzling. Smart states:

Just as Martin did, LeBlanc simply assumes the truth of the very thing he said he would prove, a feat that is neither impressive nor rational to any thinking person. He takes as his tool of analysis an hypothetical world view called Fristianity, which is supposedly identical to Christianity in every respect but one, viz. that God “is a quadrinity rather than a trinity.” The problem should be immediately obvious: the TAG argues that it is God as affirmed by Christian orthodoxy who is the necessary precondition for the reality and nature of logic. What LeBlanc did was simply beg the question on the first premise, asserting that God as such is not the necessary precondition thereof.

The introduction of Fristianity as a possible worldview which can account for the laws of logic does not, to me, seem question begging. Recall the TAG:

(1) There is a rational justification for the laws of logic

(2) It is necessary that: if Christian theism is false, then there is no rational justification for the laws of logic

(3) Christian theism is true

One possible way to analyze whether or not (2) is a sound premise is to explore possible defeaters. Fristianity was introduced as a defeater of (2) in that it shows a non-Christian theistic justification for the laws of logic and attempts to render the modal claim of (2) false. The falsehood of (2) is not assumed, it is demonstrated. Consider another example:

(1) There is a rational justification for the laws of logic

(2′) It is necessary that: if Fristian theism is false, then there is no rational justification for the laws of logic

(3′) Fristian theism is true

Would someone be begging the question if they utilized Christianity as an example of a worldview, which is not Fristianity, that accounts for logic? I don’t think so. Again, the falsehood of (2′) is not merely assumed, it is demonstrated. I hope that I have not missed the thrust of this objection, and I trust that I will be corrected if I have.

A Logical Euthyphro Dilemma

In his next objection, Smart identifies my dilemma as being a false one. He states:

In the same way that the Euthyphro dilemma commits the bifurcation fallacy on the moral question, so too does LeBlanc’s dilemma here because it fails to present or account for a third option, which may be stated in the following way: “Logical order is grounded in the very nature and character of God and expressed revelationally in his works and word”…

Oddly enough, it seems clear in my paper that I do address such a move:

A TAG defender might respond by saying that this dilemma is a false one, and advocate similar to Frame that logical principles have their basis in God’s nature and are thus neither external, nor arbitrary. Firstly, this seems to add some confusion: are logical principles based on God’s thinking, or on his nature? Frame’s above statement in response to Michael Martin seems to indicate that both are true: logical principles reflect the thinking of God and the thinking of God has its basis in God’s nature.

Frame essentially makes the claim that it is logically impossible for the nature of God to change. But the standard Frame is using to identify logical possibility is allegedly the nature of God. As such, his claim appears to be represented more accurately as:

(C)  Based on God’s nature it is logically impossible for God’s nature to be different because God is necessarily a rational God

I then go on to discuss what I feel are the shortcomings of such a move. As such, I think the claim that I’ve not presented a/the third option is clearly false.

The Asymmetric Relationship

I think that Smart may have misunderstood this section of my paper. He states:

LeBlanc draws upon a counterfactual semantic that he cites from Matthew Davidson which states that “any proposition is counterfactually implied by a necessarily false proposition.” But for some reason he interprets this to mean that since the proposition “logical principles do not exist” is necessarily false, this somehow “counterfactually implies any proposition whatsoever.”

This is the correct interpretation under Lewis’ counterfactual semantics. So when I say that a necessarily false proposition counterfactually implies any proposition I do actually mean:

(i) If 2+2=5, then the moon is made of cheese

(ii) If circles have four sides, fish are mammals

(iii) If logical principles do not exist, pigs can fly

(iv) If three does not exist, Mitch is a monkey’s uncle

and given that, as I’ve said in my paper:

Since “logical principles do not exist” is a necessarily false proposition, it counterfactually implies any proposition whatsoever. So it is also true that if logical principles did not exist, neither would God. Thus, God depends on logical principles for his existence.

And as such, we have what I propose is an asymmetrical relationship. Smart further states:

Incidentally, LeBlanc argues that “if logical principles did not exist, neither would God; thus, God depends on logical principles for his existence.” But that is a brutal straw man mistake, for the TAG argues that logical order is grounded in the very nature and character of God and expressed revelationally in his works and word. In other words, the reason why God would not exist if logical principles did not is because the latter is grounded in his very nature and character, making LeBlanc’s point here tantamount to arguing that “not identical to P” can somehow be “identical to P.”

If logical principles did not exist, then God would not exist, for logical principles are grounded in the very nature and character of God (without which God would be not-God); i.e., God depends on himself for his existence (cf. aseity).

But I have mentioned this objection in my paper as well:

Another possible solution is twofold. One must first accept that abstract objects are the thoughts of God. This is not problematic for the TAG proponent as they have already explicitly stated that this is the case. One must then further embrace the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity (DDS) and accept that God is identical with each of his attributes and thoughts. Under this view, the statements “God exists” and “Logical principles exist” express the same proposition. This eliminates the problem because any proposition is counterfactually dependent on itself.

I then go on to discuss what I feel are the shortcomings of this approach.

Conclusion

It seems to me that this round of objections already have their answers in the original paper. I trust that if I have misunderstood any of David’s points he will clear up my misunderstandings in his next post. I also would like to extend thanks to both David Smart and Chris Bolt for their interaction with the draft of my paper.

Note: The discussion posted is only that up until December 9th, 2009. Chris and I both agreed to end the discussion between ourselves at this point.

My posts will be colored blue while Chris’ posts will be colored maroon.

Mitch:

My mention of hybridization was not because I think conventionalism is “compromised”, it was a specific point drawn to a premise of the formulation. My paper is *not* on logical conventionalism. There are heaps of resources available should one want to explore the system, I’ve even mentioned one in a footnote for further reading.

Further, the form of TAG is not unique/indirect, it’s simply modus tollens. Even in Jamin’s article this is clear, he offers a formal representation.

As for Fristianity, the illustration is clear. I can simply add “or as close to Christianity” as possible in brackets to satisfy your problem, but it does not render it unsound.

I surely hope that this is not an attempt a full critical response to my paper.

Chris:

Since I did not state that your paper is on conventionalism, and since there are “heaps of resources available” should one want to explore the problems with conventionalism, and since conventionalism as a tenable position is at least as equally valid given your program as a “specific point drawn to a premise of the formulation”, I do not see that there is much by way of a counter in the first part of your comment. Bahnsen does not offer a trilemma, so you are arguing against a straw man, and I have shown the problem with proposing a hybrid. Since “or as close to Christianity as possible” with respect to Fristianity is not in your article, there is nothing wrong with my objection. You have a bit of a worrisome tendency to add things to your arguments after you have made them and then fault me for being faithful to your original arguments in my critiques. I critiqued parts of your article, not subsequent comments from you that are not in the article.

Mitch:

Bahnsen’s TAG from his debate with Stein, which Jamin says is a good resource, does invoke a trilemma. If you look at the subsection entitled “II. OPENING STATEMENT—BAHNSEN” I think this is quite clear.

I also do not think you can make so bold a claim as to say that you have knowledge of what every possible hybridized account of logic would “look like”. At least, if you want to, that burden is clearly on you.

As for the Fristianity point, I’ve said that I will add the bracketed note in the final draft so I would expect that you read it as such.

It’s not my intention to fault you for criticizing the original arguments, but in a dialog we move forward (so long as we’re not shifting goalposts). Oh sorry, forgot to add… the mention of hybridization was a response to premise (2a) in my paper. A premise that is drawn, again, from Bahnsen’s debate with Stein.

Chris:

If it is so clear then quote the exact portion where Bahnsen offers a trilemma. You cannot, because he does not. Bahnsen offers different ways that the atheist might try to justify logic, but he never says that these examples are exhaustive; something you would need to have him say for the argument you made concerning this portion of the debate. This is why you have put something into the text of the transcript of the debate that is not actually there.

I do like one thing Bahnsen says though that is certainly relevant here. “To say that they are merely conventions is to simply say ‘I haven’t got an answer.’”

Mitch:

In the above passage I’ve mentioned, Bahnsen explicitly makes the argument that no non-Christian theistic way to justify the existence of the laws of logic is possible, he then criticizes the a priori way, the a posteriori way and the conventionalist way.

Now it should be clear here that his point, that “no non-Christian theistic way to justify the existence of the laws of logic is possible” (premise 2 of the argument) cannot merely be asserted. But rather, from his statement we can extract the defending premises, that is where we get (2a) and (2b), they are required to make sense of (2c) and further (2).

You say that he never says his list is exhaustive, well he never explicitly says this, but in him presenting the three different ways, and asserting they must necessarily fail, and then stating (2) gives us a pretty justified reason to utilize this premise in a formal representation. In effect, (2a-c) are the required supporting premises of Bahnsen’s claim in the debate (as represented by premise 2)

Of course, if you still want to quibble with (2a) we could certainly just say that Bahnsen hasn’t/can’t provide an exhaustive list. But that does not move us from (2b) to (2c) and back to (2). If you really want to admit that the argument Bahnsen has given in his debate is invalid, that is fine with me, but such a move is not conducive to discussion (or his position).

My point against (2a) in my paper is pointing out precisely why the premise is questionable, and whether or not Bahnsen explicitly stated it, it’s tantamount to his argument in that debate. We can certainly ask for an exhaustive list, but I doubt he’d be able to provide one, and even if he did provide one it would necessarily include the three positions mentioned in the premise. If anything, we’d be attributing too little to Bahnsen’s claim, which does not give us a problem anywhere in my paper, save for where I say that a hybridization might account.

With that said, I give Bahnsen the benefit of the doubt and assume that he was not intending to (and indeed did not) make an invalid argument during his debate. Even if I am wrong in this, the majority of my paper does not depend on it. In fact, the majority of my paper (perhaps every section besides “Initial Objections” seems that it could be applied to any formal representation of the TAG so long as it attempted to establish the type of relationship between logical principles and God that has been attempted by Bahnsen/Frame.

As for Bahnsen’s quote on conventionalism, one could simply retort that to say they are part of God’s nature is also a non-answer. The reading I’ve suggested in my paper on conventionalism seems like a good place to start to understand why the ‘usual’ objections to conventionalism fail.

Chris:

Not only am I having difficulty finding this alleged trilemma in the debate transcript, I am likewise having difficulty finding the premises you are referring to. I am glad you admit that Bahnsen never explicitly states that the ways of justifying logic he mentions are exhaustive. Bahnsen provides examples of ways the atheist might attempt to justify logic. The trilemma, again, is something you are forcing into the text of the transcript. As Bahnsen mentions later, everything cannot be said in one debate. What Dr. Bahnsen has done here is analogous to what he does later in the debate in response to the question, “What solid evidence do you have to maintain that the Christian faith is the only true religion with a God?” You may read his answer there for some further insight.

With this out of the way though, what other ways might you think of to justify the laws of logic? I think Dr. Bahnsen has provided a pretty substantial list of examples, do you not? Since your hybrid example falls prey to the leaky bucket problem that Bahnsen uses in multiple other places there is no reason that I can see for either asserting it as some kind of tenable fourth option or accusing Bahnsen of having left it out in an attempt to provide an exhaustive list.
Since your argument concerning this point relies upon the premises you have mentioned, I must repeat what I mentioned at the beginning of this comment, which is that I am having difficulty finding the premises you are referring to in the debate transcript. Perhaps you could quote them for me. When I read the transcript, I see Bahnsen clearly stating his argument at the end of his opening statement.

“When we go to look at the different world views that atheists and theists have, I suggest
we can prove the existence of God from the impossibility of the contrary. The
transcendental proof for God’s existence is that without Him it is impossible to prove
anything. The atheist world view is irrational and cannot consistently provide the
preconditions of intelligible experience, science, logic, or morality. The atheist world view
cannot allow for laws of logic, the uniformity of nature, the ability for the mind to
understand the world, and moral absolutes. In that sense the atheist world view cannot
account for our debate tonight.”

This looks different from the argument you are attributing to Bahnsen and then writing about. You ascribe a trilemma to Bahnsen that he never states and then critique “him” on it, and then appeal to a formulation of an argument that Bahnsen never states in order to try and prove that the trilemma is in the text. It looks like you are not arguing against what Bahnsen said, but rather what you wish Bahnsen would have said. Another example of this is found in [7], which states, “Bahnsen erroneously assumes that if one is an atheist, they[sic] must be a materialist”. Try as I may, I cannot find this conditional in anything Bahnsen has said or written. Perhaps you could quote this for me from the text of the transcript while you are getting the other two quotations for me?

As for your conventionalism, you have written, “Conventionalism, as applied to logic, is the philosophical attitude that logical principles are grounded on agreements in society rather than any external reality” and then suggest that the case may be made that Bahnsen has misunderstood conventionalism. The suggestion is dubious, but at any rate you do not pursue this in your article, which is fine. You attempt to answer the charge of a lack of universality by writing that “it is impossible to think of anyone in existence who could visualize the effects of a proposition which violated the LNC[24] and in this regard the LNC is universally self-grounded”. This is an extremely bold and unproven assertion. You continue that “Bahnsen criticized conventionalism for being arbitrary and potentially giving way to people with contradictory logical systems”. Your answer is that “it is hard to imagine someone who has adopted a logical system in which there is no LNC or equivalent mechanism”. Nonsense! I do not even have to imagine this, as there are people who claim to have done so and even attempt to live in accordance with the claim. You continue by spelling out a consequence of such a view, writing, “Such a system would be as trivial as a magic eight-ball that answers ‘yes’ to every question[25]”. Well, sure, but what does this have to do with anything? This is merely a result of accepting your conventionalist program. You continue, “It is difficult to see why Bob or any of his friends would adopt a system with no mechanism to differentiate between any propositions”. Again, who cares? Do I need to know the reason someone adopts a position to know that they do in fact do so? Of course, I do know the reason people reject logic and attempt to embrace denials of logic and positions like conventionalism; it is because they are sinners. You next write, “On pragmatic grounds, it is entirely useless”. This is just your unsupported opinion though. Useless for what? I just gave one pragmatic reason for rejecting logic; logic presupposes the existence of God whom sinners want nothing to do with apart from God regenerating them and bringing them to repentance from sin and a trusting in Jesus Christ as Savior and Lord. Two quotes from the debate transcript may be brought to bear upon this discussion. The first is from Stein and the second is from Bahnsen. Together, they answer the alleged responses you provided to the brief critique of conventionalism that Bahnsen made.

“He says that the laws of logic are the same everywhere. This is not true, although they
are mostly the same. And I wonder if he ever heard of a Zen Koan, and the answer to a Zen
Koan, is something which is like – ‘what is the sound of one hand clapping’ is the most
famous Zen Koan – The answer to that kind of question is in a different kind of logic in a
sense, or extra logical, if you want to call it that.”

“It might be appropriate in some societies to say, ‘Well, my car is in the parking lot, and
it’s not the case that my car is in the parking lot.’ There are laws in certain societies that have
a convention that says, ‘go ahead and contradict yourself’. But then there are in a sense,
some groups in our own society that might think that way. Thieves have a tendency to say,
‘this is not my wallet, but it is not the case that it’s not my wallet.’ They may engage in
contradictions like that, but I don’t think any of us would want to accept this.”

The very last sentence in the quote from Dr. Bahnsen is important. There are people who will attempt to reject the kind of logic we need for intelligibility, and in a conventionalist program there are no worries in doing this. After all, “logical principles are grounded on agreements in society”, but then, how is it that logic is necessary?

Mitch:

There’s not much more I can say that has not been said in my last comment. If Bahnsen in his debate was not using the premises I’ve outlined, his argument is simply invalid. You cannot move from:

(1) There is a rational justification for the laws of logic

to:

(3) Christian theism is true

without:

(2) It is necessary that: if Christian theism is false, then there is no rational justification for the laws of logic

And further, (2) needs justification. Given Bahnsen’s criticisms in the debate, if he is attempting to construct a valid argument (which we can assume), he is doing so by the deduction from (2a-c), this is what gives him (2).

If he was not intending to give an exhaustive list, he could have just said that. But there’s no reason to infer that he did not think he was giving one, especially given how strong of a claim he was making… that *only* Christian theism can account for logic. I do think his list of examples is pretty comprehensive, but I cannot discount the possibility of some other system. It also doesn’t follow that if even these three all fail, a hybridized system containing them would also fail. That statement seems as if it would be a fallacy of composition. All I’m claiming in my paragraph there is the possibility, something Bahnsen needs to discount for the strong claims of his position to hold.

As for the justification, Bahnsen seems to assume that Dr. Stein is a materialist because he is an atheist: “What are the laws of logic, Dr. Stein, and how are they justified? We’ll still have to answer that question from a materialist standpoint.” (p. 23)

I do not think that Stein anywhere says that he is a materialist, and as such, Bahnsen assumes it.

As for conventionalism, some people may have adopted systems with no LNC-like mechanism, but these systems are trivial.

You said: “You continue, “It is difficult to see why Bob or any of his friends would adopt a system with no mechanism to differentiate between any propositions”. Again, who cares? Do I need to know the reason someone adopts a position to know that they do in fact do so? Of course, I do know the reason people reject logic and attempt to embrace denials of logic and positions like conventionalism; it is because they are sinners.”

A system with no mechanism to differentiate between propositions would still be classified as a logical system, but a trivial logical system. So if you are saying that these people reject logic, you are entirely incorrect. Conventionalism is not a denial of logic, it’s a denial of what you believe logic to be and there certainly is a difference.

As for the pragmatic justification of logic, a trivial system is useless because it does not permit us to make usable inferences. If the answer to every question is “yes”, what do we do with such a system? We must also take into account our evolutionary history and any development of language therein. How would a trivial system aid in our survival? Again, this is discussed at great length in the book I’ve cited in my paper.

Bahnsen’s criticism of conventionalism seems quite misunderstood, that is simply not how it works. But, as a commenter said elsewhere on this site, it perhaps is not your job to educate me on the TAG, and by this virtue, it is perhaps not my job to educate you on conventionalism.

So, in short, the formal version of the TAG I present *is* based on Bahnsen’s position as espoused in the debate.He does not explicitly state the trilemma, but if his argument in the debate is to be valid, he must be assuming it. Further, I’m not quite sure that Bahnsen understands conventionalism, at least in some present forms.

Also, these objections are fine and dandy but I do not feel that they address the ‘meat’ of my paper.

Chris:

I will take your repetition of what you have already stated and the lack of quotes as evidence that you are unable to answer my concerns over your representation of the argument Bahnsen actually used. I see no reason to repeat what I have already written and the quotes that I am able to produce in support of my understanding of the transcript. I will briefly mention that so far as I remember Stein did not deny the implication that he was a materialist and while he asked how a law could be material he immediately began what appears to be an attack on the opposite position from materialism during his cross-ex time which is when he made his famous error. It might be argued that in the history of Western thought atheists have traditionally been materialists, and it may also be that Bahnsen held an argument to the effect of atheism needing to be a materialist position to remain consistent, though I doubt this was the case. In any event, the conditional is far too strong to assign to Bahnsen when he stated no such thing.

Now if I understand you right, you are asserting that there may possibly be some other way to account for logic, but you do not have any idea what this would look like. Of course, if the three examples of attempts at justification fail, this leaves you in the position of being unable to account for logic and hence needing to accept Christianity upon pain of irrationality, but I suppose atheists must cling to such fideistic and irrational positions. If I may rip a quote from Bahnsen out of context and misapply it:

“One more interesting comment about that and we’ll let it go, he says ‘We do believe there are answers to these problems. We have yet to find them’. You see, that’s the problem: atheists live by faith.”

It appears that in light of my criticisms you have changed one of your views, for you write, “As for conventionalism, some people *may have* adopted systems with no LNC-like mechanism” which is certainly not consistent with your earlier, “it is *impossible* to think of anyone in existence who could visualize the effects of a proposition which violated the LNC” and “it is *hard to imagine* someone who has adopted a logical system in which there is no LNC or equivalent mechanism”. I suppose you may answer that it is impossible for you to think and that it is hard for you to imagine but nevertheless “some people may have adopted systems with no LNC-like mechanism”, but I will just repeat that it actually is the case that people have adopted such systems and your difficulty with it, if not based purely in ignorance, is that you are attempting to evaluate another society’s agreed upon logical principles from within your own, but why should your system be accepted rather than the other? I hope you will not make the mistake of appealing to the agreed upon logical principles of your society in answering this question.

You write: “A system with no mechanism to differentiate between propositions would still be classified as a logical system, but a trivial logical system. So if you are saying that these people reject logic, you are entirely incorrect.”

Not if I am right about logic. This aside, I am glad you agree that there could, according to your conventionalism, be other logical systems without such a “mechanism”. It is perhaps the case that you are only calling it trivial based upon your own society’s agreed upon logical principles though. Adherents to that system may not think it is trivial at all!

You continue, “Conventionalism is not a denial of logic, it’s a denial of what you believe logic to be and there certainly is a difference.” Unless of course what I believe logic to be is what logic actually is, but I did not write that conventionalism is a denial of logic anyway. For you to state that conventionalism is not a denial of logic is likewise to assume that your position on logic is correct. Also, it may be the case that in a system there is no difference between what people believe logic to be and what logic actually is, and as a conventionalist you certainly are not in a position to critique that system because you differ with it. It looks as though conventionalism is actually such a system.

“As for the pragmatic justification of logic, a trivial system is useless because it does not permit us to make usable inferences.”

This is circular, but aside from this you are again just assuming the agreed upon logical principles of your own society in making this claim, and the “trivial” system is certainly not subject to such a criticism as has already been mentioned.

“If the answer to every question is ‘yes’, what do we do with such a system?”

Yes.

“We must also take into account our evolutionary history and any development of language therein. How would a trivial system aid in our survival?”

I suppose we would use the agreed upon logical principles of our societies to try to answer this question.

The meat of your article actually does not look like it is TAG specific. Other than this, I briefly touched upon my approach in the original post.

It is not my job to educate you on the TAG when you are the one who is writing an argument against it, but then, it is “my job” to point out when you have made errors in your alleged refutation. The same may perhaps apply in the case of conventionalism, but add to this that you are supposedly using a conventionalist platform to argue from, so a reductio on the position leaves you…well, there is a picture.

Mitch:

I will likewise take your repetition of the problem to mean that you have not understood what I’ve stated. I assume that somewhere in obtaining your philosophy degree you were required to analyze texts and extrapolate arguments, in doing so, there are often times where a premise is not explicitly stated but must be assumed to maintain the validity of the argument. I will not repeat myself anymore, but this is one of those times. Now, moving on…

Yes, I am making the claim that if the three mentioned ways of justifying logic fail, it does not follow that all possible justifications fail unless these three are necessarily the only type of justifications. Your quotation just exemplifies something typical of religion in general, if I may utilize a quote of my own which I think applied beautifully here:

“Philosophy is questions that may never be answered. Religion is answers that may never be questioned.”

You said: “If course, if the three examples of attempts at justification fail, this leaves you in the position of being unable to account for logic and hence needing to accept Christianity upon pain of irrationality, but I suppose atheists must cling to such fideistic and irrational positions.”

This is no better than a God of the Gaps argument, applied to logical justifications. Why can’t epistemology rely on the possibility of there being justifications? If you’re saying that the case is such that these three justifications have been shown to be false, and Christianity has not, therefore we must choose Christianity, I think you’ve just begged the question in favor of Christianity. If the arguments in the bulk of my paper hold up, it is an incoherent notion to state that logical principles can be grounded in the existence of God.

“It appears that in light of my criticisms you have changed one of your views, for you write, “As for conventionalism, some people *may have* adopted systems with no LNC-like mechanism” which is certainly not consistent with your earlier, “it is *impossible* to think of anyone in existence who could visualize the effects of a proposition which violated the LNC” and “it is *hard to imagine* someone who has adopted a logical system in which there is no LNC or equivalent mechanism”.”

There is no contradiction here, I was making a modal claim (I should have clearly stated this), there is a possible world in which a species/society/what-not has adopted a system with no LNC (think, different evolutionary pressures, or what not), and it is likewise impossible to think of anyone in existence (actual) who could visualize the effects of a proposition that violates the LNC.

You say that some societies have (presumably, societies in this world) contradicted the LNC, well… which societies do you think have contradicted the LNC?

As for non-logical societies, Bahnsen used the example of Buddhist societies, with the use of Koans. I think if you know the answer to that hand-clapping Koan, you instantly reach enlightenment. Do you know the answer, and happen to know that it’s “extra-logical” or is it just a really hard question that might not have an answer (maybe that is even the point of the question, but I digress)

In an effort to clear up some of this misunderstanding, I have modified footnote #23:

“Conventionalism, as applied to logic, is the philosophical attitude that logical principles are grounded on agreements in society rather than any external reality. This agreement is not necessarily voluntary (and perhaps is necessarily not-voluntary); of course, logical conventions may have very well arisen via evolution, giving us a neurological predisposition to the conventions we do hold. Another possibility is that we acquire logic at around the same time we acquire language, and once it’s in our minds, it can’t be changed.”

I think that this is where your confusion comes in, it’s not that we can actually will to change our logical system. Bahnsen famously said in his debate that logic can’t be actions in our brains, because all of our brains are different. Perhaps he means to say that our minds are different, because evolutionarily, we’re all the same species!

At any rate, as I’ve said before, a proper treatment of conventionalism was not the aim of this paper and is available elsewhere. Given that you might not fully understand this system, it is questionable as to why you’ve rejected it’s coherence outright.

The meat of my paper is specific to the claim “logical principles can be grounded in the existence of God”, a claim I would have thought you’d have embraced wholly.

Chris:

When the proponent of a view explicitly denies an interpretation of his work and you subsequently argue against that interpretation as though it is correct you argue against a straw man. Perhaps if we let Bahnsen interpret himself (as we should) he has no argument, but then it is sufficient to point this out. You have not done this, but rather ascribe an argument to Bahnsen and argue against it as though it were his own. Further, if you do not have an argument to show the impossibility of demonstrating the premise in question then you have not refuted your alleged reformulation of TAG at this point since by your reasoning there is a possibility that it can be demonstrated.

“…there is a possible world in which a species/society/what-not has adopted a system with no LNC…”

I agree, it happens all the time in the actual world.

“You say that some societies have (presumably, societies in this world) contradicted the LNC, well… which societies do you think have contradicted the LNC?”

Actually I did not say this. I do not suppose one can contradict the Law of Non-Contradiction if the system of logic wherein it is supposedly contradicted does not have contradictions, but then, trying to operate in accordance with your view on logic, that may just be the way things look like to me.

As for societies etc. that have attempted to claim a system without the Law of Non-Contradiction and have attempted to live in accordance with this I provided some examples per Bahnsen and Stein. Other examples might include adherents to Eastern religions and philosophies, pluralists, and freshman philosophy students. The quote about the Koan is from Stein, not Bahnsen, and it is illegitimate to call it “non-logical” if you are to be consistent with conventionalism.

“…it is likewise impossible to think of anyone in existence (actual) who could visualize the effects of a proposition that violates the LNC.”

Again, this is a bold assertion that has not been given any support, and it likely is just a result of the agreed upon logical principles of your society blinding you concerning other systems.

In your arguing against TAG, you argue against a claim that you admit is not a part of the traditional presuppositionalist program. In my arguing against conventionalism, I argue against the position you describe in your footnote. You have now added to but have not changed your definition of conventionalism and your addition does not affect anything I have written with respect to problems with the view. Your attempt to write me off as having misunderstood conventionalism is telling. I have not misunderstood your conventionalism and I have been quoting your definition of it. To repeatedly claim that I have “misunderstood” a simple definition is almost as bad as an undergraduate philosophy student claiming that a brilliant scholar with a PhD in the realm of epistemology “misunderstood” conventionalism. It is becoming exceedingly clear that you do not have a counter.

You write, “I think that this is where your confusion comes in, it’s not that we can actually will to change our logical system”. Again, I beg to differ that I am “confused”, I think it more likely that you are using your rhetoric in lieu of argumentation. Where did I state “we can actually will to change our logical system”? How were any of my considerations contingent upon such an assumption? A voluntary or involuntary neurological predisposition toward logical conventions via evolution and or acquisition of logic at the same time as acquisition of language that cannot be changed is perfectly consistent with the actuality of various logical systems people adhere to that factors into what I have written. What do agreed upon logical principles in a society forced upon us by evolutionary processes have to do with rationality anyway? It is nevertheless dubious that people are incapable of changing their logical schemes, and the addition to your definition does not give rise to your statement that my “confusion comes in” because “it’s not that we can actually will to change our logical system”. If anyone is confused here, it is you, for the addition to your definition only states that “agreement is not *necessarily* voluntary”, “*perhaps* is necessarily not-voluntary”, “logical conventions *may* have very well arisen via evolution”, and another “*possibility* is that we acquire logic at around the same time we acquire language”. Further, it is either ignorant or disingenuous to attribute misunderstanding and confusion to people who have encountered conventionalism elsewhere and seen it defined as, for example, “the philosophical doctrine that logical truth and mathematical truth are created by our choices, not dictated or imposed on us by the world (Cambridge 184)” in opposition to your definition of it.

“Bahnsen famously said in his debate that logic can’t be actions in our brains, because all of our brains are different. Perhaps he means to say that our minds are different, because evolutionarily, we’re all the same species!”

All of us being the same species does not necessitate all of our brains being the same. In fact, our brains are not the same.

Not only are there problems with pragmatism, not the least of which is that it does not provide epistemic warrant, but it is difficult to see how the Law of Non-Contradiction is solely of pragmatic concern even given, contrary to some of my considerations, that its denial is not useful (Why do people lie?); for its denial is apparently more than pragmatically problematic, it is logically problematic; a contradiction. This is to say nothing of the total failure of logical positivism or the inconsistency with the dismissal of the analytic/synthetic distinction in Objectivism which program you used in debate with respect to logic. Further, if “logical principles are grounded on agreements in society rather than any external reality” then logic is not necessary, even if one tries to ground it in evolution or language for we could have evolved differently; “…there is a possible world in which a species/society/what-not has adopted a system with no LNC (think, different evolutionary pressures, or what not)” and “…there is a possible world in which a species/society/what-not has adopted a system with no LNC…”

I wrote that “if the three examples of attempts at justification fail, this leaves you in the position of being unable to account for logic and hence needing to accept Christianity upon pain of irrationality, but I suppose atheists must cling to such fideistic and irrational positions” to which you respond that this “is no better than a God of the Gaps argument, applied to logical justifications”. This is simply false, for I can deny that lightning is caused by Zeus and even come up with other explanations for it, even other unscientific explanations, and not be concerned about my entire epistemology crashing down. You actually cannot, however, deny that Christianity is the precondition for logic and come up with other “explanations” for it and not be concerned about your entire epistemology crashing down. If you are actually unable to account for logic then you are reduced to absurdity and unable to even entertain allegedly possible justifications for logic. You have no place to stand.

Since I have called into question your ability to advance even one argument by my utilizing a TA in defense of the TAG, it should be understood that we are debating actual justifications for logic here rather than mysterious “possible justifications” that you have no access to in your epistemological considerations. Even if you had a place to stand in making your arguments, you have offered little more than a Naturalism of the Gaps with respect to this point. You have not offered a consistent account of our experience concerning logic, and hence the TA has done its job. Your arguments are, as I believe you wrote of TAG elsewhere, “dead upon arrival”. “Religion” is in fact your only hope for redemption of your “philosophy”.

(The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy: Second Edition. Edited by Robert Audi. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1999.)

By the way, I would like to tell you that I have very much enjoyed the conversation and that I appreciate you taking even my “jabs” “in stride”. Even philosophers have feelings somewhere deep inside, and I do not want my attempt at the rigorous interaction that you are likely to be familiar with to come across as hateful. I am not just concerned *about* you, I am concerned *for* you.

Mitch:

I give Bahnsen the benefit of the doubt in assuming that he was attempting to make a valid argument. If he was knowingly making an argument that is invalid, and intended for this to be the case, then I have certainly erred in my inclusion of the exposition. Philosophy had to wait many years during Van Til before anything formal happened, and then some. Now, you folks complain that the formalizations are not accurate. Well, to this I say firstly that I disagree, and secondly that maybe you folks should get to work and make something cogent.

The thing about logic is that, similarly to programming languages, there might be different languages or systems and ways about going about some issue, but we can understand all of these nonetheless, we can communicate. The same is likewise the case for spoken languages, something obviously conventional in nature.

As for the Eastern Religions, pluralists and philosophy students, can be you please provide some evidence for these claims?

On the impossibility of visualizing a proposition which violates the LNC, you said: “Again, this is a bold assertion that has not been given any support, and it likely is just a result of the agreed upon logical principles of your society blinding you concerning other systems.”

Can you think of an elephant which is both pink and not pink? Can you conceive of anyone doing so? I think not, since doing so would be conceiving of it yourself!

You said: “Your attempt to write me off as having misunderstood conventionalism is telling. I have not misunderstood your conventionalism and I have been quoting your definition of it. To repeatedly claim that I have “misunderstood” a simple definition is almost as bad as an undergraduate philosophy student claiming that a brilliant scholar with a PhD in the realm of epistemology “misunderstood” conventionalism. It is becoming exceedingly clear that you do not have a counter.”

Except my statement is not an argument from authority, I’m basing it on your criticisms of conventionalism. The person with a PhD in epistemology should really not misunderstand conventionalism, and for this, one must wonder if they were just being dishonest in their presentation. As for having a counter, the counter is simply the literature on the topic, which would answer many of your questions in perhaps a much more succinct manner. My deference to the literature is due to the fact that my paper is not a defense of conventionalism, and does not rely upon a defense of conventionalism.

You said: “A voluntary or involuntary neurological predisposition toward logical conventions via evolution and or acquisition of logic at the same time as acquisition of language that cannot be changed is perfectly consistent with the actuality of various logical systems people adhere to that factors into what I have written.”

But surely you are keeping in mind the specific evolutionary pressures of our species, that is something that would be shared throughout every single human being. It could certainly give the illusion of an “abstract universal”, no?

You said: “What do agreed upon logical principles in a society forced upon us by evolutionary processes have to do with rationality anyway?”

Sounds like you are on the verge of forming a version of Plantinga’s EAAN. I’d be interested to hear some further argumentation down this line.

You said:

“If anyone is confused here, it is you, for the addition to your definition only states that “agreement is not *necessarily* voluntary”, “*perhaps* is necessarily not-voluntary”, “logical conventions *may* have very well arisen via evolution”, and another “*possibility* is that we acquire logic at around the same time we acquire language”.”

This seems to be common among presuppositionalists. If your opponent is not claiming absolutely certainty, you criticize them for this. I do not see the validity of such a criticisms, and it does not arise from confusion, it arises from honesty.

You said:

“All of us being the same species does not necessitate all of our brains being the same. In fact, our brains are not the same.”

If you could, be very specific on what you mean about our brains not being the same? My understanding of neurology is that all of our brains share a commonality in the manner of their basic functions. Of course, I’m not a neurologist or a psychiatrist, so I wonder what mental illnesses bring to the discussion. Probably, as with most disabilities of that type, biological errors in development.

You said:

“Not only are there problems with pragmatism, not the least of which is that it does not provide epistemic warrant, but it is difficult to see how the Law of Non-Contradiction is solely of pragmatic concern even given, contrary to some of my considerations, that its denial is not useful (Why do people lie?”

I do not think lying qualifies as a violation of the LNC. If I steal your bike, and I tell you that I did not. It is not the case that I did and did not steal your bike, it’s the case that I stole your bike and told you I didn’t.

You said:

” Further, if “logical principles are grounded on agreements in society rather than any external reality” then logic is not necessary, even if one tries to ground it in evolution or language for we could have evolved differently; “…there is a possible world in which a species/society/what-not has adopted a system with no LNC (think, different evolutionary pressures, or what not)” and “…there is a possible world in which a species/society/what-not has adopted a system with no LNC…””

I realize now that these statements were probably the result of writing at 4am in the morning, I could have been much more clear. If it is indeed, as I have said, impossible (for us, in this world) to visualize an elephant that is both pink and not pink, then there is no possible world in which one can visualize an elephant that is both pink and not pink (since doing so would thereby mean visualizing the visualizer and subsequently the visualization in question). It seems then that it is more accurate to state that there is no possible world in which this is the case (or you can embrace RK’s hypothesis and stop a few steps earlier).

So this requires that I change my statement about a possible world where they have evolved with no LNC. I suppose it is true though that they may have evolved with a LNC-like mechanism that is different than our LNC, a mechanism by which they can distinguish different propositions. The distinction needs to be made between evolving creatures and whether or not they are *thinking* beings. A world in which no thinking creatures ever evolved would perhaps satisfy my criteria for a “species evolving with no LNC”

Even if it were the case that conventionalism is wrong, if my criticisms in the paper hold, it follows that Christianity cannot provide the preconditions either. You might say, well you were borrowing from my worldview to establish that position, well even if this were true, the fact that the position has crumbled from within shows its failure. Isn’t this precisely what you folks mean by an internal critique? If, throughout my paper, I’ve been utilizing a Christian justification for logic and the end result of the paper is the conclusion that no Christian justification is possible, if my analyses are sound, I would have revealed the internal inconsistency of Christianity.

Your last paragraph can be summed up in what seems to be a common presuppositionalist mantra:

“You didn’t do it the way I want you to do it, therefore, you’re wrong”

I also have enjoyed the conversation, though it has taken a lot of time. I suppose I should thank you for your concern, if it is indeed genuine, but I do feel it is misplaced. Cheers.

Chris:

Unfortunately there are not many more ways I can state that arguing against your own interpretation of Bahnsen which conflicts with his interpretation of himself is an instance of the Straw Man Fallacy rather than the ‘accurate formalization’ you tenaciously claim that it is. The TAG is “cogent”, but you have not interacted with it as presented by Van Til and Bahnsen. It is the case that, according to conventionalism, there might be different systems of equally valid logic since logical principles are agreed upon by societies, and I am glad that you finally agree. The Hindu tenet “atman is brahman”, Oprah’s “many ways” theology, and a freshman’s exclamation in my philosophy class “all truth is relative!” are systems held by members of each of the three groups I mentioned which attempt to deny the Law of Non-Contradiction. It is not the case that if I cannot conceive of something myself then I cannot conceive of someone else conceiving of it; you need to think this through, and on a different point you need to realize that if conventionalism is true you are thinking it through according to the agreed upon logical principles of your own society and not necessarily upon someone else’s. Having taken your definition of conventionalism and having run it through a reductio in plain sight with no direct answer from you I cannot think of any pressing need to read the literature you have recommended to me in order to provide you with a defense of your own position on logic (and why assume that I have not read it anyway?). The truth of the matter is that you have not shown where either I or Bahnsen have misunderstood conventionalism at all even though you continue to assert that we have whereas I have shown that you have misunderstood it in some respects and that you have not offered any other counter than to tell me I need to read more about it when perhaps it is you who need to do so in order to better understand the devastating critiques written on it. You are mistaken to think that your paper does not rely upon a defense of conventionalism, for once again I have offered a TA in defense of the TAG you are allegedly attempting to argue against, and this TA calls into question the very basis upon which you make your arguments, which is prior to said arguments. Even given the specific evolutionary pressures of our species there may be differences between agreed upon logical principles from one society to the next as you have conceded above, and an “illusion” of an “abstract universal” is not the same thing as an abstract universal. Since you attempted to attribute a “misunderstanding” to me concerning conventionalism at the point of the agreed upon logical principles of a society being non-voluntary (in direct opposition to the Cambridge definition I provided), the burden was upon you to provide a definition of conventionalism wherein said logical principles are agreed upon in a society in a non-voluntary fashion, which you did not do. Instead you made an irrelevant comment about certainty as though it should not strike me as strange that you would charge me with misunderstanding conventionalism on a definitional point that you have conceded you do not actually know to be the case. Each brain differs physically from every other brain, no two being identical, but this is really a side point and not overly important since it is clear that people think very differently about even the most fundamental aspects of reality, our discussion providing all the evidence we need to establish the point. There is contradiction involved in stealing and not stealing a bike, however there is also contradiction involved in someone stealing a bike and then claiming that he or she has not done so, namely the contradiction between what is said and what is actually the case; but the greater point is that it is difficult to see how the Law of Non-Contradiction is solely of pragmatic concern. Assuming we are working within the context of evolved, thinking, social beings and want to ground the alleged necessity of logic in evolution, there is still the problem that we (being these beings in this instance) could have evolved differently, not to mention that societies are contingent entities and so, again, logic is not necessary on your conventionalism, contrary to your claims and practice. It would appear that you have offered a sort of pragmatic justification for the laws of logic only, if that.

Since your paper is offered in accordance with conventionalism, if conventionalism is wrong it does not follow that your criticisms in the paper may still hold, but rather it follows that they do not. It is true then, that you are borrowing from my worldview in order to even argue against my worldview, in which case you refute yourself and prove Christianity true. What you have stated as your belief about what presuppositionalists hold with respect to an internal critique is incorrect, as we propose that the only way by which an internal critique is possible is when it is carried out upon the Christian worldview. You may again deny that Christianity is true, but then you end in self-defeating subjectivism and ultimately skepticism, as has been shown. I will be praying that you do come to see the cogency of what I have presented, as fallible and unclear as I sometimes am, and as incapable as our philosophical systems are in expressing the truth of God. All of the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are in Christ Jesus.

Mitch:

Around and around in circles we go, Chris.

The formal exposition of Bahnsen’s argument as presented in his debate is not inaccurate. It is either the case that Bahnsen’s argument is as I’ve stated, or that he was making an invalid argument. Given that Sean Choi has posted once on this blog here before, you may find it beneficial to get in contact with him and ask him about the formulation.

How precisely are the examples that you have given of the Hindu tenet, Oprah and freshman philosophy students violations of the LNC? I’m starting to wonder if we’re even thinking about the LNC in the same way (aside from the obvious differences between our positions).

Also, people who operate within a system that utilizes LNC-like mechanisms can still make false statements… humans don’t always deduce properly (like a computer would).

You said:

“It is not the case that if I cannot conceive of something myself then I cannot conceive of someone else conceiving of it; you need to think this through, and on a different point you need to realize that if conventionalism is true you are thinking it through according to the agreed upon logical principles of your own society and not necessarily upon someone else’s.”

I would wholly disagree. If you can conceive of someone conceiving P and not-P, you have thereby conceived of P and not-P. Furthermore, what is the problem of thinking about another logical system through the eyes of my own? As I said before, there is certainly communication between the different programming languages, spoken languages and also logical ‘languages’. Some research on “bootstrapping” will help to clarify these notions.

You said:

“Having taken your definition of conventionalism and having run it through a reductio in plain sight with no direct answer from you I cannot think of any pressing need to read the literature you have recommended to me in order to provide you with a defense of your own position on logic (and why assume that I have not read it anyway?).”

I have been responding to you this entire time. I assume that you have not read the literature precisely because of the criticisms you’ve been making. Similar things happen when atheists criticize the medieval version of the ontological argument, and dismiss present forms of the ontological arguments on that basis. I suspect that both Bahnsen, and yourself, may be thinking of conventionalism in a much previous form, and thus are not taking into account all of the factors. The book I’ve cited in my paper is a fairly recent explanation of conventionalism, and is beneficial for this reason.

You said:

“You are mistaken to think that your paper does not rely upon a defense of conventionalism, for once again I have offered a TA in defense of the TAG you are allegedly attempting to argue against, and this TA calls into question the very basis upon which you make your arguments, which is prior to said arguments. ”

You need this to be true so that you can avoid dealing with the bulk of my arguments, but unfortunately it’s incoherent. There would be nothing inconsistent with my paper claiming to begin from a Christian theistic account of logic. My criticisms in the sections entitled: “A Logical Euthyphro Application”, “God and the Abstract” and “The Mind of God” would still hold and if they are sound would lead to the rejection of Christian theism as an account of logic. This would not serve as a defeater to the conclusion of my argument, but rather to the system. Merely showing me that I need to “ground” logic by some other means.

Just as the presuppositionalist says if no non-Christian theistic ways can ground logic, than a Christian theistic way can, if the Christian theistic way cannot ground logic (which follows if my critique is sound), than a non-Christian theistic way can.

You said:

“Even given the specific evolutionary pressures of our species there may be differences between agreed upon logical principles from one society to the next as you have conceded above, and an “illusion” of an “abstract universal” is not the same thing as an abstract universal. Since you attempted to attribute a “misunderstanding” to me concerning conventionalism at the point of the agreed upon logical principles of a society being non-voluntary (in direct opposition to the Cambridge definition I provided), the burden was upon you to provide a definition of conventionalism wherein said logical principles are agreed upon in a society in a non-voluntary fashion, which you did not do.”

I gave you an entire book.

You said:

“Each brain differs physically from every other brain, no two being identical, but this is really a side point and not overly important since it is clear that people think very differently about even the most fundamental aspects of reality, our discussion providing all the evidence we need to establish the point.”

Sure Chris, but the fact that we can communicate is what is of the utmost importance. Even if we’re running programs written in different computer languages, bootstrapping lets me talk to you!

“There is contradiction involved in stealing and not stealing a bike, however there is also contradiction involved in someone stealing a bike and then claiming that he or she has not done so, namely the contradiction between what is said and what is actually the case”

It is not the case that Bob has both stolen and not stolen the Bike, nor is it the case that Bob has both said he has stolen the bike, and has not said that he has stolen the bike (in the same respect). You’re forgetting that key point, “in the same respect”. The contradiction between what is said and what is actually the case is not the type of contradiction the LNC deals with.

You said:

“Assuming we are working within the context of evolved, thinking, social beings and want to ground the alleged necessity of logic in evolution, there is still the problem that we (being these beings in this instance) could have evolved differently, not to mention that societies are contingent entities and so, again, logic is not necessary on your conventionalism, contrary to your claims and practice.”

This is an example of one of your statements which shows that you have not read, or have not understood the material on conventionalism.

There is a distinction between “object-level” and “meta-level”. Consider a meta-ethical circumstance, where an evolutionary account of morality may be charged with becoming eliminitivist. “if I do some good deed X just because I am programmed to, then X is not really good to do, it’s just part of my programming” But these statements are operating on different levels. Both the following propositions would be true: “X really is good to do” and “X really is just a part of my biological programing, and that’s the only reason I think X is good to do” A contradiction only occurs when both statements are taken to be expressing a proposition of the same level.

Applied to logic, “X is really necessarily true, everywhere, regardless of what anyone thinks, and regardless of anyone’s conventions. And X really is just part of a system of conventions I have adopted as part of my programming.”

There is no contradiction here because one statement is operating on the object-level, and the other is operating at the meta-level. These ideas are all integral to conventionalism and are all dealt with in the material.

In regards to your last paragraph, my mention of conventionalism was very specific and you have been somewhat taking it out of context. It is in a subsection dedicated to exploring possible ways that God might account for logic.

So all in all, I don’t find your criticisms very convincing, and even if they did hold, they would do little to the arguments in my paper. Further, I wonder why you are reluctant to deal with the very portions of my paper that would show a Christian theistic justification of logic is incoherent.

If you are indeed hinting that we should end the discussion here (your last paragraph sounds like it is), then I also thank you for your interaction and wish you the very best during this holiday season.

Abstract:

I briefly trace the origin of the Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God and present both an informal and formal version of the argument. The argument suggests that the Christian God is a necessary precondition of logical principles. I present a couple of objections formulated by Sean Choi and Michael Martin and develop three of my own. I propose firstly that a Euthyphro-like dilemma regarding the principles of logic reveals an insufficient, or at least, arbitrary justification. I then show that the symmetrical relationship between logical principles and the existence of God is a severe problem for Christian theism which must either reject the necessity of logical principles, or Christian theism altogether. I conclude that the existence of logical principles cannot depend on the Christian God. Lastly, I show that the mere possibility that God justifies logical principles in any of the ways criticized by the Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God requires further explanation from the Christian theist as to how divine justification differs from human justification. My conclusion is that the Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God is not sound.

Introduction[1]

Cornelius Van Til set the foundation of an argument for the existence of God that focuses on certain tenets. Van Til believed that (i) everyone has knowledge of God, some just suppress it (ii) Natural theological arguments are ineffective because they do not prove the Christian God uniquely over any other, (iii) we all have presuppositions which either assist or defeat our truth-seeking intentions (all non-Christian presuppositions defeat such intention), (iv) it can be shown that without Christian theism as an adopted worldview, the intelligibility of the world is lost, that one cannot make sense of logic, morality, or science. Van Til’s system became known as presuppositionalism and the modern scholars which have taken up a defence of his position include Greg Bahnsen and John M. Frame.

The most intriguing part of presuppositionalism is the assertion that there is, and only can be, one argument for the existence of the Christian God. With the exception of Frame, presuppositionalists largely reject traditional arguments for the existence of God claiming, as Van Til, that they offer only the mere probability of God’s existence and not the certainty that a Christian requires[2].

As such, Van Til proposed a transcendental argument. Transcendental arguments have origins which trace back to Immanuel Kant and generally take the form of modus tollens:

P

If not-Q then not-P

Therefore, Q

We can find an example of such an argument in Descartes’ Cogito:

I am thinking

If I do not exist, then I am not thinking

Therefore, I exist

The unique purpose of transcendental arguments is in many ways geared towards addressing the skeptic[3]. The arguments begin with a premise with which even the most hardened skeptic will agree and move to show that there is a precondition of that premise which cannot, thereby, be denied. In the above example of Descartes’ Cogito, existing is found to be the necessary precondition of thinking.

In the case of Christian theism, the transcendental argument employed is one which asserts that God is a precondition for the existence, and intelligibility of logic, morality, and science (amongst other things). For the purpose of this paper, I will focus on the claim that the existence of the Christian God[4] is a necessary precondition of the existence of logical principles[5]. I will present a formulation of such an argument, but first I would like to clarify what the TAG is asserting.

Throughout presuppositionalist literature is this notion of needing to “account” for logical principles. To be sure to understand what is meant by this, it would be prudent to present an excerpt from presuppositionalist Greg Bahnsen in his debate with atheist Gordon Stein[6]:

What are the laws of logic, Dr. Stein, and how are they justified? We’ll still have to answer that question from a materialist standpoint[7]. From a Christian standpoint, we have an answer – obviously they reflect the thinking of God. They are, if you will, a reflection of the way God thinks and expects us to think.

With the argument presented informally, I now introduce a formal version.

The Transcendental Argument Stated:

Sean Choi, in his criticism, offers us the following formulation of the TAG[8]:

(1) There is a rational justification for the laws of logic

(2) It is necessary that: if Christian theism is false, then there is no rational justification for the laws of logic

(3)   Christian theism is true

In support of (2), Choi observes the justification as being:

(2a)      It is necessary that: if there is a non-Christian theistic way to justify the laws of logic, then it will be either the a priori way or the a posteriori way or the conventionalist way

(2b)      It is necessary that: neither the a priori way nor the a posteriori way nor the conventionalist way will justify the laws of logic

(2c)      Therefore, it is necessary that: there is no non-Christian theistic way to justify the laws of logic

Initial Objections

There are a number of criticisms which Choi makes in his paper. He chooses to grant premises (1) and (2a) though with regard to (2a) while he does grant the premise for the sake of argument, he notes that it may be a false trillema. I am inclined to agree with Choi’s analysis. It seems to me that some hybridization of any of the mentioned means of justification may bring about a new means of justification. For example, a hybridization of an a priori and conventionalist system may succeed in providing the justification of logic sought by Bahnsen, but in a manner wherein the new system may be thought of as unique to both previous a priori systems, and forms of conventionalism.

Elsewhere in his presentation[9] Choi presents a criticism of (2b) by outlining the sheer impossibility of a TAG defender showing that every possible a priori, a posteriori or conventionalist way of justifying the laws of logic fail. Of course, the TAG defender may succeed if they show that all defences of either an a priori, a posteriori or conventionalist justification depend upon a particular claim that can be shown to be false.

Bahnsen seems to think that any a priori, a posteriori or conventionalist justification of the laws of logic is incompatible with Christianity. That is to say, if one is justifying the principles of logic in any of these manners, they are employing tenets rejected by Christianity. In other words, Bahnsen believes that it follows from ‘Christianity is true’ that ‘the a priori way, a posteriori way and the conventionalist way fail to justify the laws of logic’ for if Christianity is true, the laws of logic can only be justified in the manner he presents[10]. By doing so, Bahnsen asserts that non-Christian justifications operate on the presupposition that Christianity is false. As such, in an attempt to avoid the arduous task of showing that all flavours of the aforementioned possible justifications are false (and thereby that any worldviews that employ them are false), he seeks only to show that they all depend upon a particular claim, that ‘Christianity is false’, and that this claim renders everything unintelligible. Clearly, Bahnsen has drawn a dichotomy wherein one either accepts Christianity, or wholly rejects it; no middle ground is possible. As Bahnsen states[11]:

It is absolutely crucial that transcendental argumentation begin by positing that Christian theism is either true or false…. Van Til’s defense of the faith does not require the apologist to be aware of and refute every single variation of unbelieving philosophy, but only the presupposition common to them all (namely, the rejection of Christian theism). Many apologists mistakenly imagine that there are really three options available: one may accept Christianity, reject it, or be “undecided.” But, as Van Til recognized, to be undecided about the claim that Christian theism is the presupposition necessary to make sense out of any reasoning whatsoever is to begin one’s reasoning on the operational assumption that this claim is false (and can be laid aside as one proceeds to research and develop one’s views). Since there are only two options at the most fundamental level – the truth or falsity of Christian theism as a presupposition – the refutation of the unbelieving one (in whatever illustrative variation it appears) is an indirect proof of the other.

But what might this mean for our discussion? If Bahnsen is permitted to carry on with his criteria, then if any a priori, a posteriori or conventionalist justifications of logic are shown to be false (and subsequently, the worldviews that house and depend on them) all other formulations which properly fall under those headings will also be false (worldviews included) since they employ the same proposition, namely, ‘Christianity is false’. Of course, this is not sound reasoning unless the shared proposition is what is causing the justification to be false. Bahnsen needs to show that ‘Christianity is false’ is the ‘false-making’ proposition of all non-Christian worldviews, and it doesn’t seem that this is possible by any means other than (i) showing that all possible non-Christian justifications will have ‘Christianity is false’ as the only proposition in common (for if there is even one other proposition shared by these worldviews, how might one disqualify that proposition as possibly being the ‘false-maker’?), and (ii) showing that Christianity is not false. The obvious problem is that if (ii) is shown, the TAG becomes superfluous as it is no longer needed; one has already arrived at the truth of Christian theism, and for (i) to be shown, one still has to have an awareness of “every single variation of unbelieving philosophy.”

Further, Choi rightly points out that this criterion for distinguishing between the Christian worldview and all others is insufficient. He shows the absurdity of the criteria when applied to another worldview, namely, Fristianity[12]. Fristianity is a worldview adopted by Choi, which is identical to Christianity with the exception of the triune godhead, to make the point that the claim that “non-Christian” worldviews cannot account for X is false, since in whichever way Christianity accounted for X, Fristianity would do so in the same manner. The distinguishing feature of Fristianity is that its godhead is a quadrinity rather than a trinity, it is essentially a “Christianity + 1”. Michael Butler, a defender of TAG, has responded to the Fristianity objection by stating that there is no guarantee that Fristianity will be a coherent worldview after it is laid out and thus cannot be an objection to the TAG[13]. Choi’s reply is that this is simply besides the point as the TAG, if successful, should prove that Fristianity will be incoherent outright and that there is no burden on the Fristian to exemplify coherence. Further, in response to Bahnsen’s statement that there can only two worldviews, “the believing one and the unbelieving one”, Choi notes:

…on the same basis the hypothetical Fristian could argue as follows: ‘There are only two worldviews, Fristian theism and the unbelieving one’—which is to say, any worldview that has as its presupposition the rejection of Fristian theism. All the alleged worldviews (and here we would have to include Christian theism) are really just variations on a common presuppositional theme that Fristian theism is false

In other words, we may not simply claim that all worldviews which share a certain proposition are false because some worldviews which share a certain proposition are such. It needs to be shown that the worldviews are false because of the shared proposition. Under Bahnsen’s proposal, an atheist could show one theistic worldview to be incoherent, and reason from this that all theistic worldviews, including Christianity, are incoherent since they all share the same presuppositional theme, that atheism is false. Clearly, an exhaustive examination of possible worldviews is still required if one wants to make the strong claim made in (2b).

The Transcendental Argument for the Non-Existence of God

I would like to call attention to a statement made by Bahnsen in the excerpt taken from his debate regarding the Christian’s justification for logical principles: “From a Christian standpoint, we have an answer – obviously they reflect the thinking of God. They are, if you will, a reflection of the way God thinks and expects us to think.” [14] This is supposed to be the factor that separates Christian worldviews from non-Christian worldviews, but the claim seems rather vague. What does it mean to say that the justification for logical principles is the fact that they reflect the thinking of God?

Michael Martin asks a similar question and formulates a Transcendental Argument for the Non-Existence of God (TANG) which he defended against criticisms from John Frame.[15]

Martin stated[16]:

How might TANG proceed? Consider logic. Logic presupposes that its principles are necessarily true. However, according to the brand of Christianity assumed by TAG, God created everything, including logic; or at least everything, including logic, is dependent on God. But if something is created by or is dependent on God, it is not necessary–it is contingent on God. And if principles of logic are contingent on God, they are not logically necessary. Moreover, if principles of logic are contingent on God, God could change them. Thus, God could make the law of noncontradiction false; in other words, God could arrange matters so that a proposition and its negation were true at the same time. But this is absurd. How could God arrange matters so that New Zealand is south of China and that New Zealand is not south of it? So, one must conclude that logic is not dependent on God, and, insofar as the Christian world view assumes that logic so dependent, it is false.

Frame’s response[17] stated that:

Logic is neither above God nor arbitrarily decreed by God. Its ultimate basis is in God’s eternal nature. God is a rational God and necessarily so. Therefore logic is necessary. Human logical systems don’t always reflect God’s logic perfectly. But insofar as they do, they are necessarily true.

Bahnsen and Frame’s defence of the TAG depend upon two claims:

(A) Logical principles (such as the Law of Noncontradiction) exist because God exists and the principles are reflections of his thinking[18]

(B)  Logical principles cannot be changed by God as their ultimate basis is in God’s nature, and God is necessarily a rational God.

A Logical Euthyphro Application

In analyzing both (A) and (B) it seems that the famous Euthyphro dilemma can be applied to the TAG, substituting notions of ‘goodness’ for ‘logical principles’. The dilemma could perhaps be expressed as the following: does God think in a certain way because it is logical to do so, or is thinking in a certain way logical because God does it? If the first horn of the dilemma holds it seems clear that logical principles exist independently of God. If the second horn of the dilemma holds logical principles seem to be under the whim of God, meaning that God could change them. A TAG defender might respond by saying that this dilemma is a false one, and advocate similar to Frame that logical principles have their basis in God’s nature and are thus neither external, nor arbitrary. Firstly, this seems to add some confusion: are logical principles based on God’s thinking, or on his nature? Frame’s above statement in response to Michael Martin seems to indicate that both are true: logical principles reflect the thinking of God and the thinking of God has its basis in God’s nature.[19]

Frame essentially makes the claim that it is logically impossible for the nature of God to change. But the standard Frame is using to identify logical possibility is allegedly the nature of God. As such, his claim appears to be represented more accurately as:

(C)  Based on God’s nature it is logically impossible for God’s nature to be different because God is necessarily a rational God

This does not seem to assist in any regard as what is rational is allegedly determined by God’s nature. So to argue that God’s nature must be the way it is because God is necessarily rational seems to only appeal to a standard of rationality that is separate from God, otherwise it is clearly circular.

In what manner would it be the case that God’s nature was not rational? It does not seem that a God who forms the basis of logical principles and thereby is the standard of rationality can ever be irrational (though he may certainly appear irrational when judged by a foreign standard). That is to say, if one wants to state that the Christian God forms the basis of rationality and the logical principles thereby in effect cannot be anything other than what they are, they must be appealing to a standard of logic that is separate from God’s nature as to appeal solely to God’s nature does not sufficiently answer the question; it is a non-answer.

God and the Abstract

In his TANG, Martin stated that if logical principles depend on God in any way, they lose their logical necessity and become contingent. Frame countered by making the claim that though dependent on God, the principles of logic have their basis in the nature of God and because the nature of God is necessary, so too are the logical principles.

An obvious defeater to Frame’s claim, and subsequently the TAG, would be to show that not only are logical principles not dependent on God, but they cannot be so dependent.

The dependence relationship between “God exists” and “logical principles exist” seems problematic. If God is the source of all things other than himself, and he depends on nothing for his existence, surely the relationship must be asymmetrical (with primacy granted to God), but it appears not to be.  It can be shown, in fact, that God depends on logical principles for his existence.

Consider:

(4)   Necessarily, x depends on y for its existence iff y were not to exist, neither would x[20]

Lewis’ counterfactual semantics tell us that ‘any proposition is counterfactually implied by a necessarily false proposition’. Since “logical principles do not exist” is a necessarily false proposition, it counterfactually implies any proposition whatsoever.[21] So it is also true that if logical principles did not exist, neither would God. Thus, God depends on logical principles for his existence.

The relationship between the existence of logical principles and the existence of God would be asymmetrical iff God depended on nothing for his being and logical principles depended wholly on him. In this regard, the relationship of dependence is one-way; logical principles depend on God but not vice versa. If dependence is asymmetrical, then logic cannot depend on God as it has been shown that God depends on logic.

The asymmetrical relationship can be depicted further: where P refers to logical principles and Q refers to God. If P depends on Q asymmetrically, then the worlds in which P is true must be a proper subset of the worlds in which Q is true. Since it is the case that the principles of logic hold in every world, and the set of all worlds is not a proper subset of any other set of worlds, the laws of logic cannot depend on anything, including God.

In order to overcome this problem, one could deny the necessary existence of logical principles. This seems antithetical to the presuppositionalist position which seeks to show that the only way to make sense out of logical necessity is through the existence of the Christian God. Indeed, the opposite becomes true; the only way that logical principles can be necessary is if “logical principles depend on God” is false. One could further deny the claim that “God depends on nothing else for his existence”, but this seems incompatible with Christian theism and perhaps even with a more general notion of God.

Another possible solution is twofold. One must first accept that abstract objects are the thoughts of God. This is not problematic for the TAG proponent as they have already explicitly stated that this is the case. One must then further embrace the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity (DDS) and accept that God is identical with each of his attributes and thoughts. Under this view, the statements “God exists” and “Logical principles exist” express the same proposition. This eliminates the problem because any proposition is counterfactually dependent on itself. But it is not clear that DDS is a coherent option[22]. Indeed it is not clear that the principles of logic can be thought to be attributes of God, in any capacity. This problem seems even more severe for the Christian. If the proponent of the TAG attempts to establish the conclusion that the Christian God exists, but has to accept the DDS to do so (as per the above objection) it is unclear as to how they would reconcile the fact that God is identical with his attributes and the belief that he is internally distinct as a Trinity. Indeed, if DDS is coherent, how can there be any distinction whatsoever between God the Father, God the Son and the Holy Spirit? The DDS seems wholly incoherent with Christian theism.

As such, in order to avoid the consequence of conceding that God is not entirely sovereign, one must either (i) deny that logical principles are necessary (ii) deny Christian theism. Both are unacceptable consequences for the proponent of the TAG.

The Mind of God

There is yet another respect in which the TAG is vague. It states that the Christian worldview can account for the laws of logic because they have their basis as reflections of God’s thought. Presumably, this means that the reason why the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC) is the way it is depends on the fact that God cannot avoid thinking in accordance with it due to his nature as logical. Even temporarily disregarding the previous objections, this claim seems dubious. This justification or grounding of the principles of logic does not seem to necessitate any transcendental reference. Consider Bob the Conventionalist[23]; he is a normal human being. Even as a conventionalist, Bob cannot help but think in accordance with the LNC, for how could Bob visualize the effects of a proposition that is both true and false simultaneously? If, as per Bahnsen’s statement, logical principles are reflections of the way God thinks and further if it is true that the LNC exists and holds because God cannot think that p and not-p, surely Bob’s own inability to think that P and not-P fulfills the same justification requirement.

One foreseeable objection is that Bob’s self-grounding does not explain the seeming universality of the LNC. However, it is impossible to think of anyone in existence who could visualize the effects of a proposition which violated the LNC[24] and in this regard the LNC is universally self-grounded.

In the aforementioned debate, Bahnsen criticized conventionalism for being arbitrary and potentially giving way to people with contradictory logical systems. Though it is hard to imagine someone who has adopted a logical system in which there is no LNC or equivalent mechanism. Such a system would be as trivial as a magic eight-ball that answers “yes” to every question[25]. It is difficult to see why Bob or any of his friends would adopt a system with no mechanism to differentiate between any propositions. On pragmatic grounds, it is entirely useless.

One may make the case that Bahnsen has misunderstood conventionalism[26], and one might further make the more interesting point of asking how God accounts for the laws of logic. If it is even possible that God justifies his use of logic in either an a priori, or conventionalist manner[27] premise (2b) of the TAG can be further rejected.

What might it mean to say that God justifies logic in an a priori manner? Bahnsen’s criticisms of an a priori justification can be found in his debate with Stein:

But if you don’t take that approach and want to justify the laws of logic in some a priori fashion, that is apart from experience, something that [Stein] suggests when he says these things are self-verified. Then we can ask why the laws of logic are universal, unchanging, and invariant truths – why they, in fact, apply repeatedly in the realm of contingent experience.

He argues that an a priori justification of the laws of logic does nothing to explain their universality. But, the fact that the laws of logic would be known a priori to be logically necessary does seem to explain the universality in a ‘self-verifying’ manner; they are necessarily true. One might further press to ask why it is the case that they are necessarily true rather than not and one possibility is that they are justifiable in some Platonic manner, existing as brute, primitive facts. In essence, this is presumably how God would view his a priori justification. For God, these logical principles are “just there” even if necessarily “just there”.

It may also be possible that God justifies logical principles conventionally, assuming them for a purpose.  One possible objection is that if this is the case, God could have done otherwise (chosen a different convention). It seems that if there are multiple sufficient conventionalist justifications of logical principles, God certainly would possess the capability to select the best possible and employ it on pragmatic grounds.

If these justifications are even possible, then (2b) in its current form becomes demonstrably false. Of course, it may be reworded to state:

(2b*) It is necessary that: no human forms of either a priori, a posteriori or conventionalist justification will justify the laws of logic

It would be the duty of the TAG proponent to develop an explanation as to why it is either impossible that God justify logical principles in the aforementioned two manners or why a human version of the same justification must necessarily fail.

One might object to (2b*) stating that a divine form of a priori justification or conventionalism would not differ sufficiently from a human form but space does not permit a treatment of this claim here.

Conclusion

Given (i) the initial objections, (ii) the vague and troubled explanations of what it means for God’s nature to be logical, (iii) the lack of asymmetry in the relationship between logical principles and God’s existence, and (iv) the possibility that God accounts for logic with the same justifications criticized by the TAG, it is my proposal that, pending further defence, the Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God be considered unsound and unsuccessful in its goal of establishing the existence of the Christian God[28].

[2] Not all Christians may agree that they require certainty of their position.

[3] Baggini, Julian and Peter S. Fosl. 2003. ’2.10 Transcendental arguments’. In The Philosopher’s Toolkit: A compendium of philosophical concepts and methods. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing

[4] Many will be confused as to why the Islamic or Judaic God cannot satisfy the requirements put forth by the TAG. A good discussion of this is available in the section of James Anderson’s paper “If Knowledge Then God” entitled “Argument #1: The One-Many Argument” published in the Calvin Theological Journal, Vol.40, No. 1 (2005), 49-75

[5] This may entail some overlap as to the precondition of intelligibility.

[6] A transcript of the debate is available at: http://www.bellevuechristian.org/faculty/dribera/htdocs/PDFs/Apol_Bahnsen_Stein_Debate_Transcript.pdf (the spaces in the PDF title are underscores)

[7] Bahnsen erroneously assumes that if one is an atheist, they must be a materialist.

[8] Choi, Sean. “The Transcendental Argument.” Reasons for Faith: Making a Case for the Christian Faith. Illustrated. Geisler, Norman L., and Chad V. Meister.  Good News Publishers, 2007. 238-243. Print.

[9] Ibid. 241-244

[10] As is usually the case with religion, there may be disagreements within a tradition. Many who identify as Christians may disagree with what Bahnsen believes are tenets of Christianity. In this respect, one may not agree, for example, that a conventionalist justification of logic is a non-Christian justification. For the purpose of this paper, I will assume, with Bahnsen, that if Christianity is true then the laws of logic are justified in the manner he has stated.

[11] Bahnsen, Greg L. Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings and Analysis. P & R Publishing, 1998. 277. Print.

[12] I do not seek to offer a defense of the ‘Fristianity Objection’; I only seek to utilize it to demonstrate the shortcomings of Bahnsen’s criterion.

[13] See: http://butler-harris.org/tag/

[14] This quotation is taken from the aforementioned debate.

[15] Their online discussion can be accessed at http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/michael_martin/martin-frame/

[16] http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/michael_martin/martin-frame/tang.html

[17] http://www.reformed.org/master/index.html?mainframe=/apologetics/martin/frame_contra_martin.html

[18] It is difficult to understand precisely what is meant by “reflections of his thinking.” Presumably, the TAG defender is claiming that the reason the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC) holds is that God thinks in accordance with the law, or rather, the manner in which God thinks is such that the LNC can be derived from his thinking processes.

[19] One way to make sense of this claim is that God’s thinking is a property/attribute indistinguishable from God himself. I will explore this idea, and offer some objections shortly.

[20] Davidson, Matthew, “God and Other Necessary Beings”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)

[21] Ibid.

[22] See: Plantinga, Alvin. Does God Have a Nature? Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980.

[23] Conventionalism, as applied to logic, is the philosophical attitude that logical principles are grounded on agreements in society rather than any external reality. This agreement is not necessarily voluntary (and perhaps is necessarily not-voluntary); of course, logical conventions may have very well arisen via evolution, giving us a neurological predisposition to the conventions we do hold. Another possibility is that we acquire logic at around the same time we acquire language, and once it’s in our minds, it can’t be changed.

[24] Surely if I could, I’d be one example of such a person. I’d need to conceptualize a person conceptualizing the contradiction, thereby conceptualizing it myself.

[25] Such a demonstration is beyond the scope of this paper. For a proper treatment of conventionalism, see: Syverson, Paul F. Logic, Convention and Common Knowledge: A Conventionalist Account of Logic. Stanford, California: Center for the Study of Language and Information, 2002. Print.

[26] Martin lays this charge on Bahnsen in his article, “Does Logic Presuppose the Christian God?” (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/michael_martin/logic.html)

[27] I have excluded the possibility of an a posteriori justification as I’m unsure how this would apply to God

[28] Special thanks to Phil Scott, Research Postgraduate Student at the Centre for Intelligent Systems and their Applications at the University of Edinburgh, and Dr. Klaas J. Kraay, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Ryerson University for their invaluable assistance in this paper.

Argument #1: That logical principles are not contingent on God

(1)    If logical principles are dependent on God, they are not logically necessary

(2)    But logical principles are logically necessary

(3)    Therefore, logical principles are not dependent on God

Chris stated:

Unfortunately, Mitch constantly employs this strawman and thinks he has thereby refuted presuppositionalism. God is a necessary being. Logic does not depend upon the existence of God; it is not contingent. Logic is necessary. Presuppositionalism is thus immune to the first argument Mitch makes.

Chris wants us to accept that God exists necessarily.  He may hold that belief as properly basic, but if he should wish to convince anyone else of this claim he’d be best served to present some type of an argument. He can either defend an Ontological Argument, or a modal formulation of the TAG. Why is it the case that God exists necessarily? If this reason finds its basis at all in the existence of logical principles and their dependence on God, he will have begged the question in affirming such a conclusion. But Chris has said that logic does not depend on the existence of God. From this, it is difficult to understand what the relationship between the propositions “Logic exists” and “God exists”, if the relationship is not one of dependence, then what precisely is the TAG stating? Without a dependence relationship, why is it that only X can account for Y? Further, without such a relationship there is no problem in affirming the existence of logical principles and denying the existence of God.

Argument #2: That logical principles are not contingent on God (and that presuppositionalism presumes an Ontological Argument)

(4)    If logic depends on God, then if God possibly doesn’t exist, then some law of logic possibly fails

(5)    No law of logic can possibly fail

(6)    So God necessarily exists

(7)    But there is a possible world in which God does not exist

(8)    Therefore, logic is not dependent on God

I fear that Chris may have misunderstood the argument here. Firstly, let me first say that there is no problem with a later premise contradicting a previous one if the premise being contradicted was established via deduction within the argument (or is an assumptive premise). An example of this is the logical problem of evil, which begins with the premise that God exists and concludes with the premise that God does not.

The purpose of this argument is twofold, it brings out the question of the dependence relationship between logical principles and the existence of God, and it questions the assertion that God not only exists, but exists necessarily. Premise (7), if even possibly true shows an obvious absurdity in the previous deductions. Of course, what I’m trying to elucidate is that the sub-conclusion of a modal ontological argument is being smuggled into the game by the presuppositionalist. One cannot merely affirm that God exists necessarily, it must be shown with an ontological argument. It could possible be shown with a modal version of the TAG as well, but it of course, could not be assumed within that argument. If that were the case, the argument would be question-begging. Chris might just flat out disagree with me on this point, but at any rate, this argument might be properly entitled Argument #1.5 as it is supplemental to the previous.

Impossibility of the Contrary

This portion of my post is too long to paste here so I will simply paste the entirety of Bolt’s criticism:

Mitch immediately gives chase to a rabbit and asks his readers to consider four “worldviews”: Christianity, Christianity without the incarnation (C1), Christianity with four persons in God (C2), and Christianity with an extra disciple of Jesus (C3). Mitch writes that these, “are, in effect, non-Christian worldviews that match Christianity point for point in every regard, save for one difference”. Unfortunately for Mitch this assertion is false, as may be easily demonstrated. If there is no incarnation, then Jesus has not been raised from the dead. If there are four persons in God, then baptism is to be performed in the name of more than just Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. If there is an “extra” disciple of Jesus, then the risen Christ was seen by more than “the Twelve” as the term was understood. Thus C1, C2, and C3 are not non-Christian worldviews that match Christianity point for point in every regard save for one difference and the statement Mitch makes is false. It is therefore doubtful that the rest of whatever Mitch argues in this regard makes sense. Sunday School teachers refute these kind of “worldviews” all the time, especially in cases where the class is made up of children. Since C1, C2, and C3 accept the authority of Scripture but contradict what Scripture teaches they are to be rejected as incoherent. Now I suspect that Mitch might change his argument, but really none of this should be of any concern anyway as will be seen in a moment.

This largely misses the point and I’ve addressed this issue in the previous post.

I stated:

It’s the job of TAG to show that all worldviews (actual and possible) incompatible with Christian theism are incoherent. If TAG is successful there should be a guarantee that [C1-4] (and every other possible worldview) will be incoherent. The proponent of TAG must show that all possible ways of tinkering with the contents of Christian theism, to create [any other view] are bound to fail, and must fail, necessarily.

As such, the objector to TAG needs not provide a positive proof for the coherence of [C1-4] as all that is needed to defeat TAG is to argue that for all we have reason to believe, a fully developed Fristianity seems coherent. Of course, it may sound odd and bizarre but judgments about oddness and such are governed by one’s presuppositions and are not reliable indicators of incoherence.

Clearly it is the job of the TAG defender to show us why the worldview must fail necessarily.

Bolt further states:

To begin with, Mitch is not entirely clear concerning what he believes about logic. Mitch writes that it “is clear and evident that logical principles exist as logically necessary abstractions…” but elsewhere writes in a self-contradictory fashion that logic “isn’t a thing, it’s a referrer to things” and argues that logic cannot be referred to as it is not an abstract object or entity.

As has usually been the case, Bolt charges me with being contradictory. Unfortunately for him, there is no contradiction here. Saying that logic exists as a necessary abstraction is not the same as saying that it’s a thing; why does Bolt think this? Logic may not be an abstract object or entity, but they certainly seem to be abstractions. I was not making a claim about the ontological status of abstractions. Surely, just as justice is an example of an abstraction, one must not be immediately understood to be saying that “Tennis exists, out there!”

To clarify any future misunderstanding, my position on logic falls under the heading of conventionalism.

Bolt further criticizes the notion of “Fristianity” (see above linked post):

What is Mitch standing on when he raises the Fristianity objection? What would Mitch have us to believe concerning the laws of logic, and how are they at all consistent with his worldview? How can such immaterial entities exist in a materialist universe? Why does logic continue to apply in a contingent realm of experience? How is logic imposed upon the world? Why should anyone care about adhering to the laws of logic? How is the universal and absolute nature of such laws consistent with the existence of only particular and finite minds? Such questions are only the beginning of an internal critique.

Presumably, Bolt is asking about my position rather than the hypothetical Fristian position. All of the questions which he has asked have been answered in various places throughout conventionalist literature.

Conclusion

It should be noted that Bolt did not address the last argument in the post which he criticizes. I’m not entirely sure what Bolt’s post accomplishes, perhaps it’s merely to satisfy those who have requested that he reply to me. I am, however, puzzled when Bolt states:

Mitch may continue to parrot old arguments against TAG, but what has been offered in reply is a TA in defense of TAG. I, for one, do not think Mitch is quite able to answer it. This may be the reason for the prolonged discussions concerning apologetic method as well as the search for anything on the Internet which might be used against the presuppositionalist method.

Is Bolt honestly saying that my discussion regarding apologetic method comes out of some insecurity with regard to the TAG? I don’t see any reason to make this claim, but perhaps it’s merely a joke.

I have been relatively silent on the TAG as of late, not because I am ignoring it, but rather because I am preparing a paper for submission. The topic is indeed the TAG, and I will post the paper once it has gone through the review process. Until that time, I can only say that it would be interesting to hear Bolt offer his own analysis of the relationship between logical principles and God.